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This anthology deals with the legal and ethical challenges regarding personalized 
(precision) medicine and healthcare. It can also be regarded as the final report 
of a research project on the legal and ethical aspects of personalized medicine. It 
complements the reported results of the consortium ‘Personalised medicine to 
predict and prevent Type 1 Diabetes (P4 Diabetes)’ which were briefly presented 
in the booklet entitled ‘Better, Smarter, Now: Personalised Health – From Genes 
to Society (pHealth)’, Academy of Finland, Helsinki 2019. 
That consortium was funded by the Academy of Finland in 2015–2019; the 
research project on the legal and ethical issues of personalized medicine by its 
Research Council for Culture and Society (Decision No. 29259, Announcement 
on 4 June 2015). The consortium has had the following responsible researchers 
and sites of research: as chairholder Academy Professor Riitta Lahesmaa, M.D., 
Ph.D. (Turku Centre for Biotechnology); as members Professor Mikael Knip, M.D., 
Ph.D. (University of Helsinki, Faculty of Medicine), Professor Harri Lähdesmäki, 
Dr. Sc. (Tech.) (Aalto University and Turku Centre for Biotechnology), Professor 
Matej Orešič, Ph.D. (Turku Centre for Biotechnology and Steno Diabetes Center, 
Denmark), Professor Jorma Toppari, M.D., Ph.D. (University of Turku, Faculty 
of Medicine), and the undersigned Professor Raimo Lahti, LL.D., M.Soc.Sc. 
(University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law). 
The articles of this anthology are not limited to the aspects of predicting and 
preventing Type 1 Diabetes only, as the name of the consortium would suggest. 
The list of participating researchers indicates that many-sided medical expertise 
was represented in the consortium and, in addition, computational data analysis as 
well as legal and ethical issues were covered by the participating sites of research. 
A comprehensive examination of the issues of personalized medicine requires 
multidisciplinary approaches. In this anthology, the legally and ethically oriented 
mainstream of writings has been complemented with an article of a computer 
scientist in order to recognize the possibilities and challenges of machine learning 
when interpreting the patient’s need for help. 
The central team of authors regarding legal and ethical issues of personalized 
medicine has consisted of Sandra Liede, Juli Mansnérus, and Amanda Blick, 
who have enjoyed one or more shorter research periods funded by the Academy 
of Finland. In addition, the Academy-funding has supported Céline Dujardin’s, 
Merike Helander’s, and the signatory’s research travels. Other contributing 
authors are Walter Roslin, Liisa Vaaraniemi, and Lauri Lahti. 
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LL.D. Juli Mansnérus,Professor (Emeritus) Raimo Lahti  
and LL.M. Amanda Blick
The regulatory schemes of healthcare and biomedicine are in a constant state of 
flux. In particular, the paradigm of personalized medicine is an emerging topic, 
triggering some specific legal and ethical challenges as regards to data collection, 
sharing and use, informed consent, privacy and public trust, and the changing 
status of patients and social equality. In Chapter 2, Professor (Emeritus) Raimo 
Lahti addresses these legislative developments and challenges on the basis of 
Finnish and common-European experience. The benefits and drawbacks of 
different regulatory schemes will be discussed. For instance, do we need different 
types of means ranging from ‘soft’ professional guidelines in order to maintain a 
high medical-ethical standard to legal rules with diverse enforcement models and 
sanctioning methods? Do we need a strategy that integrates private law damages 
schemes with administrative measures and – as a last resort (ultima ratio) – 
criminal sanctions?
In Chapter 3, LL.D. Candidate Sandra Liede discusses Finnish legislative 
processes aiming to draft ‘innovation-friendly’ legislation for scientific research 
purposes (the Biobank Act) as well as integrating genomic research results into 
the clinical setting (the draft Genome Act), which have been heavily challenged 
by rapid developments in technology and medicine, as well as by confrontations 
regarding finding the right balance between scientific and commercial interests, 
public health and individual rights. This Chapter also aims to provide insights on 
the legislative processes surrounding personalized medicine with a special focus 
on how the freedom of science, equitable access to healthcare, public health, 
and commercial issues have been balanced in practice with individual rights as 
expressed in the EU Charter and the Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention. 
Finally, suggestions are made for finding a way forward towards a more balanced 
communication of the rights and responsibilities of the State while aiming to 
provide equitable access to personalized health solutions.
While in Chapter 4, LL.D. Candidate Céline Dujardin presents some critical 
perspectives on Europe’s latest healthcare paradigm, which is grounded on the 
2
Introduction 
pooling of healthcare data, comprising of human genetic information as well 
as lifestyle patterns. First, the author sketches the contours of current scientific 
knowledge in the field of genetics and reviews precision medicine as a healthcare 
model. Thereafter she explores the whys and wherefores of the research benefit, 
token which is held as a core argument to support the collection of healthcare 
data, and finally, she tests whether this initiative bears the potential of a biopower.
In Chapter 5, LL.D. Candidate Merike Helander reviews the Finnish and 
international legislation of genome testing in terms of consent on behalf of a 
young child. Medical treatment, research based on the patient’s autonomy, and 
the requirement for informed consent as a prerequisite for treatment and research 
are discussed from the perspective of a child. 
In Chapter 6, LL.M. Amanda Blick discusses the legal and ethical aspects of 
CRISPR/Cas9 and prime editing, the disruptive gene-editing technologies that 
have been described to substantially expand the scope and capabilities of gene 
therapy. Special attention is paid to the ethical aspects of such applications that 
have opened new debates within the scientific community. In particular, the author 
focuses on the questions of how we should interpret the concept of human dignity 
in the bioethical discussion surrounding germline editing; and whether the child’s 
right to the highest attainable standard of health and the parents’ right to bring 
a child into the world who is not affected by the illness that they carry could, in 
some cases, balance out the child’s right to inherit a genetic pattern which has 
not been artificially changed.
In Chapter 7, LL.D. Juli Mansnérus provides an overview of ongoing 
initiatives to accelerate the market-entry of advanced therapy medicinal products 
(‘ATMPs’) that are a heterogeneous class of modern biotechnology medicines 
encompassing medicinal products based on genes, cells, and tissues. In particular, 
the joint action plan issued by the European Medicines Agency (the ‘EMA’) 
and the European Commission in late 2017 will be discussed. The plan aims 
at improving the regulatory environment for ATMPs to facilitate the research, 
development, and approval of these products in the European Union. Regulators 
are now taking measures to create a facilitative regulatory environment that 
encourages innovation, protects public health, and enables timely patient access 
to innovative, new therapies whilst ensuring patient safety. In Europe, the role 
of risk-proportionate adaptations to clinical trials and GMP manufacture along 
with the EMA’s early-access incentives and initiatives are presented as potential 
facilitators of market entry will be discussed. 
In Chapter 8, LL.M. Waltter Roslin explores risk-sharing agreements and the 
conditional reimbursement of pharmaceuticals in Finland. These are agreements 
between payers and providers to mitigate the risk of uncertainty sometimes found 
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in novel pharmaceutical products. Conditional reimbursement was introduced 
through a legislative experiment that first ran between 2017–2019 and now 
continued for another six years from 2020–2025. The author provides an overview 
of risk-sharing in general in relation to pharmaceuticals, the relevant Finnish 
legislation, and legislative experiments. Also future challenges are identified in 
relation to the transparency of the risk-sharing agreements and challenges with 
increasing the variety of the existing agreement types. Some European experiences 
and general trends are also discussed. 
In Chapter 9, LL.D. Juli Mansnérus and LL.M. Liisa Vaaraniemi investigate 
the patentability of CRISPR/Cas9 technology in Europe and the United States. 
Special attention is paid to the recent legal dispute over a patent concerning the 
use of the CRISPR/Cas9 system in eukaryotic cells. The parties involved in the 
dispute are two academic institutions, the University of California and the Broad 
Institute of MIT and Harvard, which have been investigating the system and its 
potential use as a genome-editing tool. Interestingly, the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office and the European Patent Office have granted the patent 
to both of the parties of the legal dispute. In particular, the two patent offices 
have adopted a very different approach to the concepts of innovative step and 
obviousness in inventions. This dispute influences the scientific community and 
those who wish to use this technology commercially. This Chapter will look into 
the implications of this legal dispute as well as some lessons learned.
The final Chapter 10 by Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Lauri Lahti goes beyond legal or ethical 
considerations of personalised medicine, discussing how machine learning can 
be used to enable identification of dependencies in the knowledge processes of 
healthcare and thus to support providing personalized care that addresses the 
patient’s needs. Machine learning experiments have been carried out to find out 
what kind of results can be gained when training a convolutional neural network 
model based on the ‘need for help’ ratings to classify persons into groups relying on 
the background information. Lahti reports preliminary results of his experiments 
showing that it is possible to categorize and distinguish respondent groups based 
on the patterns of their answer distributions.
4
2 
Regulatory Schemes in Innovative 
Healthcare and Biomedicine
by Professor (Emeritus) Raimo Lahti
Abstract
There are discernible divergent developments in the regulatory schemes of healthcare and 
biomedicine as well as in the role of various legal sanctions in the regulation of medical 
law and biolaw. 
In the Nordic welfare states, a new regulatory approach to medical malpractice 
and treatment injuries was introduced in the 1980s: the statutory, mandatory patient 
insurance (no-fault) scheme. The role of normal indemnity or criminal liability based on 
the individual’s fault was radically diminished as a result of this new regulatory scheme. 
Another tendency can be seen in the strengthening of the legal rights of patients as well 
as in the increase of the protection of human rights and dignity of the human being with 
regard to the application of biology and medicine. A typical and perhaps the most influential 
example of the last-mentioned development is the adoption of the special international 
legal instrument, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No. 164, The Oviedo 
Convention) in 1997 and its later additional protocols. 
The newest trend is to examine the legislative schemes addressing the mechanisms 
of personalized medicine and its challenges in such issues as (big) data collection and 
sharing, informed consent, privacy and public trust, and the changing status of patients 
and social equality. 
In my paper, these legislative developments will be analyzed on the basis of Finnish 
and common-European experience. The benefits and drawbacks of different regulatory 
schemes will be discussed. For instance, do we need differentiated means ranging from 
‘soft’ professional guidelines in order to maintain a high medical-ethical standard to legal 
rules with diverse enforcement models and sanctioning methods, and do we need a strategy 
that integrates private law damages schemes with administrative measures and – as a last 




In the Nordic welfare states, a new regulatory approach to medical malpractice 
and treatment injuries was introduced since the 1980s: statutory, mandatory, 
patient insurance (no-fault) scheme. The role of normal indemnity or criminal 
liability based on the individual’s fault was radically diminished as a result of this 
new regulatory scheme. 
Another tendency can be seen in the strengthening of the legal rights of patients 
as well as in the increase of the protection of human rights and dignity of the 
human being with regard to the application of biology and medicine. A typical 
and perhaps the most influential example of the last-mentioned development is 
the adoption of the special international legal instrument, Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine in 1997, and its later additional protocols1. 
The newest trend is to examine the phenomena and mechanisms of 
personalized (precision) medicine and health care2 and its regulatory challenges 
in such issues as data collection and sharing, informed consent, privacy and 
public trust, and the changing status of patients and social equality. In a 
recent research document, personalized health is defined in the following way: 
‘[p]ersonal health care approaches are tailored based on specific information on 
your genes, your body and your lifestyle, to be as effective as possible and to 
comprehend disease treatment, prevention, diagnostics, and rehabilitation’. The 
trend towards personalized health has been accelerated by recent developments 
in molecular sciences, major advances in information technology, and a favorable 
regulatory environment.3 The International Consortium for Personalized Medicine 
(ICPerMed) has outlined a vision of how personalized medicine will lead to the 
next generation of healthcare by 2030.4
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine, ETS No. 164). See Biomedicine and human rights. 
The Oviedo Convention and its additional protocols. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 
2009.
2 See, e.g., Barbara Prainsack, Personalized Medicine. Empowered Patients in the 21st Century? 
New York University Press, New York 2017.
3 Better, Smarter, Now: Personalised Health. Results of the Academy Programme Personalised 
Health. Results of the Academy Programme Personalised Health – From Genes to Society 
(pHealth). Academy of Finland, Helsinki 2019 [www.aka.fi/phealth], Preface. – The author 
of this paper has been the responsible researcher in the partial project (concerning legal and 
ethical issues) of the consortium within that Academy Programme Personalised Health, under 
the chair of Academy Professor Riitta Lahesmaa (University of Turku), on ‘Personalised medicine 
to predict and prevent type 1 diabetes’. 
4 The ICPerMed vision for 2030 (September 2019): How can personalised approaches pave the 
way to Next-Generation Medicine?
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In this paper, these legislative developments will be analyzed on the basis 
of Finnish, common-European, and partly global experience. The benefits and 
drawbacks of different regulatory schemes will be discussed. For instance, do we 
need differentiated means ranging from ‘soft’ professional guidelines in order to 
maintain a high medical-ethical standard to legal rules with diverse enforcement 
models and sanctioning methods, and do we need a strategy that integrates private 
law damages schemes with administrative measures and – as the last resort (ultima 
ratio) – criminal sanctions?
2.2 Medical Law and Biolaw and Their Relation to  
Bioethics – Parallel Regulatory Schemes
The boundaries of the two new sectors of law, medical law and biolaw, are 
fluid. Medical law conventionally comprises legal issues relating to healthcare 
personnel, medicine, and healthcare, especially insofar as these have to do with the 
relationship between patient and doctor (or other healthcare professional). When 
health law is addressed instead of or complementary to medical law, the former 
typically covers legal issues relating to the healthcare system as a part of public 
law. Health law is integrally linked with social welfare law, which conventionally 
comprises sets of legal norms concerning social security.
Biolaw is the most recent of the sectors of law enumerated here. Its emergence 
has to do with advances made in biology and medicine, in particular with regard 
to the applications of biomedicine and biotechnology, and with the enhanced 
understanding of bioethics. Bioethics had already earlier become the established 
umbrella term covering the ethical dimensions of medical treatment and 
care, healthcare, biological and medical research, and environmental issues. 
Developments in medical reproductive technologies and genetic engineering in 
particular have given rise to wholly new ethical and legal dilemmas. Bioethical 
questions do not merely restrict the applications of biology or medicine in relation 
to human beings but cover the biotechnology in general.5 Biolaw, as a new field 
of law and legal science, covers the same fields of biomedicine and biotechnology 
as bioethics but concentrates on judicial issues.
5 See, e.g., Cosimo Marco Mazzoni (ed.), A Legal Framework for Bioethics. Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague 1998. The term ‘bioethics’ originates from the work of Van Rensselaer 
Rotter (1971); see Helga Kuhse – Peter Singer (eds.), Bioethics. An Anthology. Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford 1999, Introduction. 
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The legal speciality of medical law and biolaw focuses on the legal issues of 
healthcare and those involving medical technology and other applications in 
an integrative way. Within such a new legal discipline, the general principles 
and concepts contained in the legal regulation of healthcare and medicine can 
be structured and systematised into more consistent and coherent general 
doctrines of law than in case of the traditional division of subjects. This goal 
of creating coherence into legal science is challenging at the present time when 
the fragmentation and pluralism of legal orders and the ‘polycentricity’ of legal 
sources are characteristic features of modern legal development.6 
2.3 The Increase of Legal Regulatory Schemes in  
Healthcare and Biomedicine
The need for a cohesive body of research in medical law and biolaw has been 
boosted by the rapid development of legislation in this field over the past few 
decades. And given that (bio)medicine has traditionally been considered to be an 
area of social life that should be subject to as little legal regulation as possible, this 
change in perspective is a marked one. Mutual trust is required in the relationship 
between patient and doctor, and the principles guiding such relationships are 
traditionally deemed to be drawn from medicine and medical ethics rather than 
from law. Professional codes of conduct have played an important role here. Such 
codes are usually international in nature, being approved either by international 
official organisations or professional societies. 
The principle of a patient’s right to self-determination only gained a foothold 
in medical ethics after World War II, in connection with the Nuremberg trials. 
The decision by the military tribunal led to the creation of the Nuremberg Code 
(1947) on the performance of medical trials on human subjects.
M. Cherif Bassiouni has differentiated between five stages through which 
human rights evolve in accordance with the degree to which the right has attained 
international acceptance: he lists the enunciative, declarative, prescriptive, 
6 See, generally, Erick Valdés – Juan Alberto Lecaros (eds.), Biolaw and Policy in the Twenty-First 
Century. Building Answers for New Questions. (Springer Nature International, 2019). See also 
Sirpa Soini, Geenitestaus ja lakien henki. Tutkimus geenitestien sääntelystä [Genetic testing 
and the spirit of laws. A study on the regulation of genetic testing]. Doctoral thesis. Unigrafia, 
Helsinki 2020. Soini prefers the term ‘biomedical law’ instead of ‘biolaw’. 
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enforcement, and criminalization stages.7 Accordingly, criminalization is the 
ultimate framework in the regulation of modern biomedical techniques (see 
later). Linda Nielsen reminds us that regulation in the area of biotechnology 
is a particularly scrupulous endeavor for several reasons, and legislation and 
regulation in the area is a means, not a goal. It is important to protect human 
dignity, integrity, privacy, and non-discrimination, but the forms of protection 
may vary considerably, and she analyses in detail different models of protection 
and regulation.8 Inger-Johanne Sand has based her theoretical scenario on the 
philosophical works of Michel Foucault and has sketched a comprehensive 
conceptual framework for governing, law, and politics in the EU law as to modern 
biotechnologies.9 
In a Nordic welfare state such as Finland, public healthcare services account for 
a considerable part of the total healthcare sector. This gives additional importance 
to questions concerning the position and duties of the public authorities (the 
State and local government).10 For example, what is the legal position of the 
individual, and what are the legal remedies available to him against a healthcare 
sector authority or official exercising public power or deciding on health services? 
Or what means are employed to steer and supervise healthcare staff and the 
healthcare system as a whole? 
In the early 1990s, municipalities and municipal federations were saddled 
with the responsibility of arranging public healthcare and were given increased 
independence in its implementation. The same time period saw a transition in 
healthcare administration from administrative supervision and guidance to the 
less regulated performance guidance and information steering. Administrative 
supervision and guidance have been reorganised in the reforms of recent years. 
The use of administrative coercive measures has been streamlined and extended 
to apply equally to healthcare units.
The expansion of legislation governing healthcare in Finland is explained 
in part by the increased regulation of the sector’s organisation, resources, and 
steering, which is typical of welfare states. In addition, particular emphasis was 
7 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Processes of 
International Protection of Human Rights, in Theo Vogler (Hrsg.) Festschrift für Hans-Heinrich 
Jescheck zum 70. Geburtstag, II. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1985, pp. 1453–1475, 1455. 
8 Linda Nielsen, From Bioethics to Biolaw, in A Legal Framework for Bioethics, supra note 5, pp. 
39–52. 
9 Inger-Johanne Sand, Governmentality, Biopolitics and the EU, in Kimmo Nuotio (ed.), Europe 
in Search of ‘Meaning and Purpose’. Forum Iuris, Helsinki 2004, pp. 149–170. 
10 As for the following explanation, see Raimo Lahti, Medical law and biolaw, in Kimmo Nuotio 




placed at the initial stages on rectifying defects of a fundamental nature having 
to do with the rights and freedoms of patients (examples include the elimination 
of forced castration and the revised regulation of the involuntary treatment of 
psychiatric patients). With the 1980s came preparations for measures to improve 
the legal position of ‘ordinary’, somatic patients as well. This work resulted in the 
enactment of the Patient Injuries Act (585/1986)11 and the Act on the Status and 
Rights of Patients (785/1992)12. Underlying these reforms was the rise of fair trial 
philosophy, in consequence of which the human and fundamental rights of the 
individual as well as the rights of consumers are strengthened in the legal system.
As Francesco Francioni points out, the development of modern technologies has 
influenced on the elaboration of many treaties and soft-law instruments in order 
to establish standards and supervision procedures in relation to biotechnology 
risks. According to him, the following human rights are most directly affected by 
biotechnologies: (1) human dignity, (2) non-discrimination, (3) self-determination, 
(4) rights pertaining to the human body, such as life, integrity, and health, (5) 
economic and social rights, including intellectual property rights and sustainable 
development.13 
In his introduction to the anthology on European Law and New Health 
Technologies, Roger Brownswood sees that collection of articles as a search for 
an establishment whether there is a distinctively European way of regulating 
new health technologies. According to him, the contributors of the book analyse 
the ways in which so much of European regulatory thinking (within both the EU 
and the Council of Europe) is oriented towards the regional market (for health 
technologies) qualified by considerations of risk (where both prospective costs and 
benefits attract attention), human rights, and ethics. Difficult balances must be 
made in relation to the leading considerations, in particular between regulatory 
restriction for the sake of safety and human rights and regulatory support for the 
sake of innovation and the market.14 
11 This Act will be from 1 January 2021 replaced by the Patient Insurance Act (948/2019). However, 
the basic structure and main contents of the Act of 1986 are retained. 
12 Hereinafter the ‘Patient Rights Act’. 
13 Fracncesco Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotehnology and Human Rights: the International 
Legal Framework, in Francesco Francioni (ed.), Biotehnologies and International Human Rights. 
Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007, pp. 3–32, 4, 18.
14 Roger Brownsword, Foreword, in Mark L. Flear – Anne-Maree Farrell – Tamara K. Hervey 
– Thérèse Murphy (eds.), European Law and New Health Technologies. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2013, vii-ix. See also, i.a., Sigmund Simonsen, European Integration – a Case 
Example from European Biomedical Research Law, in Elisabeth Rynning – Mette Hartlev (eds.), 
Nordic Health Law in a European Context – Welfare State Perspectives on Patients’ Rights and 
Biomedicine. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers / Brill, Leiden 2012, pp. 255–266.
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These references emphasize the significance of human rights as the main 
regulatory restriction. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 
1948), European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950), and the UN’s 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR, 1966) originate their legacy from 
the experience of the Second World War. Article 7 of CCPR prescribes that nobody 
shall be without his or her free consent to be subjected to medical or scientific 
experiments. 
The role of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has been important also in the field of bioethics.15 The adoption of the Council 
of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Biomedicine 
Convention, 1997) and the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU (2000) have strengthened the normative governance of biomedicine 
in Europe.16
The rise of human and fundamental rights thinking since the early 1990s has 
in Finland increased the necessity for legal regulation by statutory acts in many 
fields while at the same time clarifying the characteristics of such need and the 
manner of its implementation.17 Finland’s accession to the European Union (EU) 
in 1995, in turn, obliged it as a new member-state to implement Community 
legislation to a part of the national legal order and, after that, to recognise where the 
Community legislation affects the application of national law. The implementation 
of human rights binding on Finland, as well as of EU law (as it stands after the 
Lisbon Treaty) must be safeguarded through statutory legal remedies.
The prerequisites for restricting human and fundamental rights are precisely 
defined in the relevant legislation. Section 21 of the Finnish Constitution 
(731/1999)18 concerning protection under the law gives everyone the right to have 
his or her case dealt with by a legally competent court of law or other authority, 
as well as to have a decision pertaining to his or her rights or obligations reviewed 
by a court of law or other independent organ for the administration of justice. 
The guarantees of a fair trial and good governance shall be laid down by an Act. 
Section 80(1) of the Constitution further requires that the principles governing 
15 See, e.g., Research report. Bioethics and the case-law of the Court. ECtHR 2012 (available at 
www.echr.coe.int: Case-law – Case-Law Analysis – Research Reports). 
16 See, e.g., Richard Ashcroft, Novel Rights-Based Approaches to Health Technologies, in European 
Law and New Health Technologies, supra note 14, pp. 309–322. 
17 As for the following account, see in general Introduction to Finnish Law and Legal Culture, 
supra note. 10, passim.
18 An unofficial translation into English with the amendments up to 817/2018 included is available 




the rights and obligations of private individuals and the other matters that 
under this Constitution are of a legislative nature shall be governed by Acts, i.e. 
instruments passed by Parliament. EU law imposes requirements having to do 
with the efficiency, proportionality, and effectiveness of national legal remedies 
in its implementation.
Based on the above, it would not be overstating the case to say that human and 
fundamental rights have created a new value foundation for our legal system, and 
one which introduces a greater degree of coherence. The trend in law otherwise 
is one of differentiation and fragmentation, as indicated by the emergence of 
medical law and biolaw as a distinct sector of law. The strengthening of human 
and fundamental rights has a positive, cohering effect on this new sector of law too.
A need for new kinds of legal regulation has arisen from the rapid advances 
seen in recent years in methods of artificial human reproduction (assisted fertility 
treatments) and medical genetics. The development of biomedicine has made 
topical, for example, the protection of unborn life (the human embryo)19. Advances 
in biomedical methods, genetic engineering in particular, has focused awareness 
on a new value to be afforded legal protection, the inviolability of the human 
genome. Equally, the concept of human dignity – counted already earlier among 
human rights of a fundamental nature and principles of medical law alike – has 
assumed new dimensions and gained in scope20.
2.4 Finnish Examples of Legal Regulation of 
Healthcare: Patient Acts
The enactment of the Patient Rights Act of 1986 and the Patient Injuries Act of 
1992 had the aim of enhancing the legal protection of both patients and staff in 
19 See, e.g., Juli Mansnérus – Céline Dujardin – Raimo Lahti, Forms and levels of legal protection 
of the human embryo in biomedical research in Finland and France, in Emil W. Pływaczewski – 
Ewa M. Guzik-Makaruk (eds.) Current Problems of the Penal Law and Criminology. C.H. Beck, 
Warszawa 2019, 199–224; Laura Walin, Ambiguity of the embryo protection in the Human 
Rights and Biomedicine Convention: Experiences from the Nordic countries. European Journal 
of Health Law, Vol. 14, 2007, pp. 130–148.
20 See, e.g., the critical analysis of Laura Walin, Human Dignity as a Legal Argument in the Era 
of Modern Biomedicine, in Nordic Health Law in a European Context, supra note 14, pp. 243–
254.
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healthcare and medical treatment.21 In keeping with its title, the Patient Rights 
Act expressly lays down provisions on the legal rights of patients. This Act was 
intended to clarify, harmonise, and strengthen the principles to be observed in 
the care and treatment of patients. Structural changes in the healthcare system 
– the increasing degree of technicality and specialisation in healthcare, and the 
growing size of healthcare units – served to underscore the aim of legal protection 
underlying the Acts.
To the best of my knowledge, these Acts, which improved the legal position of 
patients, were the first of their kind in the world, although a similar development 
of legislation and professional standards occurred in several other countries as 
well, usually as a part of an overall strengthening of human and fundamental 
rights thinking. In Finnish legal culture, human and fundamental rights clearly 
gained in status in the 1990s, with the ratification of the ECHR in 1990 and the 
entry into force of the basic rights reform in the Finnish Constitution in 1995. 
As a result of this development, patient rights too have been given increasing 
weight. Under the Finnish Constitution (Section 19), the public authorities are 
obligated to guarantee everyone adequate social, health, and medical services and 
to promote the health of the population.
The Patient Rights Act and the Patient Injuries Act may today be considered to 
constitute the core statutes of medical law. Follow-up data on the application of 
both Acts has been systematically compiled in order to evaluate the achievement 
of the aims set for the Acts and to determine the needs for their reform.
These Acts are of particular significance when determining the basic legal 
concepts and general legal principles belonging to the general doctrines of medical 
law. The general doctrines of the sector of law itself, meanwhile, provide the key 
justification for its independent position.
The Patient Injuries Act introduced a mandatory liability insurance scheme 
to improve patients’ access to compensation. The scheme was thought in most 
cases to replace in practice the enforcement of ordinary tort liability and penal 
liability and by such means to avoid the conventional court proceedings by a 
simplified dispute settlement. The principles of general tort law are observed in the 
determination of the amount of compensation but the preconditions for the right to 
compensation differ from general tort law in that malpractice or negligence on the 
21 As for the following review, see in more detail Raimo Lahti, Towards a Comprehensive 
Legislation Governing the Rights of Patients: The Finnish Experience, in Lotta Westerhäll – 
Charles Phillips (eds.): Patient’s Rights – Informed Consent, Access and Equality. Nerenius 
& Santérus, Stockholm 1994, pp. 207–221; idem, The Finnish Patient Injury Compensation 
System, in Sheila A.M. McLean (ed.): Law Reform and Medical Injury Litigation. Dartmouth, 
Aldershot 1995, pp. 147–162.
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part of any individual need not be established. Patient injury within the meaning 
of the Act, i.e. a bodily injury to a patient in connection with healthcare or medical 
treatment, is defined in the initial sections of the Act, and it thus constitutes a 
special type of injury. For example, compensation shall be paid for bodily injuries 
if it is probable that these injuries result from examination or treatment taken 
or neglected, providing that an experienced healthcare professional would have 
examined or treated the patient in a different manner and would thereby probably 
have avoided the injury. 
The Patient Rights Act lays down coherent provisions to govern the status 
and rights of patients, whether in receipt of in public or private healthcare. In a 
way, the Act unifies features of law concerning persons, falling within the scope 
of private law, and social welfare law, falling within the scope of public law. This 
manner of regulation – taking into account the relevance of the Patient Injuries 
Act – has an impact on the understanding of the legal relationship between patient 
and healthcare professional, and on the formation of the principles which guide 
that relationship. The emphasis in the Act is on the determination at the level 
of law of the principles defining the status of the patient, and the Act lacks, for 
example, its own sanction provisions.
The Patient Injuries Act and Patient Rights Act are also significant with regard 
to the guidance, supervision and sanctions system in healthcare. The Patient 
Injuries Act underscores the meaning of damages as a restorative sanction, 
whereas the Patient Rights Act introduced certain new means for guidance and 
supervision: the position of Patient Ombudsman and the objections procedure. 
The supervision of healthcare professionals in Finland has traditionally taken 
place by administrative means, i.e. through administrative sanctions as well as 
disciplinary procedures and the control of the rights to practice medicine. Criminal 
penalties are of little significance in the field of healthcare.
The aim of strengthening certain legal principles comes across clearly in a 
reading of the Patient Rights Act. These principles are also constitutive as to the 
basic concepts of modern medical ethics and bioethics: respect for human dignity, 
integrity, right of self-determination, and the privacy of the patient. Furthermore, 
the values reflected in these principles occupy centre stage in our fundamental 
rights provisions of the Constitution laid down in 1995.
The Patient Rights Act upholds and specifies the substance of this right of 
self-determination and the related right of access to information, as well as the 
status of minor patients. At the same time, the principle concerning the binding 
nature of a patient’s advance directive, relevant to both terminal treatment and 
living wills, was also recorded in law.
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For a long time, the weight of these basic principles of medical law was not 
sufficiently acknowledged in legal thinking or practice. For example, in connection 
with the drafting of the provisions of the Criminal Code in its Chapter 21 concerning 
homicide and bodily assault (578/1995), there was reason to clarify to the Legal 
Affairs Committee of Parliament the following: when a patient’s right to self-
determination has been confirmed by a statutory act, the provisions of the Criminal 
Code cannot impose on physicians a duty to sustain the life of terminally ill patients 
through extraordinary measures contrary to the wishes duly expressed by the 
patient.
2.5 Biomedicine and Fundamental and Human Rights
The rise of human and fundamental rights thinking since the early 1990s has 
in Finland increased the necessity for legal regulation by statutory acts in many 
fields while at the same time clarifying the characteristics of such need and the 
manner of its implementation.22
In a recent collection of articles, the US editors view technological change 
through the lens of human rights and emphasize as the fundamental values of 
their human rights-based approach following ones: universality/inalienability, 
indivisibility, interdependence/interrelatedness, equality and non-discrimination, 
participation/inclusion, and accountability/rule of law. The writings of the book 
highlight three common themes associated with interactions between human 
rights and technology: the relationship between technology and power, the effect 
of technological innovation on accountability, and the shifting boundary between 
public and private.23 
It would not be overstating the case to say that human and fundamental rights 
have created a new value foundation for our legal system, and one which introduces 
a greater degree of coherence. The trend in law otherwise is one of differentiation 
and fragmentation, as indicated by the emergence of medical law and biolaw as 
a distinct sector of law. The strengthening of human and fundamental rights has 
a positive, coherence creating effect on this new sector of law, too. Human rights 
22 As for the Scandinavian discussion, see Henriette Sinding Aasen – Rune Halvorsen – António 
Barbosa da Silva (eds.), Human Rights, Dignity and Autonomy in Health Care and Social Services: 
Nordic Perspectives. Intersentia, Antwerp 2009, passim. An examination of medical law from 
a human rights perspective is Elizabeth Wicks, Human Rights in Healthcare. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2007.
23 Molly K. Land – Jay D. Aronson (eds.), New Technologies for Human Rights Law and Practice. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018, esp. ch. 1 (DOI: 10.1017/9781316838952).
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arguments may also be used as the basis for the critical assessment of certain 
activities in health care and biomedicine24. 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine was adopted in Oviedo on 
4 April 1997 and it took international effect in 1999. This Biomedicine Convention 
and its Additional Protocols on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings (ETS 
No. 168, 1998) and on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin 
(ETS No. 186, 2002) were ratified by Finland in 2009. The substantive provisions 
of these European legal instruments were implemented to Finnish legal order on 
1 March 2010, and after that the provisions have the status of statutory law equal 
to those of Parliamentary Acts. 
The Biomedicine Convention serves to supplement or specify the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the field of biomedicine. The case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in application of the Convention has occasionally 
made references to the standards of the Biomedicine Convention even when the 
allegedly infringing State has not even ratified it. One may conclude from this that 
the provisions of the Biomedicine Convention may in effect guide the evolutionary 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights25.
As its full name suggests, the Biomedicine Convention seeks to protect human 
rights and human dignity with regard to the application of biology and medicine. 
Its provisions define general principles (such as consent, private life and the right 
to information) as well as special standards as for human genome, biological 
and medical research on persons and human embryos, and organ and tissue 
transplants. The Biomedicine Convention and its Additional Protocols afford a 
minimum level of protection which does not prevent wider protection from being 
afforded in the application of biological and medical knowledge, respectively.
Of particular importance is Article 1 of the Biomedicine Convention, according 
to which the purpose of the Convention is to protect the dignity and identity 
of all human beings. The Biomedicine Convention and its Protocols are of 
significance, not only for the sake of formulating human rights principles and 
standards to be applied in the field of biomedicine, but also for providing guidance 
for priority-setting and balancing these divergent principles and standards. No 
conflict between the ratified Convention or its Protocols and the Constitution of 
Finland could be demonstrated, even though Article 1 of the Convention – when 
emphasising the protection of human beings – represents a certain change in the 
24 Cf. the theory of critical legal positivism, developed by Kaarlo Tuori, Ratio and voluntas: the 
tension between reason and will in law. Ashgate, Burlington VT 2010, passim.
25 See examples of cases where the Oviedo Convention has been cited in the ECtHR, Research 
report. Bioethics and the case-law of the Court, supra note 15, p. 52. 
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protected values, because it may be understood as a reason for increased legal 
protection of the human embryo. 
From Finland’s point of view, the Convention and its Protocols reinforce and 
specify already-existing and applied constitution and human rights provisions in 
the field of biomedicine. The ratified Convention and its Protocols have affected 
the relevant legal regulation in Finland even before ratification. Following 
the ratification, the public authorities shall, under Section 22 of the Finnish 
Constitution, guarantee the observance of basic rights and liberties and human 
rights. Consequently, norms equivalent by their nature to human rights are given 
a special position, as are basic rights and liberties. The said effect extends to both 
the legislator and to those who apply the law, including the professional in the 
field of healthcare and biomedical activities.
There is a keen interaction between ethical and legal regulation. Martin 
Scheinin has regarded the codes of professional and research ethic as relevant 
standards in the application of legal norms 26. In a recent anthology Cesare P. 
R. Romano et alia make a distinction between the international human rights 
law (basic notions of international law) and international bioethics law (which 
consist of such soft-law instruments as 1997 UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
Human Genome and Human Rights), They regard the last-mentioned documents 
as customary international law in the making, because soft law is a good tool to 
find out what the prevailing practice and opinio juris are. They also advocate 
that the instruments of international bioethics law should be integrated with the 
broader human rights law corpus.27 
A norm (either a rule or principle) is legally relevant, i.e. it has legal implications 
(such as legal sanctioning) when it has an institutional support, in other words 
a support in legal sources (legislation or legal practice). However, there are 
borderline areas which is reflected by the distinction between hard and soft 
law. An example of such an institutional support is Article 4 of the Biomedicine 
Convention, which prescribes that any intervention in the health field, including 
research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations 
and standards.
26 Martin Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet ja tutkimusetiikka [Human rights and research ethics], in Paavo 
Löppönen et al. (eds.), Tiede ja etiikka [Science and ethics]. WSOY, Porvoo 1991, pp. 85–103, 
91.
27 Cesare P. R. Romano, The Governance of Human (Germline) Genome Modification at the 
International and Transnational Level, in Andrea Boggio – Cesare P.R. Romano – Jessica 
Almqvist (eds.), Human Germline Genome Modification and the Right to Science. A Comparative 




It must also be noted that it is typical for the argumentation in medical law 
and biolaw that it reconciles and balances divergent legal-ethical values, interests 
and principles. In like manner, a key aspect of the legal argumentation here, 
instead of the ordinary interpretation of the law under legal rules, is the weighing 
against each other of mutually divergent legal principles of different strengths.28
A convergence of legal and ethical argumentation implicates problems for 
instance, how to interpret such vague concepts as human dignity and human 
being. There is no consensus in legal doctrines about the contents of these 
concepts, although they are key concepts in the implementation of the Biomedicine 
Convention. The same is true in relation to the legal position of human stem cells 
and human embryos. Neither exists any established legal practice how to balance 
(weight) conflicting or colliding principles (values) with each other – except the 
basic priority setting in the Biomedicine Convention, Article 2: The interests and 
welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.29 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation dominates in ECtHR consideration 
of modern health technologies, but ECHR requires respect for a minimum core 
of rights: autonomy-type rights (consent, privacy) and to some extent equality 
and the right to health.30
As for the activities of health care and biomedicine, which in essence are 
governed by morals and professional standards, there is reason to keep in mind 
the idea of so-called reflexive law as a third form of law (in addition to formal and 
substantive law). Accordingly, in a pluralistic society the legislator’s role should be 
restricted to imposing only boundary conditions and flexible procedures, offering 
a framework within which individuals and groups may then exercise their moral 
autonomy.31 Debate of this kind has focused on the principles for regulating medical 
research, to take just one example. Although the Finnish Medical Research Act 
(488/1999) imposes limits on the permissibility and conditions of such research, 
no attempt is even made to exhaustively regulate the grounds employed by the 
28 See also Soini, Geenitestaus ja lakien henki (supra note 6), p. 126, according to whom biomedical 
regulation represents theoretically a sort of legal pluralism and transnationalism; it includes 
such a sort of pluralism in which values and morals are reflected in judicial practices. 
29 Cf., e.g., Mansnérus et al., supra note 19 and Laura Walin, supra notes 19, 20. 
30 See Rory O’Connell – Sjef Gevers, Fixed Points in a Changing Age? The Council of Europe, 
Human Rights, and the Regulation of New Health Technologies, in European Law and New 
Health Technologies (supra note 14), pp. 46–69, 57, 67.
31 See my earlier analysis Raimo Lahti, Life’s Beginnings: Law and Moral Dilemmas. The Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. II, 1991, 438–468, p. 445, where I refer to David Jabbari, 
The role of Law in reproductive medicine: a new approach. Journal of medical ethics, Vol. 16, 
1990, pp. 35–40. The distinction between formal, substantive and reflexive law is based on 
Gunther Teubner, Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. Law and society review, 
Vol 17, 1983, pp. 239–286. 
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ethics committees provided for in law as they go about their task of evaluating 
the ethicality of research projects.
Finnish legislation has for the most part been amended to comply with the 
requirements under the Biomedicine Convention and its ratified Protocols. In 
certain respects, the regulations enforced become directly applicable in the absence 
of specific legislation. Examples of such regulations would be Articles 12 and 13 
of the Biomedicine Convention (predictive genetic tests and interventions on the 
human genome). However, it would be highly desirable for national legislation 
to implement such Articles by specifying legal provisions. 
With respect to the impact on the legislator and the ones applying the norms 
it has been valuable to investigate how an important possibility considered by the 
Finnish research community, somatic cell nuclear transfer technique utilized in 
therapeutic cloning is preserved subsequent to the ratification of the Biomedicine 
Convention without reservation as stipulated in the sub-paragraph 2 of the Article 
18. According to this perception, only reproductive cloning would be prohibited. 
In this very question clarification of the national legislation would be desirable on 
accordance with the Swedish example. To be noted that Sweden has in a similar 
situation deemed necessary to make a reservation in the said article upon the 
ratification of the Biomedicine Convention.
The interpretative effect of the Biomedicine Convention and its ratified 
Protocols shall also be taken into consideration. I mention as an example infant 
male circumcision, on which the Finnish Supreme Court issued a precedent in 
its decision KKO 2008:93. The Supreme Court held that the conduct of a mother 
who had a Muslim son of 4 years circumcised for religious reason was not to be 
deemed illegal and punishable as an offence of assault. In its argumentation, 
the Supreme Court made no reference to the Biomedicine Convention – which 
admittedly at the time had yet to be ratified. Subsequent to the ratification of 
the Convention, the effect of Article 6(1) must – to my mind – be considered; 
accordingly, an intervention in the health field may only be carried out on a 
person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.32 
In its precedents KKO 2016:24-25, the Supreme Court confirmed its earlier 
ruling with some specifications: the minor intervention in a male child’s physical 
integrity with his guardians’ consent, taking the form of a medically appropriate 
circumcision conducted on religious or cultural grounds should be regarded 
as a justifiable measure (and not punishable as an assault) with regard to the 
32 See my critical analysis about the case Raimo Lahti, Infant Male Circumcision – Finnish Supreme 
Court Ruling on a Multicultural Legal Protection, in Nordic Health Law in a European Context, 
supra note 14, pp. 216–227.
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child’s overall interests, irrespective the child’s own will. In the precedent KKO 
2016:24, the Supreme Court also dealt with the effect of Article 6(1) of the 
Biomedicine Convention. According to its reasoning, the child’s direct benefit 
could be interpreted as covering cultural or social benefit (especially for the child’s 
attachment to his religious and social community) and not only medical benefit 
to the child. This argument represents to my mind more a collective interest 
than an individual interest (as the individual right to corporal integrity), and this 
individual interest should prevail over the collective interests of the society or 
certain community (minority) groups, thereby better reflecting the basic values 
of the Finnish Constitution and Biomedicine Convention.
2.6 What Kind of Legal Regulatory Scheme for  
the Activities in Healthcare and Biomedicine?
As explained in section 2.4 above, Patient Acts represent in Finland a new 
regulatory approach to medical practice and treatment of injuries since 1980s. 
The statutory, mandatory patient insurance (no-fault) scheme reduced the role 
of penal and administrative sanctioning. 
An influential example of the international legal instruments for strengthening 
the protection of human rights with regard to the application of biology and 
medicine is Biomedicine Convention. Its Article 25 stipulates that Parties shall 
provide for appropriate sanctions to be applied in the event of an infringement 
of provisions contained in the Convention. Criminal sanctions are not preferred. 
I remind you about a resolution of a non-governmental organization on the 
subject. In an international colloquium in 1988 and a congress in 1989 of the 
International Association of Penal Law (AIDP), the topic ‘Criminal law and 
modern bio-medical techniques’ has been deliberated.33 The Vienna Congress 
(1989) concluded to a resolution on the subject34, and it emphasizes, i.a., 
‘1.5. In balancing these colliding interests, different points of view and 
results are to be expected due to the influence of different religious, ethical, 
and political convictions of different legal cultures and social structures. 
33 See especially the general report of Raimo Lahti, Criminal Law and Modern Bio-Medical 
Techniques. Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, Vol. 59, 1988, pp. 603–628. 
34 Resolutions of the Congresses of the International Association of Penal Law (1926–2014), Revue 
Internationale de Droit Pénal, Vol. 86, 2015, pp. 353–363. 
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In view of the frontier crossing character of these problems and increasing 
interdependence among the various countries, internationally uniform 
standards and rules should be achieved [and] if possible binding laws are 
to be introduced on an international level.’
Taking care of those various interests requires differentiated means ranging 
from professional guidelines in order to reach or maintain a high medical-ethical 
standard to legal rules with diverse enforcement models and sanctioning methods. 
A strategy that integrates private law damages schemes with administrative 
measures and criminal sanctions was in the resolution regarded as most adequate. 
Criminalization of medical activity as well as the threatening of penalties should 
remain as a means of last resort (ultima ratio). The first precondition has to be the 
worthiness of the endangering good and the blameworthiness of the endangering 
action (Strafwürdigkeit). Furthermore, on the basis of a cost-efficiency comparison 
of different means, the employment of criminal punishment should prove both 
as necessary (Strafbedürftigkeit) and suitable (Straftauglichkeit).35 
Twenty-two years later, Carlos Maria Romeo-Casabona deals with the same 
subject36 and concludes:
‘The difficulties presented by new crimes in the biotechnology sector, demand 
the legislator to proceed with the utmost scrupulousness. The effectiveness of a 
preventive answer regarding these crimes, their political-legal justification and the 
fact that they may or may not be disregarded due to their merely symbolic effect 
will ultimately depend on whether or not legislative technical premises have been 
properly managed for description and punishment of these kinds of offences.’
Criminal law provisions on modern biotechnology should be critically assessed 
on wider bases to address properly the new dangers and risks to more complex 
activities in a society. In this kind of risk society, there is a tendency to use criminal 
law for a solely symbolic-expressive purpose as a prima and not as an ultima ratio 
as well as a tendency to loosen the requirements of traditional criminalization 
principles, such as the clear identification of the protected legal interests and the 
strict definition of the constituent elements of the crime.37 
The questions revolving around the legal status of the embryo or materials of 
embryonic origin should not be disconnected from their cultural context. That 
35 Ibid. pp. 354–355.
36 Carlos Maria Romeo-Casabona, Criminal Policy and Legislative Techniques in Criminal Law 
on Biotechnology. Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, Vol. 82, 2011, pp. 83–108, 108. 
37 Cf., generally, Raimo Lahti, Towards a principled European criminal policy: some lessons from 
the Nordic countries, in Joanna Beata Banach-Gutierrez and Christopher Harding (eds.), EU 
Criminal Law and Policy. Values, Principles and Methods. Routledge: London 2017, pp. 56–69. 
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might explain the differences in punishment regarding acts somehow threatening 
genetic inheritance. The international community has already set boundaries for 
the protection of genetic inheritance. When looking at national legislation, we 
find that there are differences in wording for the same type of misconduct. For 
instance, this specific wording can be seen in the Finnish in Section 4 of Chapter 
22 (373/2009) of the Finnish Criminal Code entitled ‘Unlawful manipulation of 
genetic inheritance’:
‘A person who undertakes research involving the manipulation of the 
integrity of a human or a human embryo or a human foetus and that is 
intended to make possible
(1) the cloning of a human,
(2) the generation of a human by combining embryos or
(3) the generation of a human by combining human germ cells and animal 
genetic material,
shall be sentenced for unlawful manipulation of genetic inheritance to a 
fine or to imprisonment for at most two years.’
This penal scale for the manipulation of genetic inheritance is much lower than 
in France, where it has been regarded as comparative with a crime against 
humanity38. As to the level of punitiveness in the Finnish penal scales, it should 
be noticed the starting point of Finnish criminal policy: from all the different 
mechanisms through which the general preventive effect of the punishment should 
be reached, deterrence is not the most important; it is the socio-ethical disapproval 
which affects the sense of morality and justice – general prevention instead of 
general deterrence – without a need for a severe penal system.39 Even the Finnish 
provision has been criticized for the relatively heavy sanctions, although their 
travaux préparatoire do not go any deeper into the reasons why these specific 
acts – and nothing else – are against human dignity40. 
38 See Mansnérus et al., supra note 19, p. 211.
39 See, generally, Raimo Lahti, Towards a More Efficient, Fair and Humane Criminal Justice 
System. Cogent Social Sciences (2017), 3: 1303910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017
.1303910. Accessed 24 July 2020. 
40 See Walin, supra note 20, p. 253. 
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In a comprehensive comparative study on human germline modification, 
the editors plead in their recommendations for a human rights framework for 
such regulation of human germline genome modification that acknowledges the 
necessary restrictions on freedom of research and benefit-sharing but primarily 
emphasizes the rights to science and the right of science.41
2.7 Special Challenges of Personalized (Precision)  
Medicine to Its Regulation
Personalized medicine has a great potential for producing powerful new 
discoveries; it has been assessed that many key insights require the integration 
of an enormous scale of genetic and medical information. At the same time, 
there are regulatory concerns around issues such as data collection and sharing, 
informed consent, privacy and public trust, the changing status of patients, and 
social equality.
In a partial project of the Academy Programme Personalized Medicine 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the utilization and management of 
digital samples, patient data, clinical practices, and business activities advancing 
personalized medicine were studied. The main findings of that project show 
that the promotion of personalized health care takes predominantly place in 
the framework of innovation policy and is mainly concerned with economic 
expectations and commercialization.42 The researchers of that project identified 
two rhetoric framings within which the expectations, pursuits, plans, and 
activities for advancing personalized medicine are connected into a reasonable 
and justifiable endeavor: innovation policy and data-driven medicine.43 One 
researcher of that project has noticed how the argumentation for data-driven 
medicine relies on the moral principle of health (such as common good, public 
41 Boggio et al., Toward a Human Rights Framework for the Regulation of Human Germline 
Genome Modification, in Human Germline Genome Modification and the Right to Science, 
supra note 27, pp. 585–617, 614, 616.
42 Ilpo Helén – Hanna Lehtimäki – Karoliina Snell, Good(s) for health: Personalized health services 
and flexible appropriation of bioinformation, in Better, Smarter, Now: Personalised Health, 
supra note 3, pp. 14–15. 
43 Heta Tarkkala – Ilpo Helén – Karoliina Snell, From health to wealth: The future of personalized 




health or national competitiveness) and tends to undermine the arguments related 
to autonomy and privacy.44
The trend towards more personalized medicine will in many ways affect the 
patient-physician relationship: the physician has much more digital data which 
can be analyzed by using algorithms for clinical purposes; patients become more 
activated, and they are more often research contributors, but there is also the 
darker side of data-driven medicine (digital surveillance); borderline between 
research and care becomes flexible (for example, experimental treatments become 
prevalent); it furthers a shift from reactive and symptomatic medicine toward 
continuous and pre-symptomatic medicine.45 
In the literature, there is increasingly deliberation about the proper balance 
between patient privacy and autonomy rights and the public interest in research. 
For instance, in a recent anthology, the editors remind that the traditional ethical 
codes and regulations do not necessarily concern health Big Data activities. 
Therefore, legal and regulatory challenges relate, inter alia, to the requirement 
of informed consent, accountability schemes for (re)using health data, and 
intellectual property rights in the field.46 
In Finland, attention has recently been paid to developing innovation-friendly 
regulatory approaches and practices as part of the Government’s Analysis, 
Assessment and Research Activities in 2020.47 As one legislative example of this 
kind of regulation has been analyzed the Act on the Secondary Use of Health 
and Social Data (552/2019), which was enacted in order to facilitate research 
with health data in various registers and their reuse in business. This Act should 
be seen in connection with the strategical totality of legislation, i.e. the earlier 
Biobank Act (688/2012)48 and its pending reform after the implementation of 
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 679/2016 (which came into 
effect on 25 May 2018) and the national Data Protection Act (1050/2018), as well 
as the proposed implementation of the EU’s Clinical Trial Regulation 536/2014 
44 Karoliina Snell, Health as the Moral Principle of Post-Genomic Society: Data-Driven Arguments 
Against Privacy and Autonomy. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Vol. 28, 2019, pp. 
201–214. (DOI:10.1017/S0963180119000057).
45 See, generally, Prainsack, Personalized Medicine, supra note 2, passim.
46 Glenn Cohen – Holly Fernandez Lynch – Effy Vayena – Urs Gasser (eds.), Big Data, Health 
Law, and Bioethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018, Introduction, pp. 1–13, 5. 
See also, generally, Jochen Vollmann – Verena Sandow – Sebastian Wäscher – Jan Schildmann 
(eds.), The Ethics of Personalized Medicine. Critical Perspectives. Routledge, London 2020 
(orig. 2015). 
47 Vesa Salminen – Kimmo Halme (eds.), Innovation-friendly regulation: Current state and good 
practices. Publications of the Prime Minister’s Office, Helsinki 2020:27.
48 An unofficial translation into English is available from the website of the Ministry of Justice: 
https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2012/en20120688_20120688.pdf.
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(Government Bill 18/2020) and the draft Act on National Genome Centre and 
on the Use of Genetic Data (2019). 
In the totality of that new legislation, a balance between patients’ individual 
rights (autonomy, privacy and data protection) and the public interest (including 
innovation policy and national competitiveness) in research should be sought. 
Certain provisions and procedures according to the Finnish Constitution provide 
safeguards for taking individual rights seriously, in particular Section 80(1) 
requiring legal acts of the Parliament for the regulation of the rights and obligations 
of private individuals and the Parliamentary review of Government Bills by the 
Constitutional Law Committee49.
In a study commissioned by the European Parliament (2019) it is anticipated 
that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will enhance scientific 
research, inter alia, in respect of data security, regulatory clarity regarding 
processor responsibilities and the transfer of data, research collaborations within 
the EU, and the autonomy and trust of data subjects. The study also proposed 
normative options to help resolve potential ambiguities and promptly address 
procedural concerns.50 
Finland already has the experience from the application of the Biobank Act 
of 2012. While protecting individual data, the Act facilitates responsible and 
approved medical research in academia and industry. Firstly, a ‘broad consent’ 
for medical research was adopted. Secondly, previously collected samples can 
be transferred to the national biobank framework and used in future studies. 
Thirdly, individuals may remove their consent at any time and request any data 
generated on their samples or data.51 A ‘dynamic concept’ is also preferred in the 
study for the European Parliament.52
49 See Juha Lavapuro, Constitutional review in Finland, in Introduction to Finnish Law and Legal 
Culture, supra note 10, pp. 127–140. For instance, as for the Government Bill of the Act on 
the Secondary Use of Health and Social Data, Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament 
required in its Statement 1/2018 that Committee’s constitutional comments on the GDPR, 
autonomy and privacy shall be taken into account in the final drafting of the law text. 
50 How the General Data Protection Regulation changes the rules for scientific research. Study. 
Panel for the Future Science and Technology. European Parliamentary Research Service, July 
2019, esp. Executive summary. 
51 These merits are listed by Mark Daly, Director of the Institute for Molecular Medicine Finland 
(FIMM), in Open Access Government, Research & Innovation, 9 July 2019. 
52 How the General Data Protection regulation changes the rules for scientific research, supra 
note 50, p. 62. Similarly, see Timothy Caulfield – Blake Murdoch, Biobanking and the consent 
problem, in Timo Minssen, Janne Rothmar Herrmann – Jens Schovsbo (eds.), Global Genes, 
Local Concerns. Legal, Ethical, and Scientific Challenges in International Biobanking. Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 2019, pp. 173–184. 
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A new example of regulation in Finland is the draft Act on National Genome 
Centre and on the Use of Genetic Data (2019). This new Act would deal with 
recording genetic data for a national registry and the safe storing and handling 
of that data. The preconditions for its use would be drafted so that the rights of 
the individuals (privacy and equality, non-discrimination) could be secured. In 
all, the new Act would aim at the building of genetic databases and data storage 
as well as at regulating the availability of genetic data and the governance issues. 
The data protection and accountability for data interpretation, validation, errors, 
and possible consequences would be important principles in the regulation. As 
already mentioned above (ch. 5), national legislation is needed for implementing 
and specifying Articles 12 and 13 of the Biomedicine Convention. 
A recent doctoral thesis by the Norwegian scholar Anne Kjersti Befring, entitled 
‘Personalized medicine – Legal perspectives’ (2019), proves the importance of 
basic research on the subject. She also makes concrete proposals for amendments 
of health legislation, for instance, for the treatment of genetic data, for the control 
of genetic variations, and for the use of artificial intelligence and algorithms in 
big data analytics.53 
In her recent doctoral thesis, entitled ‘Genetic testing and the spirit of 
laws’ (2020), the Finnish scholar Sirpa Soini regards the regulatory scene in 
the biomedical field as a complex one with transnational laws, ethical codes, 
guidelines, and other policy papers. Because the biomedical field is dynamic and 
evolving in science, ‘regulatory approaches need careful assessment in terms of 
need and accuracy, so that basic research and adoption of new applications are 
not unnecessarily hindered’.54 
53 Anne Kjersti Befring, Persontilpasset medicin. Rettslige perspektiver. Gyldendal, Oslo 2019, 
esp. ch. 14. 
54 Soini, Geenitestit ja lakien henki, supra note 6, esp. p. viii (English abstract). 
26
Regulatory Schemes in Innovative Healthcare and Biomedicine 
2.8 Conclusions
I have analyzed legislative developments on the basis of Finnish, common-
European, and partly global experience. The benefits and drawbacks of different 
regulatory schemes were discussed. When summarizing the results, the following 
trend is discernible: the differentiation and fragmentation of legal order, as 
indicated by the emergence of medical law and biolaw as a distinct sector of law. 
At the same time, the strengthening of human and fundamental rights has a 
positive, coherence-creating effect on this new sector of law, too. Human rights 
arguments may also be used as the basis for the critical assessment of certain 
activities in health care and biomedicine. 
It is typical for the argumentation in medical law and biolaw that it reconciles 
and balances divergent legal-ethical values, interests, and principles. In like 
manner, a key aspect of the legal argumentation here, instead of the ordinary 
interpretation of the law under legal rules, is the weighing against each other 
of mutually divergent legal principles of different strengths. Taking care of 
those various interests requires differentiated means ranging from professional 
guidelines in order to reach or maintain a high medical-ethical standard to legal 
rules with diverse enforcement models and sanctioning methods. A strategy which 
integrates private law damages schemes with administrative measures and criminal 
sanctions was in the resolution regarded as most adequate. Criminalization of 
medical activity as well as the threat of penalties should remain as a means of 
last resort (ultima ratio).
When developing innovation-friendly regulatory approaches and practices in 
relation to personalized medicine, which is the newest trend in health care and 
biomedicine, a proper balance between patients’ individual rights (autonomy, 
privacy and data protection) and the public interest (including innovation 
policy and national competitiveness) in research should be sought. The recent 
incentive to research activity, ICPerMed vision for 2030 in line with the 3rd 
Sustainable Development Goal of the United Nations 2030 Agenda, sets out a 
vision for personalized medicine in the following sub-areas: data and technology, 
intersectoral synergies, healthcare system reforms, and education and literacy.55
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for Personalized Medicine:  
Case Finland
by LL.D. Candidate Sandra Liede
Abstract
Government legislative actions have been considered necessary in Finland in order to 
establish principles and rules for responsible, equal and secure processing of human 
biological materials as well as genomic and health data, which are all sources for delivering 
personalized medical solutions. When it’s done right, legislation can secure socially just 
and sustainable procedures as well as provide an enabling and secure legal environment 
for research, innovations and economic growth in the health sector. 
However, even well-designed e.g. flexible, enabling legislation can contain pitfalls and 
result in adverse unintended effects, if the purpose as to the justifications and reasoning 
for such legislation is not communicated accordingly. This is especially relevant when 
legislation is designed to be applied in rapidly developing fields such as personalized 
medicine, which blurs the lines between research and the clinic, and challenges fundamental 
bioethical principles. In Finland, the legislative processes aiming to draft ‘innovation-
friendly’ legislation for scientific research purposes (the Biobank Act) as well as integrating 
genomic research results into the clinical setting (the draft Genome Act) have been heavily 
challenged by rapid developments in technology and medicine, as well as by confrontations 
regarding finding the right balance between scientific and commercial interests, public 
health and individual rights.
This article aims to provide insights on the legislative processes surrounding personalized 
medicine. Special focus is on how the freedom of science, equitable access to healthcare, 
public health and commercial issues have been balanced in practice with individual rights 
as expressed in the EU Charter and the Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention, the ethical 
backboard of all biomedical issues. Distinctively, how the principle of primacy of the human 
being in Article 2 in the Oviedo Convention is reflected in the Finnish legislation. Further 
analysis is performed by providing examples of how challenges have been managed and how 
the related legal solutions reflect necessity and proportionality in terms of the legitimate 
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aims pursued by the legislation. Finally, suggestions are made for finding a way forward 
towards a more balanced communication of the rights and responsibilities of the state 
while aiming to provide equitable access to personalized health solution for all people of 
the nation.
3.1 The Promise and Challenges of  
Personalized Medicine
Personalized medicine is based roughly on the analysis and application of genomic 
and associated health data for the purposes of prediction, prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment and monitoring of human diseases. Many associate personalized 
medicine with the abbreviation P4, which stands for predictive, preventive, 
personalized and participatory medicine.1 Personalized medicine is also known 
as genomic medicine or precision medicine.
The systematic storage of genomic data has substantially increased during the 
past decade, and currently small and large-scale genomic databases exist all over 
the globe. Many countries have established national strategies for personalized 
medicine (most recently the UK in 20202), but beyond the strategies only few are 
in the process of implementing those visions and integrating genomic data into 
the healthcare system at a national level.3 Finland is one of the few, with a very 
ambitious executive objective of providing personalized medical opportunities 
for the whole population of the nation.4 Genomic data is envisioned to serve as 
1 Leroy Hood. Systems Biology and P4 Medicine: Past, Present, and Future. Rambam Maimonides 
Med J. 2013 Apr; 4(2), p. e0012. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3678833/ 
The Finnish Institute for Welfare and Health has taken P4 medicine a few steps forward by 
adding population health (P5) and translating genomics to healthcare (P6) as priority settings 




2 Genome UK: The future of healthcare. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/920378/Genome_UK_-_the_future_of_
healthcare.pdf.
3 Dornitza Stark – Lena Dolman – Teri A. Manolio – Brad Ozenberger – Sue L. Hill –Mark J. 
Caulfied, Yves Levy – David Glazer – Julia Wilson – Mark Lawler –Tiffany Boughtwood – Jeffrey 
Braithwaite – Peter Goodhand – Ewan Birney – Kathryn N. North. Integrating Genomics into 
Healthcare: A Global Responsibility. Am J Hum Genet. 2019 Jan 3, 104(1), pp. 13–20. doi: 
10.1016/j.ajhg.2018.11.014. PMID: 30609404; PMCID: PMC6323624.
4 Improving health through the use of genomic data. Finland’s Genome Strategy Working Group 
Proposal Reports and memorandums of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2015:34.
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a valuable, but optional, data type to be combined with other health data sets 
for accomplishing this objective, in cases where it is clinically and scientifically 
justified. The government’s strategic vision is in the process of being implemented 
by drafting legislation for the responsible, equal and secure use of genomic data 
(draft Genome Act).5 The new legislation aims to establish a new public authority, 
the Genome Center6, which would take leadership of guiding the implementation 
of legislation by giving guidelines targeted for public and private healthcare 
providers, the biobanking field and commercial players collectively. In addition, 
establishing a national centralized genomic database and developing necessary 
IT structure and decision-making tools for clinicians are part of the national 
initiative and aim to support integrating evidence-based genomic data and 
applications into the healthcare system. Establishing a Genome Center as a public 
authority is based on the proposition that the Center would be exercising public 
authority as the controller of the centralized national genomic database. 
Implementation of the Finnish strategy has been delayed as it has encountered 
numerous obstacles and challenges during the past five years. These challenges 
vary from regulatory (leadership)7, practical (funding) and scientific8 to ethical and 
legal issues. In principle, many support the government’s efforts to align collective 
principles for the secure processing of genomic data. Even legal provisions have 
been considered acceptable to the extent that they’re intended for securing the 
rights of present and future generations. For example, many agree that people’s 
right to an open future, and the right to know or not to know about their genetic 
character, should not be sacrificed. This in turn has led to challenging fundamental 
concepts such as self-determination and questioning the validity of present consent 
mechanisms and the justifications of ordering genetic test kits online if the rights 
of other people cannot concurrently be respected. Added training for genetic 
counselling has also been warranted. Guidance and leadership in these areas is 
much needed, yet there is wide disagreement of who should have the mandate 
to guide the entire field in these issues. Some consider this to be a prerogative of 
specialized medical professionals. The government proposed to place leadership 
5 STM071:00/2018. Draft government bill on the Genome Center and the conditions for processing 
genomic data.
6 Genomikeskus. Available at: http://www.genomikeskus.fi/en/frontpage.html. Accessed 
19.11.2020.
7 Mikko Wennberg, ‘Lainvalmistelu kaipaa pikaista uudistamista’. Available at: https://
puheenvuoro.uusisuomi.fi/wennberg/lainvalmistelu-kaipaa-pikaista-uudistamista/. Accessed 
19.11.2020.
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at the Genome Center, as no currently existing profession or entity has the legal 
powers to give guidance on all of the topics associated with personalized medicine. 
Many have opposed any additional legislation for genomics, as the European 
Union’s (EU) general data protection regulation (GDPR)9 is considered to provide 
adequate risk-based protection for data subjects in addition to providing an 
innovation-friendly regulatory environment for data processing. Correspondingly, 
the EU In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation (IVDR)10 provides strict legal requirements 
and liabilities in the context of genetic testing for a medical purpose, as the 
manufacturer must thoroughly substantiate that the test is safe, performs 
as intended, and delivers a clinical benefit. Adding technical safeguards and 
guidelines for genetic counselling could provide sufficient support for securing 
the rights and freedoms of all the people concerned. As a response, the government 
offered to establish a centralized national secure processing environment (which 
will concurrently be established following the 2019 enactment of the Act 552/201911 
for Secondary Use of Heath and Social data). However, in the case of genomic 
data and as apart from other health data, the government proposed that security 
measures should be elevated (due to the nature of genomic data and the interests 
of others in need of securing) and that biobanks and the healthcare sector should 
be obligated to store all deriving genomic data in a centralized national database 
to minimize the risks of keeping multiple copies in allocated databases. 
Highlighting the distinctive nature of genomic data wasn’t received well during 
the public consultations and was considered a threat to scientific research. As for 
centralized storage (which was backed by cybersecurity experts) and the aim to 
prevent storing multiple copies of genomic data in various databases, commercial 
interests formed a barrier for implementation. Presence of the government was 
viewed as interference in the market economy. However, the scientific community 
was more open to the idea provided that the government would financially support 
the storage of all of the data and access could be guaranteed. Some health care 
providers in turn viewed that the government was interfering with the medical 
profession and endangered patient safety by proposing to add technical layers 
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
10 Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in 
vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 
2010/227/EU.






in between clinicians and patients. As to the overall value and the purposeful 
use of genomic data in the clinic, scientific debate has torn the medical field 
into two different camps causing determined polarization of communication. All 
mentioned views have been expressed in the documents12 or discussions13 related 
to the legislative process of the draft Genome Act and highlight the complexities 
surrounding personalized medicine and balancing competing interests.
In the current health care regime of Finland, genomic data – or rather 
targeted panel and whole exome sequencing – is mainly used for diagnosing 
and treating patients with rare diseases or cancer, or for individually tailoring 
pharmaceutical therapies.14 Clinical applications based on whole genome data have 
been mainly used at the experimental or design stage, and only few physicians 
process patients’ actual genomic data in their day to day working life. However, 
the Helsinki University Hospital (HUS) – representing a majority of the largest 
university hospital district of Finland – has recently invested in new technology and 
introduced genome sequencing in the clinic, at the request of its patients.15 Public 
healthcare investing in genomic sequencing equipment clearly indicates that the 
healthcare system is taking a turn towards personalized genomics based diagnosis 
and treatments. Beyond the health care setting, genomic data is produced in 
Finland mostly within the biobanking sector. 
In the future, and especially as sequencing technology becomes more common, 
increasing understanding of disease development mechanisms and the genetic 
background of diseases is expected to translate into the clinic as higher knowledge, 
new therapies and improved opportunities for planning personalized care and 
health promotion. For example, research shows that in children with type 1 
diabetes, certain genes activate long before the antibodies associated with the 
disease are detected in the blood circulation.16 Such results may help to identify 
children who develop diabetes in the future. The Global Alliance of Genomics and 
Health (GA4GH) has predicted that by 2025 up to 60 million genome sequences 
12 STM071:00/2018.
13 STM086:00/2016.
14 Improving health through the use of genomic data. Finland’s Genome Strategy Working Group 
Proposal Reports and memorandums of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2015:34. 
15 Minutes of the meeting of the HYKS hospital area board. June 12, 2018. HUS/1802/2018. 
Available at: http://husd360fi.oncloudos.com/kokous/2018296669-3.PDF Accessed 19.11.2020.
16 Henna Kallionpää – Juhi Somani – Soile Tuomela – Ubaid Ullah, Rafael de Albuquerque 
– Tapio Lönnberg – Elina Komsi1– Heli Siljander – Jarno Honkanen – Taina Härkönen – 
Aleksandr Peet – Vallo Tillmann – Vikash Chandra – Mahesh Kumar Anagandula – Gun Frisk 
– Timo Otonkoski – Omid Rasool – Riikka Lund – Harri Lähdesmäki – Mikael Knip – Riitta 
Lahesmaa. Early Detection of Peripheral Blood Cell Signature in Children Developing Beta-Cell 
Autoimmunity at a Young Age. American Diabetes Association. Available at: https://diabetes.
diabetesjournals.org/content/68/10/2024. Accessed 19.11.2020.
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could be carried out in the clinical setting.17 This would effectively mean that the 
sequences produced by health care would outnumber the sequencing activities 
carried out for research purposes and replace the current, older analysis methods 
used in the clinic. 
Yet, the increasing amount of clinical genomic data doesn’t mean that all 
patients will de facto be sequenced as the clinical need for genomic analyses should 
always be medically and scientifically assessed on an individual and case-by case 
basis. The primary benefits of using genomic data have so far been demonstrated 
within diagnosis of hereditary and rare diseases. The use of genomic data has 
for example made it possible to significantly reduce the time taken to reach a 
diagnosis for the patient. In the area of cancer diseases, genomic data can also 
be used in the selection and monitoring of treatment. These are the low hanging 
fruits that many global personalized medicine initiatives attach to. In terms of 
public communication, they are also the easiest projects to convey to the larger 
audiences, because they produce impact in the present timeframe. 
As for improving population health by preventing multifactorial common 
diseases such as coronary diseases, type 2 diabetes and common cancers – the 
scientific evidence is pending, and wider public health impacts are expected in 
the longer future. There are hopeful expectations that genomic data could help 
identify genetic variants that are associated with common diseases, which in turn 
could lead to stratifying populations and initiating active intervention planning 
for early treatment, additional tests or lifestyle changes. Prevention programs 
could be targeted or tailored to those at higher risk. Even so, the scientific debate 
is still ongoing – both on the value of unique risk data for the prevention of 
chronic diseases and how such data could instigate healthier behavior patterns 
and eventually impact public health. There is a growing body of scientific literature 
backing the potential of genomic data for prevention and public health purposes. 
Scientists in Finland are also working hard to produce much needed evidence for 
fully integrating genomics into the clinic.
The globally unique Finnish P6 project (Genomics to Healthcare) is a large-
scale national initiative aiming to prepare the Finnish health care system for the 
clinical utilization of genetic risk information and is very essential for future hopes 
to integrate genomics into the clinic around this area. The objectives of the project 
include providing scientific evidence for the utility of genetic risk information 
in healthcare by carrying out randomized disease-specific intervention trials, 
evaluating and building competence and genomic literacy skills, evaluating the 
17 Ewan Birney – Jessica Vamathevan – Peter Goodhand. Genomics in healthcare: GA4GH looks 
to 2022. bioRxiv 203554; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/203554.
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health-economic impact of genetic risk-information in healthcare and achieving 
a level of consensus among various stakeholders for translating genomics into 
the clinic.18
In addition to the many legislative, clinical and scientific hurdles to widespread 
clinical implementation, personalized medicine in Finland is also heavily 
challenged by various concerns spanning from critique towards the government 
for lack of funding19 and establishing a very complex legal framework20 to ethical 
and legal aspects concerning for example the right to know21 and not to know, 
incidental and secondary findings22, privacy23 as well as consent and opt-out 
procedures24. However, some of the highlighted concerns require further studies 
and structured debate to confirm their existence and actual impacts. On a positive 
note and beyond the concerns expressed, a forward-looking spirit still prevails 
among the different actors within the personalized medicine framework - which 
gives hope that a common path to consensus can be found.
18 P6 – Genomics to Healthcare. Available at: https://thl.fi/en/web/thlfi-en/research-and-
expertwork/projects-and-programmes/p6-genomics-to-healthcare. Accessed 19.11.2020.
19 Olli Carpén – Marco Hautalahti. Puheenvuoro: Suomalainen potilas ansaitsee yksilöllisen 
hoidon. Turun Sanomat, 1.3.2019.
20 Tom Southerington – Seppo Vainio – Anne Pitkäranta. Biopankkilainsäädännön muuttuva 
kenttä: uhkat ja mahdollisuudet. Lääketieteellinen aikakauskirja Duodecim 2019;135(10):973–4.
21 Aaro Tupasela – Sandra Liede. (2016) State Responsibility and Accountability in Managing 
Big Data in Biobank Research: Tensions and Challenges in the Right of Access to Data. 
In: Brent Mittelstadt – Luciano Floridi (eds.), The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data. Law, 
Governance and Technology Series, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
3-319-33525-4_12.
22 Toni Lehtinen, Haluaisitko tietää riskisi sairastua verenpainetautiin tai Alzheimeriin? 
Suomeen suunnitellaan biopankkitietojen verkkopalvelua.  Available at: https://www.hs.fi/
paivanlehti/05022020/art-2000006396045.html. Accessed on 19.11.2020.
23 Sirpa Soini, Biobanks as a central Part of the Finnish Growth and Genomic Strategies: How 
to Balance Privacy in an Innovation Ecosystem? The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics. 
Volume: 44 issue: 1, page(s):24–34. 
24 Joanna Forsberg – Sirpa Soini, A big step for Finnish biobanking. Nat Rev Genet 15, 6 (2014). 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg3646; Karoliina Snell – Heta Tarkkala. Questioning the rhetoric 
of ‘a willing population’ in Finnish biobanking. Life Sci Soc Policy. 2019 Dec; 15: 4; and Marjut 
Salokannel – Heta Tarkkala – Karoliina Snell, Legacy samples in Finnish biobanks: social and 
legal issues related to the transfer of old sample collections into biobanks. Hum Genet 138, 
1287–1299 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00439-019-02070-0.
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3.2 Legislation as a Tool for Leading Innovation
Personalized medicine is in nature characterized by a ‘commercial ethos’ and the 
increasing presence of commercial actors in producing personalized healthcare 
services and products. Concurrently, genomic and biomedical research is 
increasingly commercialized.25 Nevertheless, business-driven innovation 
activities are commonly viewed as an effective way of reforming, reviving and 
supporting healthcare services and the entire health innovation ecosystem. Socially 
responsible corporate actors and a responsible market economy support building 
and maintaining the welfare society. 
In situations of social crisis, such as the prevailing Covid-19 pandemic, the 
importance of commercial collaborative activities is further emphasized. For 
example, commercially produced patient monitors, respirators, intensive care 
equipment, diagnostics, hygiene solutions and products and services related to 
remote digital care are in high demand. International public-private collaborative 
efforts have resulted in establishing digital solutions to enable health workers in 
battling the virus. These include cost-effective technologies, which can reduce costs, 
duplication and waste. The use of digital technologies can additionally prevent 
the occurrence of false-negative results and eliminate inconclusive diagnostics by 
pooling the results into a cloud and using artificial intelligence to analyze the data. 
Correspondingly, in the research environment commercial collaborations have 
sped up the development of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. This is also reflected 
as rapid reviews and publications of Covid-19 papers and results from ongoing 
vaccine trials. 
Commercial players are an integral part of the healthcare system and the 
government’s role is to support them to enhance innovation activities for the 
benefit of patients and public health. Securing innovation and competitiveness 
in the health sector is a cross-industry and societal concern. In order to support 
innovation, decision makers strive to create favorable operating environments for 
the development of personalized medicine. Such environments can be created for 
example by drafting and enacting innovation-friendly legislation - also described 
as ‘enabling’ or ‘flexible’ legislation.26 Legislation, as opposed to industry-driven 
25 Timothy Caulfield – Ubaga Ogbogu. The commercialization of university-based research: 
Balancing risks and benefits. BMC Med Ethics 16, 70 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-
015-0064-2.
26 Vesa Salminen – Kimmo Halme. Policy Brief: ‘Framework for innovation-friendly regulation’. 
Available at: http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/162229/22-2019-
Framework%20for%20innovatio.n-friendly%20regulation.pdf Other means include for example 
creating common European health data space. Accessed 19 November 2020.
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guidelines, is generally required to guarantee that all commercial actors assume 
their social responsibility consistently by following the rules of law. Maintaining 
and supporting responsible social actions is one of the most important functions 
of the government.
The development of personalized medicine requires flexible laws so that the 
law doesn’t end up becoming a barrier to medical development. Such flexibility 
was provided with the Finnish Biobank Act (688/2012).27 Flexibility in this 
context means technology-neutral outcome-based law, which leaves room for 
interpretation. The desired outcome is improved public health – by supporting 
research and eventually integrating the results into the healthcare system and 
society. Research activities are supported, provided that the actors follow the 
strict rules of the Biobank Act which have been established to protect sample and 
data donors. Operating within the legal regime of biobanking is an indication and 
guarantee that biobanks and researchers are supervised and guided by official 
authorities and thus act responsibly according to law.
Filling the legal gaps with interpretation is left at the responsibility of legal 
practitioners and supervisory authorities. Leaving room for interpretation is a 
key element of innovation-friendly legislation in fast-developing areas. The law 
is not intended to solve all possible challenges and preferably aims to guarantee 
minimum standards for responsible activity. Support for challenging questions 
can be found elsewhere – primarily from the legally binding sources of justice, 
such as human and basic rights documents, legal principles, and court cases. 
From this point of view, unstructured random public debate or assertive views 
expressed in social media should not be dogmatized as a source for interpretation. 
They are preferably isolated opinions, which do not reflect the majority of the 
public or the wider public morality. However, as with well-designed legislation, 
carefully structured public debate can at best call attention to public moral and 
indicate how society views social responsibilities as well as the necessity and 
proportionality of legislation. The tricky part is to pick the clues and identify 
the questions in need of immediate legislative attention – and to specify what 
should be left to be solved yet by interpretation or by added efforts of clearer 
communication by the government. 
A recently published article and the following public discourse in Finland 
provide an excellent example of the complexities of opinions a legislator may have 
to balance with when working with enabling legislation. In an article published 
27 The Biobank Act (688/2012) in English. Available at: https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/
kaannokset/2012/en20120688_20120688.pdf.
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in Helsingin Sanomat,28 a journalist criticized Finngen, which is Finland’s largest 
public-private genomic research project. The core of the critic highlighted conflicts 
of interest, collaborations with commercial pharma partners, and the importance 
of being open about these two central topics. Finngen represents early-stage basic 
research, the results of which are returned to Finnish biobanks for further use by 
the entire scientific community. The journalist’s critique was aimed at what he 
perceived as unrealistic promises given to the public and implied that the project 
would mainly benefit the pharma industry and the main investigators of Finngen. 
This claim was enforced by shining light on the industry ties of one of the main 
investigators and highlighted the problem of patenting. Although Finngen itself 
doesn’t aim to produce any patents, findings from possible separate ‘bespoke 
analyses’ could be potentially patented by pharma companies. Benefits of the 
project for patients and society went largely unnoticed (which was criticized by 
patient advocacies29) and the journalist implied that the interests of the research 
subjects were not sufficiently respected and that in a worst-case scenario the 
masses of Finnish genomic data would end up in the hands of U.S. intelligence 
authorities following concerns raised in the recent Schrems II-judgement30. The 
journalist duly and fairly called for the main investigator’s responsibility. However, 
one could only guess the motivation and driving forces behind the article, as it was 
also quite transparent that there had been intense lobbying behind the scenes. 
The article received fairly wide coverage as it spread in different social media 
outlets. In the end, the main achievement of the episode was reflected as echo 
chambers where the different parties only interacted with people they agreed 
with and essentially reinforced polarization, rather than deliberation.31 There 
was no substantial increase in withdrawals of consents or distrust towards the 
project or the scientific community in general. Neither did the media coverage 
reflect wider public moral. However, the public discussion did leave open a very 
central question as to how decision makers should react to the unstructured but 
28 Marko Junkkari – Boris Stefanov. Kauppaa kansan verellä. Helsingin Sanomat. Available at: 
https://www.hs.fi/sunnuntai/art-2000006623764.html Accessed 19 November 2020.
29 Minna Anttonen – Mirjami Tran Minh. Syöpään sairastuneille geenitutkimus tuo toivoa. 
Available at: https://www.hs.fi/mielipide/art-2000006630043.html?share=ee15aa931bf7c7b
bd4767c7ad0af1799. Accessed 19 November 2020.
30 CJEU case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian 
Schrems. Available at: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-07/
cp200091en.pdf Accessed 19 November 2020.
31 More on how social media works: Naomi Barnes. Navigating algorithms and affective communities 
in the quest for altmetric stardom. September 9th, 2020. Available at: Accessed 19 November 
2020.https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2020/09/09/navigating-algorithms-and-
affective-communities-in-the-quest-for-altmetric-stardom/. Accessed 19 November 2020.
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increasing public debate. For example, should a more structured public debate be 
proposed, or should there be a more detailed legal examination of the minimum 
standards of law, and balancing of competing interests and distribution of benefits 
within society?
3.2.1 The Oviedo Convention as an Ethical Backdrop for  
Enabling National Legislation 
The Council of Europe’s Convention (ETS No. 164) for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology 
and Medicine from 1997 (the Oviedo Convention)32 and its Additional Protocols33 
aim to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law in relation to 
biomedical science and the practice of medicine. There is a strong relationship 
between the Oviedo Convention and the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)34 as both aim to defend human beings by using the same basic 
set of accepted principles.35 
Regardless of many of the similarities of the two conventions, there still remain 
some differences in their applicability and enforcement.36 For example, contrary 
to the ECHR, the Oviedo Convention provides a set of flexible rules, which aim 
to ensure possible protection, and not due protection of human dignity and bio-
rights. The Oviedo Convention is a dynamic living instrument which means that the 
interpretation and application of the Convention’s provisions adapt to situations 
that possibly did not exist when the Convention was originally approved. The 
role of national governments is to uphold and elevate what is considered as the 
minimum standards of the Oviedo Convention. 
The two agreements differ also as to the control mechanisms regarding 
violations of their provisions. The Oviedo Convention has no mechanism to 
investigate and take decisions on violations, but a breach of the Oviedo Convention 
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Available 
at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007cf98. 
Accessed 19 November 2020.
33 The Additional Protocols for human cloning (1998), organ transplantation (2002), biomedical 
research (2004) and genetic testing for health purposes (2008).
34 European Convention on Human Rights. Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/
convention_eng.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2020.
35 Francesco Seatzu – Simona Fanni. Correction: The Experience of the European Court of Human 
Rights with the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 31(81), pp. 112–113. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.dk. 
36 Ibid.
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can be analyzed and the provisions enforced by the contributing case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – as long as the breaches are in the 
scope of the ECHR.37 Biomedical issues featured prominently in the case law of 
the ECtHR relate mostly to questions regarding the beginning and end of life.38 
In its conclusions the ECtHR has reflected research-related bioethical issues, 
such as privacy, self-determination, informed consent, protection of genetic and 
other clinical data and the right to know, especially upon Article 839 of the ECHR, 
which not only aims to defend individuals against arbitrary actions of the State, 
but to also guarantee personal autonomy and the right to self-determination.40 
The bioethical court cases, in which Article 8 was invoked, the Court performed 
balancing between individual rights and public interest and examined, whether 
an interference with the individual right had emerged. The Court also assessed 
whether there had been a legitimate aim for the interference and if the limitations 
had been lawful and necessary in a democratic society (See Dubská and Krejzová 
v. the Czech Republic).41 Lawfulness refers to provisions based on domestic law 
and which are in force at the relevant time and which a person is able – if need 
be with appropriate advice – to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
In the assessment of necessity, the ECtHR has concluded that a’ pressing 
social need’ should be identified and reflected in context of proportionality as to 
the legitimate aim pursued. The test of necessity assesses whether an interference 
with individual rights advances a pursued ‘social need’, such as social interests 
and rights and freedoms of others, and reaches no further than necessary to meet 
the said ‘social need’ (Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland).42 In the case of 
Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, the Court concentrated 
37 Article 32 of the ECHR.
38 Council of Europe: 20th anniversary of the Oviedo Convention (2017). Available at: https://
rm.coe.int/oviedo-convention-conference-final-report-e/1680796fc5. Accessed 19 November 
2020.
39 Article 8 of the Convention – Right to respect for private and family life ‘1. Everyone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There 
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.’
40 Francesco Seatzu, ‘The Experience of the European Court of Human Rights with the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’ (2015) 31(81) Utrecht Journal of International 
and European Law 5, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.da. Accessed 19 November 2020.
41 ECHR no 28859/11 and 28473/12. 
42 ECHR no 16354/06.
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on assessing ‘social need’ as in whether there was plausible evidence that the risk 
to democracy was sufficiently imminent.43
The test of proportionality on the other hand evaluates if a fair balance 
between competing interests has been achieved and the essence and minimum 
core of the right in question has been respected. Additionally, the ‘relevant and 
sufficient’ reasons set forth by national authorities should be assessed. In the 
context of the necessity and proportionality test, the Court has reiterated the 
fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention system and recognizes that the 
national authorities have direct democratic legitimation in so far as the protection 
of human rights is concerned. It is therefore primarily the responsibility of the 
national authorities to assess whether fair balance between public interest and 
individual rights, is achieved. States are additionally allowed to determine the 
means which they consider most proportionate for achieving the aim of balancing 
competing rights. A wide margin of appreciation is usually provided to States 
when they are required to strike a balance between competing private and public 
interests or different Convention rights. However, the scope of the margin will 
depend on the seriousness of the interest at stake and the gravity of interference 
(See Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic, Fernández Martínez v. Spain44, 
Odièvre v. France45, Van der Hejden v. the Netherlands46 and Z v. Finland47). 
One of the very basic principles of medical and bio law is documented in 
Article 2 of the Oviedo Convention - primacy of the human being: ‘The interests 
and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society 
or science’. The principle of primacy of the human being has inspired the entire 
Convention and is also one of the key principles for governments to follow when 
drafting legislation in the area of personalized medicine. The origin of the principle 
is further elaborated in the Explanatory Report, which specifies that the interests 
and welfare of the human being must in principle take precedence over the sole 
interests of society or science in the event of a conflict between them.48 How this 
is interpreted is reflected in the case law of the ECtHR.
43 ECHR no 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 et al.
44 ECHR no 56030/07.
45 ECHR no 42326/98. 
46 ECHR no 42857/05. 
47 ECHR no 22009/93. 
48 The Explanatory Report: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800ccde5 The explanatory Report does not 
constitute a binding part of the Oviedo Convention. However, it is commonly referred to in 
interpreting the Convention. Accessed 19 November 2020.
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Another fundamental principle for personalized medicine, equitable access to 
health care, is expressed in Article 3 of the Oviedo Convention. According to the 
provision, Parties shall take appropriate measures for providing equitable access 
to health care of appropriate quality. Health care in this context means offering 
diagnostics, prevention, therapy and rehabilitation (Explanatory Report)49. The 
standard of care must be assessed in light of scientific progress. Access to health 
care must be equitable, meaning first and foremost the absence of unjustified 
discrimination. The aim of the provision is to prompt States to adopt the requisite 
measures as part of its social policy in order to ensure equitable access to health 
care. These measures may take many different forms and a wide variety of methods. 
The Article can be interpreted to mean that governments can adopt for example the 
principles of personalized medicine as policy measures and provide personalized 
solutions equitably for the people of its nation.
Simultaneous protection of primacy of the human being, the interests of society, 
the progress of science and research, as well as commercial interests has caused a 
need to develop principles and rules to resolve conflicts potentially arising between 
these interests. Generally, the protection of the human means that human dignity 
is protected from scientific and societal actions which instrumentalize dignity. For 
example, creating human embryos for research is prohibited in article 18 of the 
Oviedo Convention. Article 21 prohibits financial gain of the human body and its 
parts. However, research on human embryos and the human body or its parts lie 
outside of the scope of prohibitions and are allowed when certain preconditions 
are followed. Article 15 is a general rule with reference to scientific research. 
According to the Article scientific research in the field of biology and medicine 
shall be carried out freely, subject to the provisions of the Convention and other 
legal provisions ensuring the protection of the human being. The Article represents 
a shift towards a level of pragmatism and allows States flexibility as to balancing 
different interests in national legislation. According to the case Z v. Finland, even 
a requirement in the public interest can justify overriding an individual right 
such as the one expressed in Article 8, if the legal prerequisites are fulfilled and 
safeguards are designed to secure an effective protection. 
49 Explanatory Report to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 




3.2.1.1 Margin of Appreciation in Biomedical Research in Light of 
the Oviedo Convention and ECtHR Case Law
Basic conditions for biomedical (incl. genomic) research are expressed in the 
articles of the Oviedo Convention. As a general rule, Article 16 requires that 
necessary consent as provided for under Article 5 is given expressly, specifically 
and is documented. Article 5 is a standard recognized by the majority of the Parties 
to the Convention. However, the Convention also reflects consensus in Article 22 
as to that human body parts may be removed in the course of an intervention 
(clinical or research based), and consequently stored and used for a purpose other 
than that for which it was removed – given that this is done in conformity with 
‘appropriate’ information and consent procedures. The aim of Article 22, like 
Article 5, is to ensure the protection of individuals and together they reflect the 
minimum standards set by the Oviedo Convention. Governments must uphold 
and elevate them in compliance with Article 2750 of the Oviedo Convention.
According to the Explanatory Report to the Oviedo Convention, information 
and consent arrangements may vary according to the circumstances, thus allowing 
for flexibility since the express consent of an individual to the use of parts of his 
body is not systematically needed. As a conclusion, an argument can be made 
that Article 22 cannot be interpreted as conferring an absolute obligation to 
always obtain consent before processing stored samples for secondary purposes. 
Nevertheless, individuals must be protected. The application of Article 22 may be 
apt, especially if it is impossible (the deceased) or highly difficult (current residency 
not known or the multitude of people concerned) in practice to reach those people. 
In these cases, the right to respect of private life and accordingly Article 8 of the 
ECHR may be best secured by adding safeguards, namely legislating the use of 
those samples and adding information procedures and other protective safeguards 
while allowing the use for legitimate, e.g. scientific purposes as established in 
Article 22. 
The central legal issue then from a legislative point of view while balancing 
competing interests is whether a government has a negative obligation to abstain 
from legislative actions and leave it to be decided by controllers if and when the 
appropriate information and consent procedures have been fulfilled, or whether 
there is a positive obligation of the government to provide an appropriate regulatory 
framework securing the rights of people while concurrently supporting research. 
In the case Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, the Court asserted a double 
50 Article 27 – Wider protection: ‘None of the provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted as 
limiting or otherwise affecting the possibility for a Party to grant a wider measure of protection 
with regard to the application of biology and medicine than is stipulated in this Convention’.
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logic test for solving whether a case concerns negative or positive obligations. If the 
absence of any (e.g. legislative) action by the national authorities would not have 
resulted in a violation of the Convention, there would be no case at all. This might 
be the case if furthering of science relied on consent alone. On the other hand, 
if the authorities failed to take action relating to the second option, using stored 
samples, it could be argued that there may be a case of a violation of the Convention, 
as positive actions are needed to specify what the ‘appropriate’ procedures are. If 
a finding of a violation implies the need for additional restorative action by the 
government that indicates a positive obligation. The ECtHR has concluded that 
the margin of appreciation is broader in the case of positive obligations arising 
from the Convention.51
Among other safeguards, appropriate information procedures may be added 
as positive actions, but there is no legal basis for requiring full coverage as to 
the number of people being actually reached by the procedures as privacy can 
be respected also in other ways, which complement the said procedures. As for 
realizing the right to self-determination, judging by the case law of the ECtHR, 
one of the prerequisites for justified procedures seems to be that they are based on 
national law and are foreseeable either per se or with the support of appropriate 
advice. Emphasis is placed on the adequate accessibility and sufficiently precise 
formulation of the national provisions so that an individual ‘is able’ to foresee 
the regulatory landscape of the relevant country in question (See Dubská and 
Krejzová v. the Czech Republic).
A wide margin of appreciation has also been afforded in cases of the ECtHR 
where the issues have been controversial in nature or when the State is required 
to balance different interests or rights of the Convention. Controversial implies to 
situations where there is no consensus within the member States of the Council of 
Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best 
means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical 
issues (See Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic, Van der Heijden and 
Parrillo v. Italy). In the case of consent versus allowing the use of stored samples 
for secondary purposes, it can be reasonably argued that there is consensus as 
to the possibility of using stored samples (supported with information practices) 
51 ECHR no 16354/06.
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as an alternative to obtaining informed consent although there is no common 
agreement on the right balance between these two.52
While balancing competing interests the margin of appreciation doctrine allows 
governments to take into account, for example, the characteristic traditions of 
the state. Hence, the ways in which different countries protect the minimum 
standards of the Oviedo Convention may reflect national traditions and legal 
culture. Conclusively, the Court cannot demand uniform implementation or 
balancing of the provisions of the Oviedo Convention in all Signatory States as such 
a command could be perceived as an intervention on national constitutional values 
and policy choices. In principle, national authorities are the most rationally placed 
operators to assess the necessity and appropriateness of any local restrictions 
or limitations.53 The ECtHR has to date accepted the reasons and arguments of 
governments relatively easily, although it works toward setting clear, uniform 
and well-defined criteria for defining the minimum standards of human rights.54
3.2.1.2 Balancing National Legislation in Light of the EU Charter
In addition to the minimum standards set by the Oviedo Convention for balancing 
competing interests, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (EU Charter) has since its enforcement in 2009 added a strong legal 
framework to the discussion of balancing interests in the health field. The Oviedo 
Convention has not been signed by the EU, neither are bioethical questions per 
se in the legislative scope or competence area of the EU, but EU impact can be 
achieved by legislative measures which have direct influence on national debates.55 
A direct reference to the Oviedo Convention was established in the Charter’s 
Explanatory notice, which elucidated the explanation of Article 3 in the Charter 
(the integrity of the person). According to Article 3, in the fields of medicine 
52 For example: Salla Silvola. Biobank Regulation in Finland and the Nordic Countries. In 
Elisabeth Rynning – Mette Hartlev. Nordic Health Law in a European Context. Welfare 
State Perspectives on Patient’s Rights and Biomedicine. Brill / Nijhoff 2011. https://doi.
org/10.1163/9789004223813_020 and Marjut Salokannel – Heta Tarkkala – Karoliina Snell. 
Legacy samples in Finnish biobanks: social and legal issues related to the transfer of old sample 
collections into biobanks. Hum Genet 138 2019, pp. 1287–1299. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s00439-019-02070-0. And Marjut Salokannel. Ethical review, data protection and biomedical 
research in the Nordic countries: A legal perspective. Policy paper 1/2017. NordForsk.
53 Janneke. Gerards. Margin of Appreciation and Incrementalism in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review, 2018, 18, pp. 495–515 doi: 10.1093/hrlr/
ngy017.
54 Ibid.
55 An overview report on bioethics in the European Union. Secretariat of the Commission of the 
Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community. 2009. Available at: http://www.comece.
eu/dl/KlMkJKJOllkJqx4KJK/20091029PUBIO_EN.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2020.
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and biology the free and informed consent of the person concerned must be 
respected according to the procedures laid down by law. The Explanatory notice 
makes particular reference to the Additional Protocol (ETS 168) to the Oviedo 
Convention concerning the prohibition of cloning human beings and expressly 
states that the principles of Article 3 of the Charter reflect those principles of 
the said protocol. What is noteworthy is that the Explanatory notice makes no 
reference to the Additional Protocol concerning biomedical research (ETS 195). 
Consequently, Article 3 leaves a margin of interpretation as to the precise scope 
of the provision and applicability to biomedical research using human biological 
samples. However, the topic of research can be approached by applying Article 1 
(human dignity), which constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights, or Article 
7 (respect for private life).
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter became the main 
reference for assessing compliance of national legislation with fundamental rights, 
which has since been illustrated especially in the landmark cases Digital Rights 
Ireland56 and Schrems57 of the European Court of Justice (CJEU). Additionally, 
the CJEU has affirmed in recent case law that validity of national legislation 
must be reflected solely in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Charter, and not the ECHR.58 However, the CJEU has also concluded that specific 
provisions of the ECHR must be ‘taken into consideration’ for the purpose of 
interpreting the parallel provisions of the Charter (J.N. v Staatssecretaris van 
Veiligheid en Justitie).59 According to Article 52(3) of the EU Charter the meaning 
and scope of the Charter rights shall be the same as laid down by the ECHR.
As the primary reasoning for collecting, storing and processing biological 
samples is to derive genetic information from the samples, the EU rules for 
privacy and data protection are central for addressing governments’ legislative 
scope of margin of appreciation. The right to ‘respect for private life’ (also the right 
to privacy) is addressed by Article 7 of the Charter and directly corresponds to 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Article 8 of the EU Charter provides specific ‘protection for 
personal data’ and does not correspond to a directly comparable right protected 
by the ECHR. However, Article 8 of the ECHR is relevant for interpreting the 
56 CJEU C-293/12 and C-594/12.
57 CJEU C-362/14.
58 European Data Protection Supervisor. Assessing the necessity of measures that limit the 
fundamental right to the protection of personal data: A Toolkit. 11 April 2017. Available at: 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-04-11_necessity_toolkit_en_0.pdf. 
Accessed 19 November 2020.
59 CJEU C-601/15 PPU.
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provision as according to the Explanatory note of the EU Charter, Article 8 of the 
Charter is amongst others based also on Article 8 ECHR. 
Following Article 8 of the Charter personal data must be processed fairly for 
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. In line with Article 6 of the GDPR, 
apart from consent, also other lawful bases for processing data (for example which 
are laid down by law) are available as long as appropriate safeguards are in place 
and processing is fair, lawful, transparent and accords with data minimization 
standards and individual rights.60 When processing involves genetic or health data, 
the provisions of Article 9 are to be additionally followed. However, according to 
the case law of the CJEU, any data processing operation laid down by legislation 
is legally considered a limitation on the right to the protection of personal data, 
regardless of whether that limitation may be justified.61
As legislation in the context of personalized medicine aims to balance various 
interests, the provisions of Article 23 relating to restrictions, are central for 
assessing the margin of appreciation provided for governments. The Article allows 
legislative measures that may restrict individual rights, when such restrictions 
respect the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms and are necessary and 
proportionate in a democratic society to safeguard for example public health. 
Article 168 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union reflects 
what are considered public health interests that are worthy of a high level of 
protection in all Union policies and activities. These are, for example, public 
health improvement, preventing diseases, obviating sources of danger to health, 
fighting against major health scourges and promoting research in their causes, 
their transmission and their prevention. EU countries are primarily responsible 
for organizing and delivering public health measures and the EU health policy 
serves to compliment the national policies. For example, the EU has given several 
recommendations to Member States for the purpose of Article 168. In the case 
of rare diseases (including genetic diseases), the EU has recommended for 
governments to identify research resources and needs and priorities for basic, 
clinical, translational and social research as well as modes of fostering them.62
60 European Data Protection Board. Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679. 
Available at: https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_202005_
consent_en.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2020.
61 European Data Protection Board. Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679. 
Available at: https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_202005_
consent_en.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2020.
62 Council recommendation of 8 June 2009 on an action in the field of rare diseases (2009/
C151/02.)
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Article 52 of the EU Charter defines the conditions under which rights may be 
limited. According to the provision, any limitations on the rights and freedoms 
recognized by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of 
those rights and freedoms. Limitations are accepted only if they are necessary and 
are subject to the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality plays 
a central role in the case law of the CJEU and has deeply affected EU law since the 
judgement in the Intenationale Handelsgesellschaft case in 1970.63 According to 
the judgement, a public authority may not impose obligations on a citizen except 
to the extent to which they are strictly necessary in the public interest to attain 
the purpose of the measure. The case law of the CJEU has ever since reflected 
a strict necessity test for any limitations and applies especially to the rights to 
personal data protection and respect for private life with regard to the processing 
of personal data. Proportionality and necessity in the EU law differ from the 
respective principle reflected in the ECHR. In the case law of the CJEU, necessity 
is considered as a case- and facts-based concept, which requires assessment by 
the EU legislator and consideration in the light of the specific circumstances 
surrounding the case as well as the provisions of the measure and the concrete 
purpose it aims to achieve. In the context of EU law, national legislative actions 
should be supported by evidence describing the problem, how it will be addressed 
and why existing or less intrusive measures cannot sufficiently address it. It can 
be fairly argued that for example Horizon 2020, the biggest EU Research and 
Innovation program ever, describes in its essence the problems governments are 
facing and how they will be addressed and why previous measures have not been 
enough for promoting research in public health matters. 
In conclusion, balancing individual rights with scientific and commercial 
interests or public health interests, holds possibilities for interpretation and 
national solutions within the margin of appreciation as provided for in the Oviedo 
Convention and the EU Charter and the subsequent case-law of the ECtHR and 
CJEU. However, limitations of individual rights will have to pass the necessity 
and proportionality tests. Thus, the spotlight will next be turned on national 
legislation and the examples of how the margin of appreciation has been employed 
and justified in Finland.
63 Judgment of the Court of 17 December 1970. Case 11–70.
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3.2.2 The Finnish Biobank Act as an Example of  
Innovation-friendly Legislation
According to article 3 of the Oviedo Convention ‘parties shall take appropriate 
measures to provide equitable access to health care of appropriate quality’. 
How healthcare is provided, is left for the parties to decide nationally. The EU 
Charter Article 35 specifies that everyone has the right of access to preventive 
health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions 
established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection 
shall be ensured. The health interests which require high level of protection were 
assessed in the previous chapter of this article and include, in order to be protected, 
policies and activities for e.g. promoting research in the causes, transmission and 
prevention of diseases.
Sometimes addressing complex societal challenges such as equitable access to 
health care requires visionary and brave decisions by the legislator. An example 
of visionary legislation within the field of personalized medicine is the Finnish 
Biobank Act, which was approved in 2012 after the Constitutional Law Committee 
of the Finnish Parliament had assessed its compliance with the constitution, 
Finland’s international commitments, especially the Oviedo Convention, and the 
balance between primacy of the human being and public interests, freedom of 
science and the constitutional obligation to promote public health.64 
The Biobank Act was globally unique as its objective was to support research 
activities for the purposes of promoting health, understanding the mechanisms 
of disease or developing the products and treatment practices used in health care 
and medical care, and to balance it with principles of openness and individual 
rights such as privacy and self-determination. The act was one of Finland’s first of 
several attempts at leading innovation with bold legislation. Due to the efforts to 
legislate a dynamic, fast moving area of biomedical research, a multidisciplinary 
steering group was established to monitor and assess the deployment and effects 
of the Act, development of the research infrastructure, international research 
64 According to Section 19 in the Constitution (731/1999), public authorities must ensure 
adequate social and health services for everyone and promote the health of the population. 
The Constitutional Law Committee, statement 10/2012, p. 1 ‘The task of the biobank is to serve 
researchers and research groups by storing and collecting samples and by giving them to those 
who do biobank research. This task has a close connection to freedom of science, as secured 
in the Finnish Constitution and indirectly also to the constitutional obligation of public sector 
to promote health of the people’. 
 The GDPR also emphasizes the proper balance of rights: ‘The right to the protection of personal 
data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its function in society and be 
balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.’ 
Recital 4, GDPR.
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collaboration and the effective realization of individual rights of the sample donors, 
as well as public attitudes towards research.65
Research on human biological samples and clinical data and other health-
related data has been performed throughout the history of Finland, as the 
country has a long tradition in genetic research. Non-profit clinical sample 
and data repositories have previously represented the same objectives as larger 
repositories known as biobanks do today, but at a much smaller scale. The Biobank 
Act enabled to scale up research activities and simultaneously made the wide-
ranging use of samples and associated data transparent. Governmental oversight 
and supervision, unified handling, access and registration requirements as well 
as vetting of biobanks were only a few of the novel proactive measures presented 
by the Finnish Biobank Act for the purpose of protecting individual rights.
Prohibition of financial gain (Article 21 in the Oviedo Convention) is respected 
in the Act, as in Finland biobanking is, by nature, considered to represent public 
interest in the form of scientific research and promoting public health. The 
infrastructure can be established only to support scientific research, and not for 
commercial purposes. Private actors may establish biobanks, but in the name 
of public interest all stored samples and data must be open for the use of the 
entire scientific community accordingly with the provisions of the Biobank Act. 
Charges may be collected but they must correspond to the costs incurred in the 
processing (incl. storage) of the samples. A research project utilizing the samples 
may be a public/private collaborative project and the legislation does not differ 
between the two. In the course of processing samples and associated data, biobank 
operators exercise public authority and their decisions are subject to an appeal, 
which effectively makes them administrative decisions by nature.
Broad consent was, at the time of enacting the Biobank Act, introduced as a 
new concept and tool for indicating the donor’s will to participate in biobanking 
research. With the entry into force of the GDPR, the possibility to use broad 
consent for research purposes beyond biobanking was further confirmed (Recital 
33). According to Section 11 of the Biobank Act the right to process samples in a 
biobank is based on consent, unless otherwise is regulated in the Act (e.g as in the 
case of legacy samples). The structure and the content of the Section corresponds 
to what has been described previously on the minimum standards of the Oviedo 
Convention relating to sample processing and the legal conditions for processing 
65 STM065:00/2012. The steering group issued an interim report in 2015: Sosiaali- 
ja terveysministeriön raportteja ja muistiota 2015:26. Available at: https://stm.fi/
hanke?tunnus=STM065:00/2012.Accessed 19 November 2020.
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of personal data in accordance with EU law. Of the 44 sections of the Biobank 
Act, roughly half provide legal safeguards for the protection of personal data.
The Act also provided sample and data donors new rights, which added to the 
rights provided by the GDPR and cannot be deviated from. For example, people 
have a right to be informed of the significance of any health-related data produced 
from their samples stored in a biobank.66 Legal possibilities to monitor and control 
the use of their samples and associated data were significantly increased with 
transparency requirements in the Act. Currently doners can influence the partial 
or entire use of their samples and associated data either by giving active consent 
or by opting out of the use of legacy samples. Opting out refers to the process 
indicated in Article 22 of the Oviedo Convention. In light of EU law, opting out 
indicates processing personal data based on legislative actions in accordance with 
Articles 23 of the GDPR and 52 of the EU Charter. 
3.2.2.1 Necessity and Proportionality in the Biobank Act
In the context of necessity and proportionality assessment, the ongoing national 
public debate regarding legacy samples67 cannot be ignored. The Finnish Biobank 
Act introduced personal and public opt-out notification procedures (alternatives 
for each other) for transferring legacy samples into biobanks and making them 
available for scientific research purposes. These purposes are understood broadly 
and correspond with the wording of the GDPR, which recognizes technical 
development and demonstration, fundamental research, applied research, and 
privately funded research as scientific research (Recital 159). Projects focusing 
purely on product development without the purpose of increasing scientific 
knowledge are outside of the scope of the Biobank Act and accordingly samples 
and data cannot be waived for these purposes exclusively. However, outcomes 
resulting from biobank projects can be used for further product development. 
The public opt-out procedure has been a particular point of frustration, as it 
has not been commonly understood that the opt-out model is one of the minimum 
standard options provided for in the Oviedo Convention for the purpose of 
processing stored samples for secondary use. As for the use of associated personal 
data, the opt-out system is also allowed in EU law for the necessary protection 
of public health. Necessity in the case of biobanking in Finland can be argued to 
emerge from the fact that e.g. rare (genetic) diseases, cancer diseases, and chronic 
66 This right has however led to novel challenges, which are addressed in the draft Genome Act.
67 Salokannel et al. in supra note 52. Legacy samples in Finnish biobanks: social and legal issues 
related to the transfer of old sample collections into biobanks. Human Genetics 138, pp. 1287–
1299 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00439-019-02070-0.
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diseases are an imminent threat to public health and the use of legacy samples in 
supporting research, new discoveries, and innovations in these areas comprehend 
a ‘pressing social need’ in order to find innovative medical solutions. Had the 
said legacy samples not been used in the strictly regulated realm of biobanking, 
the scientifically valuable samples would have been inaccessible to the scientific 
community at large. Finland has not created the possibility and is by no means the 
only country using the option provided for in the Convention. However, Finland 
is one of the few countries, which has used the margin of appreciation in order 
to add layers of protection to complement the broad use of legacy samples. These 
protective layers form the basis for assessing proportionality.
For example, an ethics committee pre-evaluation of legacy sample transfers 
into a biobank - including an assessment of prior consents related to the original 
collection of those samples – has been incorporated into the process. Secondly, 
an authoritative68 decision is required on the admissibility of adopting the public 
notification procedure and thus the final decisive vote lies at the supervisory 
authority, not at the biobank. In addition, the Finnish biobanks have incorporated 
added routines of checking national registries if and which sample donors are still 
alive and are competent for giving active consent. After these checks, the biobanks 
have begun to send personal notifications to sample and data donors, informing 
them of sample and data transfers. Biobanks have also provided individuals an 
opportunity to opt-out or give active consent for the future use of the samples and 
data. There are thus multiple layers of independent and objective assessments 
and a variety of steps to consider rights and freedoms of the data donors. It can 
be fairly argued that the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms have been 
duly respected. Nevertheless, the main critical claim remains and asserts that the 
competing interests have not been proportionately balanced. 
Consequently, the public notification procedure has not been perceived by 
decision makers as a legal issue in need of urgent correction. Both methods 
(consent and opt-out as well as the procedures of personal and public notification) 
have been considered legally acceptable within the frameworks of the Oviedo 
Convention and EU law. It has from the very beginning been clear that a public 
notification will not in practice reach sample donors as efficiently as a personal 
notification would. This became evident while passing the law in Parliament. 
However, in light of the case law of the ECtHR it can be argued that the procedure 
is justified as it has a legitimate aim, is necessary for imminent public health 
reasons and is based on national law which is adequately accessible and is thus 
68 The National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health, Valvira, assesses whether the sample 
donors should, in each individual case, be contacted personally, or not. 
51
 
foreseeable so that an individual is able to understand the legislative framework 
either alone or with the support of appropriate advice.
The public notification process regarding both legacy samples and associated 
data was beforehand approved by the Constitutional Law Committee of Finland. 
According to the Committee statement 12/2012, p. 4: ‘…associating sensitive data 
with the samples requires express consent. This principle can be deviated from 
for legacy samples only.’ Thus, the constitutional assessment clearly identified 
the optional minimum standards offered by the Oviedo Convention and accepted 
the use of the margin of appreciation in national biobanking legislation. However, 
contrary to prevailing critique, the acceptance did not open a door for unlimited 
processing of personal data. Processing of data is accepted only to the extent 
that is justified by the GDPR and corresponding case law and is necessary and 
proportionate in terms of the intended use. 
The purpose limitation and minimization principles required by the GDPR are 
addressed widely in the Biobank Act. Section 28 of the Biobank Act regulates access 
conditions and requires that linking the data and sample sets is justified for the 
purpose of a specific research project and that the access request otherwise fulfils 
the additional conditions declared in Section 26, which specifies access principles 
in detail. These include requirements that the intended use corresponds to the 
research area defined for the biobank and the criteria and conditions established 
for processing samples. Such conditions may be set, for example, during ethical 
preview or authoritative decisions relating to transfers of legacy samples (as 
was officially required by the Data Protection Authority and Valvira) regarding 
the Maternity Cohort). Further, terms and restrictions provided by law must be 
observed in the relevant research project and the person granted access must hold 
an appropriate professional and academic qualification for processing samples and 
data. All samples and data are pseudonymized prior to granting access to them, 
unless there is a specific reason not to do so, as has been the case when research 
was focused on rare diseases concerning relatively small groups of people. In 
these cases, the researcher usually already has obtained the consent of the people 
concerned for processing their personal data. 
The Biobank Act sets down the principles for access but does not specify the 
actual legal premises for a national health register to disclose the data. A legal 
premise is currently provided for by the Secondary Use Act, which came into force 
in Finland in 2019. The Act enabled to establish a new authority, Findata69, for 
administering and authorizing data access centrally. Within the framework, data 
access to pseudonymized data is provided only in a secure processing environment, 
69 Findata. Available at: https://www.findata.fi/en/. Accessed 19.11.2020.
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effectively giving high protection of privacy for data subjects and the secure use of 
personal data. The Secondary Use Act specifies the general conditions for access, 
and the criteria of the Biobank Act add to these conditions. In conclusion, the 
protection of individuals and personal data is multilayered. The legal framework 
does not allow the establishment of unlimited data resources and preferably 
respects the minimization principle – even in projects at the scale of Finngen. 
The principle of data minimization is also supported by Section 14 of the 
Biobank Act, which applies to data associated and stored with the samples in 
a biobank. According to the provision, a sample may be stored with associated 
data containing information on the data subject and the subject’s health status as 
well as information on lifestyle and environmental factors affecting the subject’s 
health and which have consensually been obtained from the subject. In the case 
of legacy samples, data may be associated with the samples based on an opt-out 
procedure, as has been described previously in this article. An essential objective 
to recognize is that Finnish biobanks are not comprehensive health data registers 
and are also not authorized to become one by storing extensive copies of health 
register data for all possible future uses. Access to extensive health register data 
for specific research purposes is always regulated via the Secondary Use Act. For 
the sake of clarity, Section 14 applies to associated data stored in a biobank as a 
distinction from Section 28, which applies to combining different data sets for 
the purpose of research utilizing samples and associated data obtained from a 
biobank. The two Sections of the Biobank Act together with the Secondary Use 
Act form a comprehensive framework of legal safeguards. 
How the opportunities to consent or opt-out are realized in practice depends 
on a large extent on the information provided to and received by people.70 One of 
the main purposes of the entire Finnish Biobank Act is to promote openness as 
to the use of samples and data (Section 1) and thereby maintaining trust in the 
system. This requirement of openness is not an empty definition, as it is further 
elaborated in the provisions of the Biobank Act and even to an extent that is 
not typical for the scientific culture. Active communication is key for successful 
biobanking and personalized medicine. Currently, the biobanks notify people of, 
for example, the different sample collections, processing of samples and data as 
70 Sandra Liede, Biopankkilaki määrittää säännöt – ja sen ansiosta saamme uusia hoitoja ja lääkkeitä. 
Available at: https://healthtech.teknologiateollisuus.fi/fi/ajankohtaista/biopankkilaki-




well as of ongoing research projects and results thereof.71 Different media outlets 
are utilized and additionally technical solutions for enabling dynamic consent 
procedures are being developed in the biobanks and the government level. In the 
future, openness and transparency are intended to be increased by integrating 
the information, consent, and opt-out procedures into a national information 
management service called Kanta. However, there is still much to improve to 
enhance openness and transparency. The examples from the Finnish biobanking 
field can hopefully provide a very valuable lesson for other personalized medicine 
projects in Finland and globally.
From a historical perspective, biobanking has always been criticized globally 
due to the commercial elements involved. Correspondingly, commercially 
favorable laws tend to trigger opposition and critique from many directions. If 
legislation is too flexible or too open to conflicting interpretations, it may result 
in adverse effects such as confrontations between legislators, decision-makers, 
supervisory authorities, and various other actors in the field of health. In Finland, 
the conflicting views regarding the proper application and interpretation of the 
Biobank Act have been recorded in the interim report published by the Finnish 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The report is a collection of views and 
concerns presented by different actors in the biobanking field touching upon the 
finesses and details of the Act and how it should be reformed in the future. The 
report provides a valuable insight into prevailing social perceptions surrounding 
specific scientifically and commercially beneficial legislation which has expressly 
been created to support research activities for the benefit of science, society, 
individual people, and public health. The previous pages have hopefully elucidated 
how balance has been sought and proportionality accomplished and how the 
challenges can be met in future projects.
3.2.3 The Draft Genome Act 
As sample and data collections have amplified and new technologies have 
developed, the speed of generating genomic data has skyrocketed in biobanking, 
the clinical setting, and the commercial market. This in turn has resulted in various 
new challenges, which are not specific to any one of the mentioned areas but 
71 Internet search for ‘biopankki’ (the word for biobank in Finnish) gives 66,500 results. Search 
for ‘transfer of samples to biobank’ produces 6.090 results. Biobanks have presence at least in 
facebook, twitter and instagram. Sandra Liede – Sirpa Soini – Tom Southerington: Comment 
on ‘Salokannel et al., Legacy samples in Finnish biobanks: social and legal issues related to the 
transfer of old sample collections into biobanks’. Hum Genet 139, pp. 675–677 (2020). https://
doi.org/10.1007/s00439-020-02133-7, Accessed 18.12.2020.
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rather are collective and concern all of them. These challenges relate to collective 
issues and impact individual people’s lives and the broader societal context. To 
a great extent, the characteristics and very nature of genomic data is the central 
denominator for the various implications. Within the GDPR genetic data is placed 
in the special categories of data and is considered ‘sensitive’ in nature. Processing 
of genetic data is prohibited unless section 2 of Article 9 in the GDPR provides a 
legal basis for it. In Finland, the legislator proposed, after consulting the national 
data protection authority, that processing would be based on ‘public interest’ due 
to public health issues, equitable access to healthcare, and for the purpose of 
securing rights and freedom of others. Using public interest as a legal basis for 
processing genetic data indicates a positive obligation for the government to take 
legislative actions in order to secure the rights and freedoms of data subjects. For 
this reason, the draft Genome Act aims to not only establish a Genome Center 
for leading balanced discussion in the area but also to lay down provisions for 
the responsible use of genomic data. Still, the reasoning for legislating ‘genome-
specific’ issues is not, per se, grounded in the stigmatization of genomic data as 
opposed to other sensitive medical data, but rather in the need to secure individual 
and collective rights. 
Specific risks associated with the nature of genomic data have been assessed in 
the opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29), which was 
established under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC72. According to the opinion, 
genetic information is unique by nature and enables differentiating people from 
one another. Genetic information can also provide information about relatives 
of a person, or about the ethnicity of entire communities. It can additionally be 
used for making reproductive choices. According to the WP29 opinion, strong 
protection of genetic data is a prerequisite for respecting collective rights such 
as equality and the right to health. 
By the time the decision-makers in Finland received a signal indicating that 
government backing in the form of a national genome strategy was urgently 
needed, the technologies and applications had already begun to translate fast 
into the clinic and into the laptops, mobile phones, and smart wearable devices 
of the informed consumers. The work to draft a national genome strategy was 
launched in 2014 and finalized in 2015, but unfortunately still in the year 2020, the 
implementation of the strategy (which remains a working group proposal) is still 
lacking. The slow pace of the legislator has been highly criticized, as the proposal 
72 ARTICLE 29 Data Protection Working Party. Working Document on Genetic Data. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2004/
wp91_en.pdf. Accessed on 19.11.2020.
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for a national genome strategy originally contained many good feasible objectives 
and solutions. As always, where there’s a gap, there’s also opportunity – thus 
many solutions for pressing needs are already being addressed by various actors 
in the health field. For example, possibilities for providing services for returning 
clinically relevant results from biobanking projects and Direct to Consumer (DTC) 
genetic tests and services for genetic counselling are actively explored. Many 
consider that there is no need to establish a Genome Center for the purpose of 
answering these needs.
Even so, government actions are still considered necessary because of the 
collective nature of the social needs and concerns related to them. Government 
activities are especially needed to reach sustainable, socially just and inclusive goals. 
Radical innovations have the potential of bringing rapid benefits and solutions 
to pressing social needs but rarely do they cater to the entire population without 
backing from the government. As slow as the process has been, the emphasized role 
of the government is to try and foresee an optimal legal framework, which leaves 
space for innovation and encourages new solutions and ensures safe conditions 
and fair benefits for everyone.73 
Returning of results provides a feasible example of a challenge that is collective 
in nature. In the likely event that genomic testing has been carried out in biobanking 
or commercial genetic testing, and the results are predictive of genetic disease or 
they identify the person as a carrier or point to predisposition or susceptibility to 
a disease, the person will have to be referred to appropriate genetic counselling. 
Normally in a research context, incidental or secondary findings are not returned 
to research subjects. However, Section 39 in the Finnish Biobank Act expressly 
affirms that sample donors have the right to receive, upon request, information 
derived from the sample (e.g. genomic data) concerning the donor’s health.74
According to article 12 of the Oviedo Convention, such tests may be performed 
only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes and 
are subject to appropriate genetic counselling. The Convention leaves a wide 
margin of appreciation for governments to assess first, the scope of health purposes 
and secondly, the appropriateness of genetic counselling. Distinct guidance and 
legislation on the topic are currently lacking in Finland. The interpretation of 
what ‘health purpose’ indicates can be complex. For example, distinctions between 
perceiving health as catering to symptoms by providing a diagnosis or clinical 
care or considering health as the absence of a disease are extremely relevant for 
73 Vesa Salminen – Kimmo Halme, supra note 29.
74 Tupasela et al. in supra note 21.
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legally defining the scope of application of international documents. The paradigm 
shift from care to prevention is also very distinctive for personalized medicine.
Generally, if a genetic analysis is carried out within the public healthcare 
sector in Finland, the person would be referred to a specialist doctor of hereditary 
diseases. Since these kinds of consultations are expected to increase in the future 
and the total of give or take 50 specialists in the said professional area won’t have 
the resources to cater to all requests, there would have to be a common protocol 
on how to proceed, whom to consult and where to find additional support. After 
costs, volumes, and available expertise have been thoroughly assessed, a chain of 
responsibility ought to be established. Specializing doctors and specialist nurses 
could be educated by the hereditary diseases specialists for giving counselling 
as to the impacts related to findings of monogenic and rare diseases as well as 
cancer diseases. An unresolved question is how and with which legal mandate 
could the protocol be established if it were to extend beyond the clinic and into 
the biobanking and commercial field. One option would be to legislate and draw 
a red line at monogenic, rare, and cancer diseases and require the presence of a 
hereditary diseases professional in all activities, which may produce the indicated 
results.
The Finnish government has also proposed that the implied mandate would 
be given to the future Genome Center, which could – with the help of hereditary 
diseases specialists – give collective guidance to the entire field surrounding 
personalized medicine. The Genome Center would be an added resource to be 
utilized by the specific medical profession and would enable giving guidance 
collectively to all actors in the field, without having to give separate legislation 
each time a need for guidance occurs. Unfortunately, the medical profession 
is yet to be open to accepting this proposition as there is still ongoing debate 
surrounding polarized isolated issues, which relate mostly to common diseases, 
risk calculations, and prevention strategies. However, as the amount of genomic 
data is gradually expanding due to the activities of biobanks, research projects, and 
commercial actors, there is a genuine need for guidance as to how to communicate 
the results to individual people. The key question for legislators is how to provide 
safe, sustainable, and socially just solutions in order to secure equal rights and 
health for the whole population? 
The weakness of the Finnish genome project seems to be that too many 
complex questions are being solved at the same time. The overabundance of 
unresolved questions has resulted in a standstill in the legislative work. Many 
of the issues could however be solved with less laborious mechanisms such as 
guidance. Which makes it even more important that legislative efforts should 
be focused on establishing the Genome Center, which could then take lead and 
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ownership of the complex issues at stake. Due to the mentioned reasons, this article 
proposes that the provisions for establishing a Genome Center be separated from 
the legislative process of designating legal prerequisites for processing genomic 
data. It may very well be possible and even likely in the near future that the EU, 
namely the European Data Processing Board, will take lead in introducing new 
guidelines for processing genetic data.
3.3 The Way Forward – Bridging the Gap
As important as media coverage has been for challenging the justifications of the 
complex legislative framework, it has also shed light on the conflicting or even 
distorted understandings of how legislation should be established or amended. 
Legal theory emphasizes the importance of distinguishing the legally binding 
elements of law from the reflections of social perceptions and atmosphere. Public 
perceptions may guide the legislative process and even impact legal interpretations 
by pointing out the areas in need of increased social responsibility, but attaching 
to said views by dogmatizing them is not generally considered legally justified and 
should not be documented as legally binding. Embracing a historical perspective 
makes it even more evident that social reflections are triumphantly one-sided 
and time-related.
However, in the complex area of personalized medicine, finding an optimal path 
forward towards a consensus will require bridging the gap between legislators, the 
public, and the different actors in the field of genomics and personalized medicine 
by enhanced communication. Well-structured and methodically designed public 
debate can be a much more powerful source of public morality than unconstructive 
disputes supported by random media outlets. High-quality debate can be especially 
valuable for setting the appropriate level of protection. Well-grounded public 
debate is also more apt to increasing the public’s trust in the government as 
well as research and commercial actors. Furthermore, public debate can increase 
legitimacy and support for ethically complex legislation. 
Article 28 in the Oviedo Convention requires Member States to engage in a 
public debate with society in the field of biomedicine. According to the provision, 
fundamental questions raised by the developments of biology and medicine should 
be addressed by State parties to the Convention and subjected to appropriate 
public discussion and consultation. The Council of Europe Committee on Bioethics 
(DH-BIO) has produced a guide to assist in initiating or supporting public 
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debate and responding to it through public policy.75 According to the guidance, 
understanding which approaches are most appropriate and effective is one of 
the most fundamental challenges. In this context, four key considerations are 
proposed in the document: establishing the timing, objectives, and reasons for 
initiating public debate and defining who should be involved. Public debate should 
never be used for furthering private interests. From a legislative point of view, 
public debate needs to have an actual and functional connection to the legislative 
process to be effective so that the different participants truly feel empowered to 
influence the conditions of their collective future.
Defining and understanding the critical roles of different participants is key 
to agreement and unity. Each should ultimately recognize that they have been 
given an opportunity to be heard even if the end conclusion isn’t favorable for 
them. In the case of scientists and commercial actors, finding a common language 
with the legislator is important in order to understand one another. For example, 
scientists and commercial actors commonly envision new solutions for unsolved 
problems or unmet needs. Some of the solutions may be scalable, some may 
tend to the needs of only a single person or a small group of people. Usually, 
a thorough risk assessment is mandatory and technical security measures are 
adapted to correspond to the assessed risk. What is not required is a thorough 
risk assessment and evaluation of all unknown consequences and risks in possible 
future uses and edge cases beyond the use of what the actor originally intended. 
Rather, one might hope that maybe others can figure out new and innovative 
ways to extend what the primary innovators already created. Legislative work runs 
contrary to the role of science and private organizations. Legislators have a duty 
to assess all the expected and unexpected consequences and risks – especially if 
it is attempting to legislate the use of genomic data. 
3.4 Conclusions
Governments have a statutory duty, democratic responsibility, and political 
mandate to deliver public services in consistent and equal ways.76 The risk of 
not acting may be far greater than the risk of maintaining the status quo. The 
draft government proposal for the Genome Act states in its first sentences of the 
75 DH-BIO/INF(2018)11 FINAL.





introductory chapter that ‘Everyone has been guaranteed the right to enjoy the 
highest accessible physical and mental health. This right to health, as guaranteed 
by article 12 of the 1966 International UN Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights is often interpreted as a right to require positive actions by the 
state to actively promote health.’ By understanding and embracing this duty of 
the government, it may become easier to accept that the objective has all along 
been to promote health responsibly and equally for all.
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Abstract
Precision medicine is the healthcare model chosen by the European Union to tackle 
healthcare costs and improve research outcomes. This new paradigm is grounded on 
the pooling of healthcare data, which comprises human genetic information as well as 
lifestyle patterns. On a regional level, the Union has prompted a series of initiatives 
aiming at the mutualisation of healthcare information, with the collaboration of dedicated 
national bodies. The International Consortium for Personalized Medicine (ICPerMed), the 
‘1+Million Genomes Initiative,’ for instance, comes along with the facilitation of exchange 
of healthcare data amongst European and international medical consortia. The current 
craze surrounding precision medicine is not without raising legitimate concerns as to the 
results, methods and aims of this new healthcare policy, which substitutes the circulation 
of patients to that of their personal medical data across the Union. The creation of such 
medical data flows posits the question of its authentic rationale. While economic arguments 
are heralded as an end, one is to ask whether precision medicine does not pave the way for 
a more prescriptive and controlling regional healthcare policy, tightening its mesh on both 
societal and personal levels. Several hypotheses are examined in this paper: I first sketch 
the contours of current scientific knowledge in the field of genetics, and review precision 
medicine as a healthcare model. I then explore the whys and wherefores of the research 
benefit token which is held as a core argument to support the collection of healthcare data. 
Furthermore, such argument is not foreign to a technocratic worldview, whereby policies 




‘The problem is an empirical one […] it’s what I choose to call ‘decisional 
distance.’ In other words, it is a question of measuring the optimal distance 
between a decision made and the individual it concerns, in such a way that 
the individual has a say in what is done and in such a way that this decision 
is intelligible to him, while at the same time being geared to his situation, 
without having to go through an inextricable maze of regulations.’1
Michel Foucault, Philosopher, 1983.
‘Europeanisation has opened a constantly increasing gap between decision 
makers and those who are affected by decision making.’2
Christian Joerges, Professor of Law, 2014.
The process of integration of the Union has been an empirical one. A difficult 
identification of EU citizens to the Union’s institutions and policies is a common 
argument against it. More specifically, health has always been a challenging 
political issue. It touches upon the antagonising forces of life and death, which 
are the typical powers of the suzerain.3 Modern-day politics has divested the 
thaumaturge of their healing power, to the benefit of dedicated institutions. 
Liberated from magical thinking, contemporary medicine is precise, rational 
or ‘disenchanted,’ according to Max Weber’s expression. The discovery of the 
human genome has brought medicine to a new dimension, involving sophisticated 
biotechnologies, with an unprecedented hope of curing diseases at root level. 
The technocratic turn that healthcare has operated in Europe entails a widening 
of the patient-doctor relationship, to that of translational medicine. Genetic 
information is to be scrutinised by funded research groups to tackle identified 
diseases at regional level, and prompt updated Union healthcare orientations. 
From a societal viewpoint, such a change is not without raising interrogations as 
to the way patients will appraise this new medical paradigm, and how it will affect 
their self-perception, as citizens, and as patients. Both a philosopher – Foucault- 
and a jurist – Joerges, share the same concern regarding this growing ‘decisional 
distance.’ The genomic rationalised and regionalised medicine will as well affect 
1 Michel Foucault and CFDT, Alan Sheridan, trans., “Sécurité sociale: l’enjeu,” in Lawrence D. 
Kritzman, Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–
1984, (New York and London: Routledge, 1983), 168–169.
2 Christian Joerges, “Legitimacy Without Democracy in the EU? Perspectives on the 
Constitutionalisation of Europe through Law,” in Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari, 
eds., Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, 248–268, 265.
3 Larry Dossey, ‘The Royal Touch: A Look at Healing in Time Past,’ EXPLORE 9, no. 3, (May-
June 2013).
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the spiritual dimensions of care and with the risk of increasing patients’ feeling 
of solitude and powerlessness, somewhat reduced to their genetic ontology.
What is today’s state of knowledge in the field of genetics? The deciphering 
of the human genome through the Human Genome Project4 (HGP) achieved in 
2003 unraveled about 20 500 human genes, conceived of as the ‘history book – 
a narrative journey of our species through time’5 by Francis Collins in 2001, the 
then director of the National Human Genome Institute (NHGI). The turn of the 
21st century hallmarked the incursion of quasi- ‘disruptive’6 biotechnologies into 
the allopathic realm. During the last two decades, the deciphering project of the 
human genetic codex shifted towards a narrower scope: the decoding of the ‘human 
genome’ has been followed by the ongoing collection of ‘human genomes’ or 
‘human genetic information,’ thanks to the drastic multiplication of public-private 
genetic databases consortia, a soaring global phenomenon. Lately, the American 
ENCODE project offered to create ‘an encyclopedia detailing inner workings of 
human and mouse genomes’7 to identify functional areas in the genome i.e. protein-
coding genes.8 Comparative approaches with different species are in trend.9 The 
genetic codex is envisaged as a vast library, whereby scientists infer the root cause 
of diseases, and tailor a pharmaceutical response. This is a crude description of 
the current scientific gist as I draft the present contribution. Changes in scientific 
paradigms are tested by history, and I would say, captatio benevolentiae, that 
one cannot wage on their effective success. In the Biolegal realm, positive law is 
geared to march in lockstep with the evolution of medicine, and the incessant 
renewal of its societal and ethical challenges.
4 Human Genome Project https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project/What.
5 Ibid. The full sentence attributed to Francis Collins is: ‘It’s a history book - a narrative of the 
journey of our species through time. It’s a shop manual, with an incredibly detailed blueprint 
for building every human cell. And it’s a transformative textbook of medicine, with insights 
that will give health care providers immense new powers to treat, prevent and cure disease’.
6 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great 
Firms to Fail, (Boston, Massachussetts: Harvard Business Review Press, 2016).
7 Prabarna Gangluy, ‘NHGRI-funded project creates encyclopedia detailing inner workings of 




9 See, for instance, Prabarna Ganguly, ‘Comparing epigenetic differences between humans and 




The 21st century medical zeitgeist is thus genetic data,10 prolonging the 
incursion of rational discourses within the doctor-patient relationship.11 This 
steady ‘disenchantment’ of the ars medicinae,12 in line with the technologisation 
of medical practices, is not without raising concerns as to the very use of its 
paradigmatic mutations. Such research endeavors require the collection of ‘data,’ a 
critical objective upon which genetic research depends. The ensuing uses of genetic 
human research findings are called into question, especially when research projects 
pursue a wider economical interest through biotechnological application. In this 
perspective, cooperation between political organs and research instances is key 
to the scaffolding of sustainable policies for precision medicine in Europe. This 
dynamic between rationality and political decisions reveals a continual imbalance, 
to the benefit of a technocratic orientation of healthcare and research policies in the 
Union, hence the division of its dedicated bodies13 and a symptomatic weakness of 
harmonisation, diagnosed as ‘constitutional asymmetry.’14 As Habermas observes, 
the political has become the organ of execution of a ‘scientific intelligentsia.’15 
Scientists advocating for a philanthropic view of a better world is but nothing 
new.16 The normative power of human genomics on society remains hard to assess, 
though Jennifer Doudna’s presentation during the 2017 South by Southwest 
(SXSW) technological fest in Texas displayed a vast range of applications in the 
field of germline editing, as presented in the daily newspaper Le Monde by Bernard 
Monasterolo.17 Assuredly, biomedical science, and more specifically genetics, is 
10 Dean Southwood, ‘In Genes We Trust: Genetic Privacy in the Age of Precision Medicine,’ in 
Personhood in the Age of Biolegality, Brave New Law, eds. Marc de Leeuw and Sonja van 
Wichelen, (Switzerland: Springer Nature/Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 167.
11 Michel Foucault, A.M. Sheridan, trans., The Birth of the Clinic, (London: Routledge, 1973), xv.
12 Alexandre Abensour, ‘L’éthique en médecine: une nouvelle compassion face à l’indifférence 
modern?’ in Traité de bioéthique I- Fondements, principes, repères, Emmanuel Hirsch, ed., 
(Toulouse: Érès, 2010), 73.
13 Scott L. Greer, Nick Fahy, Heather A. Elliott, Matthias Wismar, Holly Jarman and Willy Palm, 
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About European Union Health Policies but Were 




14 Govin Permanand and Elias Mossialos, ‘Constitutional Asymetry and Pharmaceutical Policy 
Making in the European Union,’ Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 4 (2015): 687–709.
15 Jürgen Habermas, René Ladmiral (trans.), La technique et la science comme « idéologie », 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 100. 
16 André Pichot, L’Eugénisme ou les généticiens saisis par la philantropie, (Paris: Hatier, 
1995), 4.
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reshaping Western society through the unfolding of a new set of norms: typical 
items, usually that of aging and healthcare costs, are to be radically tackled. In 
this context, what we often label as ‘Law’ or ‘Biolaw’ is reduced to its strictly 
instrumental function. It is within a regulatory framework that research based 
upon genetic databases is conducted, with a topical emphasis on the protection of 
the fundamental rights of data donors, and more specifically, due respect for data 
privacy within data sharing schemes. Two antagonising targets must be enforced: 
the respect of each donor’s privacy, and the pooling of an increasing amount of 
genetic information. The anonymity or pseudonymisation of human genetic data 
stocks are therefore the legal keystone from which research is deemed to conform 
to ethical methods; yet, in the meantime, ‘precision medicine’ entails a profiling 
of each donor’s genetic code. Within the allopathic context, genetic information 
is made available to dedicated professionals as a diagnostic tool for inheritable 
diseases (such as type I diabetes), orphan diseases, and other ailments (in the field 
of oncology, cardiology, inter alia). As a healthcare policy, precision medicine may 
unlock the exclusive and confidential relationship between the patient and the 
medical practitioner, bound by the Hippocratic Oath, nowadays enshrined in the 
WMA Declaration of Geneva.18 Human genetic heritage fulfills a manifold function: 
it is part of a person’s biological conformation, but also serves as raw material for 
public health projects. The genetic diagnosis concerns both the individual and 
the population, both on macro and micro levels.19 Regulatory frames upon which 
medical professionals are to contribute to ‘precision medicine’ policies lay bare a 
terra incognita: since both phenotypic and genotypic information across Members 
States shall be collected,20 will citizens have the right to refuse to contribute to the 
collective ‘genetic effort’21 in the future? To what extent will the ‘common weal’ 
argument be exercised upon them? Does the present-day legal framework act as 
an efficient protective screen, or does it play the role of the ‘legality token’ of a 
multi-leveled data-driven Biopower?
18 World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva, ‘The Physician’s Pledge,’ 9 July 2018. 
 https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-geneva/.
19 Bob Jessop, ‘From Macro-Powers to Governmentality: Foucault’s Work on Statehood, State 
Formation, Statecraft and Statepower,’ Political Geography, 26, no. 1 (January 2007): 6. ‘The 
study of power should begin from below, in the heterogeneous and dispersed microphysics of 
power, explore specific forms of its exercise in different institutional sites, and consider how, 
if at all, these were linked to produce broader and more persistent societal configurations. One 
should study power where it is exercised over individuals rather than legitimated at the centre; 
explore the actual practices of subjugation rather than legitimated at the center […].’
20 Euan A. Ashley, ‘Towards precision medicine,’ Nature Reviews Genetics, no. 17, (2007): 507–
522. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg.2016.86




In this paper, I try to unravel the Union’s ‘precision medicine’ rationale from 
two vantage points, which Axel Honneth has identified as competing critiques 
of power22: Habermas’s anthropological delineation of knowledge and interest, 
and Foucault’s biopolitical model of normalisation. I first explain that ‘precision 
medicine’ is a multi-faceted concept, at the crux of various Union instruments 
(1). I contend that the ‘research benefit token’ argument is far from anodyne, 
given the Member States’ constitutional traditions and the bioethical review of the 
ECtHR (2). I then explain how Union healthcare follows a liberal and technocratic 
line (3), as described by Jürgen Habermas. I finally test if Union genetic data 
sharing initiative bears the potential of becoming a polity akin to that of Michel 
Foucault’s biopower (4). 
4.1 ‘Precision Medicine’
It took more than a decade for Europe to catch up with the lead of the American 
‘genetic revolution.’ On the international scene, the Global Alliance for Genomics 
and Health claims the analysis of not less than 50 million genomes and exomes 
by 2021.23 The late European ‘1+ Million Genomes Initiative’24 mimics this policy, 
aiming at the mutualisation of regional genetic databases. Its proclaimed objective 
is to enhance the ‘effectiveness, accessibility, sustainability and resilience of 
health systems in the European Union’25. Indeed, ‘[i]nterpreting people’s health 
characteristics- including their genomes- is key to delivering effective health and 
care.’26 Prolific scientific literature confirms that symptomatic medicine made a 
huge leap forward in terms of ‘precision,’ for genetic information allows a deeper 
understanding of the causes of ailments, and therefore helps in tailoring the 
pharmaceutical responses to each genetic makeup. Yet, discourses surrounding 
‘precision medicine’ qua policy correspond to a rather prospective spirit, meant 
to bear fruitful results: ‘a game changer for European health research and clinical 
22 Axel Honneth, Dautrey Marianne and Olivier Voirol, trans., Critique du pouvoir, (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2016), p. 281.
23 Fruzsina Molnár-Gábor and Jan O Korberl, ‘Genomic Data Sharing in Europe is Stumbling 
– Could a Code of Conduct Prevent its Fall?’ EMBO Molecular Medicine 12, no. e11421, 
(2020): 1.
24 European Union ‘1+ Million Genomes Initiative’ https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/
en/european-1-million-genomes-initiative.
25 Ibid.
26 European Commission, DG Connect, ‘1+Million Genome Roadmap 2020-2022, Summary of a 
Document Adopted on 4 February 2020 by the Signatories of the Declaration’ https://ec.europa.
eu/digital-single-market/en/european-1-million-genomes-initiative.
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practices: sharing more genomic data will improve understanding and prevention 
of disease, allowing for more personalized treatments (and targeted drug 
prescription), particularly for rare diseases, cancer, and brain-related diseases.’27 
Biolaw’s human rights consistence is chiefly represented by the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on a regional level- coined as its 
bioethical facet28- confirming the Europeanness of medical rights. Potential data 
donors are thus at the crossroads of a heterogeneous normative nexus. On Union 
level, healthcare is a relatively recent object, yet the rise of data circulation has 
yielded new prospects for cross-border healthcare possibilities,29 and pooling of 
medical information within the Digital Single Market30. The flow of health data 
is meant to have a leveraging effect to the scaffolding of an integrative Union 
healthcare program. 
The basis for the Union’s precision medicine project is article 168 TFEU, 
under the aegis of the Commission (article 114. 3 TFEU),31 the EU regulatory 
framework for pharmaceuticals, the ‘GDPR’32 and other EU instruments.33 This 
block is the skeleton upon which personalized medicine, as a healthcare policy, is 
to be attained as a core objective of the Union, ‘a high level of health protection,’ 
27 Digibyte, ‘EU countries will cooperate in linking genomic databases across borders’, 10 April 
2018 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eu-countries-will-cooperate-linking-
genomic-databases-across-borders.
28 Council of Europe, Court of Human Rights, Research Report. Bioethics and the case-law of 
the Court, 20 October 2016, 3. ‘For the purposes of this report the term “bioethics” has been 
understood to encompass the protection of the human being (his/her human rights and in 
particular human dignity) in the context of the development of biomedical sciences.’
29 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the 
application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
30 European Commission, ‘EU countries will cooperate in linking genomic databases across 
borders,’ 10 April 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eu-countries-
will-cooperate-linking-genomic-databases-across-borders.
31 Article 114. 3 TFEU. ‘The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning 
health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high 
level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific 
facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council will also seek 
to achieve this objective.’
32 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
33 Chiefly, the in vitro diagnostics and medical device legislation, and clinical trials regulation.
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complementing national policies.34 In this respect, the enhancement of digital 
platforms constitutes a significant ally to the Union’s integration prospects, yet 
grounded on the circulation of data rather than patients, despite the cross-border 
care directive.35 The cooperation between health systems has been supported 
by the Council,36 to ‘improve the availability of skills and resources across the 
European Union,’37 eased by Electronic Health Records (ERH).
Precision medicine, also labelled as ‘personalized medicine,’ is medicine’s new 
international Copernican revolution. To the European Commission: ‘common 
medicines’ are deemed to be ‘no longer effective in treating large numbers of 
patients’38 due to the rise of healthcare costs caused by population aging.39 This 
observation is in line with that of the American Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) portal, which conveys an equivalent message: the imperative need to 
prompt a tailored disease prevention, and thus leave behind the one-size-fits-all 
paradigm.40 ‘Precision medicine’ does not correspond to any specific medical or 
scientific cure per se, but rather designates a certain healthcare policy or ‘model,’41 
based upon the mutualisation of human genetic information, on both national 
34 Article 168, 1, § 2. ‘Union action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed 
towards improving public health, preventing physical and mental illness and diseases, and 
obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health. Such action shall cover the fight 
against the major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission 
and their prevention, as well as health information and education, and monitoring, early warning 
of and combating serious cross-border threats to health.’
35 European Commission, Study on cross-border health services: enhancing information provision 
to patients, (June 2018), 125–126. https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/cross_
border_care/docs/2018_crossborder_frep_en.pdf.
 Thus far, the cross-border care directive has not been a success: ‘[…] the literature showed that a 
limited number of patients exercise their right to treatment in another MS. […] Specific barriers 
that prevent patients from seeking treatment abroad include the financial burden of upfront 
payment under Directive 2011/24/EU and obtaining reimbursement after having travelled 
abroad to receive treatment.’
36 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Encouraging Member States-driven 
Voluntary Cooperation Between Health Systems, (16 June 2017). http://data.consilium.europa.
eu/doc/document/ST-10381-2017-INIT/en/pdf.
37 Ibid., 4.
38 European Commission, Personalized medicine. Background, conference reports, publications and 
links related to personalized medicine: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation/
research-area/health-research-and-innovation/personalized-medicine_en> accessed 29 
February 2020.
39 Ibid.
40 US Food and Drug Administration, Personalized medicine. https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/vitro-diagnostics/precision-medicine accessed 29 February 2020.
41 European Commission, Personalized Medicine. https://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/
personalized-medicine_en.
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and regional levels. In the 2015 Council conclusions on personalized medicine 
for patients, it is defined as:
‘A medical model using characterization of individuals’ phenotypes and 
genotypes (e.g. molecular profiling, medical imaging, lifestyle data) for 
tailoring the right therapeutic strategy for the right person at the right 
time, and/or to determine the predisposition to disease and/or to deliver 
timely and targeted prevention.’42
Easing ‘data sharing’43 within the digital single market has thus become a crucial 
issue. The European Commission communication released in April 201844 
confirms that ‘Data is a key enabler for health transformation’45 though the report 
emphasises the need to harmonise data mutualisation among member States.46 
The use of A.I. and data-analytics are meant to optimise the use of healthcare 
digital market similarly.47 The sensitive character of medical information is not 
emphasised in this definition of personalized medicine, worded as follows: 
‘Personalized medicine is an emerging approach that uses data generated by 
new technologies to better understand the characteristics of an individual 
and deliver the right care to the right person at the right time. New 
technologies enable a wider use of genomic and other information (such 
as molecular profiling, diagnostic imaging, environmental lifestyle data) to 
help doctors and scientists better understand diseases and how to better 
predict, prevent, diagnose, and treat.’48
Precision medicine is in fact medicine that analyses genetic information which 
is said to enhance both the physicians’ diagnoses and research outcomes. This 
medical approach entails mass genetic sequencing and does not necessarily serve a 
42 Council conclusions on personalized medicine for patients, (2015/C, 421/03). https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2015:421:FULL&from=EN.
43 European Commission, Personalized medicine.
44 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee of the Regions on enabling the digital transformation of health 
and care in the Digital Single Market; empowering citizens and building a healthier society, 








strictly curative purpose, since it includes preventive or predictive aims. Evidently, 
this endeavour yields interrogations as to the protection of citizens’ privacy, and 
how damageable the release of sensitive information – in spite of the boundaries 
set by the GDPR49– could drastically alter peoples’ freedoms. The proclaimed aims 
constitute the leap of faith to which European patients will most certainly have 
to abide by, at least from the Commission’s prospective vision in the ‘Bohemia 
project.’50
Understood lato sensu, norms involved in this healthcare data policy are 
twofold: on the one hand, Union-law-stamped norms which aim at easing 
the implementation of the precision medicine policy, and, on the other hand, 
rationalised norms emanating from medical spheres per se, corresponding to 
Biomedical expert jurisdictions, inferred from probabilistic categorisations used 
in omics.51 Emphasis is indeed made on the use of omics and ‘biomarkers,’52 
which relate to a rationalised medical gaze via ‘quantifiable characteristics of 
medical processes.’53 This quantification of health sketches a blueprint of medical 
normality, which belongs to the scientists’ jurisdiction.54 One is to ask if, perhaps, 
such aims of rationalisation55 and normalisation via medical diagnoses do not 
49 Regulation (EU) 2016/79 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
§ (34), (35), (53).
50 European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Precision Medicine 
– Targeted Scenario Nº1, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018). 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/precision-medicine-targeted-scenario-14_2018_
en.pdf>
 Its prospective summary is worth a read: ‘It is 2040. Individualized precision medicine 
combining mass data analyses, genetic engineering, epigenetics, and knowledge about the 
personal microbiome and the biotic environment helps anticipate and cure illnesses. Human 
enhancement is an issue of ethical and regulatory concern.’
51 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Use of ‘-omics’ technologies 
in the use of personalized medicine, Brussels, 25 October 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/research/
health/pdf/2013-10_personalized_medicine_en.pdf.
52 Kyle Strimbu and Jorge A. Tavel. ‘What are Biomarkers?’ Current opinion in HIV and AIDS 5, 
no. 6, (2010): 463–466. https://doi.org/10.1097/COH.0b013e32833ed177.
53 Ibid., 2.
54 Ibid., 5. ‘Understanding the relationship between measurable biological processes and clinical 
outcomes is vital to expanding our arsenal of treatments for all diseases, and for deepening our 
understanding of normal, healthy physiology. [emphasis added]’
55 Alexandre Abensour, ‘L’Ethique en médecine: une nouvelle compassion face à l’indifférence 
modern?’ in Emmanuel Hirsch (ed.), Traité de bioéthique I- Fondements, principes, repères, 
(Toulouse: Érès, 2010), pp. 70–94, 73.
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unravel a Bachelardian ‘epistemological obstacle,’56 preventing other medical 
approaches to swerve from the current healthcare doxa57 and the ‘redefinition 
of disease taxonomy.’58 The use of biomarkers circumvents clinical endpoints i.e. 
‘the subject’s health and well-being from the subject’s perspective.’59 
The ‘precision medicine’ approach seems to be mostly holistic in numbers. This 
rationalised ‘bench to bedside’ policy circumvents the emotional management 
of illness, the alleviation of pain and the patient’s well-being which are critical 
deontological duties.60 Once consent is given, patients are empowered by the 
sole possibility of revoking it. As attainable as it may be, one is to question the 
true cost of this programme, in terms of respect for private life and other civil 
liberties, since precision medicine also comprises the analysis of lifestyle data, 61 
known as ‘lifestyle medicine.’ 62 Volens nolens, the destiny of one’s genetic and 
healthcare information is far from secured, regardless of the promises and vows of 
international research consortia, waging on ‘codes of conduct’63 and self-regulatory 
frameworks, rather than that of a genuine legal and ethical control. Bearing in 
mind the Modern origins of Bioethics, free rein for science has objectively shown 
to be a dramatically naïve mindset.
56 Gaston Bachelard, La Formation de l’Esprit Scientifique, Contribution à un Psychanalyse de la 
Connaissance (Paris: Vrin, 2011), 67. ‘Nous allons nous efforcer de montrer que cette science 
du général est toujours un arrêt de l’expérience, un échec de l’empirisme inventif. [...] Il y a en 
effet une jouissance intellectuelle dangereuse dans une généralisation hâtive et facile’. Author’s 
translation: ‘We will strive proving that this science of the general is always an interruption 
of experience, a defeat of inventive empiricism. […] There is indeed a dangerous intellectual 
enjoyment in a hasty and easy generalisation.’
57 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, 7. The Commission Staff working 
document on personalized medicine clearly evokes a change of paradigm: ‘Current health care 
models are organ-, system- or disease-oriented. Personalized medicine is expected to bring about 




60 WMA, Declaration of Geneva. ‘The health and well-being of my patient will be my first 
consideration.’
61 See, for instance, Yalan Chen, Xingyun Liu, Yijun Yu, Chunjiang Yu, Lan Yang, Yuxin Lin, Ting 
Xi, Ziyun Ye, Zhe Feng, Bairong Shen, ‘PCaLiStDB: a lifestyle database for precision prevention 
of prostate cancer,’ Database, Volume 2020, 2020, baz154. https://doi.org/10.1093/database/
baz154.
62 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, 5–6. ‘[…] therapies have been 
developed, and prescribed, using ‘average patient’ approach that does not take into account 
patients’ ‘molecular makeup’, a factor that, together with environmental and lifestyle factors, 
determines susceptibility to disease, the course of disease, and response to treatment.’ [emphasis 
added]
63 Molnár-Gábor and Korbel, ‘Genetic Data in Europe is Stumbling,’ 5.
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4.2 The ‘Research Benefit’ Token
Precision medicine, as such, evolves with a continuous flow of information which 
could, depending on the feasibility of its expansion, involve hundreds of millions 
of citizens.64 The Union framework is of regional and international scale,65 with 
the aim of accruing genetic data flow in the context of a healthcare policy. Yet its 
ambit remains an open book, given the vagueness of the research schemes aims: 
the exploratory character of Biomedical research somewhat prevents researchers 
from guaranteeing a precise picture of their research outcomes: a plethora of 
research discoveries occur spontaneously, it is called serendipity. In Union Law, 
medical research is not the only sector where the protection of genetic data 
requires scrutiny.66 The use of biological information within a transnational and 
judicial cooperation scheme enlightens the importance of biological (and medical) 
information, for their identificatory function in law enforcement procedures. 
The ‘Police Directive’ 2016/68067 confirms the existence of discrepancies 
between Member States as to the management of such information, since: ‘[t]he 
approximation of Member States’ laws should not result in any lessening of the 
personal data protection [emphasis added]’ (Preamble, (15) in fine), a bad omen 
in terms of legal certainty and, hence a noteworthy caveat:
‘Considering the complexity and sensitivity of genetic information, there is a 
great risk of misuse and re-use for various purposes by the controller. Any 
discrimination based on genetic features should in principle be prohibited.’ 
[emphasis added]68
64 Approximately 448 million. See Eurostat, Communiqué de Presse 111/2020, 10 July 2020.
 <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11081101/3-10072020-AP-FR.
pdf/15ed8ebe-82de-05bc-36e9-fef0faae1e33>. See, as well, Regulation 2016/679, (6), https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj.
 ‘The scale of the collection and sharing of personal data has increased significantly.’
65 Molnár-Gábor and Korbel, ‘Genetic Data in Europe is Stumbling,’ 7. 
 DOI: 10.15252/emmm.201911421.
66 Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et Conseil de l’Europe, Manuel de droit 
européen en matière de protection des données, 2018, 17.
67 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/680 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
68 Ibid., Preamble (23). 
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The data controller – an institution processing personal data, for instance - is 
not given carte blanche to use genetic information, because of the exigency of a 
‘legitimate interest.’69 The manifold relevance of genetic data, as an identificatory 
element or as research material, entails a clear delineation of limits as to the 
legitimacy of their use by both public and private bodies. It is important to note that 
racial or ethnic characteristics are ‘particularly sensitive in relation to fundamental 
rights and freedoms.’70 There lies a clear prohibition of the categorisation of 
personal data which would support ‘theories which attempt to determine the 
existence of separate human races.’71 Yet, special categories of personal data 
may also be processed for ‘health purposes, including public health and the 
management of health-care services, especially in order to ensure the quality 
and cost-effectiveness of the procedures used for settling claims for benefits and 
services in the health insurance system, or for archiving purposes in the public 
interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.’72 This is 
perhaps the most telling example of the ‘research benefit token.’ The prospective 
character of the precision medicine initiative leaves the door open for important 
discussions, especially that which concerns the efficacy of patients’ rights within 
the Union. Given the nature of its legislative basis, mostly composed of secondary 
legislation, the margin of action of citizens against excessive usage of their medical 
information by research groups shall be further specified. The universal character 
of the sensitiveness of human genetic information is a compelling urgency for 
intellectual and normative alignment.
Whilst the precision medicine initiative is to ease the flow of medical information 
across the Union, numerous cases of the ECtHR concern medical (genetic) data 
used for their probative or preemptive value, by or against individuals, and are 
subject to a tight regimentation. One is to ask whether this double-standard73 upon 
medical secrecy unveils a discrepancy regarding the protection of freedoms. In 
the case of the precision medicine programme, exchange facilitation via digital 
technologies is justified by the attainment of common weal (art. 168 TFEU), 
substantiated by economic benefits. This, again, highlights the very power of the 
research benefit argument. This economic rationale appears in plain light, once 
again, concerning the management of human genetic information. If resources 
69 GDPR, Recital 47.
70 GDPR, Recital 51.
71 Ibid.
72 GDPR, Recital 52.
73 Kathrin Kuhnert, ‘Bosphorus – Double standards in European human rights protection?’ in 
Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, (December 2006).
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have changed in nature, the rationale remains the same. ‘Data’ is the latest flowing 
layer of a mercantile exchange, amidst a vast nexus of products and services. Yet, 
genetic and healthcare data are a challenge to an unabashed liberal management, 
because of bioethical barriers. It seems difficult to envisage genetic and medical 
data as an anodyne resource, since it is a constitutional and bioethical imperative 
to secure the consent of their respective holders. 
4.3 The Technocratic Line 
Research benefits constitute a philanthropic argument favouring the ushering of 
sensitive medical information. Moreover, the medical token is unquestionably 
powerful. Indeed, who would not incline, prima facie, to contribute to the common 
healthcare effort ‘for the benefit of patients and society.’74 Our intuitive perception 
of medical and research professionals is generally positive. Scientists are the 
heroes of today, and, to keep up to a totemic-religious role75 - and maintain 
consensus with the public- enhance their communication abilities to democratise 
their knowledge.76 Communication is key, and the discursive facet of science is 
critical in many aspects, let alone fundraising. Research impregnates the societal 
realm by reshaping social interactions, be it in shifting forms of individuation 
(genetic information is topical in this respect), or, from a societal vantage point, 
by prompting new forms of rational legitimation. Habermas indeed contends that 
classical theories of statecraft and power are becoming irrelevant because of their 
lack of social embedment.77 His reappraisal of knowledge blurs the lines as to 
the determination of interests and influence of research groups onto the political 
realm.78 Research findings do serve a political purpose, and may no longer be 
envisaged as the purport of scientists locked up in their ivory tower. Between 
medical norms and legally stamped norms lies a gateway which circumvents 
former forms of power legitimation, hallmarked by a strong token of scientificity. 
74 Molnár-Gábor and Korbel, ‘Genetic Data in Europe is Stumbling,’ 1. 
75 Jürgen Habermas, Thomas McCarthy, trans., The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 2: 
Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 52–
53.
76 See Dennis Meredith, Explaining Research, How to Reach Key Audiences to Advance Your 
Work, (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
77 Axel Honneth, Dautrey Marianne and Olivier Voirol, trans., Critique du pouvoir: Michel Foucault 
et l’École de Francfort, élaborations d’une théorie critique de la société, (Paris: La Découverte, 
2016), 240.
78 Jürgen Habermas, René Ladmiral, trans., La technique et la science comme « idéologie », 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 101.
74
‘Precision Medicine’: Critical Reflections on Europe’s Latest Healthcare Paradigm   
Tight regimentation somewhat reflects the invasive character of science-laden 
norms in many sectors of civil life, and this strongly applies to healthcare as well. 
The technocratic line henceforth consists in finding justifications which are not 
necessarily tied to classical political worldviews. Science, through experimentation 
and exploration, has widened the scope of the technically feasible. Therefore, 
scientific projects are geared to fulfilling practical outcomes, with the promise of a 
return on investment. Ignoring this facet of Biomedical research would be, again, 
naïve. If one adds to this rationale a liberal framework, then the research ethics 
argument reveals a certain weakness. Given its procedural position, the ethical 
review of the ECtHR slackens the feedback reaction on potential abuses of genetic 
data management. As to the Court of Justice, its control is exercised upon an 
economic regulatory basis, which tinges its cases’ motives. In the Union paradigm, 
health as such is concretely envisaged as a ‘service’ or ‘data,’ despite the ethical 
guarantees of its dispersed constitutional kernel.79 In fact, the ambit of the GDPR, 
concerning research, seals the impossibility of exercising tight control over the uses 
of data in research projects, since ‘it is often not possible to fully identify the purpose 
of personal data processing for scientific purposes at the time of data collection.’80 
While a separate consent of the subject should be gathered by the controller for 
further processing, one might question the existence of absolute control of such 
ethical observance. This reveals an uncanny légèreté as to the objective control over 
the use of genetic information, to the benefit of research groups. Yet white blouse 
misconduct exists: the extent of settlements in the field of pharmaceutics proves 
the importance of setting clear boundaries within the field of drug development, in 
terms of fair use of patients’ medical information and pricing.81 Since research on 
genetic data aims at tailoring medication uptake upon patients’ genetic makeup, 
the imperative clarification of the Union’s integrative pricing policy continues 
to lag whilst ‘[m]edicines, particularly the research-segment, are an extremely 
profitable industry’, worthy of governments’ ‘safeguarding,’82 to the dismay of 
international competitors.83 Personalized medicine is to tackle upstream costs 
79 See infra note 87.
80 GDPR, Recital 33. See as well, Recital 43 in fine.
81 Ellen ‘t Hoen, ‘Time to put a stop to the abuse of orphan drug regulation- the latest scandal,’ 
Medicines Law & Policy, (January 9 2019).
 https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2019/01/time-to-put-a-stop-to-the-abuse-of-orphan-drug-
regulation-the-latest-scandal/.
82 Permanand and Mossialos, ‘Constitutional Asymetry,’ 688.
83 Joseph H. Golec and John A. ‘Vernon, European Pharmaceutical Price Regulation, Firm 





incurred by the inadequate uptake of medicines, and ensuing adverse reactions, 
which represents an important expenditure item (6% of hospital admissions.)84 
The rationale is, again, an economic one:
‘Significant upfront investment may be needed for technological upgrades, 
structural changes, and education and training efforts for staff in health care 
systems. Such investment may however be offset by savings in unnecessary 
costs due to inadequate treatment for a patient. The economic impact of 
personalized medicine therefore needs to be considered from an overarching 
level, the so-called ‘societal’ cost perspective encompassing the complete 
health care system as well as patient benefits in terms of reduced days of 
incapacity, days of hospitalisation, etc.’ [emphasis added]85
Curbing ‘unnecessary costs’ is indeed a crucial objective yet requiring tight 
cooperation between a web of juxtaposed healthcare and social systems. To be 
truly effective, such objective calls for a genuine reform of healthcare systems, with 
unavoidable political meddling. In recent decades, the shift towards a managerial 
model (governance) of public hospitals has not been positively received on 
national levels.86 On a tangential point, the health services market displays a 
similar field of inconsistency. The Court’s cases87 unfold the difficult equalisation 
of health costs incurred by between Member States, conundrums which their 
ex-post codification in the cross-border care Directive has timidly succeeded in 
tackling, by loosening authorisation requirements and reinforcing legal certainty. 
Regarding the harmonisation of pricing, the ‘Transparency Directive’88 was 
meant to ease import and export of medicine and prevent national policies from 
84 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Use of ‘-omics’ Technologies in 
the Development of Personalized Medicine, Brussels, 25 October 2013, 4.
 http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/pdf/2013-10_personalized_medicine_en.pdf.
85 Ibid., 6.
86 A striking example is the recent reforms of French healthcare system. See Jean-Pierre Claveranne, 
Christophe Pascal and David Piovesan, ‘La gouvernance hospitalière à la croisée des chemins,’ 
in Bras, Pierre Louis and Gérard de Pouvourville, eds., Traité d’économie et de gestion de la 
santé, (Paris: Sciences Po, 2009).
87 See for instance Luisi and Carbone, joined cases 286/82 and 26/83 [1984] ECR 377; SPUC v. 
Grogan, C-159/90 [1991] ECR I-4685; Vanbraeckel, C-368/98 [2001] ECR I-5363; Geraets-
Smiths and Peerbooms, C-157/99 [2001] ECR I-5473; Müller-Fauré, C-385/99 [2003] ECR 
I-4509.
88 Council Directive of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of measures regulating the 
pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health 
insurance systems.
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imposing financial restrictions, yet with mitigated success.89 Healthcare remains 
a rather national matter, since scientific requirements for treatments may vary 
from a country to another, hampering the flow of health services. Citing James 
Wilson,90 Govin Permanand and Elias Mossialos demonstrate that the Union’s 
pharmaceutical policy resolutely serves the industry’s interests.91 If one acquiesces 
to the technocratic hypothesis, its political importance remains undefined since the 
Union is practically prevented from scaffolding a purely liberal healthcare market 
by weighty national particularisms. Habermas explains that the technocratic 
model is insufficient92: knowledge production does not necessarily coalesce with 
technological applications. Technical and practical questions do not follow an 
identical line: healthcare reality does not necessarily correspond to industrial 
(medical) productions. While recital 157 of the GDPR clearly states that research 
results are to ground a ‘knowledge-based policy,’93 one may sensibly question 
biotechnological and digital applications resulting from such endeavour. Clear 
decisions – emanating from political organs- must be taken for such a technocratic 
system to remain dynamic. This dialectic should involve the public as well, given 
the importance that genetic research holds for future generations. Institutions and 
research groups must organise prescientific discussions,94 to find an agreement on 
the expected pragmatic outcomes,95 and act in unison with political stakeholders. 
89 Permanand and Mossialos, ‘Constitutional Asymetry,’ 701.
90 James Q. Wilson, ‘The Politics of Regulation,’ in James Q. Wislon, ed., The Politics of Regulation, 
(New York: Basic Book Inc, 1980).
91 Ibid., 694.
92 Jürgen Habermas, René Ladmiral, trans., La techninque et la science comme idéologie, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1973), 101.
93 ‘Research results obtained through registries provide solid, high-quality knowledge which can 
provide the basis for the formulation and implementation of knowledge-based policy, improve 
the quality of life for a number of people and improve the efficiency of social services [emphasis 
added]’, (Recital 157, GDPR).




4.4 A Biopolitical Future?
What could be the ultimate outcome of such ‘knowledge-based policy’? Politics and 
knowledge do not always pursue the same objective. Biomedicine, as a source of 
moral norms (primum non nocere) and medical norms (ars medicinae), challenges 
the cohesiveness of our classical understanding of law from the usual positivist 
lens. The legal anointing follows a manifold purpose: first, the enshrinement of 
moral conduct which is specifically intended for medical practitioners, in their 
contractual relationship with the patient at micro-level; second, the regulatory 
anointing of public health policies on a macro-level. Laws tend to balance 
between rationality and morals, yet for European Biolaw, moral thresholds 
vary geographically. Thus, one is to conceive of Biolaw as an instrument rather 
than a cohesive normative source. Current trends confine Biolegal scholarship 
into a positivistic vault, despite a recent attempt to theorise it.96 Consequently, 
one is led to turn to other intellectual models, which do not necessarily match 
classical legal analysis. To Foucault, the law and its representative instances, such 
as the Judge, are only a mere representation of a ‘king.’97 His ‘anti-juridism,’98 
inferred from his analysis of Boulainvilliers’ theory on the downfall of French 
nobility,99 reflects the frailty of the juridical institution in Foucault’s own sight. 
Like Habermas, Foucault observes that old constitutional models have become 
maladjusted to the technologisation of modern society. Therefore, research and 
bio-technological consortia need to be considered as part of a recent diversification 
and deployment of normative instances. Conversely, their growing importance 
in decision-making require a certain distancing with scientific knowledge, for its 
normative charge constitutes a strong source of power legitimation. In this respect, 
Foucault’s distancing from the ‘medical gaze’ started with the ‘Birth of the Clinic’ 
(1963) where he analyses the evolution of the patient’s existence as a subject, via 
a critical analysis of medical discourses. Embedded in its historical segment, the 
medical sight appears to evolve together with medical knowledge. Medicine is 
thus no absolute truth, but rather a given discourse, embedded in an identified 
epistemological layer. Foucault’s initial stance on medical norms in ‘Birth of the 
Clinic’ will evolve in his ensuing opuses. Locating the genuine roots of the ‘Birth 
96 Roman Andrzej Tokarczyk, Biojurisprudence: Foundations of Law for the Twenty-First Century, 
(Lublin: Maria Curie-Sklodowska University Press, 2008).
97 See Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, Foucault et la justice, 25 April 1977: https://www.ina.
fr/video/I06277667/michel-foucault-et-la-justice-video.html.
98 Op. Cit., Foucault, Il faut défendre la société, 173.
99 Henri Comte de Boulainvilliers, Essais sur la noblesse de France contenans une dissertation 
sur son origine et abaissement, (Amsterdam: S.n., 1732).
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of Biopolitics’ (1979) within Foucault’s numerous lectures is a delicate question. 
Foucault introduces the concept in his ‘History of Sexuality,’ and more specifically 
at the end of the first part, in The Will to Knowledge:100 
‘It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, 
even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. 
The ‘right’ to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction 
of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or ‘alienations,’ the ‘right’ to 
rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this ‘right’- which the classical 
juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending- was the political 
response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, 
from the traditional right of sovereignty.’101
One can conceive of this passage as the roadmap of ‘Society must be defended’ 
(1975–1976), and further lectures on biological governmentality. Foucault 
displaces the object of political dominion from the legal realm, to technologies of 
power exercised over the living. The exercise of this ‘right of death and power over 
life’102 connects us with the crucible of both Biolaw and Bioethics. In ‘Society must 
be defended,’ Foucault sketches out the contours of the government of the living, 
the right to ‘make live’ (‘faire vivre’) or ‘let die’ (‘laisser mourir.’)103 In Foucault’s 
Biopolitics, power through control is exercised over a given population using 
non-disciplinary104 instances of ‘normalisation’ unto people,105 whereby diseases 
become a ‘population phenomenon.’106 In such a setting, the question remains 
whether the State will exercise a disciplinary or a regulatory bio-power107 over its 
population. As this stage, ascribing a disciplinary function to the human genome 
per se seems hard to fathom, yet the normalising effect of healthcare policies is, on 
the contrary, salient, since it entails the classification of patients according to their 
100 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir, (Paris: Gallimard, 1976). ‘S’ouvre 
ainsi l’ère du biopouvoir’, 184.
101 Robert Hurley (trans.), Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. An introduction, (New York: 
Peregrine Books, 1984), 145.
102 Op.cit., History of sexuality, 133.
103 Michel Foucault, Il faut défendre la société, Cours au Collège de France, 1976, (Paris: Seuil, 
1997), 214.
104 Disciplinary power corresponds to a more tailored response to certain types of persons labelled 
as abnormals; this concept relates to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975) and Abnormal 
(1974–1975).





genetic disease. This trait is reinforced by the normal-pathological threshold,108 
which proved having found a fertile ground in medicine, and more so, genetic 
medicine. The fragmentation of the executive power into various expert bodies 
in capitalist societies entails a tendency to normalisation, since norms are to 
frame, convey or facilitate information flows. Foucault conceives of Biopolitics as 
a bottom-up system,109 whereby control is exercised in all sectors of biological life, 
via a strong monitoring of healthcare and other disciplinary instances. His model 
addresses a given population rather than economic agents. Power and control 
are exercised through all capillaries of power, in line with his ‘panoptic’ concept 
of surveillance. Yet, the ‘Biopolitical hypothesis’ is questionable as a coherent 
model to explain the Union’s orientations in terms management of genetic data. 
There is no clear indication of a direct and vertical power or urge applied upon 
citizens, or that which would coerce them in changing their lifestyle, in function of 
their genetic makeup- thus far. Foucault, as a ‘genealogist of statecraft,’110 aimed 
at scaffolding and explaining new models of government in relation a state’s 
biological substrate, namely the population. There is no, need for the EU to abide 
by any genetic hygienism, but rather an encouragement, upon lawfully gathered 
consent, to provide national repositories with valuable information for research 
groups and bolster economic growth within the digital market. In this respect, 
Habermas’ analysis matches the technocratic orientation of such healthcare policy. 
Foucault’s model, however, sketches out a darker scenario for future ‘knowledge-
based’ policies, questioning the ultimate aims of scientific legitimation.
4.5 Conclusions
Precision medicine, like other expert domains, is the late modern result of a 
slow process of knowledge division and scientification. The flow of healthcare 
information is meant to ease the work of research groups and bolster the production 
of pharmaceutical treatments. In such paradigm, genetic information holds a 
pivotal role: it is the codex from which diseases are to be inferred, and tackled. Yet, 
such a vision of medicine works in well-defined cases, while numerous diseases 
have an environmental cause, or are due to certain lifestyle patterns. In terms 
of freedoms, the ushering of such information is compelling, especially if it is to 
108 See Georges Canguilhem, Le normal et le pathologique, (Paris: PUF, 1966).
109 Bob Jessop, ‘From Micro-Power to Governmentality: Foucault’s Work on Statehood, State 
Formation, Statecraft and Statepower,’ Political Geography 26, (2007): 24–40, 34. 
110 Ibid., 36.
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be controlled under the guise of medical reason. There is no absolute guarantee 
as to the ethical use of such information by research groups or other dedicated 
bodies. The consent revocability alone does not seem to counteract the potential 
use or abuse of data, be it for research purposes. The results of such studies on 
healthcare and genetic information may affect a higher number of European 
citizens than that of the donors alone. In fact, ‘knowledge-based’ policies might 
as well be based on research results which initially concerned a certain number 
of subjects, rather than the entirety of a given population. This might create a 
feeling of ‘decisional distance,’ reinforced by a certain fear of reification. In this 
perspective, the medicine precision initiative is built on a fragile ground in terms 
of respect for fundamental rights and health democracy. Its economic rationale 
requires a solid protection of patients, not only as potential holders of a genetic 
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Abstract
Genetic research is increasingly being performed both in clinical medicine and in medical 
research. There is a high interest in the field and the vision is that in the future health 
promotion and treatment of diseases would be individually designed based on genomic 
information. It is also necessary to conduct genome research involving children because 
children have the right to the best possible treatment and medication. Legal questions 
concerning genome research involving children are particularly interesting when a child’s 
participation in early childhood is based on the proxy-consent and the data is possibly 
stored for future research purposes. The genomic data of the child always provides data 
about both parents and other close relatives. Some research findings may be relevant to 
the child only in adulthood. Samples and the data can be stored for decades in biobanks. 
In this chapter, I review relevant regulation in the Finnish legislation of genome testing in 
terms of consent on behalf of a young child. In Finland, in the absence of specific legislation 
of genomic testing, regulation on healthcare, medical research, and biobanking remains 
applicable. The parents’ right to act on behalf of the child are regulated to some extent 
differently in these situations.
5.1 Introduction
Genetic research is increasingly being performed both in clinical medicine and in 
medical research. There is a high interest in the field and the vision is that in the 
future health promotion and treatment of diseases would be individually designed 
based on genomic information. For some diseases, such as certain cancers, 
1 My warmest thanks to LL.M. Amanda Blick for her great help with the translation this article 
from Finnish to English.
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individualised treatments are already a reality.2 Diagnostic pre-symptomatic 
genetic tests in children are mainly carried out as part of the child’s treatment. 
Large-scale genomic tests are especially used to diagnose rare diseases, which 
are often examined in a newborn or a young child.3 Genomic information is also 
examined in medical research, in which children may participate under certain 
legal conditions. Biobanks play a key role in utilising genomic information in 
medical research. Children’s samples are also stored in biobanks. Through research 
into the genetic factors that influence the health and diseases of children of different 
ages, even children can benefit from the advances made in the field of medicine.4 
In this paper, I will review the legislation of genome testing in terms of consent 
on behalf of a young child. Medical treatment and research are based on the 
patient’s autonomy and the requirement for informed consent as a prerequisite 
for treatment and research. The starting point for international and national 
regulation is that the consent of the child is given by his or her custodian until 
the child is able to decide for himself or herself on the basis of his or her age and 
maturity. The right of the custodian to give consent on behalf of the child is based 
on his or her status as the child’s legal representative.
Genomic tests are often performed on newborns or very young children, so 
consent to the test is given by the custodian. Consent on behalf of a child requires 
careful consideration as to whether consenting is in the best interests of the child as 
a patient or as a research subject. When giving consent on behalf of another person, 
there is also always a strong connection to the question of who is entitled to access 
the research results and other patient information. In Finland, in the absence 
of specific legislation, regulation on healthcare and medical research remains 
2 Parempaa terveyttä genomitiedon avulla. The National Genome Strategy. Proposals for action by 
the working group. Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Reports and Memorandums 2015:24, 
pp. 8 and 28. The term genome refers to the entire human genetic material which consists of 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). A gene is a piece of DNA that causes a cell to produce a specific 
product such as a protein. See more specifically, Maarit Jokela: DNA perimän välittäjänä, 
pp. 9–14 in Maarit Jokela – Mirkka Oja-Leikas – Meri Rova (ed.): Kiehtovat geenit. Mihin 
geenitietoa käytetään? Duodecim 2017, and in the same publication Johannes Kettunen: 
Geeneistä genomiin, pp. 15–21.
3 Helena Kääriäinen: Geenitestaus. Lääkärikirja Duodecim 2 May 2015, available online at 
www.terveyskirjasto.fi/terveyskirjasto. See also Carla G Van El – Martina C Cornel – Pascal 
Borry – Ros J Hastings – Folrence Fellmann – Shirley V Hodgson – Heidi C Howard – Anne 
Cambon-Thomsen – Bartha M Knoppers – Hanne Meijers-Heijboer – Hans Scheffer – Lisbeth 
Tranebjaerg – Wybo Dondorp – Guido M W R De Wert: The whole-genome sequencing in 
health care. Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics. European Journal 
of Human Genetics 2013, Vol. 21(6), pp. 580–584.
4 Government proposal 229/1998 on the Medical Research Act, p. 15. See also Näkökulmia 
lääketieteellisestä tutkimuksesta lapsilla. Valtakunnallisen terveydenhuollon eettisen 
neuvottelukunnan asettaman työryhmän loppuraportti 2003, pp. 4–5; Kouvalainen, Kauko: 
Lasten lääkehoidon historiasta. Tabu 6/2005, Lääkelaitos, pp. 8–12.
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applicable.5 Genomic testing is conducted as part of a treatment or research, 
therefore requiring informed consent.6 This generally applies to biobanking as 
well. The parent’s right and duty to act on behalf of the child are regulated to 
some extent differently in these situations.
My intention is therefore to examine how giving consent on behalf of the 
child is regulated in different situations where genomic research is carried out 
and how legislation safeguards the rights of the child. To illustrate the topic, 
I will first describe how genomic information is utilised in children and I will 
reflect on the specificity of genomic data over other patient data. The nature 
of genomic data contributes to whether consent to genomic research should be 
evaluated differently than consent to other medical research or treatment. Then, 
in accordance with the research questions mentioned above, I will look at the 
regulation of consent on behalf of the child and assess how it contributes to the 
realisation of the rights of the child.
5.2 Genome Research and Children
5.2.1 Genomic Information as the Basis for Personalized Medicine 
Today, health promotion, disease prevention, and treatment are increasingly based 
on genetic data derived from the patient’s genome, as well as other information 
from clinical research and lifestyle and environments, which can be combined and 
analysed using effective digital methods. This relates to personalized medicine 
5 Specific legislation is currently under preparation, see the draft Government proposal on the 
Genome Centre and the conditions for processing genomic data (hereinafter draft Genome 
Act) of 9 May 2019 prepared by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, available online at 
<https://stm.fi/hanke?tunnus=STM071:00/2018> as well as the draft Government proposal for 
the Biobank Act, repealing the Biobank Act (688/2012) and amending the Act on the Medical 
Use of Human Organs, Tissues and Cells (101/2001) and the Act on the Status and Rights of the 
Patient (785/1992) (the draft Biobank Act) 28 March 2018, available online at <https://stm.fi/
hanke?tunnus=STM110:00/2015>. The reforms will have an impact on, e.g. how samples and 
related information can be used for research, development, and innovation purposes in addition 
to therapeutic purposes, and how the privacy and autonomy of the registered individuals can 
be protected in different situations.
6 Commercial genetic tests are excluded from this study, for an outlook on the subject see e.g. 
Marja Pirttivaara: Kuluttajille suunnatut genomitietopalvelut, pp. 175–184 in Jokela et al. 2017. 
See also Kavot Zillén – Jameson Garland – Santa Slokenberga: The Rights of Children in 
Biomedicine. Challenges posed by scientific advances and uncertainties. The Council of Europe’s 
Committee on Bioethics 2017, pp. 29–31. On problems with commercial genetic tests, see e.g. 
Nina Meincke: Geenitestit. Oikeudellisia kysymyksiä. Lakimiesliiton kustannus, Helsinki 2001, 
pp. 31–34. 
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that seeks targeted treatment, i.e. the most effective and safe treatment selected 
for each patient based on his or her individual characteristics and symptoms.7
Gene and genome research are utilised in patient care to diagnose diseases 
and developmental disorders and to find, among other things, the most effective 
medication with the least side-effects. In addition to clinical work, tests are 
performed in medical research and clinical trials.8 Various tests are used to analyse 
varying fractions of the genome. A gene test analyses the structure of DNA at the 
level of one or a few genes. Gene panels are used to diagnose a particular disease 
or symptom, where dozens or hundreds of genes are studied simultaneously. 
Genome-wide sequencing is utilised in research and, for example, in the diagnosis 
of rare diseases and in the treatment of cancer. In clinical settings its use in patient 
care is not yet very common. Exome sequencing, the determination of the region 
coding the protein of the genome, is utilised in both research and patient care, 
particularly in the diagnosis of rare hereditary diseases, congenital malformations 
and cancer.9 Genetic counselling is central to gene and genome research.
In paediatric patients, genetic testing is usually used when the child has 
symptoms but the diagnosis is otherwise unclear. Targeted gene panel tests 
are used when a child has a clearly rare condition, but the test is needed to 
make a diagnosis. Genome-wide screening or exome sequencing is utilised in 
situations where the symptoms are vague and no suitable gene panel is used. In 
particular large-scale tests include the difficulty of result interpretation and may, 
for example, reveal genetic defects of unknown significance or those that will cause 
an untreatable disease. The results of the test may also be relevant to the parents, 
siblings, possible future siblings, and other close biological relatives of the child.10 
7 See Helena Kääriäinen: Geeni- ja genomitutkimuksia terveille ja sairaille, pp. 79–87 in Jokela 
et al. 2017; Palotie – Samuli Ripatti: Suomi luomassa genomiikan ja terveystiedon internetiä 
[Finland establishing the internet of genomics and health data]. Duodecim 2017;133:771–5; 
Sakari Jokiranta – Kristiina Hotakainen – Iiris Salonen – Pasi Pöllänen – Kai-Petri Hänninen – 
Jari Forsström – Ilkka Kunnamo: Genomitieto käytännön lääkärin arkipäivään – päätöksenteon 
digitaaliset työkalut [Genomic data into everyday work of a medical practitioner - digital tools 
for decision-making]. Duodecim 2017;133:791–800.
8 Kääriäinen 2017, pp. 81–84. Predictive genetic testing to determine the risk of developing a 
particular disease is performed on children only when the disease should be prevented or treated 
in childhood. Tests that predict the later disease of the unborn child can be done at the request 
of the parents in the embryonic and foetal stages.
9 See e.g. Kääriäinen 2015; Jonna Saarela – Kaisa Kettunen: Kenelle eksomisekvensointi? [Who 
would benefit from exome sequencing?] Duodecim 2017;133(5):481–8. 
10 Kääriäinen 2015. See also Samuel Myllykangas – Juha W Koskenvuo – Tero-Pekka Alastalo: 
Uuden polven sekvensointimenetelmät geenidiagnostiikassa [Novel high-throughput sequencing 
strategies in genetic diagnostics]. Duodecim 2013;129(2):141–8.
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The exploitation of genomic data in all its aspects, such as its importance for 
improving public health, is not without criticism.11 At the same time, many of the 
various threats associated with genomic information are also being considered. 
Possible security breaches and disclosure of data for commercial purposes are 
seen as challenges in data privacy. The use of genomic information, for example, 
in the field of genetic profiling in insurance or working life, and the potential for 
increased discrimination against sick or disabled people is a cause for concern.12 
The various treatments based on genomic information, gene therapies, and genetic 
engineering, in turn, raise questions about their safety and, for example, whether 
the development will lead to eugenics.13 The development of gene therapies and 
drugs is expensive, so their equitable availability is a concern for many.14 Another 
challenge may be the availability of sufficiently comprehensive genetic counselling. 
Gene tests on children also include questions about how far parents have access 
to their child’s information and whether they deprive the child of the right not 
to know when giving consent on behalf of the child.
Although genomic information can already be used today to diagnose and 
treat many diseases, from many aspects these are still in the early phases. Much 
more research is also needed before genetic treatments, such as gene therapies 
11 Juhani Kere: Hyödyttääkö genomitieto kansanterveyttä? Duodecim 2019;135(22):2147–8. See 
also the interview of Professor of Pharmacogenetics Mikko Niemi ‘Geenitestit ovat vain yksi 
työkalu’, Suomen Lääkärilehti 22/2018 vsk 73, p. 1411.
12 The risk of genomic information falling into the wrong hands can also be made more proportionate 
by stating that every blood sample or hair follicle contains all the human genetic information 
and can therefore, in theory, lead to misuse (Kääriäinen 2015). See also, e.g. Lääkärin etiikka, 
7. painos, Suomen Lääkäriliitto 2013, pp. 90–92; Many threats and ethical issues have already 
been addressed at the legislative level. 
13 See e.g. Alisa Opar: CRISPR-edited babies arrived, and regulators are still racing to catch up. 
Nature Medicine 2019, Vol.25(11), p. 1634(3); Petter Portin: Ihmisen geeniterapiassa avautuu 
uusia mahdollisuuksia. Duodecim 2016;132(1):26–32; Seppo Ylä-Herttuala: Geenihoidot: 
haasteita ja lupauksia. pp. 88–94 in Jokela et al. 2017. On the ethics of the consequences of 
gene therapies, see Matti Häyry: Ihminen 2.0. Geneettisen valikoinnin ja parantelun eettiset 
kysymykset. Gaudeamus 2012, pp. 187–208.
14 An example of this is the situation that has arisen in the public debate in Finland. Pediatric 
patients with severe and rare neurological SMA muscle disease caused by a genetic mutation 
did not receive the specific nusinersen medication intended for treatment due to its high cost. A 
similar debate has taken place in several European countries. Since then, the Council for Choices 
in Health Care in Finland (COHERE Finland) has outlined that patients who become ill as a 
child can receive this medication. See Palveluvalikoimaneuvoston perustelumuistio ja perusteet 
neuvostolle suosituksen antamiseksi. Aihe: Nusinerseeni SMA-taudin hoidossa. Justification 
memorandum of 15 March 2018. STM038:00/2017. On February 21, 2019, COHERE Finland 
has also announced that it has begun preparing criteria for the continued treatment of the 
nusinersen medication.
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and gene editing, are so advanced and safe that they can be used extensively.15 
The development of personalized medicine based on genomic data requires the 
availability of extensive sample data and other health data from a sufficiently large 
population.16 Finland has particular strengths to become a leading international 
actor in genome research. These include, for example, our demographic population 
being established by a small founding population, comprehensive health records 
and the use of a personal identification number, a tradition of epidemiological 
research, large sample collections of population data, and a favourable attitude 
of citizens towards research.17
A genomic centre is currently being set up in Finland, with the task of 
developing, among other things, a nationwide genomic data register.18 The 
establishment of the genome centre is included in the proposal of the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health Task Force for a National Genome Strategy for 2015–
2020. Under this strategy, a new law will regulate the operation of the genome 
centre, including the conditions for carrying out genetic analyses, the protection of 
genome data and its responsible and appropriate use. The purpose of a genomic 
data register would be to support health and medical care, disease prevention and 
scientific research. It could be used both in the treatment of individual patients 
and in medical research. The use of the register is therefore linked to health 
purposes. The genomic data register would consist of lawfully stored genomic 
data and related metadata generated by biobanks and health care providers.19
15 See e.g. Portin 2016; Seppo Ylä-Herttuala: Geeniterapialääkkeet tekevät tuloaan. Duodecim 
2013;129:788–9. The first gene therapies were administered to humans in 1989. Only a few gene 
therapy drugs have been approved in Europe. About 3,000 clinical trials have been performed by 
the end of 2018 (interview of Kirmo Wartiovaara in the podcast Terveydeksi-Geenit, Duodecim 
2019). See also Josephine Johnston – John D Lantos – Aaron Goldenberg – Flavia Chen – 
Erik Parens – Barbara A Koenig: Sequencing Newborns: A Call for Nuanced Use of Genomic 
Technologies. Hastings Center Report July 2018, Vol. 48, p. 5.
16 See e.g. Palotie – Ripatti 2017; Jokiranta et al. 2017. An example of genetic research based 
on genetic information is the FinnGen research project that aims to better understand the 
mechanisms of diseases and develop new therapies by combining genomic and health 
information., available online at <www.finngen.fi>.
17 Palotie – Ripatti 2017, p. 772.
18 STM 2015:24, p. 33. For information of the genome centre, see also <www.genomikeskus.fi>.
19 For the aim, data content and purpose of the genomic data register, see the draft Genome Act, 
pp. 138–140. The recording obligation would mean that the register would contain genomic data 
on patients regardless of whether they have refused to the processing of their genomic data for 
non-therapeutic purposes, as well as on samples analysed in biobanks with active consent or 
old samples transferred to a biobank. The aim is to create a register of variations and reference 
data from the genomic data received or produced by the genome centre for health and medical 
care, disease prevention, and scientific research. The disclosure of data for these purposes would 
be provided for in the same act.
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The upcoming new legislation would cover genetic testing, defined as all genetic 
laboratory tests that can be used to infer a person’s health or genetic status, predict 
disease risk or side effects of treatment, diagnose or confirm disease or illness, 
or determine and assess treatment and its effects.20 Health-related analyses for 
the purpose of scientific research would fall outside of the scope of the act. If 
research results from which conclusions on health status can be drawn are utilised 
in the treatment of individual patients or the results obtained are disclosed to 
the research subject, however, this would be considered an interpretation of the 
results that would be subject to the regulatory rules on genetic analyses included 
in the new act.21 The legislation has been under preparation for a long time and it 
is included controversial issues. At this stage, it is still difficult to predict what will 
happen to the upcoming proposal of legislation. In accordance with the current 
plan, the government proposal will be submitted to Parliament in March 2021.
5.2.2 Is Genomic Data More Special Than Other Health Data?
When considering whether consent to genomic research should be evaluated 
differently than other health or medical research, the key question is whether 
genomic information should be considered special when compared to other health 
data.22 Privacy and sensitivity of health data are the starting point for international 
regulation, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (2016/679) 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data and repealing Directive 94/46/EC). Similarly, national legislation, such as the 
Data Protection Act (1050/2018) and legislation on patient data in health care, 
20 Draft Genome Act, pp. 165–166. According to the draft for the act, a person’s health status 
means a physiological or pathological function or condition. If genetic analysis makes it possible 
to draw conclusions about these, they fall within the scope of the act. The scope of the draft 
for the act includes predictive analyses as well as disease risk and disease prevention analyses. 
The draft for the act also covers genetic tests to diagnose and confirm a disease or illness. In 
addition, pharmacogenetic analyses, i.e. analyses that predict a drug response or reaction, fall 
within the definition of treatment within the meaning of the act.
21 Draft Genome Act, p. 166 (direct translation): If, for example, a scientific study shows that 
a particular marker measured in a blood sample may help in diagnosing a disease or illness 
before symptoms begin, such a result would not be considered a health-related genetic analysis 
or health service. Instead, confirming the finding with additional tests to support an individual 
diagnosis and interpreting the result or data to determine a health condition or disease or to 
determine treatment or preventive measures is considered a health-related genetic analysis and 
health service within the meaning of the draft for the act to which health services apply.
22 The term ‘health data’ is usually used as a synonym for patient data, although it can also 
be understood more broadly to include e.g. information on lifestyle and living conditions. In 
personalized medicine, it is natural to speak of health information precisely in its broadest 
sense.
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considers that health data enjoy privacy protection, and, as a rule, may only be 
processed by a limited number of healthcare professionals involved in client or 
patient care. Genomic data is considered personal data and health data.23 
However, genomic data has also been given a special status to a certain extend. 
In particular, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and the Council of Europe have been active players. UNESCO has 
adopted, inter alia, the Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human 
Rights (1997) and the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003). 
The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Human 
Dignity in the Field of Biology and Medicine (Finnish Treaty Series 23-24/2010, the 
Biomedicine Convention), with its additional protocols, is a key legal instrument 
in this field at the European level.24 In addition, various recommendations have 
been issued within the Council of Europe.25 These instruments establish principles 
that enable genetic testing, but also limit research and genetic interventions. The 
fundamental principles of the documents are respect for human dignity, self-
determination, protection of privacy, and genetic nondiscrimination. 
There is a broad consensus on the privacy and sensitivity of health data. It 
is also generally accepted that genomic data is part of health data. According 
to Launis, a strong interpretation of the special position of genomic data over 
other health data is based on the notion that genetic data is more accurate and 
predictable than other health data, that it also tells more about other individuals, 
mainly close relatives than other health data, and that it is also permanent, more 
fundamental and more personal. Under a weak interpretation, genetic data is 
exceptional in some uses or applications and requires special protection in certain 
situations, such as in the insurance business or recruitment. A weak interpretation 
23 Article 4(13) of the General Data Protection Regulation: ‘genetic data’ means personal data 
relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person which give 
unique information about the physiology or the health of that natural person and which result, 
in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question. See 
also recitals 34–35 and 51–54 in the preamble to the General Data Protection Regulation.
24 There are four additional protocols to the Biomedicine Convention: the Additional Protocol 
on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings (CETS 168), the Additional Protocol concerning 
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (CETS 186), the Additional Protocol 
on Biomedical Research (CETS 195) and the Additional Protocol concerning Genetic Testing 
for Health Purposes (CETS 203). Finland has ratified the first two in connection with the 
ratification of the Biomedicine Convention. Finland has also signed the Additional Protocol 
concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes and its ratification is related to the preparation 
of the Genome Act. Finland has not yet signed the Additional Protocol on Medical Research.
25 See, inter alia, the Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)6 on research on biological materials of 
human origin, the Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)8 on the processing of personal health-
related data for insurance purposes, including data resulting from genetic tests, and the 
Statement on genome editing technologies, 2015.
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also highlights the fact that obtaining informed consent is more challenging in 
genetic research. Explaining and understanding the details of genetic research 
when giving consent is complex and obscure, so it is not always clear whether 
the conditions for informed consent are met as required.26 
On the other hand, issuing a special status for genomic data in relation to 
other health data has also been criticised. It is argued, inter alia, that genomic 
information determines only a part of human characteristics and that lifestyle 
and environmental factors, for example, have a major impact on health. By 
conventional diagnostic means, as many conclusions can be drawn from on a 
person’s health status based on a person’s symptoms and other external signs or 
behaviours as a genetic test would tell. Anyone familiar with the family’s medical 
history may also determine the person’s risk of becoming ill later. Disclosure of 
other health data can sometimes violate a person’s privacy much more severely 
than genomic information falling into the wrong hands.27 One view has been 
that genetic health data can only be considered as more fundamental than other 
health data in the subjective sense, resting on a person’s own perceptions and 
beliefs.28 The question is, then, how a person himself or herself views the health 
data, whether he or she considers the results of a genetic test to be more specific 
and reliable than other test results, and how he or she will act on the information 
he or she receives.
Regardless of which interpretation is chosen, to me, it seems justified that at 
least like other health data, genomic information is treated as sensitive personal 
data. The uncertainties, but also the possibilities, of genomic data go far into 
the future. Thus, especially from the perspective of the best interest of the child, 
it is justified to view genomic data as sensitive data. When a child is not yet in 
a position to influence the processing of his or her genome data, it would be 
necessary to consider it even as highly sensitive data. Parents’ decisions in favour 
26 Veikko Launis: Geeniteknologia, arvot ja vastuu. Gaudeamus 2003, pp. 58–61. See 
also Kirsi Vähäkangas – Esko Länsimies: Suostumuskäytäntö ja henkilöllisyyden suoja 
geenipankkitutkimuksessa, Suomen Lääkärilehti 14/2004 vsk 59, pp. 1552–1555; Meincke 
2001, pp. 22–24. 
27 On the conversation, see e.g. Aarno Palotie – Mari Kaunisto – Helena Kääriäinen – Markus 
Perola – Kimmo Pitkänen – Samuli Ripatti – Sirpa Soini – Elisabeth Widén: Genomitiedon 
arkaluonteisuus on tiukassa elävä myytti. Lääkärilehti 15/2018 vsk 73, pp. 916–917 and response 
Lasse Lehtonen – Heikki Saxén: Geenitieto on salassapidettävää terveydentilatietoa. Lääkärilehti 
17/2018 vsk, 73 pp. 1044–1045.
28 Veikko Launis: Ihmisarvo. Vastapaino, Tampere 2018, pp. 276–284. Launis discusses the 
conceptual question of whether it is philosophically meaningful to consider genetic health 
data to be more fundamental to other individual health data in the sense that it embodies an 
individual’s permanent and unchanging nature or identity. He has also stated that almost any 
health data can, in a subjective sense, be a feature that defines a person’s essence or identity, 
respectively (Launis 2003, p. 60).
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of the child in early childhood should not jeopardize the best interests of the child 
now or in the future.
5.3 Consent Given on Behalf of a Child 
5.3.1 Informed Consent as a Prerequisite for Genomic Research
Self-determination and the right to the integrity of the individual are fundamental 
principles of medical ethics and medical law and biolaw. It follows from these 
principles that treatment procedures and medical research will generally require 
the consent of the patient or research subject.29 The rapid development of 
biomedicine is a constant challenge to ethical and legal thinking and thus requires 
a review of legislation in a changing regulatory environment. This also applies 
to the evaluation of regulation around consent, for example in the context of 
genome research.
The basic principles of informed consent are permanent. Legally valid consent 
requires that the consenting party has the necessary capacity to make the decision, 
has sufficient knowledge to do so, has the opportunity to consider the matter before 
making his or her decision, and voluntarily makes the decision without coercion 
or pressure. It must be also possible to withdraw consent. The principles apply 
equally to children when they are able to give their consent and to custodians 
when they give consent on behalf of the child.30 
Giving informed consent to genome testing requires an understanding of the 
rather complex and difficult issues involved, including heredity, and therefore high 
29 The doctrine of informed consent which embodies the autonomy and the right to the integrity 
of the patient or subject has evolved over the decades as a dialogue between medical ethics and 
medical and biolaw since the 1940s. The starting point for regulation in the field of biolaw is 
considered to be the adoption of the Nuremberg code in 1947. For an outlook on the development 
of the doctrine of informed consent, see e.g. Irma Pahlman: Potilaan itsemäärämisoikeus. 2. 
ed. Edita, Helsinki 2006, pp. 121–140.
30 On the child’s right to self-determination, see Kirsi Pollari: Lapsipotilaan päätöksentekokyky ja 
sen arviointi. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 387, 2019, pp. 145–171. On the consent of the child 
to health care research, see e.g. Priscilla Alderson: Children’s Consent and ‘Assent’ to Healthcare 
Research, pp. 174–189 in Michael Freeman (ed.): Law and Childhood Studies, Oxford University 
Press 2012; Liisa Nieminen: Lapsi tutkimuskohteena: Kuka päättää lapsen osallistumisesta 
tutkimukseen? Lakimies 2/2009 pp. 226–253. On the consent of the child and biobanks, see 
Liisa Nieminen: Biopankkitoiminta lasten terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin edistäjänä: oikeudellinen 
tarkastelu, pp. 58–85 in Niina Rutanen – Kaisa Vehkalahti (ed.): Tutkimuseettisestä sääntelystä 




requirements are placed on pre-consent information.31 When a custodian gives 
consent on behalf of a child, he or she must consider his or her grounds for the 
consent specifically from the perspective of the child. It is understandable that 
the decision of a custodian may also be influenced by his or her own personal 
wishes and views, but that consent should nevertheless be primarily in the best 
interests of the child. The difficulty might be also that there is still a great deal 
of uncertainty and unawareness about genome testing. So, is it even possible at 
all to provide the necessary information needed for informed consent? In this 
context, specific questions arise, such as how to deal with secondary research 
findings that may emerge in the research that will only be relevant much later 
and to whom the results should be shared. Or how to prepare for the fact that 
something significant to the health of the child can be interpreted from the once 
analysed genomic data later on? If the testing reveals, now or later, that the child 
is at risk of developing a serious disease at some point in his or her life, what 
impact will that knowledge have on the child’s future life? Knowledge can influence 
how parents provide care for the child and whether, for example, they start to 
unnecessarily protect the child, leading to a restriction of the child’s normal life. 
It also affects the child’s right not to be aware of the disease risk. The genetic risk 
factors that have emerged from genomic testing may be of wider significance, 
at least to the parents themselves, to the siblings of the child tested, and to any 
possible future siblings.32 
5.3.2 International Regulation on Consent Given on  
Behalf of the Child
In all cases where the rights of the child are concerned, the regulation must be in 
conformity with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Finnish 
Treaty Series 59-60/1991).33 The Convention on the Rights of the Child does not 
31 The custodian giving consent on behalf of the child should also, e.g. to some extent understand 
and consider the fact that in biobanking, samples and related information may be disclosed not 
only to research but also to development and innovation activities. 
32 About the challenges, see e.g. Kenneth Boyd: The impossibility of informed consent? Journal 
of Medical Ethics 2015;41:44–47. Especially in relation to genomic tests in children Katherine 
Burke – Angus Clarke: The challenge of consent in clinical genome-wide testing. Archives of 
Disease in Childhood 2016;101:1048–1052.
33 The importance of the human right treaties to health care regulation generally, see e.g. Lisa 
Forman – Sivan Bomze: International Human Rights Law and the Right to Health: An Overview 
of Legal Standards and Accountability Mechanisms, pp. 33–71 in Gunilla Backman (ed.): The 
Right to Health. Theory and practice. Studentlitteratur Ab. Lund 2012; Birgit Toebs: Introduction: 
Health and Human Rights in Europe, pp. 1–19 in Birgit Toebes – Mette Hartlev – Aart Hendriks 
– Janne Rothmar Herrman (ed.): Health and Human Rights in Europe. Intersentia 2011.
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contain an explicit article on consent to health interventions or medical research, 
but confirms the right of the child to influence decision-making in relation to 
himself or herself in accordance with his or her age and maturity (article 12)34 
and that the custodians have the right and duty to protect the child and to act in 
the best interests of the child (articles 3(2) and 18). Every child has the inherent 
right to life and to the survival and development to the maximum extent possible 
(article 6), and to the closely related right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health (article 24).35 The healthy development of a child and the best 
health care available to him or her can be promoted, for example, by allowing 
children to participate in medical research. Any research, however, must be safe 
and in the best interests of the child.36 It should also be borne in mind that a 
child, like adults, has the right to privacy (article 16) and to physical and mental 
integrity (article 19).
In particular, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
requires compliance with, inter alia, the requirement for the informed consent 
of the person concerned, obtained in accordance with the procedures laid down 
by law (Article 3(2)(a)).37 In addition, numerous international agreements and 
recommendations on biomedicine provide, in principle, for the required consent 
in a very uniform manner and in line with the requirements for informed consent 
34 Opinions of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
the child in health in General Comment No. 12 on the right of the child to be heard (CRC/C/
GC/12), paras. 98–104. The Committee emphasises the provision of information for children 
in connection with treatment and participation in research. The Committee also recalls that 
the child has the right to counselling, which does not equal the right to medical consent and 
should therefore not be subject to any age limit.
35 On the interpretation of articles 6 and 24, see Noam Peleg: The Child’s Right to Development. 
Cambridge University Press 2019, pp. 120–126.
36 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child emphasises the responsibility of 
institutions, researchers, private companies, and others involved in research on children to 
respect the principles and provisions of the Convention and the International Ethical Guidelines 
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. The Committee also points out that, in 
research, the best interests of the child must always prevail over the general or scientific progress 
of the community. See General Comment No. 15 (2013) on the right of the child to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health (art. 24 (CRC/C/GC/15), para. 85. For more details 
on the best interests of the child, see General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to 
have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1) (CRC/C/GC/14). 
See also General Comment No. 3 on HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child (CRC/GC/2003/3), 
para. 29.
37 The Charter also enshrines the child’s right to protection and care, as well as the right to express 
his or her views and to have them taken into account in accordance with age and maturity 
(Article 24). Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit 




already stated above.38 As a general rule, in the case of a small child, consent is 
given by the parent or custodian until the child is able to give his or her consent. 
For example, the Biomedicine Convention (Article 6) and its Additional Protocol 
on Genetic Testing (Article 12) require that consent to a health measure or research 
be given by the legal representative of the child or by an authority or a person or 
body provided for by law. The Explanatory Report to the Biomedicine Convention 
uses the plural form of ‘parents who have custody of the minor’, but does not 
otherwise state whether the consent of both parents is always or in some cases 
required or only the consent of the other parent is sometimes sufficient.39
In addition to these general consent requirements that apply to genomic 
research, international standards restrict the child’s participation in research in 
various ways. Of course, limitations must be taken into account when assessing 
consent on behalf of the child. Under the Biomedicine Convention, a child who is 
unable to give his or her consent may participate in research if the results have the 
potential to produce real and direct benefit to his or her health and the child does 
not object (Article 17). Where a study is not expected to be of immediate benefit 
to the subject, it may only be undertaken if the research entails only minimal 
risk and burden for the individual and the research has the aim of contributing 
to the ultimate attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to the person 
concerned or to other persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same 
disease or disorder or having the same condition. With regard to genomic research, 
it should also be noted that under the Biomedicine Convention, predictive genetic 
testing may only be carried out for health purposes or health-related scientific 
research and must be accompanied by appropriate genetic counselling (Article 
12). In the case of minors, the provision is further specified in the Additional 
Protocol concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes, which requires that 
a genetic test may only be carried out for the child’s direct benefit. As a general 
rule, testing of a child should be withheld until the child can give his or her own 
consent. However, if abstaining from testing has a negative effect on the health 
or well-being of the child, testing is possible earlier. This includes, for example, a 
situation where preventive measures may be taken in the event of a disease that 
38 Also pursuant to Article 7 of the General Data Protection Regulation, when the processing of 
personal data is based on the consent of the data subject, it shall be explicit, and the controller 
must be able to prove its existence. It must be also possible to withdraw consent. See also recital 
32 in the preamble to the General Data Protection Regulation. The draft Genome Act (pp. 63–
87) contains a fairly comprehensive summary of international regulatory developments as well 
as foreign and EU legislation.
39 Explanatory Report to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (CETS 164), para. 45.
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may occur before the child is able to decide on testing.40 Finland has not yet been 
ratified the Additional Protocol, but has already signed it in 2008. The Additional 
Protocol does not apply to genetic tests carried out for research purposes or to 
tests carried out on the human embryo or foetus.
International regulation of consent also leaves room for national discretion 
which has also been applied.41 For example, regulations and practices regarding 
the consent of a child to clinical trials vary considerably within the European 
Economic Area. The age at which a child can give his or her consent ranges from 
14 to 18, and in some countries, there is no specific age limit at all. There are 
also differences in who can give consent on behalf of the child: one parent, both 
parents,or the legal custodian.42 
5.3.3 National Legislation on Consent Given on Behalf of the Child
National regulations follow the principles of international regulation. The basis 
for this regulation is the Constitution of Finland (731/1999), which guarantees 
everyone the right to privacy and personal integrity (section 7). This is also 
considered to guarantee the individual’s right to self-determination.43 Children 
must be treated as equal individuals and have the right to influence matters 
concerning themselves to a degree corresponding to their level of development 
(section 6(3)). The responsibility of parents for the protection and well-being of 
children is, in turn, expressed as the responsibility of the public authorities to 
support the family and other persons responsible for the care of the child in this 
task (section 19(3)).
40 Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes CETS 203, para. 91. Testing may 
be also allowed, for example, on the grounds that a predictive test performed without delay 
and producing a negative result might spare the subject highly invasive regular examinations 
(para. 92).
41 E.g., the Explanatory Report for the Biomedicine Convention (CETS 164, para. 42) states the 
following: ‘Since the purpose of the Convention is not to introduce a single system for the whole 
of Europe but to protect persons who are not able to give their consent, the reference in the 
text to domestic law seems necessary: it is for domestic law in each country to determine, in 
its own way, whether or not persons are capable of consenting to an intervention and taking 
account of the need to deprive persons of their capacity for autonomy only where it is necessary 
in their best interests’.
42 See Pirkko Lepola – Allison Needham – Jo Mendum – Peter Sallabnak – David Neubauer – 
Saskia de Wildt: Informed consent for paediatric clinical trials in Europe. Archives of Disease 
in Childhood (ADC) 2016;101:1017–1025.




National legislation protects the specificity of genetic data in many ways, but as 
it has already been shown, in Finland, specific legislation for gene tests or genomic 
research is yet to exist.44 Currently, genomic research and consent to research will 
thus rely on legislation relating to health and medical research. Patient status is 
regulated by the Act on the Status and Rights of Patients (785/1992, the Patient 
Act), which applies as a general law when it comes to the organization of health 
and medical care (section 1). In the case of a minor, the starting point is that 
the child is cared for in agreement with him or her if the child is able to decide 
on his or her age and level of development; otherwise, the care is decided in 
agreement with the custodian or other legal representative (section 7).45 When a 
child participates in a medical examination, the consent provisions can be found 
in the Medical Research Act (488/1999, the Research Act). The Act of the Medical 
Use of Human Organs and Tissues (101/2001, the Human Tissue Act) regulates the 
collection of specimens taken for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes for medical 
or research purposes. The Biobank Act (688/2012) applies when a sample is given 
for and stored in a biobank.46 
The above-mentioned legal acts follow the principle of the Patient Act on the 
right of the custodian or other legal representative to give consent on behalf of 
the child. The Research Act also provides for more detailed conditions for the 
participation of a child in research (section 6). A minor may only be examined 
if the same scientific results cannot be obtained by other subjects and if the 
research presents only a minor risk of injury or burden to the minor. In addition, 
it is expected that the research is expected to have a direct benefit to his or her 
health or a particular benefit to the same age group or state of health. The child’s 
own consent is bound to reaching the age of 15 and to the child’s maturity and 
44 Chapter 22 of the Criminal Code of Finland (373/2009) contains penal provisions for violation 
of a foetus, embryo, and genetic inheritance. In addition, the prohibition of genetic modification 
is laid down in the Act on Assisted Fertility Treatments (1237/2006, sections 4 and 5). Section 
15 of the Medical Research Act stipulates that Research on embryos and gametes for the purpose 
of developing procedures for modifying hereditary properties shall be prohibited, unless the 
research is for the purpose of curing or preventing a serious hereditary disease. Under the 
Act on the Protection of Privacy in Working Life (759/2004, section 15), the employer is not 
permitted to require the employee to take part in genetic testing during recruitment or during 
the employment relationship, and has no right to know whether or not the employee has ever 
taken part in such testing.
45 Consent is usually given by the child’s parents. However, the parent/custodian does not have 
the right to refuse treatment that is necessary to prevent a danger to the child’s life or health. 
The right of a parent to decide on the care of his or her child is also limited by the fact that the 
parent does not have the right to demand any treatment, but the treatment must always be 
medically acceptable.
46 The Biobank Act has allowed the collection of children’s samples from the outset, but only now 
have some biobanks started collecting children’s samples. It is not possible to retrieve genomic 
data from all samples stored in the biobank.
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understanding of the research or the research procedure in question (section 8). 
A further condition is that the research is expected to directly benefit the child. 
In the Human Tissue Act, the child’s own consent is tied to his or her ability to 
understand the situation (section 7). Under section 12(3) of the Biobank Act, the 
custodian gives consent on behalf of the minor. In addition, if a minor is able to 
understand the significance and nature of biobank research, given his or her age 
and level of development, his or her written consent is also required.47 
When evaluating consent regulation, it is important to consider the difference 
between medical research and biobank research. In medical research, consent 
is given to a particular pre-planned trial and its primary purpose is to protect 
the subject’s autonomy and personal integrity. Consent covers sampling and use 
of the sample for research. The subject shall receive the necessary information 
about the trial before consent is given. In biobank research where, at the time 
of consent or at the time of sampling, not all the studies in which the sample or 
the analysed data is intended to be used are known. Under the current Biobank 
Act, only one ‘broad consent’ is given. With the consent of the subject, the subject 
authorises the storage of the sample in a biobank and the consent will subsequently 
cover the processing of the samples and other sensitive personal data in research 
activities. According to the Government proposal for the Biobank Act, informed 
consent requires that the person giving consent must be provided with sufficient 
information of the nature of biobank research, including the use of any genetic 
and other data. Consent is based on the knowledge of the purpose of the biobank 
47 A person may also later refuse the processing samples and data stored in the biobank. This 
also applies to the so-called old samples that have been transferred to the biobank by operation 
of law. The rights contained in the Biobank Act to revoke or amend the consent given and to 
prohibit or restrict the use of old samples have been granted only to the data subject. However, 
consent and withdrawal of consent have been considered as comparable legal acts. Thus, the 
custodian would have the right to withdraw the consent and apparently also to prohibit or restrict 
the use of the child’s samples under the same conditions as he has the right to give consent on 
behalf of the child. See e.g. the decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman ‘Lääketieteellisessä 
tutkimuksessa voi käsitellä henkilötietoja vain suostumuksensa perusteella’, diary number 
3107/4/12, 19 December 2013. Biobanks apparently do not yet have the capacity to handle 
limited consents or prohibitions (e.g. Kimmo Kääriä – Sirpa Soini – Suvi Kouki – Jari Suhonen: 
Biopankkisuostumusten hallinta Kanta-palvelujen avulla, toiminnallinen määrittely. Terveyden- 
ja hyvinvoinnin laitos - Ohjaus 1/2016, p. 10). See also a summary of the guidelines for the 
consent of minors in biobanks in Nieminen 2019.
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and the nature of the operations of the biobank, not on individual trials for which 
samples may be used in the future.48
It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned legal acts do not require the consent 
of the child to be in the best interests of the child. In this context, the requirement 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to give priority to the best interests 
of the child in all decisions concerning the child implies that consent for genomic 
research on behalf of the child should also be in the best interests of the child. The 
assessment of the best interests of the child entails, inter alia, that the custodian 
should consider the long-term effects of the decision on the child.49 This is a 
consequence of the persistent nature of genomic information, but also of the fact 
that child health decisions often have a long-lasting effect, even up to adulthood. 
This is particularly important when it comes to participating in biobank research, 
where samples and data are stored for a long period of time and when consent is 
given it is not known for what they will be used in the future. With the consent of a 
young child, research can be carried out even before the child is able to understand 
the meaning of the matter and to influence decision-making concerning himself 
or herself. Biobank research may reveal findings that are not relevant until after 
the child has grown up. It is therefore a question of protecting the privacy of the 
child and of the right of the child to know and not to know during childhood, but 
also as he or she grows up. Of course, it is also a question of the extent to which 
parents are entitled to know about the findings of the child’s samples.50
In the next section, I will discuss issues related to consent on behalf of the 
child, which in themselves concern other treatment or research, but which in 
my view should be considered separately for genomic research. They relate to 
the custodian’s consent to consent, the requirement in the Research Act and 
48 Government proposal 86/2011 for the Biobank Act and amending the Act on the Medical Use 
of Human Organs, Tissues and Cells and the Act on the Status and Rights of the Patient, p. 50. 
See also Matteo Macilotti: Reshaping Informed Consent in the Biobanking context. European 
Journal of Health Law 19 (2012) pp. 271–288. The content of the consent, however, may remain 
unclear to the consenting person, see Yle Uutiset 8 December 2019 ‘Suomalaiset antaneet yli 
400 000 suostumusta biopankkeihin – Ylen kysely vahvistaa, että monelle on epäselvää, mihin 
he ovat suostuneet’, available online at <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-11103007>.
49 The time dimension of the assessment of the best interests of the child has been considered, 
among other things, from the perspective of child protection. Although the decision on custody 
is based on an assessment of the current situation, child protection is in fact a matter of making 
a prediction of how the authority’s decisions will in reality affect the best interests of the child 
now and in the future. See e.g. Tapio Räty: Lastensuojelulaki. Edita, Helsinki 2015, p. 13.
50 See e.g. Josephine Johnston – Eric Juengst: Are Parents Really Obligated to Learn as Much as 
Possible about Their Children’s Genomes? Hastings Center Report July 2018, Vol. 48, pp. 14–
15. Parents may have the need to find out everything possible about the child’s health, which 
may be due, for example, to the fact that they want to prepare for the child’s possible special 
needs. On the other hand, they may even feel obligated to consent to any medical procedure 
that could benefit the child. 
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the Biobank Act that the consent given should be in accordance with the child’s 
presumed will, and how the consent on behalf of the child affects the child’s privacy 
and the right to know and be ignorant. It should be noted that a person other 
than the child’s biological parent may be the custodian of the child. However, in 
the following review, I will not address this point of view, but assume that the 
custodian is the biological parent of the child. Also, I will not address the challenges 
that may arise if consent is separated from one of the parents.
5.3.4 Challenges Related to Giving Consent on Behalf of the Child
5.3.4.1 Who Gives Consent: A Parent Alone or Both Parents 
Together?
As a general rule, parents or other legal custodians of a child have the right to 
decide on behalf of the child until the child is sufficiently mature in age and level 
of development to decide for themselves or once the child reaches the age of 
18. The Act on Child Custody and Right of Access (361/1983, the Child Custody 
Act) contains the basic provisions governing the legal relationship between the 
child and the custodian. The purpose of child custody is to ensure the well-being 
and balanced development of the child in accordance with the child’s individual 
needs and wishes (section 1). Custody is primarily the responsibility of the child’s 
parents or other legal custodians who must act in accordance with section 1. The 
custodians have the right to decide on the care, upbringing, residence and other 
personal matters of the child (section 4) and the custodian represents the child 
in his or her personal affairs unless otherwise provided by law. Parents cannot, 
therefore, make decisions on behalf of the child for any given reason.51 
Unless otherwise provided or prescribed, the custodians of a child are jointly 
responsible for the duties inherent in custody and make the decisions concerning 
the child together (section 5 of the Child Custody Act).52 By way of exception to 
this general rule, if one of the parents cannot participate in the decision-making 
concerning the child due to travel, illness or any other reason, and a delay in the 
decision-making would be detrimental, the consent of his or her is not necessary. 
51 See e.g. Urpo Kangas: Perhe- ja jäämistöoikeuden perusteet. Alma Talent 2013, p. 98. Kangas 
states that all the decisions relating to the child’s care are closely connected to the child’s 
personal life and life choices.
52 The provisions refer to the right of the court to issue orders on the division of responsibilities 
between custodians (9.4). Parents can also agree on the division of responsibilities between 
custodians (section 7, revised on 1 December 2019). See Government proposal 88/2018 on the 
Act amending the Act on Child Custody and Right of Access and other related acts, pp. 44–45.
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The right of the custodian alone to decide on the child in the event of the other 
custodian being prevented from participating in the decision-making process 
applies only to minor matters. However, if the child’s best interests do not seem 
to require otherwise, on the matter of great significance for the future of the child 
parents may only make a joint decision. According to the legislative documents, 
a matter of major importance to the future of the child is, inter alia, the decision 
on the child’s medical care, such as surgery or medical treatment in the event of a 
serious disease. In such cases, the consent of both custodians is always required. 
The fact that the other custodian is not present or that failure to perform the 
treatment measure could cause harm would in principle not be sufficient reason 
to deviate from the obligation to cooperate. However, the best interests of the child 
must always be considered. Thus, for example, in situations where the health or 
life of the child is at risk or the health of the child would be endangered if medical 
procedures were not performed, the consent of a single parent may be sufficient.53 
From the point of view of the Child Custody Act, it is clear that the obligation to 
cooperate is intended to be quite strong and should only be derogated from for 
specific reasons. 
In practice, health care is conducted with the consent of a single custodian in 
usual, routine situations and minor interventions.54 In these situations, it is often 
possible to assume the existence of an authorisation from another custodian. For 
example, if another custodian regularly brings the child alone to the clinic or to 
the doctor’s office, the professional may assume that an authorisation exists.55 
It is somewhat problematic that the issue remains to be solved in individual 
53 Government proposal 224/1982 for the Act on Child Custody and Right of Access and amending 
the Guardianship Act and other related acts, p. 14. The exceptions to the joint responsibility 
provided in the Child Custody Act exist mainly due to practical reasons. As an additional 
condition, the ‘harm caused by delay’ defined in section 5 of the Child Custody Act may be 
something other than harm caused to the child alone. The preparatory works did not, however, 
specify what is meant by this or to whom the inconvenience to others could only justify the 
decision of the custodian alone.
54 Kurki-Suonio, Kirsi: Kuka saa päättää lapsen asioista? Lakimies 7–8/2010 pp. 1183–1203, 
and for situations in health care in particular pp. 1189–1192. See also Salla Lötjönen: The 
Regulation of Neonatal Research in Finland, pp. 123–135 in Su Mason – Christopher Megone 
(eds.): European Neonatal Research: Consent, Ethics Committees and Law. Ashgate, Aldershot 
2001, p. 123.
55 This can be a status-based, situational or authorization-based authorization. In fact, for each 
procedure performed at the reception, the professional has to assess separately whether only 
one of the custodians can decide on it alone. On the division of parental responsibility, see 
Hakalehto, Suvianna: Lapsioikeuden perusteet. Alma Talent 2018, pp. 187–189 and in health 
care in particular, Pollari 2019, pp. 95–98.
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situations, although accepted practices per se have been formed.56 In health care, 
cooperation between parents and health care professionals is, as a rule, a day-
to-day activity. However, there are also challenging situations the resolution of 
which could be facilitated with clear regulation.
For example, the Supreme Court of Finland has stated that non-medical 
circumcision of boys must be regarded as a significant matter within the meaning 
of Article 5(2) of the Child Custody Act, which can be decided only jointly by the 
custodians.57 The Parliamentary Ombudsman, for his part, has taken a stand on 
the joint responsibility of custodians in his decisions concerning both medical 
research and vaccination. The Ombudsman is of the opinion that, as a rule, the 
participation of a child in medical research can only be decided by both parents 
together. On the other hand, the consent of one parent has been considered 
sufficient for routine healthcare measures. The consent of one parent may also be 
considered sufficient for medical research if the required intervention is minor, 
such as blood sampling.58 In the decisions on swine flu vaccination and HPV 
vaccination, the Ombudsman, referring to the provisions of the Child Custody 
Act on the obligation of custody to cooperate, states that vaccination requires, 
in principle, the consent of both custodians. The above-mentioned vaccinations 
are not routine procedures for which only the consent of one of the custodians 
would be sufficient. 59 
Therefore, even in the light of the above-mentioned solutions, the joint 
responsibility of the custodians can be considered as the general rule. In addition, 
it should be noted that the Child Custody Act requires that derogations be provided 
56 In the view of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the consent of one parent is sufficient 
for vaccinations under the national childhood vaccination program, but confirmation of refusal 
to be vaccinated is required from both custodians (decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
of 17 June 2011, diary number 4640/4/409, paragraph 3.3.). See also Merike Helander: 
Rokottaako vai ei? pp. 59–95 in Suvianna Hakalehto – Irma Pahlman (eds.): Lapsen oikeudet 
terveydenhuollossa. Kauppakamari 2018, pp. 84–88.
57 KKO 2016:25, paragraphs 21–28. The Supreme Court also ruled that the custodians have no 
right to even collectively decide on measures against the child which, objectively assessed, would 
violate the child’s fundamental rights and would be contrary to his or her best interests.
58 Decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 25 October 2006, diary number 1016/4/04, 
‘Menettely lääketieteellisessä tutkimuksessa’, paragraph 3.4.3. In his decision, the Ombudsman 
referred to both section 5 of the Child Custody Act and the final report of the ETENE working 
group on research on children. 
59 Decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of 17 June 2011, diary number 4640/4/09, ‘Parents’ 
permission to vaccinate a child against swine flu’ and decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
11 June 2015, diary number 5294/2/13, ‘Implementation of the HPV vaccination campaign’.
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or prescribed separately.60 However, at least for the time being, the Patient Act, 
the Research Act or the Biobank Act have not done so.61 Nor have these acts or 
their working documents specifically addressed the issue of genome research. A 
provision is required in the forthcoming Genome Act requiring the consent of 
both custodians to carry out high-risk genetic analyses. Genome-wide analyses are 
considered high-risk analyses in the legislative proposal.62 In contrast, for low-risk, 
routine analyses, only the consent of the other custodian would be enough. This 
is justified by the fact that the threshold for carrying out health-related genetic 
tests should not be set too high. The Ombudsman’s view has been stricter: the 
obligation of custody cooperation should not be tied to the risk classification 
of genetic tests. Cooperation of the custodians should therefore in principle be 
required for all genetic analyses.63
The letter of reference to minors for biobanks recognizes the need for 
cooperation, at least in some situations. This is justified, inter alia, by the special 
status of children as data subjects.64 The letter advises that, depending on the 
circumstances, it might be reasonable to seek the consent of both custodians, 
which is supported by the fact that biobank research may target genetic data that 
may concern both parents. Particularly in the case of joint custody, it would be 
advisable to seek the opinion of both custodians. In case of disagreement between 
custodians, refusal to seek consent should be considered. Ultimately, this should 
be decided on a case-by-case basis in the best interests of the child. Genome 
60 The joint responsibility of custodians is provided, for example, in section 3 of the Freedom of 
Religion Act (453/2003), under which the religion of a child is decided jointly by the custodians. In 
case law, the Supreme Administrative Court, for example, concluded in its decision KHO:2004:99 
that if the another custodian objects, the other custodian alone cannot validly declare a non-
religious child to religious education with reference to the relevant provision of the Freedom 
of Religion Act and section 5 of the Child Custody Act. 
61 Section 7 of the Patient Act does not take a position on joint responsibility or on how to proceed 
if the custodians disagree. Nor do the drafting documents specify the co-operation of custodians, 
but merely refer only to the Child Custody Act (Government proposal 185/1991 on the Act on 
the Status and Rights of the Patient, p. 17). The Government proposal for the Biobank Act 
(Government proposal 86/2011, pp. 49–50), on the other hand, states that giving consent for 
the storage of a sample in a biobank does not include a decision that is significant for the minor, 
so the consent of one custodian would be sufficient. The definition for a significant decision is 
not provided in the Government proposal. The reform of the Biobank Act also does not require 
the consent of both custodians, but it is especially recommended in situations of joint custody 
(draft Biobank Act, p. 42).
62 Draft Genome Act, p. 223. 
63 Opinion of the Ombudsman on the draft Genome Act of 12 July 2019, EOAK/2777/2019.
64 The National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health letter of reference to biobanks on 
the basics of processing samples and data from minors of 27 April 2016, pp. 2–3. Today, the 
responsible authority for the guidance and supervision of biobanking and maintains a public 
register of biobanks in order to perform its tasks is Finnish Medicines Agency Fimea. See more 
at <https://www.fimea.fi/valvonta/biopankit>.
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research also reveals information about other close relatives of the subject. In 
addition to the fact that consenting to research may easily become challenging, 
if custodians disagree or the consent of only one parent has been obtained, it can 
have an impact on how information about the research results can be given to 
any relatives of the unknowing parent.65
In the legislative reform of the Biobank Act, specific provisions on biobank 
samples in newborns are proposed.66 Newborn sampling would be restricted by 
the ban on taking extra samples for biobanks. In addition, the need to comment 
on the point at which biobank consent could be sought has been identified. For 
the purpose of participating in a medical study, consent for the collection of 
umbilical cord blood samples has been sought during pregnancy, as consent 
required during childbirth has been considered ethically questionable. If this 
were to be the case for biobank samples, it would be clear that prior consent on 
behalf of the newborn would be provided for separately. In my view, there is also 
the specific question of whether a pregnant woman can give her consent alone 
or whether the consent of both biological parents is required. The general rule 
in other legislation is that decision-making during pregnancy is restricted to the 
mother’s right. However, if at any point biobank samples are used to determine 
a child’s genomic information, it is possible that it will also provide information 
relevant to the health of the child’s father or close relatives. Thus, it would be 
important that consent be sought from both parents of the child. 
While it is not possible and appropriate to define all situations that arise 
in health care and medical research, it would be much clearer for the joint 
responsibility of custodians that the law would provide guidelines on how to 
proceed in the event of disagreement between the custodians. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman has also noted a lack of legislation in this respect in at least two of its 
decisions on child vaccination. In the Ombudsman’s view, the Patient Act should 
be clarified, with reference to the legislation regarding adults with disabilities. In 
65 Probably the most ethically challenging situations are those in which one parent or other relatives 
are unknowingly at risk and the parent who consented on behalf of the child being examined 
is unable or unwilling to pass the information on to the other parent or relatives. Although the 
right to data protection must be respected, the right of another person to know, for example, 
about a life-threatening illness, could justifiably be considered more important (Lääkärin etiikka 
2013, p. 87). 
66 This is justified by the fact that the collection of samples from newborns raises strong ethical 
issues, which means that the provisions of the current Biobank Act are not sufficient to ensure 
the legal protection of newborns. However, these issues are not specified. The samples collected 
in the biobank could in practice be umbilical cord blood samples as well as heel samples. An 
umbilical cord blood sample would be obtained from a non-invasive blood sample taken after 
delivery after umbilical cord dissection and a heel sample from the sampling of newborns for 
statutory metabolic diseases (Draft Biobank Act, p. 45).
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the case of adults with disabilities, when their representatives disagree, the matter 
must be resolved in a way that can be considered to be in the patient’s personal 
interest.67 In the case of a minor, a similar requirement could be written in the 
form ‘in the best interests of the child’. In addition, at least the detailed rationale 
of the act should guide how the best interests of the child should be assessed.68 
5.3.4.2 Presumed Will or the Best Interest of the Child
The Research Act and the Biobank Act provide that consent on behalf of a child 
must be in accordance with the child’s presumed will. This provision (section 15(3)) 
was added to the Research Act in connection with the national implementation 
of the European Parliament and Council Directive on clinical trials on medicinal 
products (2001/20/EC) in 2004. No further justification for the addition was 
provided back then.69 In the preparatory works of the Biobank Act, the presumed 
will of a minor is linked to the determination of the child’s opinion: the person 
giving consent on behalf of the child should as far as possible clarify the child’s 
opinion and act accordingly. The consent would then be in accordance with the 
child’s presumed will.70 A similar concept of presumed will is not expressed, for 
example, in the Biomedicine Convention. Instead, it only requires that the views 
of the child be taken into account according to age and maturity.
The above-mentioned regulation is problematic for two reasons. First, the 
concept of ‘presumed will’ is used in a way that does not take into account children 
of different ages. The newborn or young child who has not yet been able to form 
his or her views on the research or any research procedures probably has not been 
able to express anything that another person could base an assumption on in terms 
of his or her will. In these situations, it may not even be possible to think that the 
child’s opposition might be taken into account. Usually, the concept of ‘presumed 
will’ is used to regulate health care, for example in situations where the patient 
67 Decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of 17 June 2011, diary number 4640/4/409, and 
decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of 11 June 2015, diary number 5249/2/13.
68 On factors to be taken into account in assessing the best interests of the child, see CRC/C/
GC/14, in particular paras. 46–99.
69 Government proposal 20/2004 on amending the Medical Research Act and the Medicines Act. 
The Directive (Article 4) states the following: ‘… consent must represent the minor’s presumed 
will’. Regulation 536/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on clinical trials 
on medicinal products no longer mentions the concept of presumed will. The amendments to 
the law related to the implementation of the decree are to be submitted to Parliament at the 
end of 2019. According to the Government proposal for the Act on Clinical Trials and certain 
related laws (11 April 2018), the presumed will requirement is no longer proposed. The rationale 
is that the legislation explicitly obliges the child to be consulted and involved in the decision-
making process, even if he or she is not yet able to give his or her consent.
70 Government proposal 86/2011, p. 49. 
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cannot give consent, but the initiation of treatment cannot be postponed. This 
may be an unconscious or demented patient whose decision is made by their legal 
representative and must be in accordance with the person’s presumed will. Thus, 
the concept of ‘presumed will’ generally refers to the past, a person’s previously 
expressed view of the present matter. The intention may have been expressed 
explicitly in writing or communicated verbally to another person.71 The person’s 
view can be ascertained from the family members or other close relatives.
Another problem with the ‘presumed will’ construction is that it does not 
oblige the child’s best interests to be taken fully into account but is based on the 
(presumed) opinion of the child, as expressed e.g. in the preparatory documents to 
the Biobank Act.72 Section 7 of the Patient Act provides for consent on behalf of a 
minor patient but does not stipulate that treatment should be in the best interests 
of the child, who is not self-determined. Instead, the previously expressed will of 
the disabled adult must be taken into account when consent is given and, if this 
is not clear, the patient must be treated in a way that can be considered to be 
in his or her personal interest (section 6(3)).73 The presumed will for a disabled 
adult has been discussed, for example, in an emergency care setting. The stable 
and healthy will previously expressed by an adult supersedes objective criteria 
for care. In the case of a child, his or her previously expressed will, which differs 
from objective criteria of care, could be followed only exceptionally. This is true 
even if it is a child who is mature enough to consent. The reason for this is that 
the child with a shorter life experience than adults may not be able to understand 
the consequences of his or her decision.74
Instead of following the doctrine of presumed will in the Research Act and the 
Biobank Act, it would be more reasonable to require consent in the best interest 
71 Sections 6(2) and 6(3) of the Patient Act. The concept of presumed will can also be used in a 
situation where the person is dead (sections 9(1) and 12(2) of the Human Tissue Act). According 
the view of The Committee on Constitutional Affair , the presumption of a person’s consent 
to the removal of his or her organs and tissues after his or her death cannot be based on 
how other people, for example, according to opinion polls, react to the matter. Instead, efforts 
should be made to clear out the previously expressed opinion of the deceased (Statement of 
the Committee on Constitutional Affairs 24/2010 – Government proposal 276/2009, p. 3). In 
the context of a gene bank discussion, it has been proposed to use, instead of or in addition to 
informed consent, e.g. presumed consent based on the presumption that people will consent 
to research that is presumed to be harmless. It has, however, been considered a problematic 
option. See Vähäkangas – Länsimies 2004, p. 1554.
72 Government proposal 86/2011, p. 49. See also government proposal 18/2020, p. 149.
73 Government proposal 185/1991, p. 17. The treatment of a disabled patient shall consider his or 
her personal views and the factors he or she would give priority to.
74 Markku Helin: Lapsi ja vajaakykyinen potilaana. Suomen Lääkärilehti 40/2003 vsk 58, pp. 
4025–4028. In this context, Helin also raises the question of how the custodians’ right to 
parenthood is respected in these situations.
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of the child. Similarly, the requirement of consent in favour of the best interests 
of the child should be added to the Patient Act and should also be included in 
the new Genome Act. Such legislation could clarify and harmonise the existing 
practices. It would also take into account children of all ages. When assessing 
the best interests of the child, the rights of the child shall be taken into account 
holistically and on a case by case basis. Thus, it also includes examining the child’s 
opinion in accordance with the child’s evolving capacity.75 The assessment may 
therefore also take into account the ‘presumed will’ formed on the basis of the 
child’s opinions when it comes to an older child who is able to express or has 
previously expressed his or her views on the subject. 
5.3.4.3 A Child’s Right to Privacy or a Parent’s Right to the  
Child’s Genomic Data?
A parent’s right to a child’s health data is based on the parent’s responsibility 
to take care of the child’s growth and development in the best interests of the 
child. At the same time, the parent should respect the child’s privacy and self-
determination in accordance with the child’s evolving capabilities and should also 
seek to safeguard the child’s fundamental and human rights in advance. When it 
comes to genomic information, the precautionary protection of the rights of the 
child could mean, for example, that the parent would not have the right to know 
all the results of the genome research at a stage when the child is not yet able to 
consent to the research. It is possible that at some point the genomic information 
of each child would be determined early, possibly immediately upon birth.76 The 
earlier the genome information is explored, the more attention should be paid to 
75 CRC/C/GC/14, para. 43. The obligation to find out the opinion of the child applies to children 
of all ages. See e.g. Priscilla Alderson – Joanna Hawthorne – Margaret Killen: The Participation 
Rights of Premature babies. The International Journal of Children’s Rights 2005, Vol. 13(1–2), 
p. 31–50.
76 This conclusion is supported by, e.g. the reflections on collecting samples from newborns 
presented in the reform of the Biobank Act (draft Biobank Act, pp. 44–45).
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the protection of the child’s privacy and the child’s right to know or not to know 
at a later stage.77 
The right of access to patient and health records is an integral part of consent 
and everyone is naturally entitled to their own information. Under Article 10 of 
the Biomedicine Convention, everyone has the right of access to information 
concerning their state of health, but if they do not wish to have such information, 
their wishes must be taken into account.78 Similarly, at the national level, section 5 
of the Patient Act confirms the right of the patient to know and not to know. The 
patient shall be given information about his or her state of health, the significance 
of the treatment, various alternative forms of treatment and their effects and 
other factors related to his or her treatment that are significant when decisions 
are made on the treatment given to him or her. However, the information should 
not be given against the will of the patient or when it is obvious that giving the 
information would seriously endanger the patient’s life or health. In the case of 
a minor who is not yet able to make independent decisions regarding his or her 
treatment, the information should be given to the person making the decision on 
behalf of the child, i.e. usually the parent of the child.79
When genomic research is performed in the context of a child’s clinical care, 
the analysed information comprises part of the child’s patient information. The 
77 Johnston – Juengst 2018. The studies mentioned in the article have examined the willingness 
of parents to find out a child’s genomic information. Willingness has been found especially on 
the part of parents of sick children. Parents of healthy children are more reserved. As for the 
justifications, e.g. a desire to prepare for any possible special needs of the child or an obligation 
to allow any medical procedure that may be beneficial to their child. In Finland, the willingness 
of parents to participate in voluntary screenings during pregnancy has been studied. 90% of 
pregnant women planned to participate in chromosome aberration screening in combination 
screening, more than 80% in structural screening at weeks 18–21 of pregnancy, and less than 
a tenth in structural screening after week 24 of pregnancy. The most common reasons were 
ensuring the child’s state of health, finding diseases and abnormalities, confirming the pregnancy, 
seeing the child, getting all possible information, and ensuring the number of foetuses (Maarit 
Nykänen – Siiri Nelimarkka – Anna Turunen – Reija Klemetti: Vanhempien odotuksia ja 
kokemuksia sikiöseulonnoista Suomessa 2015. The expectations and experiences of pregnant 
women and their partners concerning foetal screening in Finland 2015]. National Institute 
for Health and Welfare (THL). Discussionpaper 6/2018. Helsinki, Finland 2018 (abstract in 
english), pp. 16–18). 
78 According to the Explanatory Report to the Biomedicine Convention, a person’s will not to know 
himself or herself may in certain situations be waived or the information could be provided to a 
third party, e.g. if the provision of the information is likely to prevent the spread of a contagious 
disease. Exceptions may also be provided in national law. For more details, see CETS 164, paras. 
63–70. 
79 The provision should be interpreted narrowly, i.e. the mere suspicion of danger or harm would 
not be sufficient (Government proposal 185/1991, p. 15). Valvira’s guidance letter of 2016 states 
(p. 5) that the regulation in the Patient Act should be duly taken into account in connection with 
sampling when it comes to treatment or diagnostics and, where applicable, also when samples 
are collected with consent only for biobanking.
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processing of patient data is primarily governed by the provisions of Chapter 4 
of the Patient Act on patient records and other materials related to treatment.80 
The basic premise is that the parent has a right to the child’s patient records, 
which of course is also a prerequisite for the parent’s involvement in the decision 
to care for the child. The legislation does not comment on the extent or accuracy 
with which the results of (genetic) research should be communicated to parents, 
so it is up to the attending physician to decide. The reporting of results may 
involve ethically problematic situations. Not all findings can be interpreted yet. 
Genome-wide research may also find incidental findings, for example, about a 
disease that is currently untreatable, or which may not manifest until adulthood.81 
Should these be told to the parents of a young child? The research results of a 
child always reveal information about both biological parents, so are parents 
entitled to be informed of the results that are relevant to them? Genetic counselling 
should be given in connection with the reporting of results but may not always 
be sufficiently available.82 
When a custodian exercises his or her right to view a child’s medical records, 
he or she always interferes with the child’s privacy to some extent. This relates 
to a restriction of a right recognised as a fundamental and human right, thereby 
requiring that such a restriction regulated with sufficient precision and legitimacy.83 
The same applies to information given to a custodian from a biobank. In my view, 
the existing legislation does not fully meet these requirements. For example, the 
Biobank Act only provides for the right of the custodian to give biobank consent 
on behalf of the child but does not explicitly state with whom, in these situations, 
80 Among other legislation, e.g. the Act on the Electronic Processing of Client Data in Healthcare 
and Social Welfare (159/2007).
81 Myllykangas et al. 2013, p. 143. Targeted methods can be used to study genetic areas relevant to 
patient care in large clinical populations. Genome and exome sequencing provide information 
that is not directly related to clinical questions but may be relevant to the patient’s health and 
future. Ethical issues related to targeted methods can be reduced by limiting analytics to subjects 
relevant to the clinical problem.
82 See e.g. Kääriäinen 2017, pp. 84–85. On the challenges in dealing with diagnoses based on 
genetic testing, especially within families, see Meincke 2001, pp. 72–75; Line Bune Juhl: Genetic 
Privacy: Autonomy or Solidarity? pp. 292–303 in Elisabeth Rynning – Mette Hartlev (eds.): 
Nordic Health Law in a European Context. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012.
83 Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child reaffirms the child’s right to privacy, 
which must not be infringed arbitrarily or unlawfully. On the conditions for the restriction 
of fundamental rights, see the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs 25/1994 – 
Government proposal 309/1993, p. 5.
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any research findings will be shared.84 The provision on the right of access of 
registered individuals (section 39) does not specifically regulate the situation of 
acting on behalf of the child. Although there is no explicit legislation, it is clear 
that the findings must be communicated to the caregiver when it is relevant to the 
child’s care and the child is not yet able to take responsibility for his or her care.85 
In this respect, the previously mentioned guidance letter for biobanks refers to the 
Data Protection Ombudsman’s statement that, in principle, the rights of the data 
subject belong to everyone, regardless of age or disability, and that a third party 
cannot exercise the data subject’s rights. The rights of the data subject include the 
right to access the data stored in the register. Under certain conditions, another 
person may also be authorised by the data subject in exercising his or her rights. 
Such legal representatives include, for example, custodians of a minor child or 
other legal guardians. The guidance letter does not elaborate on how a young 
child should be dealt with or, for example, whether information should always 
be given to the requesting custodian or both. 
The disclosure of information concerning a young child should be decided 
in the best interests of the child and the starting point should be that only the 
information necessary to ensure the good care of the child is provided to the 
parents. Information relating, for example, to a disease that appears at the earliest 
in adulthood and which cannot be prevented by any measures, should not be 
provided. At the same time, however, it must be ensured that the child himself 
or herself receives the desired data when being able to understand their meaning 
and when being able to take responsibility for his or her own health. This is the 
84 The Government Decree on the Consent Form for Biobanks (643/2013) stipulates that the 
consent document also records the possible consent of the sample donor as to whether the 
biobank may report a clinically significant finding, but does not specifically comment on who 
will be informed if another person has given consent on behalf of the sample donor.
85 Valvira’s guidance letter of 2016. The guidance states, among other things, that as with consent, 
the minor should also be consulted and his or her opinion taken into account when he or she is 
judged to be sufficiently mature, considering his or her age and developmental stage. Pursuant 
to section 9(2) of the Patient Act, a minor should also have the right to prohibit the provision 
of information related to a sample from a biobank to a custodian or other legal representative. 
Ultimately, the matter should be resolved in the best interests of the child. For example, if the 
clinical finding is a serious illness, it would most likely be in the best interests of the child to 
inform the custodian or other legal representative. In situations where the child has himself 
refused to provide information to the custodian, the matter should ultimately be resolved in 
the best interests of the child.
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position taken in the forthcoming Genome Act.86 This approach, however, also has 
its own challenges. Once the child’s genomic information has been determined by 
the consent of the custodian, the child will no longer have the opportunity to make 
his or her own decision on the sequencing of the genome or whether to allow the 
use of the genome data in research. The right to refuse to receive information and 
the right to subsequently prohibit the use of the data for research purposes later 
as a teenager or adult does not fully guarantee the child’s right to an open future. 
5.4 Conclusions
In considering the issues of regulating consent on behalf of the child, it has been 
assumed above that sensitive health data is created in the process of genomic 
research, especially when conducted in early childhood and with extensive genetic 
testing. The protection of the rights of the child must therefore be a paramount 
consideration in the processing of such data. In addition to safeguarding the 
right of the child to influence decision-making in relation to himself or herself in 
accordance with his or her developing capacities, care must be taken in the best 
interests of the child when giving consent on behalf of the child. The Convention 
on the Rights of the Child confirms the independent status of the child as the 
subject of his or her rights and the special protection of the child’s right. The 
custodians should find a balance between these two rights when acting on behalf 
of the child. My views above (section 3.4) on how the law on the consent of the 
child should be developed would help to achieve this balance.
Existing legislation does not explicitly address informed consent from the 
perspective of genome research. Thus, at least for the time being, regulation leaves 
a great deal of room for interpretation to the enforcer. Genomic data is, at the 
very least, sensitive personal data comparable to other health data, so it would be 
important to explicitly regulate its processing. The Genome Act that is currently 
under preparation and the reformed Biobank Act will play a key role in this respect.
86 The draft Genome Act (p. 227) proposes that a minor whose health-related genetic analysis has 
been performed with the consent of a custodian be informed of the storing of genomic information 
das he or she grows up. It also states the following (direct translation): the custodians in the 
position of decision-maker should not take a decision which is contrary to the best interests 
of the child, for example by requiring them to be informed of any diseases that may arise in 
adulthood that the child, especially when older, may not want to know. In these situations, the 
doctor should act in the best interests of the minor and in such a way that the right not to know 
and the right to an open future are actualized. The child may be informed at the time of the 
genetic analysis of matters relevant to the current treatment or other situation or circumstance.
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Germline Gene Therapy:  
Safeguarding the Best Interests  
of the Child
by LL.M. Amanda Blick
Abstract
New gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR/Cas9 and prime editing have been described 
as having the potential to substantially expand the scope and capabilities of gene therapy. 
Such previously unimaginable treatment possibilities provide different applications in 
healthcare, including correcting disease-causing genetic mutations in children entirely 
through germline cells or embryos. The risks relating to the use of these techniques as 
well as the question of whether such use offends against human dignity have since been 
debated in the scientific community. Notably, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has in 
its recent report placed higher focus on the welfare of the future person, deviating from 
the more traditional human rights argument where the integrity of the human genome 
is understood as an extension of safeguarding human dignity. Through balancing the 
legal-ethical principles around the ongoing discussion, this article argues that the current 
human rights perspective should place more focus on parents’ reproductive rights as well 
as the child’s right to the highest attainable standard of health, thereby considering the 
best interests of the unborn individual as a whole.
6.1 CRISPR/Cas9 and Prime Editing: A World of 
Possibilities
The previous years have marked the discovery of disruptive gene-editing 
technologies that have been described to substantially expand the scope and 
capabilities of gene therapy. These include technologies like CRISPR (‘Clustered, 
Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeats’) and prime editing, which 
have been referred to as one of the most promising and even the most important 
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developments in the field of gene editing to date.1 Compared to the cost-efficiency 
and ease of use of earlier technologies, such technologies can also offer previously 
unimaginable treatment possibilities through their applications in healthcare.2 
Not only are they useful in somatic therapies for the prevention and cure of genetic 
diseases, but they have potential in correcting disease-causing genetic mutations 
in children entirely through germline cells or embryos, thereby even altering the 
genome that can be passed onto any future generations.3
The ethical aspects of such applications have also opened new debates within 
the scientific community. Commentators have pointed out the risks relating to 
the use of these techniques as well as considered inheritable genome editing to 
constitute a violation of human dignity in itself. Among these voices, the Committee 
on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development of the Council of Europe 
recently reiterated the call for a ban on using germline cells or human embryos 
which have undergone intentional germline editing by declaring that such use 
crosses a line viewed as ethically inviolable.4 This area of research is particularly 
highlighted by ethical concerns surrounding human dignity, both relating to the 
inviolability of the human genome and the best interests of the child in terms of 
the child’s right to the highest attainable standard of health. The article focuses 
1 The CRISPR system that relies on the Cas9 enzyme functions together with a small RNA molecule. 
On the principle of base-pair complementarity, the RNA molecule recognises the region of 
the target DNA, which is then cleaved by the Cas9 enzyme. For a more detailed explanation 
of the technology’s working mechanism, see Jennifer A Doudna – Emmanuelle Charpentier, 
The New Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISPR-Cas9. Science 346(6213) 2014, pp. 
1258096-1–1258096-9. The article provides an in-depth analysis of the functioning system of 
CRISPR-Cas9 and further explains its ability to potentially correct genetic mutations that cause 
inherited disorders. Similarly, prime editing is described to have the ability to correct about 
89% of known pathogenic variants. See Andrew V Anzalone – Peyton B Randolph – Jessie R 
Davis – Alexander A Sousa – Luke W Koblan – Jonathan M Levy – Peter J Chen – Christopher 
Wilson – Gregory A Newby – Aditya Raguram – David R Liu, Search-and-replace genome 
editing without double-strand breaks or donor DNA. Nature 576(7785) 2019, pp. 149–157.
2 See Tracey Tomlinson, A CRISPR Future for Gene-Editing Regulation: a Proposal for an Updated 
Biotechnology Regulatory System in an Era of Human Genomic Editing. Fordham Law Review 
87(1), pp. 437–483, 482, Joanna Smolenski, CRISPR/Cas9 and Germline Modification: New 
Difficulties in Obtaining Informed Consent. Am J Bioeth 15(12) 2015, pp. 35–68, 35, and Heidi 
Ledford, CRISPR, the disruptor. Nature 522(7554) 2015, pp. 520–524, 520.
3 See John EJ Rasko – Gabrielle M O’Sullivan – Rachel A Ankeny, Is inheritable genetic 
modification the new dividing line?, pp. 1–15 in John Rasko – Gabrielle O’Sullivan – Rachel 
Ankeny (eds.), The Ethics of Inheritable Genetic Modification: A Dividing Line? Cambridge 
University Press 2006, p. 6, where germline editing is defined as any biomedical intervention 
altering the set of genes with transgenerational effects, including all interventions performed 
at an early enough stage to have inheritable effects. In somatic gene therapy, respectively, the 
functioning gene is introduced into the already differentiated non-germ cells from the human 
body, replacing the defective one, but without the aim to induce mutations in the germline.
4 Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development. Germline genome editing 
in human beings, Declaration adopted by the Committee on 4 December 2018.
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on these questions of how we should interpret the concept of human dignity in 
the bioethical discussion surrounding germline editing; and whether the child’s 
right to the highest attainable standard of health and the parents’ right to bring 
a child into the world who is not affected by the illness that they carry could, in 
some cases, balance out the child’s right to inherit a genetic pattern which has 
not been artificially changed.
6.2 Review of the Fundamental Rights Associated 
with Germline Gene Therapy
6.2.1 Grounds for Excluding Germline Gene Therapy: Respecting 
the Physical Integrity of Descendants
Various direct and indirect regulation mechanisms surrounding germline gene 
therapy exist in both national legislation as well as international instruments, 
including human rights conventions and primary and secondary law of the 
European Union.5 On the national level, the prohibitions of undertaking germline 
gene therapy are laid down in sections 4 and 5 of the Act on Assisted Fertility 
Treatments (1237/2006) as well as Chapter 22, sections 3 and 5 of the Criminal 
Code of Finland (39/1889).6 These prohibitions follow from various human rights 
instruments and most notably the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine (‘the Biomedicine Convention’), Article 13 of which provides that and 
intentional human germline modification shall be prohibited in all cases, even 
for health-related reasons.7 
5 The process leading to the development and eventual commercialisation of gene therapy 
medicines has areas been largely harmonised in the Union in areas such as clinical trials and 
obtaining marketing authorisation for advanced therapy medicinal products. Article 3(2)(c) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union further provides that the prohibition 
of ‘eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons, must be respected 
in the fields of medicine and biology’.
6 Section 15 of the Medical Research Act (488/1999) further stipulates that research on embryos 
and gametes for the purpose of developing procedures for modifying hereditary properties shall 
be prohibited, but this prohibition does not apply if the research is carried out for the purpose 
of curing or preventing a serious hereditary disease.
7 Notably, on p. 27, the Government proposal 3/2006 to Parliament for the Act on Assisted 
Fertility Treatments and amending the Paternity Act makes a reference to Article 13 to the 
Biomedicine Convention, although the Biomedicine Convention was only ratified a few years 
after on 13 November 2009 and entered into force on 1 March 2010.
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Indirect control mechanisms discouraging the development of germline gene 
therapy are further contained in relevant Community law. These include inter alia 
the harmonised legislation around advanced therapy medicinal products and the 
provision of economic incentives for research through patenting.8 Another example 
is Article 90(2) of the Regulation 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use which provides 
that ‘no gene therapy trials may be carried out which result in modification to the 
subject’s germline genetic identity’. A similar view is further reflected in Article 6(2) 
of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions which considers the 
commercial exploitation of processes for modifying the germline genetic identity 
of human beings as contrary to ordre public and morality, thereby limiting the 
economic incentives for research of CRISPR/Cas9 and prime editing in human 
applications.9 The Commission’s report on the Development and Implications of 
Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering explains that 
this exclusion of germline gene therapy exists in particular in order to respect the 
‘physical integrity of descendants’ – simultaneously, however, the Commission 
recognises somatic gene therapy as ‘very valuable for the treatment of genetic 
diseases’.10
The regulatory mechanisms surrounding germline gene therapy are unequivocal 
even where commentators describe that interpreting the exclusion as intending to 
8 Following what is stated in recital 40 in the preamble to the Directive 98/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions, the decision to unequivocally exclude germline therapy from patentability was 
based on the ‘consensus within the Community’ that interventions in the human germline 
offend against ordre public and morality. The earlier proposal for the directive further stated 
that unequivocally excluding from patentability any such methods of treatment was ‘important’ 
in view of the ‘importance and the controversial nature of the unprecedented questions’ See 
recital 24 in the preamble to the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on 
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, COM/95/0661 final.
9 Article 6(1) of the directive states that inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their 
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality. With reference to Article 
6(1), Article 6(2) specifies that inter alia processes for modifying the germline genetic identity of 
human beings and uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes are excluded 
from patentability.
10 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Development and 
implications of patent law in the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering, COM/2002/0545 
final, point 5.2.3. The connection between physical integrity and human dignity is understood to 
rely on both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as part of the primary 
law that is applicable for directive as well as the reference to recital 16 of the preamble to the 
directive which states that the the European Convention on Human Rights forms part of the 
general principles of Community law, further providing that patent law must be applied so as 
to protect the dignity and integrity of the person. See Oliver Mills, Biotechnological Inventions: 
Moral Restraints and Patent Law. Routledge 2010, p. 146.
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deny the incentive for research on the prevention of severe hereditary diseases is 
in itself ‘controversial’.11 This controversial nature of such exclusions is apparent 
from the further issues that have been raised during the implementation of 
Community legislation. For example, upon implementing the relevant provisions 
of the Directive 98/44 into the Patents Act (550/1967), the Environmental 
Committee commented that modifying the genetic identity of human germ cells 
so that alleles causing hereditary diseases are corrected cannot be considered 
contrary to ordre public or morality and such methods should be patentable.12 
It was explained that the examples listed should be read in conjunction with the 
general provision – this, however, is in great contrast with the wording of Article 
6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44, which explicitly states that such methods are considered 
unpatentable, thus leaving no room for such interpretation.
In my opinion, the above contrasting views show that while germline gene 
therapy is discouraged in many instances, the issue appears to be more complex 
than the current legislative position sets it out to be. I wish to argue that the basic 
values enshrined in European human rights instruments around human dignity 
and integrity form a common ground for exploring further the concept of human 
dignity in the field of biolaw.13 Next, I will investigate whether any applications 
for germline gene therapy exist that are acceptable in light of human dignity after 
the concept first defined through the contents of human rights conventions and 
other legislation.
6.2.2 Interpretations of the Concept of Human Dignity
The concept of human dignity is reflected upon several human rights conventions 
– and they are also where human dignity derives its legislative force on the 
11 Ana Nordberg, Patentability of human enhancement: from ethical dilemmas to legal (un)
certainty, pp. 54–92 in Tana Pistorius (ed.), Intellectual Property Perspectives on the Regulation 
of New Technologies. Edward Elgar 2018, p. 77.
12 Statement of the Environmental Committee 3/2000 — Government proposal 21/2000, p. 2.
13 The following bioethical principles are identified in conjunction with international human 
rights standards: freedom of research; benefit sharing; solidarity; respect for dignity; and the 
obligation to respect and to protect the rights and individual freedoms of others. See Andrea 
Boggio – Cesare P R Romano – Jessica Almqvist, Toward a Human Rights Framework for the 
Regulation of Human Germline Genome Modification, pp. 585–617 in Andrea Boggio – Cesare 
P R Romano – Jessica Almqvist (eds.), Human Germline Genome Modification and the Right 




supranational level.14 While the European Convention on Human Rights refers 
to human dignity only implicitly, it is still understood as the supporting principle 
behind all the more practical embodiments that human rights instruments 
provide.15 As the primary international instrument aiming to protect human 
dignity by prohibiting the misuse of innovations in biomedicine, the Biomedicine 
Convention underlines securing human dignity as its leading purpose.16 According 
to its Explanatory Report, the concept of human dignity ‘constitutes the essential 
value to be upheld’ and it is understood to form the basis of most of the values 
emphasised in the Convention.17 
The Convention, however, provides no further definition or explanation as 
to what human dignity actually comprises, and this type of ambiguity is also the 
reason why the concept of human dignity has also faced criticism.18 Without 
a more structured basis in argumentation, the concept of human dignity is 
argued to risk becoming a void mantra for expressing distrust towards any new 
technology.19 Since the concept of human dignity is so difficult to define – not 
to mention unlikely to face opposition – it is for this reason that using it as an 
argument would require specifying more precisely what human dignity means in 
any given context and why the proposed or existing policy decisions are necessary 
14 In addition to these international human rights instruments, human dignity is also reflected 
upon national legislation, including section 1(1) of the Constitution of Finland (731/1999) which 
provides that the constitution shall guarantee the inviolability of human dignity and the freedom 
and rights of the individual and promote justice in society.
15 Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, Vilnius, 3 May 2002, 
which refers to ‘the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings’. The concept is 
often traced to originate from Immanuel Kant putting forward the idea of human dignity as the 
superiority of man over other animals by the merits of his personality and ability to act freely 
in accordance with the universal moral laws. According to Foster, however, it was only after 
the Second World War and the atrocities of the Holocaust that human dignity established its 
position as a very significant, if not the most important principle in human rights. See Charles 
Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law. Hart 2011, p. 40.
16 Article 1(1) of the Biomedicine Convention obliges all Member States to the Convention to ‘protect 
the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, 
respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the 
application of biology and medicine’.
17 Explanatory Report to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, para. 9.
18 This criticism is not new, as leaders of philosophical thought from both the left and right such as 
Schopenhauer, Marx, and Nietzsche condemned the term as contentless and without reference 
to any concrete basis. See Christopher McCrudden, Human dignity and judicial interpretation 
of human rights. European Journal of International Law 19(4) 2008, pp. 655–724, 661.
19 Laura Walin, Alkio- ja kantasolututkimuksen sääntely bio-oikeudellisena mallina. Forum Iuris 
2010, pp. 38–39.
116
Germline Gene Therapy: Safeguarding the Best Interests of the Child   
to safeguard its inviolability.20 I have to agree with this view, as many of the 
human rights conventions as well as their explanatory reports inevitably fail to 
address the concept of human dignity, and it is indeed a difficult one to define. 
Understanding the political atmosphere behind these developments, securing 
its formal importance by including the concept in the human rights instruments 
is argued to have been prioritised over fighting over exact definitions.21 Indeed, 
despite the issues relating to the concept’s ambiguity, it is still viewed to play an 
important role in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation 
and adjudication.22
In determining physical integrity, further problems arise with the definition 
of the human being, as an unborn child is not yet a legal person who could be a 
direct subject of protectable rights.23 When the International Bioethics Committee 
working for UNESCO issued a document titled Report of the IBC on updating 
its reflection on the human genome and human rights, it declared that when 
it comes to the question of physical integrity and human life, a consensus is 
‘impossible to attain’.24 While some contend that the threshold of the right to life 
is reached only at some point of the development of human life, others believe 
that unconditional respect is due from the very beginning, presupposing a strong 
notion of the sanctity of life, to which understanding embryogenesis as an ongoing 
process is connected.25 The legal ambiguity of the unborn individual’s status and 
rights – or the lack of them – leaves room for arguments on both sides: on the 
one hand, it makes it possible to ignore the question of the welfare of the unborn 
individual, since one could argue that there is no legal person that could be seen 
as the subject of any such rights; on the other hand, those with an antagonistic 
20 Ibid.
21 Foster 2011, p. 94.
22 McCrudden 2008, pp. 655–724.
23 This is the view adopted in the Finnish legal system as recognised by Walin 2010, pp. 101–
102. See also Douglas Walton, The slippery slope argument in the ethical debate on genetic 
engineering of humans. Sci Eng Ethics 23(6) 2017, pp. 1507–1528, 1527, where he states that 
one could ‘say that germline modification is done on a patient that does not exist yet’.
24 The intention of this updated report was reportedly to address some of the ethical issues raised 
by the Chinese experiment that edited germline of non-viable human tripronuclear zygotes. 
See Puping Liang – Yanwen Xu – Xiya Zhang – Chenhui Ding – Rui Huang – Zhen Zhang 
– Jie Lv – Xiaowei Xie – Yuxi Chen – Yujing Li – Ying Sun – Yaofu Bai – Zhou Songyang – 
Wenbin Ma – Canquan Zhou – Junjiu Huang, CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human 
tripronuclear zygotes. Protein Cell 6(5) 2015, pp. 363–372.
25 UNESCO International Bioethics Committee, Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights. SHS/YES/IBC-22/15/2REV.2. UNESCO 2015, pp. 




approach towards restrictions on germline editing can claim that there is no 
human whose physical integrity could be violated.26
The definition of the human being was reflected in the decision on Vo v. 
France of 8 July 2004.27 Raising the question of whether an unborn child 
is considered to have a right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR, the Court 
commented on this issue by stating that while no European consensus 
exists on the nature and status of the embryo or foetus as regards being a 
person with the right to life for the purposes of Article 2, even the fact that 
the embryo or a foetus has the potential and capacity to become a person 
means that it requires some level of protection in the name of human 
dignity. The Court concluded that as a common ground between States, it 
may be only regarded that the unborn humans, at the stage of embryo or 
foetus, belong to the human race, without offering a clear answer to the 
question of whether an unborn child is a person or not.28
As demonstrated by the decision Vo v. France of 8 July 2004, the fact that an 
unborn human is not considered a legal person does not mean that the unborn 
human would be completely devoid of protection under the ECHR. The biggest 
problem here still seems to be that many varying definitions of these concepts exist 
with no exact meaning to build their core. Thus, the legal use of the term appears 
to occur in cases where it is not possible to provide clear rational justifications for 
the arguments supporting the claims; this, in turn, leads to further ambiguity, as 
European states with varying legal cultures share different ideas on the concept 
of dignity. Deviating from this thought, I believe that it is the systematisation of 
such concepts that truly empowers their use, and acknowledging that nations 
place different emphasis on the basic principles that are understood to define the 
concept of human dignity in European bioethics and biolaw is a good place to 
26 See, e.g. Foster 2011, pp. 58–60, where he explains that this ambiguity is also why the concept 
is subject to constant interpretation. See also Juli Mansnérus – Céline Dujardin – Raimo Lahti, 
Forms and levels of legal protection of the human embryo in biomedical research in Finland and 
France, pp. 199–224 in Ewa M Guzik-Makaruk – Emil W Plywaczewski (eds.), Current Problems 
of the Penal Law and Criminology: Aktuelle Probleme des Strafrechts und der Kriminologie. 
Wydawnictwo C.H Beck 2019.
27 In the case of Vo v. France, Mrs Vo claimed compensation for the loss of her six-month-old 
foetus as the pregnancy was accidentally terminated in a hospital after a misunderstanding.
28 Vo v. France, paras 84 and 85.
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start.29 Without clear legal rules or guiding principles to which we can adhere, we 
risk facing arbitrary use of power in important bioethical issues – or, as I argue 
later to be the case with Community law – with conservative views overriding 
European pluralism.
6.2.2.1 Reviewing the Human Genome as an Extension of  
Human Dignity
To better understand the concept of human dignity, it is worth reviewing its 
definition in human rights instruments and the relevant bioethics commentaries 
further explaining its content. Justifying the necessity of prohibiting germline 
gene therapy to respect the physical integrity of descendants implies that future 
individuals, although yet unborn, are recognised as entities to which human rights 
argumentation to some extent applies.30 As pointed above, the concept of human 
dignity is an abstract one and does not necessarily have to relate to an individual 
in order to be violated. Instead, it is the human genome that is in many sources 
reviewed as an extension of human dignity.
Referring to Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, in its recommendation on Genetic 
Engineering in 1982, the Council of Europe emphasised how the rights to life and 
human dignity imply the ‘right to inherit a genetic pattern which has not been 
artificially changed’.31 Building upon this, Article 1 of the UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights explains how the 
human genome is ‘the heritage of humanity’ in a symbolic sense, underlying ‘the 
fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition 
of their inherent dignity and diversity’.32 In the same recommendation, germline 
interventions were identified as an example of practices that could be contrary 
to human dignity.33 Still relying on the notion of Article 1 of the UDHGHR, the 
29 On these basic ethical principles – autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability – see Jacob 
Dahl Rendtorff, ‘Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw: Autonomy, dignity, 
integrity and vulnerability – Towards a foundation of bioethics and biolaw. Medicine, Health 
Care and Philosophy 5(3) 2002, pp. 235–244.
30 In the same recommendation, the Council of Europe further recognized the great potential of 
gene therapy, stating at para. 4. d. that ‘the explicit recognition of this right must not impede 
development of the therapeutic applications of genetic engineering (gene therapy), which 
holds great promise for the treatment and eradication of certain diseases which are genetically 
transmitted’.
31 Recommendation 932 (1982) on Genetic Engineering. Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 
January 1982 (22nd Sitting).
32 As a soft-law instrument, the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
acts as a framework around which the details and refinements of the actual binding national 
and international legislation may later have been developed.
33 Article 24 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997.
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UNESCO International Bioethics confirmed its view that even for therapeutic 
purposes, any alternatives to this interpretation ‘would be to jeopardise the 
inherent and therefore equal dignity of all human beings and renew eugenics, 
disguised as the fulfilment of the wish for a better, improved life’.34
The Biomedicine Convention further signifies the impermissible nature of 
germline modifications due to human dignity. It is understood that the Convention 
was mostly designed to address developments in gene therapy, and it does 
indeed take a stance on the subject.35 For other than preventative, diagnostic, 
or therapeutic purposes, any interventions seeking to modify the human genome 
are generally prohibited under Article 13 of the Convention, and intentional 
human germline modification is prohibited in all cases, even for health-related 
reasons.36 The explanatory report clarifies that the article does not rule out somatic 
interventions that affect the germline through unwanted side effects, for example, 
in certain cancer treatments by radiotherapy or chemotherapy possibly affecting 
the reproductive system of the person undergoing the treatment.37 Therefore, it 
seems that any modifications of the human germline violate human dignity only 
through their deliberative nature.38
34 Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 26.
35 Jeff Kipling, The European Landscape for Human Genome Editing: A review of the current state 
of the regulations and ongoing debates in the EU. Academy of Medical Sciences 2016, p. 12. 
36 This is apparent from the wording of the Article 13, where it is stipulated that an intervention 
seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken ‘only if its aim is not to introduce 
any modification the genome of any descendants’.
37 See the Explanatory Report to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (CETS 164), para. 92, stating this ‘may be the case, for example, for 
certain treatments of cancer by radiotherapy or chemotherapy, which may affect the reproductive 
system of the person undergoing the treatment’. The issues that relate to these ‘incidental 
enhancements’ are the same that are raised outside preventive medicine. Taking the example 
of gene therapy that has had unexpected side effects in mice, should these have similar effects 
in humans, they would not only prevent early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, but also improve 
the treated individuals’ cognitive capacities and extend their lifespans. This further raises the 
question of whether such interventions fall outside the limits of responsible gene-editing or 
are they just acceptable side effects of successful disease prevention. Eric T Juengst – Gail E 
Henderson – Rebecca L Walker – John M Conley – Douglas MacKay – Karen M Meagher – 
Katherine Saylor – Margaret Waltz – Kristine J Kuczynski – R Jean Cadigan, Is Enhancement 
the Price of Prevention in Human Gene Editing? CRISPR J 1(6) 2018, pp. 351–354, 353.
38 Ana Nordberg elaborates on whether the provision may interpreted as only prohibiting non-
therapeutic germline interventions, arguing that ‘genetic therapy, even if it affects future 
generations, does not have the aim of introducing a modification since its objective is to cure 
or prevent a medical condition’. Nordberg 2018, p. 77. The UNESCO International Bioethics 
Committee, however, confirms that such an interpretation is not exactly in line with the aim 
of the Convention. See the Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights, p. 26. For further discussion on this idea of intentionality, see Rasko – 
O’Sullivan –Ankeny 2006, p. 5.
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The Biomedicine Convention has been described as ‘important’ and ‘unique’ as 
it is the first – and only – international legally binding instrument fully devoted 
to biomedical issues.39 However, even on a European level, the Convention is 
not exactly universal, since as a regional instrument, the Convention has limited 
geographic scope and application.40 While it has been presented that the 
ratification of the Biomedicine Convention and its Protocols would indicate that 
a growing European consensus has been built around its provisions, agreeing with 
such perspectives is noted to be difficult since the Convention has only been ratified 
at a varying rate.41 Out of 47 Member States, 35 have signed the Convention, 
but only 29 of these have also ratified it and implemented the principles into 
their national laws, with six of those ratifying Member States having reservations 
limiting the extent to which they are bound to certain provisions.42
Despite the various opinions surrounding this question, the Council of Europe 
nevertheless views the human genome as an extension of human dignity, without 
offering many answers as to why this is. This view has since been challenged by 
various commentators assessing the question of whether editing the genome of 
one’s descendants could truly amount to an infringement of human dignity. One 
notable example is the recent report by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics which 
states that the concept of human dignity is not helpful in this context and that 
the moral importance of human beings is not dependent on the possession of 
a particular set of genomic variations.43 Even the Finnish Medical Association 
has stated in its ethical guidelines that the integrity of the genome should not be 
considered an intrinsic value, viewing the modification of the disease-causing gene 
so that a healthy one would be transmitted to future generations as desirable.44 
Although all European bioethics commentators appear to share the commitment 
to human dignity, some argue that using the human dignity argument against 
39 Henriette Roscam Abbing, The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. An Appraisal 
of the Council of Europe Convention. European Journal of Health Law 5(4) 1998, pp. 377–
387, 379. In her appraisal, Henriette Roscam Abbing states that it is, in essence, a Health Law 
Convention ‘pur sang’.
40 Fransesco Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights: The International 
Legal Framework, pp. 3–32 in Biotechnologies and International Human Rights. Hart 2007, 
p. 27.
41 Juli Mansnérus, Commercialisation of Advanced Therapies: A Study of the EU Regulation on 
Advanced Therapy Medical Products. Unigrafia 2016, p. 80.
42 These states include Croatia, Denmark, France, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.
43 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing and Human Reproduction: social and ethical 
issues. Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, p. 158.
44 Finnish Medical Association, Lääkärin etiikka. Suomen Lääkäriliitto 2013, p. 92. In Finnish, 
they provide that ‘on toivottavaa, että sairauden geeni voitaisiin korvata normaalilla ja terve 
geeni siirtyisi jälkeläisiinkin. Genomin koskemattomuudesta ei pidä tehdä itseisarvoa’.
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modifying the human germline is a ‘logical fallacy’.45 Reviewing the human 
genome as an extension of human dignity can even give rise to arguments that 
would support the thought of the right to being born with a ‘core genetic identity’, 
without certain diseases.46 Some authors further challenge the concept of the 
human genome by stating that the term lacks coherence in any case: as the human 
genome should be understood as ever-changing living material that does not 
remain static in human individuals, it remains unclear how the inviolability of the 
genome is compromised through germline editing.47 I agree this to be a valid point 
to the extent of how trillions of mutations have been estimated to take place inside 
of our bodies every day; but I do not believe that we should completely ignore 
the concept of human dignity relating to the human genome when considering, 
for example, the production of chimeras consisting of human and animal DNA. 
The truth is perhaps found somewhere in between these extremities, with the 
principles of the welfare of the future person and social justice and solidarity 
guiding such moral evaluation.
6.2.2.2 Safeguarding the Best Interests of the Unborn Individual
‘Would it be unethical not to fix something if you could? If it were very 
safe, wouldn’t it be wrong not to?’48
Alongside human dignity, the quest for harmonisation and European constitutional 
pluralism has resulted in another core value that is reflected in the Biomedicine 
Convention, namely the value of protecting fundamental rights.49 I want to 
approach this question from a human rights perspective that notes the various 
implications relating to gene therapy, both when it comes to the human dignity 
aspect of individual rights as well as the societal implications on human dignity 
45 Iñigo de Miguel Beriain, Human dignity and gene editing. EMBO Rep 19(10) 2018, e46789.
46 Martin Gunderson, Human Rights, Dignity, and the Science of Genetic Engineering. Social 
Philosophy Today 22/2006, pp. 43–57, 46.
47 Walin 2010, p. 80.
48 These are the exact words of Nobel laureate Craig Mello as presented in Cormac Sheridan, 
CRISPR germline editing reverberates through biotech industry. Nature Biotechnology 33(5) 
2015, p. 432.
49 Susan Millns, Consolidating Bio-rights in Europe, pp. 71–84 in Francioni 2007, pp. 71–72. 
Recalling the history of the instrument, one of the members of the drafting group recognizes 
that ‘it was soon decided that the concept of dignity, identity and integrity of human beings/
individuals should be both the basis and the umbrella for all other principles and notions that 
were to be included in the Convention’.
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– and I will start systematically from the individual aspects first, later following 
up on the solidarity aspects on a societal level.
6.2.2.3 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
The World Health Organisation was the first to formulate the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health in the level of human rights instruments by declaring 
it in its 1946 Constitution as a ‘right of every human being without distinction of 
race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition’.50 Shortly afterwards in 
1948, the United Nations was then also inspired to recognise the right to health as 
a human right and laid down in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which provides the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of each individual themselves as well as their family.51
Among the human rights instruments recognising the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health is also the Oviedo Convention, Article 3 of which 
requires member states, taking into account health needs and available resources, 
to take ‘appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, 
equitable access to health care of appropriate quality’. For children in particular, 
Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child guarantees every child 
the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to 
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.52 Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights further provides 
that the ‘right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health’ requires active steps from the Member States. This, 
as clarified by the guidance on the full realisation of the right to health in the 
General Comment No. 14, results in the right to health providing not only the 
freedom to control one’s health and body but also entitlements to health services.53 
50 The Constitution was described as revolutionary at the time of its adoption. See Maite San 
Giorgi, The Human Right to Equal Access to Health Care. Intersentia 2012, p. 10.
51 For a commentary, see Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. Signal 
Books 2016, p. 30, where he states that ‘the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not 
say that humans have ‘the right to life until the age of ninety’. It says that every human has a 
right to life, period. That right isn’t limited by any expiry date’.
52 Toebes elaborates further on the concept of health, stating that to some it is a physical condition 
marked by the absence of disease or infirmity, while to others it represents a state without harm. 
See Birgit Toebes, Health and Human Rights: In Search of the Legal Dimension. Human Rights 
& International Legal Discourse 9(2) 2015, p. 212–224.
53 These health services include preventive, curative, primary, and rehabilitative care as well as 
treatment relating to reproductive health and mental health, provision of essential drugs, and 
treatment of epidemic diseases. See San Giorgi 2012, pp. 11–12.
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On the basis of these human rights instruments, the right to health is understood 
to confer the right to the underlying determinants of health, including healthcare.54 
After the adoption of the above-described human rights instruments, the 
advancements in healthcare have then expanded the contents of the right to health 
extending to the individual also being able to access preventive medicine.55 The 
UNESCO International Bioethics Committee also recognises this development, 
stating that the benefits resulting from advancements in human genetics having 
an impact on health protection and healthcare should be considered a part of the 
fundamental right of every human being to enjoy the highest attainable standard 
of health.56
As preventive medicine is thus understood to be included in the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health, preventing severe hereditary illnesses 
through gene therapy also falls into this category – after all, in individual cases, 
it is indisputable that a child born with a severe hereditary illness will face suffering 
from its symptoms and, as a result, experience a lower quality of life.57 Based on 
this conclusion, some authors have even described the assertion that germline 
interventions would offend human dignity as ‘highly debatable’ when its aim 
is to protect future generations from severe inheritable diseases.58 This view is 
shared by those who on these same grounds go as far as describing the incentives 
to continue gene editing research as ‘a moral imperative’.59 I believe that it is 
therefore relevant to further investigate the question of whether applications for 
germline modifications exist that would rather safeguard human dignity instead 
of violating it. Rather than focusing on the abstract concept of protecting human 
dignity, I hold that these aspects appear to place greater emphasis on the more 
practical interests and welfare of the individual affected by his or her condition. 
54 San Giorgi 2012, at p. 19, provides further examples of the core content of these determinants, 
including nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water, adequate sanitation and safe and 
healthy occupational conditions. 
55 Ana Nordberg – Timo Minssen – Sune Holm – Maja Horst – Kell Mortensen – Birger Lindberg 
Møller, Cutting edges and weaving threads in the gene editing (Я)evolution: reconciling scientific 
progress with legal, ethical, and social concerns. Journal of Law and the Biosciences 5(1) 2018, 
pp. 35–83, 63–64.
56 The IBC mentions personalized medicine and precision as concrete examples in the advancements 
that can have an impact on health protection and healthcare. See the Report of the IBC on 
updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 28.
57 Deryck Beyleveld – Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw. Oxford 
University Press 2001, p. 145.
58 Nordberg – Minssen – Holm – Horst – Mortensen – Lindberg Møller 2018, pp. 63–64.
59 Julian Savulescu – Jonathan Pugh – Thomas Douglas – and Christopher Gyngell, The moral 
imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos. Protein & Cell 6(7) 2015, pp. 
476–479.
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This is not to say, however, that germline gene therapy is without concerns, both 
those relating to the human dignity of the unborn individual as well as the wider 
societal effects. These deserve their own review that I will conduct later in this 
article by focusing both on the aspects relating to the individual and the aspects 
that have a clear connection to society as a whole.
6.2.2.4 Risk-to-Benefit Ratio: When Are Therapies Sufficiently Safe 
and Effective?
The UNESCO International Bioethics Committee has recently stated that the 
current restrictive approach to germline editing exists due to the uncertainties 
on the effect that germline modification could have on future generations.60 
Similar to any therapy, overcoming safety concerns remains a prerequisite for 
human applications – and at the present stage of research, safety and efficacy for 
CRISPR/Cas9 and prime editing are still not sufficiently demonstrated to ensure 
that germline gene therapy would only affect the targeted genes.61 It is argued that 
for germline gene therapy, these safety concerns are highlighted when considering 
how significantly the intervention is likely to affect the lives of individuals who 
could be considered ‘designed on demand’ and transmit their genome to future 
generations without consent.62 If the therapy ends up being unsuccessful, it is not 
only the future person that will be affected – as the effects of germline editing 
are hereditable, the next generations will also face the consequences, and the 
effects of any off-target mutations will not always be benign or predictable nor 
readily reversible.63 Considering further how some mutations resulting from 
unsuccessful gene therapy might not be detected until only later in life, proceeding 
60 Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 
14.
61 Although the accuracy of gene editing has significantly improved with CRISPR-Cas9 and prime 
editing when compared to previous methods, there have been implications that even the most 
accurate technology developed so far has not yet worked with sufficient accuracy. As of the current 
situation, there is a prevailing risk that the Cas9 enzyme alters other parts of the genome than 
what has been intended, causing unwanted changes in the DNA. Moreover, the CRISPR-Cas9 
technology has been shown to work most efficiently in cells that lack a functional p53 protein, a 
phenotype common to cancer cells, leaving cells vulnerable to tumorigenic mutations and thus 
possibly resulting in increased cancer risk. See Emma Haapaniemi – Sandeep Botla – Jenna 
Persson – Bernhard Schmierer – Jussi Taipale, CRISPR–Cas9 genome editing induces a p53-
mediated DNA damage response- Nature Medicine 24(7) 2018, pp. 927–930.
62 Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 25.
63 Marcelo de Araujo, Editing the Genome of Human Beings: CRISPR-Cas9 and the Ethics of 
Genetic Enhancement. Journal of Evolution and Technology 27(1) 2017, pp. 24–42.
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with caution is argued to be all the more justified to ensure that human dignity 
is not compromised.64
At present, due to our lack of knowledge of these potentially detrimental effects, 
the risks of irreversible damage relating to germline interventions are therefore 
described to be disproportionate in comparison with its potential benefits, and 
view of these concerns, there is widespread agreement that germline gene therapy 
should not be encouraged.65 The European Group of Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (‘EGE’) shares this view by stating that a moratorium should prevail 
on such genetic modification on human embryos or gametes which would result 
in the modification of the human genome.66
In the clinical context, some authors argue that for germline editing to become 
a viable option from the perspective of human dignity, precision should be 
unbending and no errors should be tolerated to avoid transgenerational harm.67 
On a more general level, such an approach appears to be not very widely adopted 
in medicine – medical procedures completely free from the risk of adverse effects 
seem to be more the exception than the rule. Instead, it is the balance between 
the impact of the risks and the benefits that should form the dividing line.68 Both 
the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee as well as the Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics have recommended that applications in gene therapy should be 
proven to be ‘acceptably safe and effective’ before considering them for treatment 
of human beings – this does not necessarily equal ‘free from any risk’.69
Even this above approach, however, would require reaching an agreement 
on the threshold of what we consider as ‘acceptably safe and effective’. I agree 
safety risks to be a valid concern for the time being – it is, however, expected 
that at some point, the risk-to-benefit ratio will reach a favourable limit where the 
benefits could outweigh the risks on certain therapies targeting the germline for 
curing severe hereditary illnesses. It is central to here understand the balancing 
64 Dana Carroll, Genome Editing: Past, Present, and Future. Yale J Biol Med 90(4) 2017, pp. 
653–659, 655.
65 Donald B Kohn – Matthew H Porteus – Andrew M Scharenberg, Ethical and regulatory aspects 
of genome editing. Blood 127(21) 2016, pp. 2553–2560, 2556.
66 The EGE has not, however, introduced any similar objections to somatic therapy. See European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, Statement on gene editing, 2015, pp. 1–2.
67 Eli Y Adashi – I Glenn Cohen, Therapeutic Germline Editing: Sense and Sensibility. Trends in 
Genetics 36(5) 2020, pp. 315–317, 315.
68 For discussion of the complexity of the risk-to-benefit ratio, see Janet Malek, Understanding 
Risks and Benefits in Research on Reproductive Genetic Technologies. J Med Philos 32(4) 
2007, pp. 339–358.
69 Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 
28, and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, p. 156.
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of the great benefits achieved from preventing potentially severe – possibly even 
lethal – effects of hereditary illnesses versus the risks associated with the therapy 
itself. At the point where the risk falls below these benefits, germline gene therapy 
could start to appear more favourable in clinical settings. Correspondingly, for 
issues where safer and more effective alternatives exist, there are no sufficient 
grounds for pursuing germline editing in terms of the risk-to-benefit ratio. Further 
contributing to this view, Lasse Lehtonen has argued that the more severe the 
effects of inherited disease are, the more justified it seems to treat the carrier 
of the gene that causes the disease.70 I consider that this can be alternatively 
formulated as to say that the more gene therapy intends to secure the welfare 
of the future person, the more favourable gene therapy appears – and the fewer 
benefits we can expect from therapy, the less viable it seems to accept its risks 
from the perspective of human dignity.
It is therefore relevant to discuss whether there are justifiable grounds for 
germline modification or whether the unborn individual’s right to health could be 
secured through alternative approaches such as somatic interventions or embryo 
selection. At least in some cases, germline gene therapy does seem more viable 
than somatic interventions. When corrected at the earliest stages of human 
development, all of the differentiating cells inherit the added gene during cell 
division, including both somatic and germ cells, this alone promising a clear 
benefit for the treatment of genetic diseases affecting a variety of cell types.71 
Somatic gene therapy, respectively, would possibly require a combination of 
several procedures to accomplish delivery to the many different organs and their 
disparate cell types. Not only does germline gene therapy allow editing all the 
affected cells at once, it also presents a potential treatment for diseases in non-
dividing cells to which somatic cell gene therapy might not apply.72 Additionally, 
while somatic gene therapy cannot alleviate the symptoms caused by irreversible 
damage during foetal development attributable to defective genes, germline gene 
therapy potentially prevents such damage, correcting these before embryogenesis 
proceeds to further stages.73 Somatic gene therapy, although widely used in the 
70 Lasse Lehtonen, Ihmisen geeniterapia, pp. 25–36 in Lasse Lehtonen (ed.), Bio-oikeus 
lääketieteessä. Edita 2006, pp. 35–36.
71 Cystic fibrosis is provided as an example. See LeRoy Walters – Julie Gage Palmer, The Ethics 
of Human Gene Therapy. Oxford University Press 1997, pp. 62–63.
72 Among such diseases, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is named as an example, expressing itself in the 
nervous system, the cells of which are both non-removable and non-diving. Correspondingly, 
many of the diseases prevalent in the Finnish genetic heritage are often caused by mutations in 
a single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). These are among the diseases that could be potentially 
corrected by germline gene editing.
73 Walters – Palmer 1997, The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy, 63.
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management of severe hereditary diseases, further has no use as a treatment 
for mitochondrial diseases as it is not possible to repair or alter the mutations 
occurring in mitochondrial genes by using somatic interventions. Because of the 
way that mutations in mitochondrial DNA occur, the health of the affected unborn 
individuals is more or less at stake, with comparisons such as ‘each pregnancy 
would be like playing a game of reproductive roulette, the variable being how 
severely affected the baby would be’.74
Some authors still question the necessity of germline editing on the grounds that 
if we want to prevent hereditary illnesses, it can be already achieved with the use 
of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (‘PGD’). In this method, after several viable 
embryos are produced via successful in vitro fertilisation (‘IVF’), the technology 
works by simply selecting the embryo without the disease-causing allele.75 PGD 
lacks the risks of germline editing because no DNA is altered in the process, and 
given that PGD is indeed useful in many circumstances, it is argued that germline 
intervention is not needed because the theoretical possibility of not transmitting 
specific identifiable genes applies to ‘virtually all interested couples’ through the 
methods already available.76 However, when looking deeper into the circumstances 
in which prospective parents find themselves, I find it difficult to agree with this 
statement. Several reasons can exist as to why such selection is not always possible; 
for example, the number of viable embryos might be reduced due to advanced 
maternal age or due to prior failures to reach the embryo transfer stage. It is 
argued that germline editing proves indispensable in these and related contexts.77
Further human dignity aspects relate to whether the whole process of embryo 
selection apart from germline editing presents itself as a eugenic practice as it 
includes selecting out individuals who have done nothing wrong but to inherit 
genes causing disability and disease.78 This is a mindset that the report of the 
UNESCO International Bioethics Committee to some extent appears to agree 
on, stating how gene therapy could also be a way to eliminate the need for such 
74 Alice Park, The next frontier in fertility treatments. Time 193(1) 2019, p. 32. The article also 
discusses a promising innovation in fertility treatments, mitochondrial replacement therapy 
(MRT), which involves replacing the mutated mitochondrial DNA with healthy mitochondrial 
DNA from a donor, essentially resulting in the child having three biological parents by introducing 
a small amount of DNA from a donor.
75 On the clinical use of the technology and a further description of its working mechanism, see 
Harvey J Stern, Preimplantation genetic diagnosis: prenatal testing for embryos finally achieving 
its potential. J Clin Med 3(1) 2014, pp. 280–309.
76 Paul R Billings – Ruth Hubbard – Stuart A Newman, Human germline gene modification: 
a dissent. Lancet 353(9167) 1999, pp. 1873–1875, 1874.
77 Adashi – Cohen 2020, pp. 315–317.
78 Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: The Ethics of Selective Reproduction. 
Oxford University Press 2010, p. 149.
128
Germline Gene Therapy: Safeguarding the Best Interests of the Child   
selection without raising the issue of deciding on the life itself.79 It is then presented 
that germline editing, as it allows all children to be born while safeguarding their 
right to the highest attainable standard of health, could present itself as just as 
acceptable or even more acceptable option – only that embryo selection is morally 
accepted in several European states for the prevention of serious illnesses while 
germline editing is not.80 These issues with discrimination along with societal 
implications and effects on social sustainability will be further discussed in the 
later sections of this article.
6.2.2.5 The Question of Autonomy and Reproductive Rights
Autonomy is one of the further consequences deriving from human dignity.81 To 
better explain this link between human dignity and autonomy, it can be understood 
in the sense that the right to self-determination also underpins respect for the 
integrity of the individual.82 Respecting the principle of human dignity is thus 
assumed to require taking the person into account as an autonomous individual 
who chooses their own destiny.83 Following up on this thought, one of the reasons 
why somatic gene therapy is considered much less problematic in this sense is that 
its direct effects are only limited to the treated child but not his or her possible 
future descendants.84 Thus, upon closer investigation, one of the issues with 
germline editing appears to stem from how it fails to respect the autonomy of the 
yet-unborn individuals that are inevitably affected by the parental decision. This 
viewpoint is particularly challenging when considering that the effects of germline 
79 Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 26, 
where it is stated that this could further help reduce the controversies around respecting the 
right to life.
80 On further discussion on the ethics of selection, see Alix Lenia Hammerstein – Matthias Eggel 
– Nikola Biller-Andorno, Is selecting better than modifying? An investigation of arguments 
against germline gene editing as compared to preimplantation genetic diagnosis. BMC Medical 
Ethics 20:83 2019.
81 This, as argued by Nordberg et al., is apparent from Article 6 of the Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Right as well as Article 11 of the Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by the UNESCO General Conference on 19 October 2005. 
See Nordberg – Minssen – Holm – Horst – Mortensen – Lindberg Møller 2018, p. 52.
82 Mansnérus 2016, p. 32. Interestingly, as noted by Mansnérus, the individual right to self-
determination has not been mentioned in the Biomedicine Convention nor in the Explanatory 
Report.
83 On respect of autonomy among the principles of medical ethics, see Raanan Gillon, Ethics needs 
principles—four can encompass the rest—and respect for autonomy should be ‘first among 
equals’. J Med Ethics, 2003;29(5):307–12.
84 Roberto Andorno, The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection 




therapy are understood to be irreversible as the autonomy of the future individual 
is compromised without the ability to ever decide otherwise.85
In addition to the above-described safety issues, dissenting opinions often refer 
to this lack of autonomy, describing the legal permission to specifically alter the 
lives of unborn individuals ‘unprecedented and unjustified’.86 Some even go as far 
as stating that germline editing would result in ‘generations of nonconsent’ as the 
inheritable alterations would first present themselves in the genome of the child 
and then in the subsequent generations.87 As legislation otherwise allows parents 
to make medical decisions on behalf of their children given that such decisions are 
in the best interest of the child, some authors hold that the consent would not be 
required for the first edited generation or even for the generations that follow as 
‘non-existent beings’ cannot be subjects of such rights.88 From the human rights 
perspective, the Council of Europe does appear to be in line with this principle in 
its Recommendation on Genetic Engineering, stating that in cases of experiment 
with embryos, gene therapy must not be used ‘except with the free and informed 
consent of the parents or legal guardians’.89 This refers to the possibility of gene 
therapy being undertaken with the consent of parents, thereby neglecting the 
idea of the autonomy of future generations.
Clinical applications of germline modification also involve the question of the 
prospective parents’ reproductive rights. The strengthened understanding of what 
the right to privacy and family life should contain has gradually extended to rights 
relating to reproductive health – albeit historically, reproductive rights have not 
always extended to the prospective parents’ right to become parents let alone 
to choose what characteristics their child will have in terms of health and well-
being.90 For one example, the number of parents driven to undergo reproductive 
screening shows a continually increasing trend: undergoing these screenings has 
85 This argument, however, applies to all other conditions that the child inherits even without 
modifications on the germline.
86 Paul R Billings – Ruth Hubbard – Stuart A. Newman, Human germline gene modification: a 
dissent, Lancet 1999; 353: 1873–1875.
87 Niklaus H Evitt – Shamik Mascharak – Russ B Altman, Human Germline CRISPR-Cas 
Modification: Toward a Regulatory Framework. Am J Bioeth 15(12) 2015, pp. 25–29, 27.
88 Ibid.
89 The Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation 934 (1982) on Genetic 
Engineering, paragraph 4. c.
90 Another example of how reproductive rights have formed positive obligations for the state 
is the provision of infertility treatments to single women. Here, the right to have a family is 
considered more important than the child’s right to be born into a family of two parents. See 
Sakari Salminen – Riitta Burrell – Lasse Lehtonen: Hedelmöityshoidot, lisääntymisvapaus ja 
lapsen etu. Oikeustiede-Jurisprudentia 2007:XL, pp. 303–404, 333.
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not only become the norm, but it is now common to terminate the pregnancies 
where the child is suspected of having severe developmental defects.91
It is also worth noting that in other medical matters, parents also make decisions 
on behalf of their child – although the legal status of the unborn child makes a 
similar assessment difficult. The future legal entity does not have a real separate 
right to self-determination, while parents have the right to prenatal autonomy, 
which grants them the right to decide the fate of their yet-unborn children. By 
analogy, I consider this to take place in the form of expectant mothers with 
substance abuse problems who are granted autonomy in terms of their decisions 
despite any detrimental effects they may have on the future individual.92 The 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights below highlights how far the 
limits of parental autonomy can truly extend, the case concerning an action in 
favour of the condemnation of Italy for violating the ECHR as Italian legislation 
did not allow couples to resort to PGD while simultaneously allowing selective 
abortions.
In the judgment Costa and Pavan v. Italy of 28th August 2012, No. 
54270/10, the Court interpreted the concept of parental autonomy against 
human dignity. The applicants in this case were an Italian couple who had 
learned that they were carriers of cystic fibrosis as their first child was 
born with the condition. In the quest to avoid their other children to also 
suffer from the effects of the disease, they wanted to use preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis which would allow the genetic selection of an embryo 
free from cystic fibrosis.93 The Italian Government justified the ban on 
their recourse to PGD inter alia due to the interest in precluding the risk 
91 Hannah Lou, Eugenics Then and Now: Constitutional Limits on the Use of Reproductive Screening 
Technologies, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 42(2) 2015, pp. 393–414. This ‘modern 
culture of pregnancy’ is characterized to reflect what the author calls an ‘unspoken discomfort 
with human disabilities and imperfections’ that, coupled with a bias towards termination when 
abnormalities are found, creates justifications and attitudes for interference with nature. As a 
personal thought, it is possible that a great variable in what the term ‘reproductive rights’ has 
comprised of over time has been the simple fact that the inherited conditions of an unborn child 
could not have been previously affected at all – many children, as they have traditionally been 
brought into this world, have been born without the parents setting too many expectations on 
the possibility to affect the health status of their child. With the availability of new diagnostics 
and therapies, this paradigm is now shifting.
92 See Merike Helander, Päihdeongelmaisen odottavan äidin itsemääräämisoikeus vai lapsen etu?, 
pp. 61–100 in Raimo Lahti (ed.), Biolääketiede, tutkimus ja oikeus. Forum Iuris 2012, pp. 87–
88. On the feminist aspects of this discussion, see Riitta Burrell, Naisia ja sikiöitä: Avustetusta 
lisääntymisestä ja sikiön oikeuksista. Forum Iuris 2003, pp. 22–23.
93 Costa and Pavan v. Italy of 28th August 2012, No. 54270/10, para. 3.
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of eugenic selection.94 The Court, however, concluded that where Italy, on 
the one hand, banned the use of PGD, but on the other hand, allowed the 
applicants to abort a foetus affected by the disease, this inconsistency in 
Italian legislation violated Article 8 of the Convention guaranteeing the 
right to the respect of private and family life.95
This decision is argued to constitute an important step in the recognition of 
prospective parents’ right, as phrased by the Court, ‘to bring a child into the 
world who is not affected by the illness that they carry’.96 In a commentary for the 
case, it was argued that the right to a genetically healthy child in fact equals the 
‘right to eugenics’, further envisaging the ‘improvement of the human condition 
by a greater technological mastery of individual and collective existence’.97 It is 
noteworthy that in the preparatory works of the Finnish Fertility Treatments Act, 
instead of referring to any types of eugenic practices, the prohibition on germline 
modification was justified only generally on the grounds of protecting the interests 
and dignity of the child.98
On the national level, the Supreme Court of Finland has assessed how to 
balance the question of parental autonomy and best interests of the child 
in cases of elective surgery performed on children for religious or cultural 
reasons. In its conclusions, the Supreme Court stated that when exercising 
parental rights, account must be taken of any restrictions arising from 
fundamental rights, and in the event of any conflict, the guardians should 
seek to find solutions that are in the best interests of the child.99
On the basis of the above, parents may, therefore, have the right to decide on 
behalf of their child on measures that interfere with the child’s physical integrity, 
given that such measures intend to promote the child’s welfare and development. 
94 Costa and Pavan v. Italy, para. 46.
95 Costa and Pavan v. Italy, paras 64 and 71.
96 Costa and Pavan v. Italy, para. 65.
97 Gregor Puppinck, The Case of Costa and Pavan v. Italy and the Convergence between Human 
Rights and Biotechnologies. Commentary on the ECHR Ruling in Costa and Pavan v. Italy, No. 
54270/10, 28th August 2012 (July 1, 2013). Quaderni di Diritto Mercato Tecnologia - N°3, Anno 
III, pp. 152–177, 171.
98 Government proposal 3/2006, pp. 27–28. As noted by Salminen et al., historically, the same 
grounds of protecting the interests of the child also worked to justify forced sterilisations or 
abortions, but these would now be considered obvious violations of human dignity and of 
fundamental rights. See Salminen – Burrell – Lehtonen 2007, p. 348.
99 KKO 2008:93, para. 23.
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In particular, when this concerns the child’s health status on which in the most 
serious of cases even the child’s right to life might be dependent on, this question 
should be balanced to secure the welfare of the future person rather than just 
noting on the physical integrity of descendants. I am inclined to challenge the 
worth of respecting the physical integrity of descendants if those descendants’ 
quality of life is greatly reduced as a result – if they are even capable of living at 
all. This is also why I propose looking at an alternative approach toward securing 
human dignity in this field.
6.3 Doctrinal Reassessment: Blurring the Lines 
between Somatic and Germline Interventions
The ethical and legal issues raised by genome editing might differ according to 
their field of application. While proponents for drawing these distinctions state 
that they help clarify the typical ethical and legal distinction between acceptability 
and unacceptability, the line between somatic and germline cells is argued not to 
be ‘100% impermeable in principle’.100 Similarly, others have raised the question 
of whether this differentiation between somatic and germline interventions should 
be upheld, particularly when considering that somatic gene therapy can also have 
side effects on the human germline.101 Further blurring the artificial distinction of 
drawing the line between somatic and germline interventions, the Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics suggests assessing the acceptability of such therapies on two leading 
principles: the welfare of the future person and social justice and solidarity.
6.3.1 Protecting the Welfare of the Future Person
From the perspective of human dignity, drawing the distinction between 
therapeutic interventions versus enhancement as well as the distinction between 
somatic and germline interventions shown to be more difficult in practice than it 
seems on paper. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has recognised this difficulty of 
100 Hermann Garden – David Winickoff, Gene editing for advanced therapies: Governance, policy 
and society, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers. OECD Publishing 2018, 
No. 2018/12. 
101 Jens Reich – Heiner Fangerau – Boris Fehse – Jürgen Hampel – Ferdinand Hucho – Kristian 
Köchy – Martin Korte – Bernd Müller-Röber – Jochen Taupitz – Jörn Walter – Martin Zenke, 
Human Genome Surgery – Towards a responsible evaluation of a new technology. Analysis by 
the Interdisciplinary Research Group Gene Technology Report. Berlin-Brandenburg Academy 
of Sciences and Humanities 2015, p. 14.
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drawing a clear distinction between different types of human applications for gene 
therapy and instead suggests that the primary focus should rely on the welfare of 
the future person by formulating the principle as follows:
‘Gametes or embryos that have been subject to genome editing procedures 
(or that are derived from cells that have been subject to such procedures) 
should be used only where the procedure is carried out in a manner and for 
a purpose that is intended to secure the welfare of and is consistent with 
the welfare of a person who may be born as a consequence of treatment 
using those cells.’102
The above represents a very different mindset from the interpretation of the 
central human rights around this issue than those presented the interpretations 
of human rights instruments and Community law. It deviates away from the 
traditional understanding of the concept of human dignity, rather focusing more 
on the potential benefits of the technology, stating that it could potentially reduce 
unnecessary human suffering and untimely death from diseases that could be 
prevented with its therapeutic applications. Further, it even suggests that the 
principle of protecting the welfare of the future person respects human dignity 
rather than violates it.
6.3.1.1 Procreative Beneficence and the Risk of Instrumentalisation
The concept of human dignity is further argued to be inseparably linked to the 
prohibition of human instrumentalisation.103 This principle is widely recognised 
by European bioethics legislation along with the UNESCO International Bioethics 
Committee which in its report provides how human dignity entails the duty to 
refrain from reducing anyone to a ‘mere instrument for the fulfilment of the 
wishes and preferences of others’.104 The origins of this principle are understood to 
derive from the second formulation of Kant’s universal moral law, the categorical 
imperative, which reads as follows:
102 Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, p. 75.
103 Foster 2011, pp. 43–57.
104 Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 11, 
where the Report of the IBC states that ‘the responsibility to future generations is important 
because it respects the rights of those coming into life later on. It is also important for our social 
relationships, for a society in solidarity and for justice between all peoples to keep in mind that 
the respect for the dignity of every human being entails the duty to refrain from making her or 
him a mere instrument for the fulfilment of the wishes and preferences of others’.
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‘Handle so, dass du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der 
Person eines jeden anderen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als 
Mittel brauchst.’105
The risk of instrumentalisation is recognised as one of the concerns relating to 
germline editing. This is due to the fact that through germline editing, coming into 
existence is argued to be no longer left to chance but depends on certain genetic 
preconditions.106 This, in turn, risks undermining the right to self-determination 
as the child is treated as a means of fulfilling parental or societal expectations.107 
Indicating respect for individuals as ends-in-themselves is well recognised in 
the European legal culture even on the level of the basic ethical principles in 
bioethics and biolaw, although arguably understood through the lenses of 
cultural differences and local variations.108 As an opponent to this thought widely 
accepted and manifested in European bioethics and human rights tradition, Julian 
Savulescu has put forward the idea of procreative beneficence, essentially stating 
that it is instead a moral imperative for us to create the ‘best’ individuals possible.109 
This putative obligation to produce the ‘best’ child appears to be internal to the 
parents’ own desire to be motivated by concern for the wellbeing of their future 
child in selecting against genetic illnesses.110 
Other views have posed a critical review towards the concept of 
instrumentalisation, pointing out that referring to human dignity to prohibit 
germline is more or less pretentious, as to some it seems ‘obvious’ that choosing 
not to edit the genome of this embryo would imply treating the embryo as a mere 
means and not as an end in itself.111 I still must add to this discussion that various 
other reproductive technologies apply the concept of genetic selection to screen out 
severe genetic illnesses. As provided in the judgment of Costa and Pavan v. Italy, 
105 ‘Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always 
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means to an end.’ Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Johann Friedrich Hartknoch 1785, p. 429.
106 On the discussion around genetic preconditioning, see also Alix Lenia Hammerstein – Matthias 
Eggel – and Nikola Biller-Andorno, Is selecting better than modifying? An investigation of 
arguments against germline gene editing as compared to preimplantation genetic diagnosis, 
BMC Medical Ethics 20(83) 2019, p. 3.
107 Ibid.
108 Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw: Autonomy, 
dignity, integrity and vulnerability – Towards a foundation of bioethics and biolaw. Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy 5/2002, 235–244, 235.
109 Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficience: Why We Should Select the Best Children, Bioethics 
15(5) 2001, pp. 413–426, 413.
110 Savulescu 2011, 416–417.
111 de Miguel Beriain 2018.
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this is not viewed as such to constitute a problem from the perspective of human 
rights, although the same arguments that apply to the risk of instrumentalisation 
of the unborn human by means of germline editing apply to PGD and other 
prenatal screening technologies as well. This is not to say that these could not 
be problematic from other perspectives such as health inequities on a societal 
level, but in terms of instrumentalisation, this does not seem to pose a convincing 
argument for these technologies to violate human dignity.
6.3.1.2 ‘Slippery Slope’ Arguments
Some authors have based their opposition on permitting any types of therapeutic 
interventions for the human germline on the argument that even unambiguous 
cases of curing severe hereditary illnesses could eventually become a step on a 
path towards non-therapeutic genetic enhancement.112 These researchers in the 
field share the concerns that if therapeutic interventions on the human germline 
were permitted, it would start a path towards non-therapeutic enhancement.113 One 
of the aspects relating to this criticism is that even if editing the human germline 
for therapeutic purposes were considered acceptable, such editing would also 
inevitably lead to non-therapeutic applications.114 These ‘slippery slope’ arguments 
essentially state that while all gene editing is based on the initial justification of 
curing severe illnesses, the line between therapy and enhancement will inevitably 
become more blurred, slowly leading up to dystopian scenarios.115 This thought 
discourages germline editing even in cases where germline editing would benefit 
112 Douglas Walton, The slippery slope argument in the ethical debate on genetic engineering of 
humans, Sci Eng Ethics 23(6) 2017, pp. 1507–1528.
113 Edward Lanphier – Fyodor Urnov – Sarah Ehlen Haecker – Michael Werner – Joanna 
Smolenski, Don’t edit the human germ line, Nature 519(7544) 2015, pp. 410–411, 411. Harari 
even carefully describes how such development could take place: ‘The same might happen with 
genetic engineering. If a billionaire openly stated that he intended to engineer super-smart 
offspring, imagine the public outcry. But it won’t happen like that. We are more likely to slide 
down a slippery slope. It begins with parents whose genetic profile puts their children at high 
risk of deadly genetic diseases.’ Harari 2016, p. 52–53.
114 Matti Häyry, Rationality and the Genetic Challenge: Making People Better? Cambridge University 
Press 2012, p. 193 and Lehtonen 2006, p. 36.
115 Wibren van der Burg, Slippery Slope Arguments, pp. 129–142 in Ruth Chadwick (ed.): 
Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Vol. 4. Academic Press 1998, p. 129. As noted by de Araujo 
2017, p. 28, these dystopian futures are depicted in popular culture in films like Gattaca (1997) 
and novels such as Aldous Huxley, Brave New World. Chatto & Windus 1932.
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the welfare of the future individual since it would also eventually lead to pursuing 
genetic human enhancement, which the authors consider morally wrong in itself.116
In addition to the hopes of curing genetic illnesses that have been difficult 
to treat up to now – and the occasional reference to the possibility of human 
enhancement – the main response relates to fear and concern about the possible 
abuse of the technology.117 Honnefelder describes this fear as an expression of 
fundamental moral intuitions, further asserting that such intuitions are very 
important and, in accordance with the ‘heuristics of fear’, should not be ignored.118 
As Honnefelder insightfully points out, however, like slippery slope arguments, 
these moral intuitions still cannot substitute for a thorough examination and 
judgment based on moral and legal principles.119 Honnefelder continues to argue 
that such legal and ethical discussions still face certain difficulties, including the 
fact that the suggested procedures are new and therefore they first need to be 
identified and accurately described. After achieving this, the consequent step of 
applying our moral and legal standards and principles requires that we classify the 
new procedures based on our experiences – and the difficulty is that because these 
procedures are new, our experiences are not always applicable. Still, since ethics 
and legislation refer to actions, these actions must be identified and described 
accurately and in accordance with the general consensus.120
116 Douglas Walton, The slippery slope argument in the ethical debate on genetic engineering of 
humans. Sci Eng Ethics 23(6) 2017 pp. 1507–1528, 1527, where he systematises this concept by 
stating that it actually divides into two main different slippery slope arguments: first one argues 
that current developments will blur the boundary between somatic and germline interventions; 
this argument more specifically presumes that the acceptance of germline gene therapy ‘is a 
catastrophic outcome in its own right’; the second one argues that once germline gene therapy is 
established as an acceptable medical procedure, it will inevitably be used for genetic enhancement 
as well – the latter argument is not, however, against the acceptance of germline gene therapy 
per se.
117 Ludger Honnefelder, Human Rights and Democracy in the Face of Scientific and Medical 
Developments – Defending Scientific, Medical and Technological Ethics, Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 1(22) 2004, pp. 36–37.
118 Honnefelder 2004, pp. 17–18. On the concept of heuristic of fear, see Hans Jonas, The Heuristics 
of Fear, pp. 213–221 in Melvin Kranzberg (ed.), Ethics in an Age of Pervasive Technology. 
Westview Press 1980.
119 Ludger Honnefelder, Science, Law and Ethics: The Biomedicine Convention as an Ethico-legal 
Response to Current Scientific Challenges, pp. 13–22 in J.K.M. Gevers – E.H. Hondius – J.H. 
Hubben (eds.), Health Law, Human Rights and the Biomedicine Convention: Essays in Honour 
of Henriette Roscam Abbing. Martinus Nijhoff 2005.
120 Honnefelder 2005, p. 18.
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6.3.2 Social Justice and Solidarity
While conforming to the principle of protecting the welfare of the future individual 
is in all instances necessary, it is not alone sufficient to make such edits morally 
permissible.121 Based on this conclusion, the Nuffield Council forms the second 
leading principle of germline editing on social justice and solidarity:
‘The use of gametes or embryos that have been subject to genome editing 
procedures (or that are derived from cells that have been subject to such 
procedures) should be permitted only in circumstances in which it cannot 
reasonably be expected to produce or exacerbate social division or the 
unmitigated marginalisation or disadvantage of groups within society.’122
The UNESCO International Bioethics Committee also notes that respect for the 
dignity of every human being is important for not only our social relationships 
but ‘a society in solidarity and for justice between all peoples’.123 This concept of 
solidarity, broadly understood as a mutual obligation to assist one another, is 
listed among the principles that bioethics commentators have traditionally placed 
value on in the European context, also justifying a strong involvement of state 
authorities in public healthcare.124 European bioethics have indeed argued to be 
characterised by the principle of solidarity, which results in human dignity further 
expressing the intrinsic value of the human being in a community or society.125
6.3.2.1 The Concern of Widening Societal Divisions
When considering the acceptability of germline editing from the perspective of 
human dignity, it is to be understood that the concept also touches upon broader 
societal issues – respect for human dignity also consequently requires respect 
for diversity, non-discrimination, and non-stigmatisation.126 This understanding 
of ‘human dignity as a constraint’ essentially states that human dignity may 
also pose restraints to individuals despite autonomy comprising part of human 
121 Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, p. 75.
122 Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, p. 87.
123 Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 33.
124 See Amir Muzur – Iva Rinčić, The Oviedo Convention and (European) bioethics: how much do 
they really have in common? Jahr 8(16) 2017, p. 248, and Prainsack, Barbara – Alena Buyx, 
Solidarity: Reflections on an emerging concept in bioethics. Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2011, 
p. 22.
125 Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw: Autonomy, 
dignity, integrity and vulnerability – Towards a foundation of bioethics and biolaw, Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy 5/2002, pp. 235–244, 237.
126 Nordberg – Minssen – Holm – Horst – Mortensen – Lindberg Møller 2018, p. 52.
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dignity.127 While the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee also recognises 
that the benefits resulting from advancements in human genetics having an 
impact on health protection and health care should be considered as content 
of the fundamental right of every human being to enjoy the highest attainable 
standard of health, scientific progress should not deepen inequalities within and 
among countries nor be used for discriminating against individuals or groups.128 
Some populations or individuals having a genetic advantage over others is thus 
understood to represent a social problem that relates not only to the inequity 
itself but also to the social and health inequality regarding access.129
Regarding the societal connection on human dignity and human rights, Article 
3 of the Biomedicine Convention further underlines how ‘the interests and welfare 
of the individual should prevail over the sole interests of science or society’.130 
I believe that this principle also leads to the conclusion that while we should 
carefully consider these wider societal concerns presented above, when the welfare 
of a child is truly at stake – as is the case with severe hereditary illnesses – these 
sole societal interests cannot override the interests and welfare of the future 
individual. Simultaneously, however, this Article should not be misunderstood 
in the sense of only focusing attention on individuals and removing society from 
its responsibilities and requirements of social solidarity. As emphasised by the 
UNESCO International Bioethics Committee, genetic profile and other factors of 
individual biology are not the only factors dictating rules for individual adaptability 
to social conditions and the environment.131 This further allows room for us to 
127 Beyleveld – Brownsword 2011, pp. 29–47.
128 Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 9. 
The IBC notes the following: ‘Effects of discrimination and stigmatization can also occur with 
regard to prenatal and preimplantation genetic testing. The consequence of detecting a genetic 
abnormality is very often not a therapeutic intervention for the unborn child, which may be 
simply impossible. Even though some diagnoses have led to treatment in utero, the more likely 
consequence is resorting to abortion or discarding the embryo. Erroneous or misinterpreted 
results could lead to the destruction of healthy and normal embryos or fetuses. The introduction 
of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis is being increasingly implemented as a routine measure during 
early stages of pregnancy, especially in countries with an established system of technique-based 
pregnancy care. This could have a major impact not only on reproductive freedom, but also 
on the perception of disability and on societal solidarity with disabled people and women who 
give birth to them.’
129 Eduardo Rodriguez Yunta, Ethical Issues in Genome Editing using Crispr/Cas9 System, J Clin 
Res Bioeth 7(2) 2016, 1000266.
130 On the contrary, commentators have noted that the Biomedicine Convention has through this 
approach diminished the importance of the society and thus taken a step towards denying the 
typically European principle of solidarity. See Muzur – Rinčić 2017, p. 248.
131 Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human Genome and Human Rights, p. 11.
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consider the societal aspects of germline editing, to which also the issues around 
selection and discrimination are closely connected.
6.3.2.2 The Issues Around Selection and Discrimination
The assessment of whether human germline editing could be contrary to human 
dignity is similar to the question of procreative rights, especially relating to 
the use of IVF procedures.132 Both allow selecting for avoiding severe genetic 
conditions, and since PGD also includes selecting out disability and disease, it 
too can be considered a form of eugenics.133 These practices have also been said 
to increase social pressure upon parents, as opting out of such practices could be 
perceived as prospective parents ignoring the health status of their future child.134 
This, according to Sandel, could represent a detrimental level of ‘hyperagency’ to 
mastering every aspect of life, in particular the aspect of reproduction.135 Germline 
editing could thus have collateral and indirect effects on other people in society as 
well through the widening of existing differences between people due to access.136 
This is also why the Nuffield report also faced critical reviews arguing that germline 
editing would be socially dangerous owing to the disparity that would result from 
allowing those who can afford such procedures to edit the genomes of their own 
children. Without access to germline gene therapy for prospective parents who 
do not possess the financial means required, the pre-existing differences between 
those of a different socio-economical standing would widen as long-term effects 
of such interventions.137
Voices of marginalised groups have further issued their concerns relating 
to the selective reproductive technologies communicating something about the 
society perceiving the lesser status or value of disabled people. This is not only 
argued to cause psychological damage but also wider harm through the effects 
on broader social attitudes towards disabled people.138 Under this ‘expressivist 
objection’, selecting against the birth of those suffering from genetic illnesses 
expresses a discriminatory attitude and sends a harmful message about disabled 
132 De Araujo 2017, pp. 24–42.
133 Wilkinson 2010, p. 149.
134 Michael J Sandel, The case against perfection: ethics in the age of genetic engineering. Harvard 
University Press 2007, p. 62.
135 Ibid.
136 Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, pp. 79–80 and Emmanuelle Tuerlings, Background Paper 
Governance 1 Human Genome Editing. WHO Expert Advisory Committee on Developing Global 
Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing 2019.
137 Walters – Palmer 1997, p. 83.
138 Bjørn Hofmann, ‘You are inferior!’ Revisiting the expressivist argument. Bioethics 31(7) 2017, 
pp. 505–514.
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people also to wider society through the health policies that promote such actions 
through allowing, funding, or recommending its use.139 When there is a shift 
in expectations, the social acceptance of those conditions may decrease. I not 
only share these concerns but consider the possibility of discrimination to be 
two-sided – in addition to those facing challenges with the issue today, I see 
here the theoretical possibility a new group of genetically edited children being 
discriminated against due to being viewed as ‘less human’ and individuals with 
an unedited genome presented as more ‘pure-blood’ humans.140
Referring back to the judgment Costa and Pavan v. Italy of 28th August 2012, 
No. 54270/10, it is still significant to note how despite Italy arguing that respecting 
the prohibition of discrimination for genetic reasons would have required stepping 
away from any practices where the selection of embryos was necessary, the Court 
did not accept this reasoning due to the inconsistency of practices around PGD 
and selective abortions.141 Thus, based on this conclusion, in cases where other 
forms of selective reproduction technologies are available, even if they exist only 
to prevent a serious genetic illness, germline editing cannot be denied on the 
grounds of wanting to avoid genetic discrimination. Still, if such practices were 
to become commercialised and further normalised, this could lead to a shift in 
norms relating to the expectations of its use.142 While it might be difficult to predict 
the exact consequences that these technologies could have on a wider societal 
level, all of these factors require evaluation before moving forward with clinical 
applications – and bear directly on the risk-benefit analysis and the assessment 
of the justification for any given use.143
Referring to the reasoning above, however, the effort to cure and prevent severe 
genetic illnesses and the premature death that follows seems to be of overriding 
importance, and arguably, for therapeutic applications, the assessment of human 
dignity does not provide a clear justification for the prohibition of germline gene 
therapy in clinical settings – in my view, the arguments in favour of therapeutic use 
139 Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, p. 83.
140 I believe this example is even comparable to the discrimination that Muggle-born wizards face 
in Harry Potter, a series of fantasy novels written by British author JK Rowling, where they are 
being called ‘mudbloods’ solely because of their background while wizards with no Muggles or 
Muggle-borns on their family tree receive the title of ‘pure-bloods’.
141 Costa and Pavan v. Italy of 28th August 2012, No. 54270/10, paras 64 and 71.
142 On this idea of shifting social norms and ‘progress’, see the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018, 
p. 78–79.
143 Sarah Chan – Peter J Donovan – Thomas Douglas – Christopher Gyngell – John Harris – 
Robin Lovell-Badge – Debra J. H. Mathews – Alan Regenberg, Genome editing technologies 
and human germline genetic modification: The Hinxton group consensus statement. Am J 
Bioeth 15(12) 2015, pp. 45–46.
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seem to supersede those opposing it on the grounds of human dignity. I am aware, 
however, that this might not be the conclusion of some Member States where 
their national identity and own human rights tradition place more importance 
on other basic principles on European bioethics; but given the value that these 
technologies could have in terms of safeguarding the best interests of the child, 
I believe it is worth discussing whether we can find a balance with these values 
through embracing the doctrine of European pluralism.
6.3.3 Balancing European Pluralism with Religion in Bioethical 
Discussion
Along with the above-discussed principles, the human rights tradition that 
is reflected in European bioethics also includes the tradition of pluralism. 
European pluralism essentially refers to accepting the various moral codes and 
their differences between states, allowing them to decide on ethically sensitive 
matters where no clear consensus exists. Simultaneously, the principle of pluralism 
promotes states to adhere to the agreed human rights principles, including that of 
pluralism.144 The adopted ‘united in diversity’ approach to ethics can be respected 
to allow European states to freely select and decide on the level of protection of 
the accepted values.145
While inevitably influenced by the historical events that have shaped the 
European culture to what it is today, the concept of human dignity in the context 
of the integrity of the human genome is understood to also strongly rely on the 
Judeo-Christian roots.146 Due to the later attempts to avoid reference to religion, 
the concept of human dignity in legal texts has reached a level of self-evidency – 
and once detached from this theological framework, the pragmatic considerations 
reflected in human rights conventions are described to have turned into a ‘semi-
144 This ‘cultural regionalism’ is built on the idea of subsidiarity under which European states 
interprets these principles according to the particularity of their specific convictions. See Dahl 
Rendtorff 2002, p. 235. This principle of subsidiarity is also referred to in Article 5(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union, which provides that in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.
145 Markus Frischhut, The Ethical Spirit of EU Law. Springer 2019, p. 231.
146 Yechiel Michael Barilan, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Responsibility. The New Language 
of Global Bioethics and Biolaw. MIT Press, 2014.
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fictious, semi-real status “ascribed” to the person as such’.147 Community law is 
understood to also have been shaped by religion, but it is also argued that the 
relationship between religion and the Union law operates in both directions: while 
the Union recognises the promotion of ordre public and morality as a valid basis 
of law and thus enables religious norms to influence the content of Community 
law, the Union is argued to have the power to also impact the role that religion 
has in Europe as of today.148 For germline gene therapy, the sanctity of the human 
genome relies in particular on Catholic views where the man is seen as Imago 
Dei, the ‘image of God’, which also influences how the meaning and importance 
of human dignity and its implications in bioethics are understood to vary even 
between European countries.149 The different approaches that Member States 
have adopted on this issue highlights the fact that no European consensus exists 
on balancing bioethical principles with religious views, including the relationship 
between religion and human dignity.150 
Through strict regulation on research leading up to the advanced therapy 
medicinal products associated with germline therapy as well as assisted 
reproduction services, the use of medical applications of gene editing is already 
carefully controlled in European countries.151 Indeed, I believe that not only should 
be up to the national legislator to decide how to regulate the advances that gene-
editing technologies offer in human applications – further requiring flexibility in 
147 Aurel Kolnai, Dignity. Philosophy 51(197) 1976, pp. 251–271, 259. On contrasting thoughts, 
see Lisa Sowle Cahill, Germline genetics, human nature, and social ethics, pp. 145–166 in 
Ronald Cole-Turner (ed.), Design and Destiny: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Human 
Germline Modification. MIT Press 2008. Cahill reports from the Jewish and Christian perspective 
that germline modification could be acceptable for therapeutic, although not for enhancement 
purposes.
148 Ronan McCrea, Religion and the Public Order of the European Union. Oxford University Press 
2010, p. 2. 
149 Rendtorff – Kemp 2000, p. 143.
150 For example, the Irish constitution strongly respects human dignity described to derive from 
the Catholic doctrine of the sanctity of life, which is reflected in particular in the protection of 
the life of the unborn individual as essential to the idea of human dignity. The debate between 
Catholic and secular bioethics highlights the Italian discussion around these basic principles. 
The Netherlands, by contrast, exercises the principles of tolerance, autonomy, and pluralism, 
also visible in the liberal views on other bioethical issues like euthanasia. For further examples, 
see Rendtorff – Kemp 2000 p. 195.
151 As provided by Article 9(1) of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine concerning Biomedical Research (CETS No. 195), every research project shall be 
submitted for independent examination of its ethical acceptability to an ethics committee. Along 
with these ethical reviews preceding clinical trials, data protection legislation, funding policies, 
and applying for marketing authorisation, obtaining reimbursement from public healthcare 
systems further remains an imperative for commercial success in the Union and thus presents 
itself as an effective mechanism in regulating these technologies. On further control mechanisms, 
see Mansnérus 2016, pp. 93–99.
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the other regulatory areas where this issue is harmonised in the Union – but that 
the time might be right for reassessment on the national level as well.152
6.4 Conclusions
This article has provided an insight into the complex relationship between 
the currently existing direct and indirect regulation mechanisms surrounding 
germline editing and the safeguarding of the best interests of the child. First, it 
has highlighted the connection on how any prohibitions against germline gene 
therapy are understood to mainly rely on the concept of human dignity where 
they are argued to respect the physical integrity of descendants as well as the 
integrity of the genome. After reviewing the human dignity aspects in terms of 
uses for germline gene therapy, I have questioned whether a consensus truly 
exists on therapeutic applications offending against human dignity once the safety 
issues around these technologies are adequately resolved. Balancing the legal-
ethical principles on the child’s right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of 
health along with the parents’ reproductive rights might just as well as work to 
justify clinical applications in this field – this all relies on how each state balances 
these basic European bioethical principles touching upon human dignity in their 
own legal culture. It is also worth arguing that the emphasis we put on each of 
these values can change – and has changed – over the years among nations. 
Understanding this development, a less restrictive approach would better reflect 
the pluralistic views around human dignity. For the view that the Finnish legal 
culture shares based on the basic principles of bioethics, the position on whether 
therapeutic applications of human germline editing offend human dignity seems 
to be dissenting – but for other legal cultures with different emphasis on these 
values, this might be different.153 We should accept these differences as a reflection 
152 The UNESCO International Bioethics Committee also appears to note this possibility and 
elaborates on how germline editing without any sound medical reason should be discouraged 
through legislation, further suggesting removal of public resources and in some cases also using 
prohibitions as examples. See the Report of the IBC on updating its reflection on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights, p. 26.
153 Referring to what has been stated above, see, e.g. Finnish Medical Association 2013, p. 92, 
where it is stated that passing on the normally-functioning copy of gene be to offspring would 
be a desirable outcome, and that integrity of the genome should not be considered an intrinsic 
value.
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of European pluralism, understanding how ethics are culturally embedded and 
thus regional.154 
I have therefore argued that the current human rights perspective should 
place more focus on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, here 
considering the best interests of the unborn individual. As the arising gene-editing 
technologies like CRISPR/Cas9 and prime editing could soon be closing a gap 
between possibility and reality, the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee 
has noted that such rapid developments in the field will require continuous 
reflection and re-interpretation of the principles touching upon human dignity.155 
In efforts to respond to this development, the WHO has recently formed the 
Human Genome Editing Expert Advisory Committee, advising and making 
recommendations on global standards for governance and oversight of human 
genome editing. The European Commission is also in dialogue with the WHO, 
other international organisations, and Member States on approaches for a global 
governance framework. The EGE is also currently developing its opinion on 
gene editing, comprising an analysis of the ethical, societal, and fundamental 
rights implications of genome editing as well as a set of policy recommendations. 
These upcoming opinions, reports, and statements will inevitably influence the 
developments around germline gene editing in Europe, with hopes that when 
reviewing the issue around human dignity, the best interests of the child will also 
be considered as a whole.
154 Inger-Johanne Sand, Governmentality, Biopolitics and the EU, pp. 149–170 in Kimmo Nuotio 
(ed.), Europe in Search of ‘Meaning and Purpose. Forum Iuris 2004, p. 169.





Over Ten Years Since the Adoption  
of the EU Regulation on Advanced 
Therapy Medical Products
─ Lessons Learned Thus Far
by LL.D. Juli Mansnérus
Abstract
Advanced therapy medicinal products (‘ATMPs’) are a heterogeneous class of modern 
biotechnology medicines encompassing medicinal products based on genes, cells, and 
tissues. The European Medicines Agency (the ‘EMA’) and the European Commission issued 
a joint action plan in late 2017 with the goal of improving the regulatory environment 
for ATMPs to facilitate the research, development, and approval of these products in the 
European Union. Regulators around the world are taking measures to create a facilitative 
regulatory environment that encourages innovation, protects public health, and enables 
timely patient access to innovative, new therapies whilst ensuring patient safety. In Europe, 
the role of risk-proportionate adaptations to clinical trials and GMP manufacture along 
with the EMA’s early-access incentives and initiatives are presented as potential facilitators 
of market entry.
7.1 Introduction
Advanced therapy medicinal products (‘ATMPs’) are a very heterogeneous class 
of modern biotechnology medicines encompassing medicinal products based on 
genes, cells, and tissues. They provide new therapeutic opportunities for many 
diseases and debilitating injuries to the human body, particularly in disease areas 
146
Over Ten Years Since the Adoption of the EU Regulation on Advanced Therapy Medical Products  
of unmet medical need.1 ATMPs were introduced into the EU legislation with 
the adoption of Regulation (EC) 1394/2007 (Regulation (EC) No. 1394/2007 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on advanced 
therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation 
(EC) No. 726/2004, 2007, hereinafter the ‘ATMP Regulation’). The primary 
consequence is that all ATMPs in the EU are centrally authorized by the European 
Commission. In parallel, the Committee for Advanced Therapies (the ‘CAT’), which 
is the primary scientific committee of the EMA that scientifically evaluates ATMPs, 
was also established. 
The ATMP Regulation amended Directive 2001/83/EC (Directive 2001/83/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, 2001), which is 
the overarching directive for medicinal products for human use.2 The ATMP 
Regulation includes several incentives to develop ATMPs: fee reductions for 
scientific advice, a classification system to determine if investigational products 
adhere to the definition of ATMPs, and a certification procedure for quality 
and non-clinical data for small and medium-sized enterprises.3 These two 
classification procedures are performed by the CAT, and they provide two means 
of engaging with the European regulators before the marketing authorization 
process. Overall, similar requirements are in place for ATMPs compared to other 
medicinal products, including compliance with Good Clinical Practice (‘GCP’) and 
Good Manufacturing Practices (‘GMP’) during the course of all clinical trials and 
compliance with post-marketing requirements.4
1 Christian K. Schneider – Jilma Paula – Flamion Bernd – Todorova Bruno – Racheva Lyubina – 
Anna Paphitou – Ivana Haunerova – Toivo Maimets – Jean-Hugues Trouvin – Egbert Flory – 
Asterios Tsiftsoglou – Balázs Sarkadi – Kolbeinn Gudmundsson – Maura O’Donovan – Giovanni 
Migliaccio – Jānis Ancāns – Maciulaitis, Romaldas – Robert, Jean-Louis – Samuel, Anthony 
– Ovelgönne, Johannes H – Hystad, Marit – Andrzej Mariusz Fal – Beatriz Silva Lima – Anca 
Stela Moraru – Peter Turcáni – Robert Zorec – Sol Ruiz – Åkerblom, Lennart – Narayanan, 
Gopalan – Kent, Alastair – Bignami, Fabrizia – Dickson, J George – Dietger Niederwieser 
– María-Angeles Figuerola-Santos – Ilona G. Reischl – Claire Beuneu – Rosen Georgiev – 
Maria Vassiliou – Alena Pychova – Mette Clausen – Taina Methuen – Sophie Lucas – Martina 
Schüssler-Lenz – Vasilios Kokkas – Zsuzsanna Buzás – Niall MacAleenan – Maria Cristina Galli 
– Aija Linē – Jolanta Gulbinovic – Guy Berchem – Committee for Advanced Therapies (CAT). 
Nature Reviews. Drug Discovery, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2010, pp. 195–201.
2 Paula Salmikangas – Sol Ruiz – Martina Schuessler-Lenz – Patrick Celis – Ilona Reischl – 
Margarida Menezes-Ferreira – Egbert Flory – Mathias Renner – Nicholas Ferry. Marketing 
Regulatory Oversight of Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs) in Europe: The EMA/
CAT Perspective, in: Maria C. Galli – Mercedes Serabian (eds.), Regulatory Aspects of Gene 
Therapy and Cell Therapy Products, Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology. Springer 





It has been argued that the rigorous regulatory requirements stemming 
from the ATMP Regulation as well as the high cost of GMP compliance impede 
the market entry of new advanced therapies. Since the adoption of the ATMP 
Regulation in late 2008, a small number of ATMPs5 has been granted a marketing 
authorization in the European Union. Yet, it should be noted that the reality is much 
more complicated. The reasons for the small number of ATMPs in the European 
market are only partly attributable to the rigorous regulatory requirements. 
Generally speaking, there are a number of aspects that may constitute obstacles 
for the market entry of new advanced therapies. Such aspects include, but are 
not limited to, availability of research funding and capital investments to fund 
high development costs; uncertainties in intellectual property protection; privacy 
protection and ethical aspects affecting access to primary materials; disharmonized 
classification of ATMPs; difficulties in the accommodation of personalized, niche 
production with industry-scale standards on GMP; difficulties in obtaining pre-
clinical and clinical research authorizations as well as the burdensome marketing 
authorization procedure. Furthermore, the high cost of ATMPs and difficulties 
in obtaining reimbursement are often mentioned as obstacles for the market 
access of ATMPs.6 However, it should be noted that some ATMPs are granted 
a hospital exemption at the Member State level. The exemption enables ATMP 
manufacturing outside of commercialization pathways on a non-routine basis 
for ATMPs that are custom-made for individual patients. The requirements 
are not as rigorous as for clinical trials but should include, for example, central 
manufacturing standards (Article 28 of the ATMP Regulation). 
5 As of 26 November 2020 15, to be exact of which 3 have been withdrawn.
6 Juli Mansnérus, Commercialisation of Advanced Therapies. A Study of the EU Regulation on 
Advanced Therapy Medical Products. LL.D. University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law 2016, p. 104.
148
Over Ten Years Since the Adoption of the EU Regulation on Advanced Therapy Medical Products  
Table 1. Overview of ATMPs in the European Union











2009 Standard Autologous cartilage cells Cartilage defects of the 
knee
N N




vector for gene delivery
 Familial lipoprotein lipase 
deficiency
Y Y
MACI 2013 Standard Matrix applied 
characterized autologous 
cultured chondrocytes
Cartilage defects of the 
knee
N Y
Provenge 2013 Standard Autologous peripheral 
blood mononuclear cells 
Prostate cancer N N
Imlygic 2015 Standard Genetically modified 
oncolytic viral therapy
Melanoma N Y
Holoclar 2015 Conditional Autologous human 
corneal epithelial cells 
containing stem cells
Corneal lesions Y Y
Strimvelis 2016 Standard Autologous CD34+ 





Zalmoxis 2016 Conditional Allogeneic T cells 










Spherox 2017 Standard Spheroids of human 
autologous matrix-
associated chondrocytes
Cartilage defects of the 
knee
N Y
Alofisel 2018 Standard Allogeneic mesenchymal 
stem cells
Complex perianal fistula(s) 
in adult patients with 
Crohn’s disease
Y Y
Kymriah 2018 Standard 
(PRIME)
Genetically modified 
autologous T cell 
immunotherapy
Pediatric B-cell acute 
lymphoblastic leukemia 
(ALL); Relapsed or 
refractory diffuse large 
B-cell lymphoma 
Y Y
Yescarta 2018 Standard 
(PRIME)
Genetically modified 
autologous T cell 
immunotherapy
Relapsed or refractory 












Stem cells taken from the 
patients that have been 
genetically modified to 
contain a working gene 
for beta-globin





Spinal muscular atrophy Y Y
NB: Table lists marketing authorizations until 26 November 2020.
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The ATMP field is quite new. Due to the immaturity of technologies and the 
associated scientific uncertainties, it may be too early to expect results. Many of 
the current technologies in development are novel, and decade-old inventions 
are just now reaching the European market. Indeed, ATMPs’ road to the market 
is rather long and requires long-term investment. For instance, the development 
of Strimvelis took more than 20 years of intense research.7 In the beginning, 
Holoclar seemed an exceptional case, as research and development started 
around 1996 and first clinical results were published just a year later. However, 
in reality, the product was under development for 25 years.8 When it comes to 
the ATMP pipeline and novel emerging technologies, such as CRISPR (which was 
discovered in 2012), it is likely that we still need to wait before seeing products 
enter the market, as there is still a number of safety considerations that need to 
be addressed.9 Yet, the marketing authorization of two genetically modified T 
cell immunotherapies shows that new technologies are slowly reaching the market 
(Kymriah, Yescarta). 
Even though market entry appears quite a complicating and resource-
consuming process, the challenges do not end there. The EMA may withdraw 
products due to safety reasons or because of a company’s failure to ensure the 
manufacturing of the product. The marketing authorization holder can also request 
the revocation of the license when it can no longer deliver the ATMP or purely for 
commercial reasons. Currently, most ATMPs target (ultra) orphan diseases and 
small patient populations, which makes it often impossible to benefit economics of 
scale and difficult to make reasonable profits to cover substantial development and 
GMP-compliant manufacture costs. Hence, such niche markets become vulnerable 
to the withdrawal of ATMPs. Indeed, the majority of the withdrawals of ATMPs 
have been made for commercial reasons, not due to safety considerations.10
An ATMP must also be commercially successful in order for it to stay on 
the market, as the marketing authorization and GMP-compliant facilities are 
7 GSK, StrimvelisTM receives European marketing authorisation to treat very rare disease, ADA-
SCID, 2016. Available at: https://www.gsk.com/en-gb/media/press-releases/strimvelistm-
receives-european-marketing-authorisation-to-treat-very-rare-disease-ada-scid/. Accessed 13 
September 2020.
8 Alison Abbott, Behind the scenes of the world’s first commercial stem-cell therapy, Nature 
News Q&A. Available at: http://www.nature.com/news/behind-the-scenes-of-the-world-s-first-
commercial-stem-cell-therapy-1.17022?WT.mc_id=TWT_NatureNews. Accessed 13 September 
2020.
9 Michael Kosicki – Kärt Tomberg – Allan Bradley, Repair of double-strand breaks induced by 
CRISPR–Cas9 leads to large deletions and complex rearrangements. Nature Biotechnology 36 
2018, pp. 765–771.
10 Mansnérus 2016, supra note 6, p. 12.
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costly to maintain. At one extreme, Glybera, uniQure’s world’s most expensive 
gene therapy to treat an ultra-orphan disease lipoprotein lipase deficiency, was 
only used once in the EU and subsequently withdrawn due to its commercial 
failure in the EU and difficulties reaching the US market.11 Another example of an 
orphan product is Strimvelis, which is designated for a very rare disease affecting 
approximately 15 people in the EU on a yearly basis.12 A limited patient population 
results in a very high cost of a product. Holoclar is targeting a bigger, but still a 
rather limited patient group, only 1,000 European patients per year.13 However, 
some ATMPs, such as Imlygic, indicated for late-stage melanoma reach a larger 
market, as approximately 19,250 metastatic melanoma patients are treated in 
Europe every year.14
Costs associated with GMP compliance constitute one of the major bottlenecks 
for the efficient translation of research into commercialized advanced therapies. 
Since the adaptation of the ATMP Regulation, all developers of advanced therapies 
have been required to comply with industry-level standards on quality, safety, 
and efficacy. However, many ATMPs are developed by academia and SMEs who 
struggle with stringent regulations for medicinal products.15 Thus, the EMA has 
been facing a difficult task: fostering research on ATMPs to expand patient access 
whilst ensuring the safety of the patients. To meet these objectives, the EMA has 
actively organized stakeholder consultations. After a series of multi-stakeholder 
meetings, the EMA released new GMP guidelines specific for ATMPs in November 
2017 to allow risk-based flexibilities to these rigorous requirements.16 To further 
foster research on ATMPs, the EMA and the European Commission issued a joint 
11 uniQure, uniQure Announces It Will Not Seek Marketing Authorization Renewal for Glybera 
in Europe, 2017. Available at: http://www.uniqure.com/GL_PR_Glybera%20withdrawal_
FINAL_PDF.pdf. Accessed 29 October 2018.
12 GSK 2016.
13 Giovanni Milazzo – Michele De Luca – Graziaella Pellegrini, Holoclar: first of its kind in more 
ways than one. Cell and Gene Therapy Insights 2 2016, pp. 183–197.
14 ESMO, Press Release: Thousands of Melanoma Patients in Europe Have no Access to New 
Life Saving Drugs, 2016. Available at: https://www.esmo.org/Conferences/Past-Conferences/
ESMO-2016-Congress/Press-Media/Thousands-of-Melanoma-Patients-in-Europe-Have-no-
Access-to-New-Life-Saving-Drugs. Accessed 29 October 2018.
15 Tomáš Boráň – Margarida Menezes-Ferreira – Ilona Reischl – Patrick Celis – Nicolas Ferry 
– Bernd Gänsbacher – Hartmut Krafft – Michele Lipucci di Paol – Dariusz Sladowski – Paula 
Salmikangas, Clinical Development and Commercialization of Advanced Therapy Medicinal 
Products (ATMPs) in the EU: how are the product pipeline and regulatory framework evolving? 
Hum. Gene Ther. Clin. Dev. 28 2017, pp. 126–135. https://doi.org/10.1089/humc.2016.193. 
16 European Commission, Guidelines on Good Manufacturing practice specific to Advanced Therapy 
Medicinal Products 2017a, adopted on 22 November 2017. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
health/sites/health/files/files/eudralex/vol-4/2017_11_22_guidelines_gmp_for_atmps.pdf. 
Accessed 13 September 2020.
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action plan in late 2017 with the goal of improving the regulatory environment for 
advanced therapies to facilitate the research, development, and approval of these 
products in the EU.17 Regulators are now taking measures to create a facilitative 
regulatory environment that encourages innovation, protects public health, and, 
finally, enables timely patient access to innovative, new therapies whilst ensuring 
the safety of the patients. In particular, the role of risk-proportionate adaptations to 
clinical trials and GMP manufacture along with the EMA’s early-access incentives 
and initiatives are presented as potential facilitators of market entry. This chapter 
analyses and presents the latest changes and events in the ATMP space in Europe.








E • Great interest to public 
health with respect to 
therapeutic innovation
• Preliminary clinical evidence 
of substantial benefits
• Reduced regulatory 
evaluation period
PRIME E • Potential to benefit patients 
with unmet medical needs 
based on early clinical data 
• Intensive regulatory 
engagement




A • Serious condition with 
unmet medical needs
• Use in emergency situations
• Orphan designation  
• Approval based on non-
confirmatory data





A • Ultra-rare conditions 
• Lacking state of scientific 
knowledge blocks 
comprehensive studies
• Comprehensive studies are 
unethical
• Approval based on non-
confirmatory data
A=adaptive regulatory pathway, E=expedited regulatory pathway
17 European Commission, European Commission-DG Food Health and Safety and European 
Medicines Agency Action Plan on ATMPs, 2017b. Available at: http://www.ema.europa.eu/
docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2017/10/WC500237029.pdf. Accessed 13 September 
2020.
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7.2 The EU Regulation on ATMPs Affecting the 
Commercialization Landscape 
7.2.1 Background of the ATMP Regulation
The emergence of human tissue engineering technologies in the late nineties 
triggered concerns about inadequate regulatory governance in this field. The 
need for harmonized EU-wide legislation was evident.18 Ever since, the need for 
establishing a more favorable regulatory atmosphere to support and facilitate the 
development of a strong internal market for ATMPs has been urging. Initially, 
the EU-wide lex specialis on ATMPs was deemed necessary for the purpose of 
safeguarding public health (even though healthcare as a public service does not, 
as such, subordinate to the internal EU market). Yet, under proportionality and 
subsidiarity principles, ‘common safety concerns in public health in an area in 
which application of existing EU legislation and additional national measures 
have proven insufficient’ were the only route for the European Commission to 
enact EU-wide legislation in the ATMP field.19 
The industry raised the concern that the lack of EU-wide legislation on ATMPs 
would harm patients since they are denied the potential benefits of these therapies. 
In addition, legal harmonization of the European ATMP field was assumed to 
improve predictability and, consequently, potentially facilitate decision-making 
in investments in R&D of ATMPs. It was also predicted to cut the expenses of 
meeting different quality, safety, efficacy, and marketing standards in the different 
EU Member States.20 The impact of the industry lobbying was significant, while 
other stakeholders (such as academia and public tissue establishments) had a 
minor influence in the final scope and contents of the legislation in the field, 
which can be seen in the following aftermath: 
i. Ethically neutral and quite a technical approach. The EU’s limited 
mandate to harmonize the ethical aspects of ATMPs resulted in an 
ethically neutral, rather technical legislative approach. Some disputed 
that ethical aspects were avoided (such as the commercialization of 
altruistically donated material of human origin). The industry’s lobbying 
blurred the differences between non-profit and profitmaking activities 





of tissue establishments.21 Ethical issues were left to be dealt with by 
the Member State, as far as possible. This has resulted in disharmonized 
approaches to the availability of certain types of raw materials or 
products based on such materials. Also, the current wording of Article 
4 Directive 2001/83/EC is drafted so ambiguously that the Member 
States may deny access to products based on cells or tissues on many 
possible grounds.22
ii. Commercial actors are now allowed to perform cell and tissue banking 
activities. However, in some Member States, it is still very difficult for 
SMEs and other commercial actors to carry out comprehensive activities 
despite the EUCTDs framework (The framework Directive 2004/23/EC 
and two technical directives, 2006/17/EC and 2006/86/EC) allowing 
them to procure, store, and process cells and tissues and to be qualified 
as tissue establishments.23
iii. Widening the scope of the EUCTDs to cover autologous cells to be 
used for medicinal products. The distinction between the regulation 
applicable to autologous and allogeneic tissue- and cell-based products 
was avoided.24 However, small-scale production of autologous products 
often takes place in hospitals. For such tailor-made production, the 
expensive industrial GMP manufacture model is not well suited.25 
To mitigate these issues, the European Commission has launched 
ATMP-specific GMP guidelines also addressing some particularities of 
autologous products.26
iv. Inclusion of ATMPs as a subcategory of cell- and tissue-based products 
within the medicinal products regulatory regime. ATMPs must now 
be compliant with the requirements for conventional pharmaceuticals. 
Even though GMP standards play an important role in the quality 
21 Jean-Paul Pirnay – Alain Vanderkelen – Daniel De Vos – Jean-Pierre Draye – Thomas Rose – 
Carl Ceulemans – Nadine Ectors – Isabelle Huys – Serge Jennes – Gilbert Verbeken. Business 
oriented EU human cell and tissue product legislation will adversely impact MS’ health care 
systems. Cell Tissue Bank. Dec;14(4) 2013, pp. 525–60. 
22 Ibid. Mansnérus 2016, supra note 6, p. 173.
23 Pirnay et al. 2013, supra note 21. See also Mansnérus 2016, supra note 6, pp. 173–174.
24 Pirnay et al. 2013, supra note 21.
25 Mansnérus 2016, supra note 6, pp. 173–174.
26 European Commission 2017a.
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management of ATMPs and the protection of public health27, such 
requirements risk becoming disproportionately costly for SMEs, 
research units in the academia, and public tissue establishments, 
and, consequently, impeding innovation.28 Recently, some risk-based 
flexibilities have been allowed in the ATMP-specific GMP guidelines.29
v. Conditions for applying for a hospital exemption are kept as narrow as 
possible. Consequently, some valuable established therapies are risking 
becoming unavailable.30 To avoid negative incentives, the hospital 
exemption should be kept narrow31 and other risk-proportionate 
flexibilities should be applied to facilitate the manufacturing of ATMPs.32
vi. Creating an incentive system for SMEs. These incentives focus on the 
main financial and administrative entry obstacles for SMEs in pre-
marketing authorization procedures. Some of the incentives have been 
extended to cover the academia and non-profit organizations. Despite 
these incentives, other obstacles (especially GMP compliance-related 
financial hurdles) make it hard for SMEs to enter the EU market.33
27 Mansnérus 2016, supra note 6, p. 174.
28 Pirnay et al. 2013, supra note 21.
29 European Commission 2017a.
30 Pirnay et al. 2013, supra note 21..
31 Kim F Pearce – Martin Hildebrandt – Hildegard Greinix – Stefan Scheding – Ulrike Koehl – 
Nina Worel – Jane Apperley – Matthius Edinger – Andrea Hauser – Eva Mischak-Weissinger 
– Anne M Dickinson – Mark W Lowdell. Regulation of advanced therapy medicinal products 
in Europe and the role of academia. Cytotherapy 2014 Mar;16(3), pp. 289–97.
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their access to the internal market and to foster the competitiveness of European 
pharmaceutical companies. On the other hand, however, the need to guarantee the highest 
level of health protection for patients was strongly emphasized.34 Both industry and patients 
alike anticipated to benefit from a facilitated access to the EU market via the centralized 
procedure.35 Manufacturers were expected to benefit from improved regulatory certainty for 
the development of ATMPs and the free movement of those products within the EU as well. 
It was also assumed that patients and healthcare professionals would benefit from a timely 
access to innovative treatments.36 
Yet, a few years after the adoption of the ATMP Regulation, it appeared evident that 
the ATMP Regulation in its actual form failed to meet some of its above-mentioned primary 
objectives, as few new products entered the EU market. However, the reasons for the low 
number of ATMPs are only partly attributable to the ATMP Regulation.37 The European 
Commission organized a public consultation regarding the experience gained from the 
                                                 
34 Mansnérus 2016, supra note 6, p. 175. 
35 Bettina Klug – Patrick Celis – Melanie Carr – Jens Reinhardt, Regulatory structures for gene therapy 
medicinal products in the European Union. Methods Enzymol 507 2012, pp. 337–54. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Mansnérus 2006, supra note 6, p. 175. 
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36 Ibid.
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market. However, the reasons for the low number of ATMPs are only partly 
attributable to the ATMP Regulation.37 The European Commission organized a 
public consultation regarding the experience gained from the application of the 
ATMP Regulation38 and released, together with the EMA, a joint action plan to 
address shortcomings of the ATMP Regulation and related processes.39
37 Mansnérus 2006, supra note 6, p. 175.
38 Klaus-Dieter Sohn, Centrum für Europäische Politik EU Report: ‘Experience with the ATMP 
Regulation’, cepPolicyBrief No. 2014–34 2014. Available at: http://www.cep.eu/Analysen/
COM_2014_188_ATMP/cepPolicyBrief_COM_2014_188_ATMP_Regulation.pdf. Accessed 
14 September 2020.
39 European Commission 2017b, supra note 17.
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Table 3. Benefits and Shortcomings of the ATMP Regulation 
Benefits Shortcomings
+ increased regulatory and administrative 
assistance from the EMA’s SME Office
+ significant 90 percent fee reductions for 
scientific advice and inspections for SMEs (65 
percent fee reduction for others)
+ significant fee reductions for the marketing 
authorization application for SMEs developing 
ATMPs or orphan medicinal products
+ fee reductions on the EMA’s scientific 
advice have been recently extended to cover 
academia and non-profit organizations if the 
applicant qualifies for the PRIME scheme
+ postponement of the fee payable for 
marketing authorization application or 
related inspection until after the grant of the 
marketing authorization for SMEs
+ conditional fee exemption where scientific 
advice is followed and the marketing 
authorization is unsuccessful for SMEs
+ certification of quality/nonclinical data for 
ATMPs for SMEs 
+ providers of equipment or GMP grade 
ancillary reagents potentially benefit from 
the ATMP Regulation, as their short term 
sales may increase when ATMP suppliers are 
adapting to meet the standards
− the number of licensed ATMPs in the 
internal market remains low and many licenses 
have been withdrawn (However, reasons for 
this can be only partly attributed to the ATMP 
Regulation.)
− the interest of big pharma in the 
development of ATMPs still remains limited 
and pharmaceutical industry standards 
constitute significant financial impediments 
for developers of ATMPs (i.e. usually SMEs, 
academia, and hospitals) providing tailor-
made or niche advanced therapies
− the introduction of pharmaceutical industry 
standards (such as GMP and marketing 
authorization requirements) to cover ATMPs 
resulting in a predominantly risk-averse 
regulatory environment (However, it is positive 
that recently issued new GMP and CLP 
Guidelines include ATMP-specific adaptations 
and risk-proportionate flexibilities, and 
ATMP-specific GCP Guidelines are soon to be 
launched.)
− inconsistencies in the application of the 
hospital exemption is conducive to creating 
uncertainty amongst national competent 
authorities and developers of ATMPs, as 
it does not promote the harmonization of 
practices
− the significant administrative burden and 
high cost of GMP compliance has been 
underestimated by research funding bodies
− inconsistencies in the implementation of 
the ATMP Regulation, in particular the lack of 
harmonized ATMP classifications constitute a 
barrier to the development of ATMPs across 
the EU, as national competent authorities 
cannot use the classification procedure when 
they face difficulties with the classification of 
ATMPs
− the certification procedure is used very 
seldom, it needs to be linked to the marketing 
authorization procedure, and fee reductions 
should be extended to cover non-profit 
organizations (i.e. academia)
Source: Adapted from Mansnérus with updates supra note 6, p. 180
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7.4 New Measures to Accelerate the Market Entry of 
ATMPs in the EU
At first glance, one could find that the actual benefits of the ATMP Regulation 
appear quite limited, as the rigorous GMP and marketing authorization 
requirements seem to have hampered the market entry of new ATMPs. Yet, it can 
also be assumed that the ATMP Regulation has protected patients from unsound 
treatments. It is clear that policymakers and regulators alike are facing a very 
difficult task; they need to find the appropriate approach to deal with uncertainties 
and potential risks to public health whilst balancing between conflicting interests, 
such as innovation, safety, and the free movement of goods. In 2014, the European 
Commission identified five concrete amendment proposals to accelerate the 
translation of research into authorized ATMPs: (1) improving the conditions 
for non-profit organizations; (2) extending the certification procedure to cover 
non-commercial organizations and ensuring a better link with the marketing 
authorization procedure; (3) streamlining the current definitions of ATMPs to 
cover all ATMPs to prevent disparities in national classifications; (4) adapting 
the marketing authorization requirements for special products (particularly 
autologous ATMPs); and (5) harmonizing the hospital exemption to avoid negative 
incentives. 
More recently, the European Commission and the EMA have, pursuant to 
their joint action plan, taken a number of measures to improve the conditions 
for the market entry of ATMPs. These measures include, but are not limited to, 
revising standards and launching risk-based adaptations, streamlining different 
procedures, improving stakeholder interaction and training as well as initiating 
discussions for the further harmonization of discrepancies in national approaches. 
7.4.1 Revising Standards and Streamlining Procedures to Address 
Particularities of ATMPs
GMP compliance-related costs have been reported to constitute a major bottleneck 
for the translation of research into advanced therapies. It has been argued that 
rigorous technical requirements (which are not negative as such) risk becoming 
disproportionately costly for SMEs and, consequently, impeding innovation. 
Recent ATMP-specific adaptations to GMP requirements have been welcomed 
by developers of ATMPs, as the specific characteristics of ATMPs are now better 
taken into consideration. These flexibilities are anticipated to decrease the costs 
related to compliance with GMP guidelines. 
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It appears that along with the EMA, some regulatory authorities in the Member 
States seem to have adopted a pragmatic approach already, allowing for a risk-
based assessment of manufacturing procedures. The most recent adaptations 
to the ATMP-specific GMP requirements together with the risk-proportionate 
adaptations to clinical trials represent positive developments that may facilitate 
the market entry of ATMPs. Among other things, a number of changes in 
applicable guidelines and standards are hoped to facilitate the development 
and manufacturing of ATMPs in the foreseeable future: ATMP-specific GMP 
standards, Q&A document on the risk-based approach to non-substantially 
manipulated ATMPs, guidelines on GLP for ATMPs (all above published 2017), 
guidelines on GCP for ATMPs led by the European Commission (published 2019), 
guidelines on investigational ATMPs (consultation closed), scientific guidelines on 
ATMPs (a number of guidelines have been adopted lately or are being revised), 
scientific considerations on gene editing technologies (under preparation) as well 
as guidelines on safety, efficacy, and RMPs for ATMPs and the revision of the 
EMA’s procedural guidance on the evaluation of ATMPs (both revised in 2018). 
The introduction of the supplementary GMP requirements for ATMPs is not only 
necessary to facilitate the market entry of new ATMPs but also to protect public 
health. However, it should be noted that without efficient enforcement in the 
form of inspections and effectiveness measures, EU directives and regulations 
as such are inadequate to protect patients from unsafe medicinal products. 
Therefore, increasing the training of inspectors and other relevant stakeholders 
is of paramount importance. 
7.4.2 Increased Stakeholder Interaction and Training
Under Article 78 of the Clinical Trials Regulation, the Member States of the EU 
shall appoint inspectors to supervise compliance with said regulation. Moreover, 
it is the Member States’ responsibility to ensure that the inspectors are adequately 
qualified and trained. No unified ATMP inspection training or assessment 
criteria have been set thus far. It is clear that GMP compliance as such does not 
automatically guarantee the quality, safety, and efficacy of a medicinal product. 
For this reason, inspections and unified assessment criteria should be in place 
when similar quality and safety standards for ATMPs are being pursued in the 
Member States. 
There is also a concern that the current risk-based approach puts major 
pressure on qualified persons, as they may release products according to 
different interpretations in different Member States. In this respect, the EMA 
has acknowledged that qualified persons would benefit from more guidance and 
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training in risk-proportionate approaches. More recently, the EMA has taken 
several measures to mitigate this problem. It has committed to providing enhanced 
scientific support and possibilities for early dialogue with multidisciplinary expert 
teams as part of the PRIME scheme, and the CAT is organizing awareness 
sessions with ATMP related topics. The EMA has also committed to providing 
increased stakeholder support for SMEs and academia and increasing awareness 
of regulatory processes and framework as well as increasing interaction between 
EMA and health technology assessment bodies. 
7.4.3 Harmonization of Discrepancies in National Approaches
The hospital exemption, which is applied very inconsistently across the EU 
Member States, is conducive to create uncertainty amongst national competent 
authorities and developers of ATMPs. To mitigate this problem, the EMA has 
initiated discussions with national competent authorities in order to harmonize 
practices. 
Beyond the ATMP Regulation as such, there are also other areas affecting 
the ATMP field that would benefit from a greater EU-wide harmonization. 
For instance, the GMO Directive (Directive 2001/18/EC) is not particularly 
designed for medicinal products. Thus, a number of shortcomings appear in its 
disharmonized implementation across the EU. Establishing a central repository 
listing the requirements and timelines for GMO assessment in every Member 
State could possibly be the first step towards greater harmonization. The European 
Commission is initiating a dialogue with national competent authorities to reduce 
discrepancies in GMO legislation applicable to ATMPs. 
7.4.4 Potential of the EU Regulation on Clinical Trials for ATMPs
The new Clinical Trials Regulation (Regulation 536/2014) entered into force on 
16 June 2014. From the perspective of developers of ATMPs, the Clinical Trial 
Regulation allows for a streamlined application procedure via a single entry point-
EU portal, more harmonized review of clinical trial applications, and possibly 
faster approval times. The EMA has paid attention to the differing requirements 
across the EU Member States. In particular, the integration of assessment in 
clinical trial authorizations poses a challenge in the context of multicenter clinical 
trials on ATMPs. The timelines of such assessment should be aligned with those 
of a clinical trial authorization. 
Regardless of the harmonization of the application process, it should be 
noted that ethical approvals of clinical trials remain within the competence of 
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the Member States. Consequently, the endorsement of a trial depends on the 
ethical position adopted by the ethical boards of the Member States. As long as 
different national competent authorities apply the classification of medicines as 
ATMPs differently, this will also constitute an impediment for ATMP development. 
Developers of orphan drugs face difficulties in this respect, as research must be 
conducted across many jurisdictions to obtain adequate recruitment rates. On 
a more general note, concerns have been voiced that the benefit-risk balance of 
products in development focuses mostly on risks. Some stakeholders argue that 
greater emphasis should be put on expected but realistic benefits, especially in 
the case of unmet medical needs. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The ATMP Regulation aims to harmonize the legislative landscape for ATMPs 
throughout the EU, with the EMA offering regulatory support to developers. The 
near future will reveal how widely the reformed risk-based approach in GMP 
manufacture and clinical trials gains wider general acceptance among the national 
regulatory authorities and ATMP developers in Europe. It also remains to be 
seen whether these adaptations are sufficient to nurture the ATMP meadow and 
ameliorate the availability and accessibility of valuable treatments. Furthermore, 
a careful assessment of benefit-risk balances should constitute a part of the 
development strategy early on. These aspects should be discussed early with 
regulators and health technology assessment bodies alike to allow the adaptation 
of GMP and marketing authorization requirements. Future development and 
authorization is likely to occur under accelerated access pathways, which need 
to be duly aligned with payment and reimbursement structures to ensure and 
facilitate global patient access to new technologies. 
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On the Lookout for Experience:  
The Legislative Experiment 
of Conditional Pharmaceutical 
Reimbursement in Finland
by LL.M. Waltter Roslin
Abstract
This chapter explores risk-sharing agreements and the conditional reimbursement of 
pharmaceuticals in Finland. These are agreements between payers and providers to mitigate 
the risk of uncertainty sometimes found in novel pharmaceutical products. Introduced 
through a legislative experiment that first ran between 2017–2019 and now continued for 
another six years from 2020–2025. Overall, the first experiment delivered positive results, 
however, the consensus was that more experiences from all aspects of risk-sharing were 
needed and further data collection is required to fully grasp how conditional reimbursements 
should be legislated in Finland. Conditional risk-sharing has the potential to increase access 
to treatment, which can have human rights implications as states are often mandated to 
provide a certain level of healthcare to their citizens, this general relation to fundamental 
human rights is analysed in this chapter. An overview will be provided of risk-sharing in 
general in relation to pharmaceuticals, the relevant Finnish legislation, and legislative 
experiments. Issues within the legislation and the experiments will be expanded upon, 
and future challenges identified, namely in relation to the transparency of the risk-sharing 
agreements and challenges with increasing the variety of the agreement types utilised. 
European experiences and general trends are also presented to give a short overview and 
contrast. This chapter intends to be a descriptive exercise in forming a ground basis for 
understanding the current national system of conditional reimbursements and provide 
few closer insights into the potential future after the current experiment.
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8.1 Introduction: Risk-Sharing Agreements in 
Pharmaceuticals and the Finnish Experiment
Healthcare is one of the cornerstones of modern welfare society, representing a 
promise from the state to provide and enable a healthy life, but it is also an ever-
increasing expenditure.1 A vast number of actors and organisations are working 
to maintain the access to treatment, both public and private, either financed based 
on a private insurance model or a national insurance model. However, irrespective 
of how the access to a doctor is provided, treatment also requires medicine, and the 
development of pharmaceuticals has long been a partner in the societal equation of 
maintaining health. As a naturally occurring panacea has not yet been discovered, 
there is an interest in developing new medicines. However, as the development 
of pharmaceuticals can be a costly endeavour, with long development processes, 
vigorous testing phases, and competition, the manufacturing of a new drug 
requires a vast amount of faith, deep pockets and a projection of profit. Whilst 
research occurs in universities and hospitals around the world, manufacturing and 
development are mainly conducted by pharmaceutical companies. Nonetheless, 
the question of profit is a central factor with private companies, and the societal 
sphere in which the industry operates is layered. As there is a societal interest in 
the attainment of pharmaceuticals and the continuation of their development, 
the state also has its role to play in incentivising them. 
To mitigate the risks posed by the development of novel medicine, risk-
sharing agreements (RSA) are utilised.2 In particular, their benefits are the 
increase mitigation of uncertainty about clinical outcomes and cost-effectiveness 
of medicines for the state by allowing conditional reimbursement of the drug, 
enabling early access to treatment for patients with more experimental and 
innovative medicine, easing national budgets, and promoting more focused 
1 Data from the Finnish institute for health and welfare show that there has been a steady increase 
in expenditure between 2000-2018, especially expenditures on outpatient care rose 8,6% 
between 2017–2018, for more information: Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos, Tilastoraportti 
23/2020, Terveydenhuollon menot ja rahoitus 2018. 06/2020.
2 RSA’s are agreements between payers and producers aimed at mitigating the risk caused by the 
uncertainty of the curative value of new and existing medicines. A more in-depth definition is 
given in chapter 2. 
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utilisation of a medicine on a subgroup of patients.3 Risk sharing is especially 
beneficial for orphan diseases, as their profitability is often perceived as low, and 
the limited patient-base can pose difficulties in attaining enough real-world data.4 
However, similar uncertainties can still exist in other products, if they have been 
recently developed and lack the necessary ‘real-world data’ to satisfy the state’s 
reimbursement board. Thus, risk-sharing can enable a novel product’s potential 
reimbursement and hasten its entry to the market.
In 2017, Finland joined the trend carried by many EEA countries by introducing 
a conditional reimbursement scheme with Chapter 6, section 6a of the Finnish 
Health Insurance Act (Sairausvakuutuslaki).5 However, instead of permanent 
legislation, the government used experimental legislation to implement the new 
scheme.6 Introduced in Government Bill 184/2016,7 the duration of the trial 
was set for three years; however, not enough conclusive evidence was generated 
to decide the future of conditional reimbursement in Finland, and the experiment 
was continued for another six years with the following legislative trial.8 Based 
on the past and the current experiments there is room to analyse the general 
impact of conditional reimbursement on the Finnish health care sector, its actors, 
patients, and the general legislative framework. There are currently 37 products 
with a risk-sharing agreement with the Finnish Pharmaceutical Pricing Board 
3 Francisco R. Gonçalves – Susana Santos – Catarina Silva – Gabriela Sousa, Risk-sharing 
agreements, present and future. Ecancermedicalscience 2018 pp. 2–3; Martin Wenzel – 
Suzannah Chapman, Performance-based managed entry agreements for new medicines in OECD 
countries and EU member states: How they work and possible improvements going forward. 
OECD working papers No. 115 02/2020, pp. 12–14; Louis P. Garrison & others, Performance-
Based Risk-Sharing Arrangement –Good Practices for Design, Implementation, and Evaluation: 
Report of the ISPOR Good Practices for Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Arrangements Task 
Force. Value in Health 16(5) pp. 703–719, 704–710.
4 For more see: Wouter Boon – Luis Martins – Marc Koopmanschap, Governance of conditional 
reimbursement practices in the Netherlands. Health Policy 119(2), pp. 180–185. 
5 The Health Insurance Act (in Finnish: Sairausvakuutuslaki, Act of 1224/2004, as amended).
6 Experimental legislation is a governance tool, where the state introduces an act that is made 
valid only for a specified duration, used to search and test alternative ways to solve societal 
issues.
7 Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi sairausvakuutuslain muuttamisesta ja väliaikaisesta 
muuttamisesta sekä laeiksi lääkelain 57 b ja 2013 §:n ja terveydenhuollon ammattihenkilöistä 
annetun lain 22 ja 23 §:n muuttamisesta HE 184/2016 VP (Government Bill 184/2016). In the 
Finnish legal order, the intention of the legislator, often percieved through the government 
bills, is used as a weakly binding source of law and thus given more attention to than in some 
other jurisdictions. See more: Aulis Aarnio, The Sources of Law in Aulis Aarnio (ed.), Essays 
on the Doctrinal Study of Law. Springer 2011 pp. 147–163. 
8 Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi sairausvakuutuslain muuttamisesta ja väliaikaisesta 
muuttamisesta HE 40/2019 VP (Government Bill 40/2019).
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(FPPB); all are financial-based agreements.9 This means that the conditionality 
of the reimbursement is tied to a performance of a financial factor, the amount of 
units sold, patients treated, or the volume of product used. However, instead of 
focusing on financial aspects, performance-based agreements are also possible, 
focusing on the quality of treatment and patients’ response to it.10 As focusing on 
the outcome of treatment would potentially increase the quality of treatment and 
the overall betterment of society, there could be a potential benefit in increasing 
performance-based agreements in conditional reimbursement decisions.
8.1.1 The Structural Overview of Conditional Reimbursements in 
Finland; Government Bills 184/2016 and 40/2019 as Well as 
the Functioning of the Pharmaceutical Pricing Board
Conditional reimbursement in Finland was introduced in 2017 to utilise new drugs 
in a controlled manner and increase patient access to treatment. In addition, 
the goal was to supplement Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s government’s program 
to cut EUR 150 million from pharmaceutical reimbursements. The plan was to 
increase competition, reduce drug waste, promote rational treatment and the 
configuration of the special reimbursement. Conditional reimbursement was then 
proposed as a new risk-sharing mechanism to control the introduction of new 
products.11 In a Conditional Reimbursement Agreement (CRA), the provider, 
in this case the pharmaceutical company, enters into an agreement with the 
payer (the government) operated by FPPB, to mitigate the potential risk a new 
pharmaceutical product may have. Through guaranteeing a reachable endpoint 
with the agreement, the provider guarantees a particular outcome with the 
product having the risk in case of non-fulfilment, to trigger a duty to return the 
reimbursed portion of the price to the government. The government will then grant 
a reimbursement decision to a product that might not have been reimbursable in 
the past due to lack in some parts of its ‘real-world data’, providing patients with 
access to novel products. The nature of these agreements is often financial, as 
9 FPPB, Conditional Reimbursement. 08/2020 Available online at: https://www.FPPB.fi/content/
uploads/2020/01/Ehdollinen-korvattavuus_010820.pdf.
10 For a good overview of the two types of risk-sharing agreements see: Jacoline C Bouvy – Claudine 
Sapede – Sarah Garner, Managed Entry Agreements for Pharmaceuticals in the Context of 
Adaptive Pathways in Europe. Front Pharmacol 2018; Martin Wenzel – Suzannah Chapman 
pp. 12–16. 
11 Government Bill 184/2016 p. 1.
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also seen in Finland’s case, mostly due to the ease of using volume/price related 
endpoints, which is also echoed by the general risk-sharing trends in Europe.12
The responsibility to manage and approve the new conditional agreements 
was delegated to the FPPB, the pharmaceutical pricing board functioning within 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs as it already had the oversight of the 
general reimbursement application proceedings. The mandate of FPPB is based 
on the Health Insurance Act.13 Its task, under Chapter 6, section 1 of the Act, is 
to validate reimbursement, validate a reasonable wholesale price for the purpose 
of reimbursement, and to make decisions to increase the reasonable wholesale 
price and the termination of reimbursement and reasonable wholesale price. 
The board consists of the main body, as well as an expert group all appointed 
by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs for a three-year period.14 FPPB 
is a separate entity from the Finnish Medicines Agency (Fimea), which is the 
Finnish national body within larger EU-wide pharmacovigilance and manages 
the market authorisation process for Finland under the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA). Fimea oversees and supports pharmaceutical development and 
has since 2015 gathered the performance and economic value-based evaluations 
of pharmaceutical products and coordinated the related cooperation. The goal of 
Fimea is to evaluate all new hospital medicines and major product expansions15. 
Under the current structure, reimbursement application requires the market 
authorisation of the pharmaceutical.16 Hence, with both agencies conducting 
analysis into the reimbursability of a product, whilst remaining interconnected, 
the agencies’ mandate does not overlap.
Despite its few visible shortcomings, the 2017–2019 experiment produced 33 
financial-based CRAs. It was generally viewed positively by stakeholders: when 
asked during the public consultation from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
whether the experiment should be discontinued, made permanent or continued, 
the continuation was sought by all parties present.17 Hence, a new experimental 
12 Bouvy – Sapede – Garner 2018 p. 3; see also Wenzel – Chapman 2020, pp. 17–27.
13 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 1–3.
14 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 2.
15 Heikki Ruskoaho, Lääkekorvausjärjestelmän kehittäminen: Selvityshenkilön loppuraportti. 
Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö 06/2018 p. 39.
16 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 4, subsection 1.
17 Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, Lausuntopyyntö luonnoksesta hallituksen esitykseksi 
sairausvakuutuslain muuttamisesta ja väliaikaisesta muuttamisesta. 08/2019. The responses 




legislation was initiated with Government Bill 40/2019 to address and continue 
the previous experiment. 
The wording of the act remains rather similar as it was during the old 
experiment, apart from a few changes made to further clarify for both FPPB and 
contracting pharmaceutical companies to conduct the agreements better. Most 
notably, there was the decision to keep the wholesale price of a product engaged 
in a CRA confidential and not to include the agreed price in the determination 
of a reasonable wholesale price of another product.18 However, the real potential 
impact of the continuation of the experiment can be seen as a possibility to increase 
the portion of performance-based agreements in Finland. Performance-based 
agreements are heavily reliant in the collection and accumulation of data by 
healthcare professionals.19 The previous experiment’s three-year duration was very 
little time to achieve any substantial information. This possibility for an increase 
in performance-based agreements was also noted down in the deliberations of 
the legislator.20
8.1.2 How Are Conditional Reimbursement Agreements Regulated 
Under the Finnish Health Insurance Act?
Under Chapter 6, section 6a of the Finnish Health Insurance Act, a novel 
pharmaceutical product can be granted conditional reimbursement, proven if 
there is a special unmet medical need, and there is substantial uncertainty with 
the cost of treatment, the effectiveness of the product, cost-effectiveness, or other 
substantial uncertainty related to the reimbursement of a product or the evaluation 
of the reasonable wholesale price. FPPB then, based on the application, decides 
whether to initiate the negotiations with the pharmaceutical company. If the 
negotiation stage is reached, an agreement can be made between FPPB and the 
company on the reimbursement. Reimbursement can be valid for a maximum 
duration of five years, consisting of a single decision or continuous fixed-term 
decisions.21 
In the CRA, the category of reimbursement is also agreed upon. This can 
be one of the following: basic reimbursement, lower special reimbursement, 
and higher special reimbursement, this type of a direct price reduction is rather 
18 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 7, subsection 4.
19 Garrison and others, pp. 708–713.
20 Government Bill 40/2019.
21 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 6 a, subsection 3; section 12 subsection 2.
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commonly used, especially in oncological drugs.22 The Health Insurance Act does 
not stipulate using other forms of risk-sharing, yet price reduction has been used 
in Finland by Kela prior and is thus the most prominent type. Nonetheless, as 
the law does not stipulate a preference over the reimbursement type and with 
the potential increase in performance-based agreements, more intricate options, 
such as outcome guarantees for the population or money back guarantees for 
individuals, are possible.23
Reimbursement can be sought for the general use of the product, unless 
the product fulfils one of the four requirements under Chapter 6, section 5, 
Subsection 2: 1) the drug is used to treat a disease of a temporary nature or 
with mild symptoms; 2) the therapeutic value of the treatment is low; 3) the 
product is used for another purpose than treatment of a disease; or 4) the drug 
is a traditional herbal product or homeopathic.24 In the case usage of the product 
might fall under the aforementioned categories, a limited reimbursement can be 
agreed upon for a specific use of a product.25
The agreements themselves, as well as the negotiations, are kept confidential 
due to the sensitive commercial data within them. This most often refers to the 
agreed wholesale price of the drug. The reason for such confidentiality may be 
because a Member State’s pricing board can, in practice, apply the wholesale 
price of a product in a foreign country to determine the reasonable price in its 
home territory. The final price of a drug in one EU Member State can impact the 
price of the same or similar drug in another.26 However, there is a clash with the 
principles of transparency by the Finnish Act on the Openness of Governmental 
Activities. Naturally, an exception exists in case of commercially sensitive data, 
where confidentiality can be claimed.27 However, especially as discovered during 
the previous experiment, when a product subject to an agreement is used as 
22 Kim Pauwels et al. Managed Entry Agreements for Oncology Drugs: Lessons from the European 
Experience to Inform the Future. Frontiers in Pharmacology 2017, p. 5.
23 Garrison et al, 2013 p. 707.
24 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 5, subsection 2.
25 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 6; Meaning if product X, would be a more expensive 
product to treat an illness A than its current competitor, yet it would have a secondary use as 
a treatment for illness B, it could be granted limited reimbursement under the Health Care Act 
to treat B if it has proven value. This limitation was introduced in Government Bill 97/2005 to 
partially limit the exceeding costs of reimbursements and to clarify under what circumstances 
reimbursement can be given.
26 This practice is known as external price referencing; for more information, see: Cécile Rémuzat 
and others, Overview of external reference pricing system in Europe. Journal of Market Access 
& Health Policy 2015.
27 Act on Openness of Governmental Activities (in Finnish: Laki viranomaisten toiminnan 
julkisuudesta act of 621/1999, as amended) Chapter 6 Section 24, subsection 1(20).
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a comparator for the appraisal of another product, to what extent should the 
confidentiality be lifted to ensure there are no artificial veils barring cost-effective 
agreements? This utilisation of confidential data was, in practice, prohibited 
during the first experiment. It would appear that with added subsection 4 to 
Chapter, section 7 of the Health Insurance Act,28 the utilisation of a product under 
agreement as a comparator when determining a reasonable wholesale price is 
barred. However, now that part of the product should be used as a comparator, 
to what extent is confidentiality in the agreements beneficial?
As seen in the earlier subsection, the requirements for conditional reimbursement 
are threefold: the product must be novel, there is an unmet medical need, and 
the product has some flaws barring it from the general reimbursement scheme. 
Novelty is often mentioned in intellectual property related matters, implying 
something as being recent and different; however, this naturally excludes already 
available remedies that might currently struggle with reimbursement applications, 
namely orphan diseases.29 There appears to be a lack of discussion into the 
potential conditional reimbursement of older products; should such agreements 
be facilitated to better cover the treatment of diseases that have very low patient 
numbers? Additionally, with the potential increase of personalized medicine in the 
future,30 the way pharmaceuticals are used could develop into more individual-
based dosages, instead of the bulk production currently used to supply patients. 
8.2 Risk-Sharing
8.2.1 Risk-Sharing Agreements and Managed Entry Agreements: 
Similar Definitions, Different Focus?
After a review of the recent academic publications, there have been a plethora of 
definitions given to RSAs, which are also referred to as Managed Entry Agreement 
(MEA), Patient Access Schemes, or Special Pricing Agreements, each with slightly 
differing emphasis. 
28 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 7, subsection 4.
29 Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi sairausvakuutuslain muuttamisesta ja väliaikaisesta 
muuttamisesta HE 97/2005 VP (Government Bill 97/2005), p. 8.
30 See more: Janet Mifsud – Marcel Maliepaard, Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacogenetics: Bringing 
the Magic Bullet Closer to Reality, pp. 91–107 in G. Grech – I. Grossman (eds) Preventive and 
Predictive Genetics: Towards Personalized Medicine. Advances in Predictive, Preventive and 
Personalized Medicine. Springer 2015. 
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Authors appear to use the definitions of MEAs and RSAs interchangeably. The 
difference in whether the term MEA is utilised over RSA appears to be related to 
the specificity and the policy objective the author wishes to convey.31 When aimed 
to specify the relation between the state and the pharmaceutical company in the 
introduction of new products, MEA seems to be more favoured. There also seems 
to be an underlying focus on affordability and access with MEAs rather than the 
more overall risk coverage with RSA. This was also promoted by Ferrairo and 
others when observing that within eastern Europe, in the available agreements, 
only some of them had any true risk-sharing components, and the legislator has 
not given any definition of the risk or risk-sharing in question. However, as also 
pointed out in the study, risk-sharing can also be implicit.32 This is also because 
these agreements cover products that have limited evidence coverage. Due to this 
implicit risk, even if the agreement does not have any true risk-sharing elements, 
it should still be a practice of risk-sharing. In Finland, the legislator refers to the 
general sphere of conditional reimbursement as an application of risk-sharing 
models,33 without there being a distinction between RSAs or MEAs. MEAs are 
in general risk-sharing measures and thus irrespective of which term is applied, 
the matter is still related to the general subject of risk-sharing. However, by 
focusing on calling it a risk-sharing agreement, the term has a more general 
approach on the subject despite their definition being the same. Naturally, with 
further development of novel risk-sharing measures, it may become important 
to distinguish between the terms; however, they still appear to be used rather 
interchangeably. 
When searching for a general definition of RSAs, inspiration can also be sought 
from MEAs. There is a generalised definition of ‘managed entry agreement as any 
arrangement between a manufacturer and payer/provider that enables access 
to a health technology subject to certain conditions’.34 Another definition gives 
more emphasis on the risk inherent to the agreement: ‘Agreements concluded 
by payers and pharmaceutical companies to diminish the impact on the payer’s 
budget of new and existing medicines brought about by either the uncertainty 
of the value of the medicine and/or the need to work within finite budgets.’35 
A third definition would be ‘Market access agreements between payer/provider 
31 Wenzel – Chapman 2020, p. 12.
32 Alessandra Ferrairo et al., The Implementation of Managed Entry Agreements in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Findings and Implications. PharmacoEconomics 35 2017, pp. 1271–1285, 1280.
33 Government Bill 40/2019, Government Bill 184/2016.
34 Jacoline C. Bouvy – Claudine Sapede – Sarah Garner 2018 p. 3. 
35 Adamski and others, Risk sharing arrangements for pharmaceuticals: potential considerations 
and recommendations for European payers. BMC Health Services Research 2010, pp. 2– 3.
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and pharmaceutical companies utilize various pricing mechanisms that attempt 
to manage the degree of risk and uncertainty presented at the time of pricing and 
reimbursement application.’36
It becomes evident by comparing these provided definitions that RSAs identify 
as its core the contact between producer and payer as well as the facilitated 
increased access to treatment. Taking into account a conditional element, the 
presence of risk inherent to the real-life behaviour of a medicine that may 
negatively impact the payer, and the risk of ‘decision uncertainty’, the possibility 
for the product not to be effective or cost-efficient. There is clash between how 
the producer and payer may have a different view of the potential value of the 
product, and only by agreeing to a shared risk taking can both parties be assured.37 
However, by taking the risk and providing the manufacturer the reimbursement 
there is further facilitation of pharmaceutical development and access to treatment. 
Hence a more compact version of the definition of an RSA would be that RSAs are 
agreements between payers and producers aimed at mitigating the risk caused by 
the uncertainty of the curative value of new and existing medicines.
8.2.2 Financial-Based and Performance-Based Agreements:  
A Short Overview
RSAs have been divided into two categories, financial agreements, and performance-
based agreements. Financial-based agreements, also currently the preferred form 
of RSAs within Europe are categorised by an observable financial performance.38 
Price/volume arrangements and budget impact schemes, focusing on the financial 
control of expenditures, where the manufacturer might pay to the payer a rebate of 
a portion exceeding an agreed threshold, or if a certain threshold is not reached, a 
duty to refund the reimbursement may trigger. This is the form of the agreement 
currently utilised by FPPB with its CRAs. Alternative to this is a patient access 
scheme, where free products or discounts are often agreed for a specific period to 
improve the value of the new medicine and accumulate further real-life data for 
future reimbursement. Patient access schemes also cover a price-capping scheme, 
where an individual patient’s expenses are capped.39 Whilst not being a producer/
payer agreement, Kela uses a patient access-based system with the general cap 
36 Faulkner et al. Pricing and Reimbursement Experiences and Insights in the European Union and 
the United States: Lessons Learned to Approach Adaptive Payer Pathways, Clinical pharmacology 
and therapeutics 2016, pp. 730–742, 731.
37 Garrison et al., 2013 p. 706.
38 Wenzel – Chapman 2020, p. 13.
39 Adamski et al, 2010 pp. 3–4.
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an individual must pay for medicine in Finland. Performance-based agreements 
can be generally observed to contain an added level of data collection, where the 
price/reimbursement and/or revenue of the product is connected to the outcome 
of the collected data either explicitly by a specific agreement, or implicitly, through 
a possibility to renegotiate coverage. The data collection can either be related to 
the performance of the product within the whole patient base or the functioning of 
treatment in individual cases. Two models of performance-based agreements can 
be identified, a performance-linked real-world arrangement, where the utility and 
outcome of the treatment is the priority, or a research-orientated arrangement, 
where the focus is on the attainment of further evidence to reduce uncertainty 
and provide data for further reimbursement decisions.40 Naturally, a performance-
based CRA can contain elements of both. 
8.2.3 European Trends with Risk-Sharing: There Is a Clear 
Preference for Financial-Based Agreements
With the numbers of RSAs increasing globally, the general trend in Europe has 
been to favour financial-based agreements over performance based, with England 
and Italy being the notable exceptions.41 This can potentially be attributed to the 
stark contrast between the two agreement types, with financial-based agreements 
generally viewed as less cumbersome for the parties.42 The general drawbacks 
of performance-based agreements are identified as the difficulty in evidence 
gathering, lack of good endpoints, and general complexity for patients.43 Risk-
sharing seems to imply a more cumbersome process for states and pharmaceutical 
companies to undergo, and for them to succeed, critical data infrastructure is 
required. 
A recent study from Sweden reviewed all RSAs made by the Swedish Authority 
between January 2015 to August 2019 compiling agreements made for 56 products, 
highlighting that the focus of the Swedish national reimbursement agency was said 
to be cost-sharing rather than risk-sharing.44 Seeing as there are less performance 
based agreements made than financial ones in general, this might be the focus 
40 Garrison et al. 2013 p. 705; Pauwels et al. 2017, pp. 4–5, Bouvy – Sapede – Garner 2018, pp. 
3–6.
41 Wenzel – Chapman 2020, pp. 17, 25.
42 Wenzel – Chapman 2020, p. 25.
43 Bouvy – Sapede – Garner 2018, p. 5.
44 Emelie Andersson – Johanna Svensson – Ulf Persson – Peter Lindgren, Risk sharing in managed 




in many other countries as well.45 Cost-sharing is still an integral part of RSAs; 
however, its impact on the development of pharmaceuticals and the lack of risk-
sharing should be further researched. This ideology has most likely had an impact 
on the number of performance-based agreements, as cost-sharing would appear 
to be more easily managed and require less generated evidence than risk-sharing.
8.2.4 Human Rights and Risk Sharing: Interplay Between 
Increased Access and Right to Receive Treatment? 
There is a multitude of economic and political reasons for Finland to utilise 
risk sharing; however, there are also human rights obligations from the Finnish 
Constitution as well as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights to consider 
when utilising RSAs. Through increases in the availability of pharmaceuticals 
for a wider patient base in both novel medicines but also lowered prices, there 
is potential higher access to treatment, which contributes to the ideals of the 
general welfare state, but also directly promotes the abstract goals of sections 6 
and 19 of the Constitution.46 
Section 19 Subsection 3 of the Constitution tasks the government and 
municipalities to ensure that everyone has access to an adequate level of healthcare, 
and the general promotion of health. This agency does not set a subjective right 
about the received care, but rather requires a general possibility for access, whether 
public or private.47 The general discussion tends to gravitate more towards 
providing hospital services, but access to pharmacy bought prescriptions is also 
a crucial part of the overall picture of healthcare services. Discussion can easily 
gravitate towards the general ‘which particular medicine should be reimbursed’ 
instead of the current focus on the overall functioning of the CRAs. It is clear 
that with limited resources not everything can be reimbursed, however through 
designing and utilising RSAs more products can become available to patients,48 
hence improving access to treatment provided by the social welfare system, better 
fulfilling the objects set in section 19. This also promotes the right to equality 
enshrined in section 6, if through CRAs, products with fewer patients can be 
45 The observation made by Ferrario and others was that from the countries they researched had 
no definition of risk or risk-sharing, and the policymakers did not address these agreements 
as RSAs, stating that the introduction of ‘risk’ came from academic literature instead. Hence 
the focus on cost-sharing might be rooted in this contrast; Ferrario et al. 2017, p. 1283.
46 Finnish Constitution (in Finnish Suomen Perustuslaki Act of 731/1990, as amended) Chapter 
2, Section, 6 Equality Principle; Chapter 2, Section 19, Right to Social Security.
47 Kaarlo Tuori – Toomas Kotkas, Sosiaalioikeus. Talentum 2016 p. 237.
48 Faulkner et al. 2016, p. 730; Adamski and others 2010 p. 2.
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gradually introduced into the general reimbursement scheme, patients suffering 
from far rarer illnesses could be granted increased access for reimbursements, 
not originally possible due to the high risk that would befall the government 
without risk-sharing or vice-versa can promote the creation of novel treatments 
that previously might have been deemed financially over costly to produce.
The Finnish Constitution echoes the rights of European citizens under Article 
35 of the European Charter, where ‘[e]veryone has the right of access to preventive 
health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions 
established by national laws and practices.’49 Akin to the section 19 of the Finnish 
Constitution, the obligation stemming from the charter does not grant subjective 
rights to European citizens to access healthcare. Rather, it gives Member States 
agency to ensure that the overall social welfare structures are accommodating 
and striving towards equal and effective coverage. 
The interplay between risk-sharing and human rights is an important factor 
when considering how the Finnish government should proceed with the future 
of conditional reimbursement. The call for equality in reimbursed treatments can 
clash with the notion of cost-effectiveness that is required for a reimbursement 
decision. Conditional reimbursement scheme tries, in principle, to tackle the 
unequal access to expensive products.50 However, limits are still set in terms 
of cost-effectiveness as seen from Chapter 6, section 6a of the Health Insurance 
Act, and it seems no alternative criteria are being presented. The question is then 
whether the scheme can increase access enough to better the overall welfare state? 
49 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 391–407, 
Article 25.
50 Boon – Martins – Koopmanschap 2015 pp. 180–185.
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8.3 Results of the 2017–2019 Experiment: Overall 
Positive Remarks Despite Inefficient Experiences 
and the Lack of Transparency of the Agreements 
With the current interest given by the Finnish legislator in the continuation of 
the experiment, CRAs seem to have had the desired impact and that both the 
government as well as the interest groups were eager to share their opinions. All 
in all, there were 33 replies sent to the Ministry during the public consultation 
between 8 August 2019 and 6 September 2019.51 Mostly giving the green light to 
the Ministry’s proposal for Government Bill 40/2019. There were also 11 expert 
statements delivered during the proceedings.52 
A primary success of the experiment was the achieved savings on governmental 
expenditures on pharmaceuticals; the amount of reimbursements refund reached 
the projected EUR 14 million marker that was projected at the introduction of 
the experiment.53 This, combined with the knowledge that the reduction of the 
total number of declined general reimbursement applications could potentially 
lead to a better functioning reimbursement scheme, as with added efficiency, 
future savings on expenditure could be possible. This also demonstrated that an 
earlier involvement and possible reimbursement could have a positive impact on 
the overall efficiency of the reimbursement scheme. However, it was highlighted 
by the Ministry of Finance that purely relying on refunds will not give the full 
overview of the economic impact of CRAs as the agreement has the potential of 
affecting the wholesale price of the drug. Hence, comparisons between the prices 
of products between the EU Member States were recommended.54
The government as well as a few interest groups highlighted the increase in 
patients’ access to treatment, and increased the amount of products on the market, 
in cases where there has been substantial uncertainty concerning the product.55 
According to a review by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela) it would 
51 See n17 for the list of replies.
52 The statements were given by: THL, Association of Finnish Municipalities, Fimea, KELA, 
Association of Finnish Pharmacies, Rinnakkaislääketeollisuus ry, Pharma Industry Finland, 
Suppliers of Parallel Imported Medicines in Finland, SOSTE, The Finnish Medical Association, 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
53 Government Bill 40/2019, Government Bill 184/2016.
54 Valtiovarainministeriö (Ministry of Finance), Lausuntopyyntö VM/1397/00.00.05/2019, 
30.8.2019, p. 2.
55 Government Bill 40/2019, Sairaanhoitajaliitto, Sairaanhoitajaliiton lausunto hallituksen 
esitykseen eduskunnalle laiksi sairausvakuutuslain muuttamisesta ja väliaikaisesta 
muuttamisesta. 08/2019; Soste, suomen sosiaali ja terveys RY, Lausunto. 08/2019 
(STM060:00/2019); Syöpäjärjestöt (Cancer Society of Finland), Lausunto Sosiaali- ja 
terveysministeriölle. 09/2019 (STM060:00/2019).
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appear that the introduction of conditional reimbursements has reduced the time 
between market authorisation and reimbursement decision of oncological drugs.56 
However, it should be noted that no specific study was presented to measure the 
impact of the past experiment in whether the increasing number of reimbursed 
products did positively impact access in reality. The government and parts of the 
industry operate with the assumption that the introduction of 33 new products 
into the sphere of reimbursement is enough to increase access.57 More research is 
required to fully grasp the whole extent of the impact CRAs have on the access to 
treatment to better weight and further justify the usage of a legislative experiment.
The matter of the fact was that there were no performance-based agreements 
conducted within the three years of the experiment, a vacuum that was noted by 
both the government as well as the interest groups.58 This was due to both the short 
duration of the first experiment and a lack of a clear structure for their introduction. 
Financial-based agreements are considered less complex to manage,59 and the data 
in question does not necessarily require a clear exchange of information between 
clinicians, patients, the pharmaceutical company, and the government. Despite 
not proposing any clear solutions to facilitate the increase of performance-based 
agreements, apart from acknowledging for the need for additional resources, 
the increase of performance-based agreements is highlighted within the bill as a 
target for the future.60
Overall results from the experiment are limited. As the number of decisions 
made keeps increasing, some information on the evaluation of reimbursements 
and the decision-making process has been generated. Experience was also gained 
concerning the enforcement and evaluation of the agreements, the enforcement 
of the rebate and renewal of agreements. What has not been evaluated is the 
administration and securing of medicines when the conditional reimbursement 
decision has expired and transition to the regular reimbursement scheme should 
take place.61 According to the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), 
further emphasis is needed in relation to the enforcement, evaluation, rebate 
56 KELA, Lausuntopyyntö 10/2019 (STM060:00/2019).
57 Government Bill 40/2019, p. 5; Lääketeollisuus (Pharma Industry Finland), Ehdollisen 
korvattavuuden jatkaminen mahdollistaa uusien lääkkeiden saamisen ripeästi ja tasapuolisesti 
niitä tarvitsevien potilaiden käyttöön. 09/2019 (STM060:00/2019).
58 Government Bill 40/2019, p. 10; Cancer Society of Finland 2019; THL. 
Lausunto/1811/4.00.02/2019. (STM060:00/2019).
59 Faulkner and others 2016 p. 731.
60 Government Bill 40/2019, p. 10.
61 Government Bill 40/2019, p. 6.
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and the expiry of the agreements.62 Yet, all this is in relation to financial-based 
agreements. 
The experiment of 2017–2019 was still a partial success; the budgetary goals 
were met, there was an increase of pharmaceutical products on the market, and 
both the government as well as the private interest groups appear to be interested 
in further bettering the system within the following six years. Despite the success, 
the results were limited, as medicines have a long lifetime and three years is not 
long enough to fully grasp the impact of RSAs. Whether the lack of gained results 
was due to the limited time available or lack of effective measurements in place 
is unknown. Statistical information will arrive in due course; however, to ensure 
the attainment of robust data, wider application of CRAs and different types of 
RSA should be utilised.
8.3.1 Issues with the Current Risk-sharing Model in Finland: 
Transparency, Performance-based Agreements and 
Sustaining the Level of Healthcare
Perhaps the clearest drawback of the CRA is the decrease of transparency within 
the Finnish reimbursement scheme as this was voiced by nearly all the interest 
groups taking part in the public consultation. In practice, having confidential 
agreements between FPPB and pharmaceutical companies might be required to 
incentivise the companies to partake in risk-sharing; however, the overall situation 
appears unclear. There was some increased clarity with the added Chapter 6, 
section 7(4) of the Health Insurance Act63 that now only bars products with a 
CRA from being used in the determination of the wholesale price of a similar 
product. Based on the idea that due to the product’s probability of returning part 
of its sales profit to the health insurance fund, the agreed wholesale price would 
not then be the true final price64 making it unreasonable to appraise another 
product with an incomplete price of the reimbursed product. However, the section 
only bars appraisal in relation to the wholesale price, and as also noted in the 
government bill, a CRA product should otherwise be used as a comparator, thus 
lowering the artificial veil created by a reimbursed product. It remains to be 
seen how pharmaceutical companies will utilise this clarification, whether the 
competition for CRAs will become increased now that these products may be 
62 THL 2019.
63 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 7, subsection 4.
64 Government Bill 40/2019 p. 13.
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used as comparators, however without knowing the wholesale price the picture 
might be too incomplete to be fully seen. 
Despite the lack of a law defining the usage of experimental legislation, it is 
taken for granted in Finland that the Constitution does not ban the creation of 
temporary legislation, despite it departing from the traditionally perceived ideals 
of good legislation, permanence and abstractness. The object of experimental 
legislation is the attainment of information should permanent legislation be 
altered based on the experiment.65 This obligation is not clearly defined under 
Finnish law; however, to echo the results of the Swedish RSAs,66 there has been 
more focus on cost-sharing than risk-sharing, and this should apply in Finland 
as well. In principle, it should be observed that as the legislator itself views this 
experiment to be part of risk-sharing, it should follow that when conducting 
a legislative experiment on risk-sharing, risk-sharing measures should also be 
prioritised67 instead of cost-sharing. The challenge for the ongoing trial will be to 
shift this paradigm to ensure enough experiences are gained from both financial 
and performance-based agreements. 
In addition, the issue with a temporary act affecting social welfare is that if 
the legislation is not made permanent, there is a possibility that achieved social 
welfare is then weakened after the expiry of the legislation. The principle of the 
prohibition to weaken fundamental rights (heikennyskielto) is the reverse of the 
agency effect in social rights law. If the legislation requires the development of the 
social security system to a certain level, it also means that the system cannot be 
weakened below that required level. However, if there is no clear description of the 
appropriate stage, but rather an expectation of continuous development, it would 
then follow that potentially any decline in social security could be prohibited.68 
The obligations to ensure access to treatment under section 19, Subsection 3, 
of the Constitution does not pose a clear level required to be achieved. There is 
no mention of the type or extent for universal access, but rather ensuring that 
everyone has access to an acceptable level of health care. However, if CRAs indeed 
increase the access to treatment it could be argued that the overall betterment of 
the system could trigger the protection of the prohibition to weaken. According 
to the Constitutional Law Committee, it is reasonable to consider the national 
economy when determining the extent of the benefits granted by the state, which 
65 Pauli Rautiainen. Kokeilulainsäädäntö ja sen perusteelliset reunaehdot, Lakimies 2/2019 pp. 
192, 200-201.
66 Andersson – Svensson – Persson – Lindgren 2020 p. 409.
67 Government Bill 40/2019 pp. 5–6.
68 Tuori – Kotkas, 2016 pp. 207–208.
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could potentially then call for the reduction of certain social benefits in case of 
a depression or other financial instability. Although fundamental rights should 
be considered as the priorities given by the legislator, and even if there would 
be financial grounds to reduce the benefits granted, the source from which the 
reduction should be targeted should be prioritised to come from those services and 
schemes that do not originate from fundamental and human rights obligations.69 
Hopefully after the current experiment, there will be more substantial evidence 
to consider about the increase of access to treatment and the general level of 
healthcare provided by CRAs.
Lastly, reimbursement is not granted to every type of product. The two 
primary defining requirements were novelty and products that are applied to 
‘treat an illness’. Novelty is simply referring to the fact that the product needs 
to be new, barring older inventions that might struggle with a smaller patient 
base. On the other hand, to ‘treat an illness’ is used to single-handedly exclude 
treatments designed to prevent an illness from the possibility of reimbursement.70 
Especially concerning the current Covid-19 pandemic, and the general importance 
of preventative action in health care, the exclusion of vaccination71 and other 
preventative measures could, in principle, be reconsidered. Having an emphasis 
on new entries to the market does limit the potential coverage and access to 
preventative care as for instance products such as Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) 
given to people with a risk to contract HIV are not part of the reimbursement 
scheme.
8.4 The Future of Conditional Reimbursement in 
Finland
Hopefully, within the following six years, a plethora of CRAs can be conducted to 
facilitate the development of evidence to both reach a conclusion about the future 
of risk-sharing in pharmaceutical reimbursement in Finland, as well as fulfil the 
satisfy the requirements of using a legislative experiment in gathering enough 
data on risk-sharing. Yet to reach that goal, there is a need to increase the number 
69 Pauli Rautiainen. Perusoikeuden heikennyskielto. Oikeus 2013(42) pp. 261–283, 270–271, 
Tuori – Kotkas, pp. 207–208.
70 Klaus Nyblin. Mihin suuntaan lääkekorvausjärjestelmä kehittyy. Defensor Legis N:o 6/2009 p. 
942.
71 Vaccines are covered in Finland if they are part of the national vaccination strategy.
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of performance-based agreements, and whilst both providers and payers seem 
motivated in doing so, concrete measures need to be made. The conflict exists 
with the call for transparency and protection of confidential information, and 
the question is, will this also expand to cover the results of the trials? However, 
there are also already identifiable questions to consider about the principles of 
the reimbursement scheme and what product types should be covered.
8.4.1 Mitigating the Loss of Transparency through Focusing 
on the Transparency the Process and Accepting a Level of 
Confidentiality
From the new phrasing of section 7 Subsection 4,72 and the government’s 
clarification on how to use CRA products as comparators it appears that some 
added transparency would be brought into the agreements. Despite the wholesale 
price still being treated as confidential, the new stage in the discussion should 
revolve around the transparency of potential endpoints considered in performance-
based agreements. For these types of agreements, the gathering of information 
is required, and new infrastructure needs to be introduced to ensure that the 
evidence created will be applicable in the future. With learnings gained from the 
experiences of other EU Member States where performance-based agreements 
have been tested, availability of information was said to be the key for purposeful 
and effective information gathering.73 As identified by the OECD, confidentiality of 
the research outcomes of performance-based agreements has limited third-party 
access to assess the agreements’ effectiveness.74 However, the balance between 
commercially sensitive data and transparency can be difficult to ascertain. While 
full third-party access might be difficult to accept, focus should also be placed on 
the cooperation with other EU pricing boards. Partially also provide an answer to 
the potential imbalance identified by the Finnish Competition Authority, where 
different pricing boards were said to be in a weaker position to negotiate with 
a company that has access to multiple European markets, as the company has 
access to its own negotiations and reimbursement decisions while Member State 
pricing boards cannot exchange the same information75 
Multiple interest groups called for the re-evaluation of the level of confidentiality 
given to these arrangements. Either stating that the government does not give 
72 Health Insurance Act Chapter 6, section 7, subsection 4.
73 Garrison et al., 2013 pp. 711–713.
74 Wenzel – Chapman 2020 p. 47.
75 European cooperation was also promoted by THL2019.
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enough reasoning as to the necessity of such wide application, or that increased 
lack of transparency goes against the current practices and trends in governance.76 
There is no clear mentioning of the appropriate level of confidentiality in the 
government bills, and as performance-based agreements are yet to be tested in 
Finland, the practice is also lacking. However, if European trends are followed, 
pharmaceutical companies are sure to opt to keep the evidence developed as 
confidential as has been the current practice.77 The reason for confidentiality, 
especially for the wholesale price, as earlier pointed out, stems from the application 
of external price referencing, which has the adverse effect on the overall structure 
of financing pharmaceuticals promoting optimisation in the varying stages.78 
Finland, as a smaller market, might also struggle to receive more competitive 
prices without confidentiality as not to drag the price of the product down for 
larger markets.79 Nonetheless, the confidentiality of the wholesale price can be 
currently justified with commercial sensitivity of the data, yet it should be re-
evaluated at the end of the current experiment.
For the promotion of performance-based agreements and the requirement 
of the attainment of evidence enshrined in the usage of a legislative experiment, 
there is a need for wider access to the possible data generated. As the 2017–2019 
experiment clearly did not fulfil this general objective with the reported lack of 
evidence, wider cooperation between the actors should be enforced. There should 
be greater transparency used with the future reporting performance outcomes 
of CRAs to favour the proper functioning of the experiment, which can then be 
reassessed after its expiry. Greater transparency would ensure that other countries 
might also benefit from the knowledge sharing, with less likely duplication of 
studies conducted.80 
76 Lääkäriliitto (The Finnish Medical Association), lausunto Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriölle 
09/2019. Cancer Society of Finland 2019. 
77 Wenzel – Chapman 2020 p. 55; Garrison and others 2013 p. 714.
78 Kilpailu ja kuluttajavirasto (Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority), Lausunto. 09/2019 
(STM060:00/2019); THL 2019.
79 Ministry of Finance 2019.
80 Wenzel – Chapman 2020 p. 4.
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8.4.2 The Potential Changes to CRA Legislation After the 2020-
2025 Experiment 
Depending on the learning outcomes of the current experiment, the health 
insurance act can undergo many potential changes. The way the agreements are 
governed, which type to favour, the recommended forms of risk-sharing should 
be utilised, however, as the aforementioned benefit from having more health 
economic data, based on the previous experiment there are already few identifiable 
subjects that can be considered for the next length of reimbursement policy.
Currently, CRAs are only available for pharmacy drugs, and a natural step 
would be to expand this possibility also to cover hospital drugs. However, as 
there are already many institutions in Finland evaluating the cost-effectiveness 
of pharmaceutical products, this might prove an opportunity to reconsider the 
fractured layout of the current reimbursement actors, with FPPB managing 
outpatient care and FIMEA hospital drugs. There is a recommendation to unify 
all the actors under a single organisation referred to as ‘the Finnish medicines 
agency’. To better use the evaluation of drug treatment to support decision making, 
acquisition, and pricing of medicines as under the current legal framework, there 
are parallel proceedings with different methods and processes.81 It should be 
recognised that all the actors carry specialised tasks; however, there are potential 
benefits both from governance as well as the industry’s perspective that could 
be reached, at least in principle, if all performance evaluations were conducted 
by the same actor. This could potentially also fall in line with the European 
Commission’s recent directive proposal in unifying and giving further guidelines 
on Health Technology Assessments (HTA), and how they should be made more 
compatible within Europe.82 
The discussion still exists of whether reimbursements should be expanded to 
cover new categories of products, either preventative treatments or older less-novel 
treatments that might have struggled with their initial reimbursement application. 
This would inevitably impact the overall principles of the Finnish reimbursement 
scheme and require a larger change in its foundations. However, currently, there 
is a lack of data to further promote this claim, and as such, it is left as more of a 
concluding theoretical observation.
81 Ruskoaho 2018 pp. 48–49.
82 See: European Commission, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 




8.4.3 How to Enable Risk-Sharing Instead of Cost-Sharing: 
Clear Definition of a Strategy and Reconfiguration of the 
Agreements Made
There is a risk that the Finnish experiments will repeat Sweden’s experience and 
focus on affordability rather than managing the risks due to the uncertainty of the 
products. Practising cost-sharing, rather than risk-sharing. With only performing 
financial-based agreements, it is difficult to say what the lack of performance-
based counterparts has had on the reimbursements overall, as the thresholds for a 
product to be accepted into the different agreement types can vary. Performance-
based agreements can have a much higher threshold for cost-effectiveness as its 
evaluation would be based on the accumulated data rather than the projection 
based on a list price.83 However, to facilitate performance-based agreements, 
the issue of sensible data collection needs to be solved. The data collection also 
needs to also fulfil the requirements set in the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) of the European Union.84 
In principle, data collection should be divided into two distinct parts: the 
process and the content. Through a clearly defined process, both parties might 
gain clarity of the obligations related to the practicalities of the agreement and 
communicating this to the data subjects during data collection would fulfil the 
notification obligations under GDPR. Currently, in Finland, there is no public 
design of evidence gathering for CRAs, and there is no clear strategy which 
platforms are used or what critical infrastructure should be designed. It might 
not be efficient to rely on the case by case cooperation between the FPPB and 
pharmaceutical companies, and to utilise existing patient data reporting systems, 
there should be a clearly defined practice. With more public participation in data 
gathering, the industry might require fewer incentives to partake in the agreements, 
and the transparency of the process would have stronger legal protection. However, 
if privately managed data collection is utilised instead, the potential to incentive 
evidence generation should be explored. By restructuring the incentivisation and 
focusing less on upfront payments, and more on rewarding performance (or the 
opposite of penalising underperformance), companies might consider it more 
beneficial to invest in thorough evidence gathering, as there would be a clear 
incentive in doing so.85 The content of the data collection should be determined 
83 Andersson – Svensson – Persson – Lindgren 2020 p. 409.
84 European Commission, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation).
85 Wenzel – Chapman 2020 p. 47; Bouvy – Sapede – Garner 2018, p. 7.
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based on a case-by-case analysis of the product in question as having a rigid system 
of fixed endpoints brings limited flexibility and cannot adapt to the changes in 
the market.86 
Another possibility to impact the overall numbers of performance-based 
agreements would be to reconsider the contracts used in CRAs. Using a more 
specialised contract model intended to protect both the commercial interest as 
well as set clear and transparent goals for data collection could be recommended. 
Following a model inspired by the NHS England Cancer Drugs Fund, each CRA 
could consist of two contracts, a ‘data collection agreement’ and the commercial 
agreement.87 The data collection agreement would explain the planned data 
collection and what uncertainty it is aimed at tackling. The commercial agreement 
would then contain the agreed endpoints as well as other commercial information 
related to the price of the product. 
There is a potential to further incorporate HTA into reimbursement decisions. 
When evaluating the cost-efficiency of a product, the decision should also make 
a statement concerning whether the product is recommended for an RSA, 
either financial or performance-based. With early involvement of RSAs into 
the evaluation of a product, both manufacturers as well as reimbursement 
boards might be more ready to act upon based on the recommendation, also 
streamlining the interpretations of the requirements for products to enter the 
risk-sharing arrangements. HTAs also already include the relevant information of 
the uncertainties of the product in relation to comparative effectiveness to other 
products, cost-effectiveness and budgetary implications.88
8.4.4 Risk-Sharing and Personalized Medicine
Personalized medicine will impact the setting of clinical trials, as the typical stage 
III trial of thousands of patients does credibly display the effectiveness and safety 
of a product used to treat widely spread diseases; however, it performs poorly 
when measuring the benefits and disadvantages of a drug used to treat a rare 
hereditary disease. It is already common that novel products are intended for 
smaller patient bases or orphan diseases, and that its use is limited, which is then 
86 Pauwels and others 2017, p. 5.
87 NHS England Cancer Drugs Fund Team, Appraisal and Funding of Cancer Drugs from July 
2016 (including the new Cancer Drugs Fund) A new deal for patients, taxpayers and industry. 
07/2016. 
88 Wenzel – Chapman 2020 p. 45.
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expanded further with increased evidence development.89 As the market seems 
to be moving from a traditional ‘bulk’ entry into specialised, consistent evidence 
gathering, CRAs can be a good tool for governments to facilitate a more joint 
evidence development. 
From the study commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 
the overall conclusion was that the general Finnish reimbursement scheme does 
not adequately take into account the requirements of the changes in health care 
by personalized medicine.90 While the criticism was directed at the system in 
general, citing inequality in cancer treatment. Wherein certain cases, if there is 
a treatment based on a limited grounds due to mutation, the best practice for 
treatment in the hospital is not reimbursable; however, the new drugs available in 
outpatient care are, creating inequality between the intravenous treatments and 
ingestible products.91 This, however, akin to the earlier discussion of the leaving 
preventative treatments outside of the scope of the reimbursement decision, is 
a wider discussion on the overall future of the Finnish reimbursement scheme. 
CRAs remain a natural partner with personalized treatments as they enable the 
reimbursement of products with a clear focus on continuous evidence gathering, 
as well as products that might struggle with the ‘traditional’ accumulation of 
clinical data. 
8.5 Conclusions
It appears that the new experiment brings more potential trial performance-based 
agreements and conditional reimbursement has the potential to increase access to 
new treatments. Yet, conditional reimbursements are still finding their way into 
the practices of payers and producers in Finland, and more data on the economic 
and health benefits of the new system are required, data of which is hopefully 
generated by all possible agreement types. When the current experiment comes to 
an end in 2025, the legislator will be determining the overall worth of the past three 
plus six years of conditional reimbursement and is faced with a similar decision 
whether to discontinue, continue or make the experiment a permanent part of 
the reimbursement scheme. A lot can happen in six years; however, already based 
89 Ruskoaho 2018, p. 57; see also James P. Bishop – Sonal B. Halburnt – Patrick A. Akkari – Scott 
Sundseth – Iris Grossman, Roadmap to Drug Development Enabled by Pharmacogenetics in 
Godfrey Grech – Iris Grossman (Eds) Preventive and Predictive Genetics: Towards Personalized 
Medicine. Springer 2015 pp. 43–69.
90 Ruskoaho 2018, pp. 71–72.
91 Ruskoaho 2018, pp. 56–57.
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on the first experiment there are strong grounds to consider the permanence of 
conditional reimbursement and section 6a.92 With the new experiment, there is 
an increased possibility of piloting different types of agreements and considering 
raising the number of performance-based agreements, if society can meet the 
requirements posed by increased need for data collection. An increase in a wider 
variety of agreements can also help shift the overall focus of the current scheme 
to prioritise impact and effectiveness of treatment instead of amounts of units 
sold. With personalized medicines looming in the near future, more specialised 
treatments will become available to purchase that might struggle to gain enough 
of a patient base to warrant a standard reimbursement initially, with having a 
conditional reimbursement scheme, and lowering the threshold for risk-sharing 
to take place, access to treatment will be increased, bettering the overall social 
welfare system.
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– A Case Study of Patents on  
CRISPR/Cas9 Technology
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Abstract
This chapter investigates the patentability of CRISPR/Cas9 technology in Europe and the 
United States. Special attention is paid to the recent legal dispute over a patent concerning 
the use of the CRISPR/Cas9 system in eukaryotic cells. The parties involved in the dispute 
are two academic institutions, the University of California (the ‘UC’) and the Broad Institute 
of MIT and Harvard (the ‘Broad Institute’), which have been investigating the system and 
its potential use as a genome-editing tool. Interestingly, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (the ‘USPTO’) and the European Patent Office (the ‘EPO’) have granted 
the patent to both of the parties of the legal dispute. In particular, the two patent offices 
have adopted a very different approach to the concepts of innovative step and obviousness 
in inventions. This dispute influences the scientific community and those who wish to use 
this technology commercially. This chapter will look in more detail into the implications 
of this legal dispute as well as some lessons learned.
9.1 Introduction
The CRISPR/Cas9 system, i.e. ‘Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic 
Repeats’ and ‘CRISPR-associated protein 9’, is a pivotal genome-editing technology 
that has gained substantial attention since 2012. It is a rather simple but powerful 
tool for editing genomes, which enables scientists to change DNA sequences and 
modify gene function. This technology has myriad possible applications in several 
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fields of science and engineering ranging from agriculture to biomedical research. 
It has the great potential to transform medicine and diagnose, treat and prevent 
many diseases, and more recently it has been used in developing diagnostic 
tools, which may be used to detect infectious diseases such as COVID-19. A great 
variety of possible applications results in a wide array of commercial possibilities. 
Therefore, understanding the scope and limitations of the patent protection of this 
technology is of paramount importance for those who wish to use the technology 
in their research and for those would like to commercialize their innovations in 
Europe and beyond.
Globally speaking, there are thousands of patent applications on CRISPR/
Cas9 technology and new ones are constantly emerging. In recent years, the most 
burning topic has been the title and rights to the so-called ‘founding patent’ of 
the CRISPR/Cas9 system’s use on editing on cells, in particular eukaryotic cells 
(a group of organisms including plants and animals). Interestingly, the European 
and United States Courts have adopted very different approaches to resolving 
this exceptional patent dispute between the UC and the Broad Institute. In the 
United States, the UC has a right to the genetic engineering in prokaryotic cells 
and the Broad Institute has been granted a patent on engineering eukaryotic 
cells. The USPTO has viewed that the innovative step from using CRISPR/Cas9 
on prokaryotic cells to using it on eukaryotic cells is significant enough to grant 
a patent. In Europe, the EPO has taken an opposite view and granted the UC 
a patent that covers all cell types. As there are substantial financial interests 
and some significant commercialization potential in the genetic engineering of 
eukaryotic cells, both parties to the dispute have pursued a patent covering them. 
Consequently, the UC contested the United States patent decision, while the Broad 
Institute tried the same in Europe. After many years of legal battle and some 
decisive rulings, which were expected to end the dispute, the proceedings are 
still ongoing.
At this stage, there is a need to explore further the actual differences in what 
was perceived as innovative in the United States as compared to Europe in the 
context of patenting genetic editing technologies in light of these recent rulings. 
There is also a need to analyze the implications of the rulings from the viewpoint 
of the commercialization prospects of CRISPR/Cas9-based technologies in Europe 
and beyond. As this patent case has very exceptional features, there is a need to 
consider whether there is anything that we could learn from this case thus far. 
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9.2 What Is CRISPR/Cas9 and Why Is It So Pivotal?
The CRISPR/Cas9 system is opening up a new era in molecular biology. In the 
field of genome editing, researchers have been striving for years to find efficient, 
reliable, and safe ways to alter the genome of living cells. In terms of precision, 
the CRISPR/Cas9 system represents a significant step forward, in comparison 
to the older generation gene-editing technologies, including zinc finger nucleases 
and transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs). The previous 
genome engineering technologies, like agrobacterium mediated gene transfer 
or mutagenesis, are generally known to be very hard to control, imprecise, and 
often not yielding the desired outcomes. Now, the CRISPR/Cas9 system provides 
scientists with the tools to edit the human DNA present in living human cells, letter 
by letter. However, it should be noted that although the CRISPR/Cas9 system has 
been described as revolutionary, in light of the current scientific understanding, 
the procedure of modifying genes has not been proven safe yet. Among other 
things, it should investigated what kind of damage the CRISPR-Cas9 causes to 
human DNA, as it is known that gene editing may in some cases disrupt healthy 
genes even though its purpose is to only fix defective ones.1
Similarly to other gene-editing technologies, the CRISPR/Cas9 system 
comprises two separate parts. In the case of CRISPR/Cas9, there is the part 
that can be engineered to recognize the different parts of the genome sequence 
(CRISPR-sequence) and the enzyme part that cuts the targeted sequence (Cas9 
enzyme). Then, what makes CRISPR/Cas9 so special? Compared to other genome-
editing techniques, CRISPR/Cas9 has been found to be much easier, more precise, 
and affordable to use.2 Consequently, the CRISPR/Cas9 technology was rapidly 
adopted as a useful gene-editing tool in all fields of biology and science dealing with 
molecular biology. None of the older generation techniques ever reached the same 
utilisation rate among researchers despite the fact that they have been available for 
use much longer. CRISPR/Cas9 is not only paving its way as a ground-breaking 
laboratory tool, but the practical uses of this technology offer even more significant 
opportunities. Firstly, CRISPR/Cas9 provides new opportunities in agricultural 
genomic engineering and breeding that have not been previously within our reach. 
Secondly, a very significant commercial application of this technology is to be found 
within the (bio)medical field. In theory, the possible uses are nearly endless; any 
1 See Michael Kosicki – Kärt Tomberg – Allan Bradley, Repair of Double-Strand Breaks Induced 
by CRISPR–Cas9 Leads to Large Deletions and Complex Rearrangements. Nature Biotechnology 
36 2018, pp. 765–771.
2 Heidi Ledford, Titanic Clash over CRISPR Patents Turns Ugly. Nature 537(7621) 2016a, p. 460.
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illness that has genetic roots could possibly be cured by means of the CRISPR/
Cas9 technology. In addition to inherited genetic diseases, this technology has 
been thought to be a possible cure for a wide array of diseases, ranging from HIV 
to malaria as well as all the different types of cancers.3
Currently, the possible applications of CRISPR/Cas9-assisted genome therapy 
appear almost endless. The high financial value of the CRISPR/Cas9 system 
has resulted in a wide array of university spin-off and start-up companies in 
the field operating on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, numerous patent 
applications relating to some forms of CRISPR/Cas9 technology have been filed 
in the US, Europe, and beyond. As vast amounts of capital have been invested in 
CRISPR/Cas9-assisted genome editing technologies, expectations for success are 
high and the competition is getting intense. Hence, understanding the scope and 
possible limitations of the patent protection of the CRISPR/Cas9 system becomes 
increasingly important when navigating in this highly competitive environment.
9.3 Patentability of Gene-Editing Technology
9.3.1 Patent System as an Incentive for Promotion of Technological 
Innovation
International intellectual property conventions set forth the global regulatory 
framework for patent protection, and national patent laws supplement this 
framework. Patent legislation provides the patent holder an exclusive right to 
prevent others from using the patented invention for commercial purposes during 
a limited term of patent protection, usually 20 years from the filing date of the 
application. An objective of this legal monopoly, as set out in art. 7 of the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS Agreement’), 
is to contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare. Thus, the patent legislation aims at providing to universities, technological 
companies, and other researchers a favorable operational environment in which 
innovation, research, and development are encouraged by legislative incentives.
3 Mohammad-Reza Mahmoudian-sani – Gholamreza Farnoosh – Ali Mahdavinezhad – Massoud 




Strong patent protection is often required to fund the very significant R&D 
associated with the development of new technologies. This is particularly true in 
the case of pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents.4 Patents are frequently used 
for raising capital, and they have become increasingly important for developers 
of new technologies. Patents may signal quality as well as technical progress to 
capital markets or to venture capitalists, and sometimes they also serve as collateral 
for bank loans.5 Furthermore, universities need patents to attract investors for 
university spin-offs.6
For the above-mentioned reasons, to name a few examples, applying for a 
patent may be a potentially financially lucrative possibility for researches. In 
exchange for the exclusive right to monetize the invention during the term of 
patent protection, the patent holder’s exclusive right ceases to exist upon the 
expiration of the term, and thereafter the invention falls in the public domain 
and may be used by others without paying any royalty fees. In addition, when 
a patent application is published during the patent proceedings, the invention 
must be fully disclosed to the public in a sufficiently clear manner in order to be 
carried out by a person skilled in the art. Once fully disclosed, the invention can 
be used as a basis for further innovations after the expiration date. Therefore, 
the patent system sets a framework for progress of science, as researchers might 
otherwise prefer to keep their inventions in secret.
Consequently, a patent can be seen as a contract between the inventor and the 
rest of the society that provides benefits for both parties. Instead of being kept in 
secret, an invention benefits the society while the patent protection incentivizes 
inventors to invent.7 However, by virtue of their exclusivity, patents may also be 
deemed as blocks for science, which is entirely against the purpose of the existence 
of the patent system. This has been a subject of public discussion especially in 
the field of biotechnology, and this also seems to be the case in the CRISPR/Cas9 
dispute at hand. 
4 See for example Juli Mansnérus, Commercialisation of Advanced Therapies: A Study of the EU 
Regulation on Advanced Therapy Medical Products. LL.D. Dissertation. University of Helsinki, 
Faculty of Law 2016, p. 109.
5 Åsa Hellstadius,  A Quest for Clarity: Reconstructing Standards for the Patent Law Morality 
Exclusion. LL.D Dissertation. Stockholm University 2015, pp. 84–86.
6 Mansnérus 2016, p. 109.
7 See Hannah M. Mosby,  Biotechnology’s great divide: strengthening the relationship between 
patent law and bioethics in the age of CRISPR-Cas9. Minnesota Journal of Law Science & 
Technology 19(2) 2018, pp. 565–604.
192
Transatlantic Comparative Perspectives on Patenting Genome-editing Technologies   
9.3.2 Gene-Editing Technologies’ Eligibility for Patent Protection
In order to be eligible for patent protection, an invention must meet all 
mandatory patentability requirements. The eligibility for patent protection 
of a biotechnological invention, including gene-editing technology, is mainly 
dependent on the same requirements as inventions in other fields of technology. 
As a starting point, an invention must be of patentable subject matter. Not all 
subjects are considered inventions; for instance, mere discoveries of substances 
in nature are not patentable. Some subject matter has also specifically been 
excluded from patentability by way of exceptions stipulated by patent laws. In 
the context of biotechnology, the America Invents Act of 2011 § 33(a) rejects 
patent protection for inventions directed at or encompassing human organisms. 
Similarly in Europe, art. 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (the ‘EPC’) 
and art. 6 of Directive 98/44/EC (the ‘Biotech Directive’) excludes inventions the 
commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality 
from patentability. This could be relevant when applying for a patent for a gene-
editing technology related invention.
Additionally, an invention must be novel. In practice, this means that an 
invention must be considered new in comparison with the applicable prior art 
in the field, if it does not form part of the state of the art. The degree of novelty is 
not only an indispensable prerequisite for a patent grant, but from the perspective 
of commercialization of the invention, it also plays a key role as a determinant 
of patent value. Carpenter et al. have provided a concept of ‘scientific linkage’ 
in seeking to describe the technical novelty of a patented innovation. Their 
findings empirically support the idea of theoretical assumptions of novelty being 
a determinant of patent value. Their key finding is that references, i.e. ‘citations’ 
to the scientific literature, correlate with the value of a patented innovation.8
Furthermore, in the United States, an invention must be non-obvious, whereas 
in Europe it must involve an inventive step (for comparative perspectives see Table 
1 below). Additionally, in the United States, an invention must be useful, and in 
Europe it must be susceptible of industrial application. Despite the deviating 
wordings in patent legislation on both sides of the Atlantic, the requirements 
are similar, but the USPTO and the EPO sometimes take rather different stands 
with regard to interpretation, which appears to be the case in the CRISPR/Cas9 
dispute at hand.
There are certain challenges specifically related to the patentability of 
biotechnological inventions. The complexity and unpredictability of biological 
8 See Mark P. Carpenter – Martin Coope – Francis Narin, Linkage Between Basic Research 
Literature and Patents. Research-Technology Management 23(2) 1980, pp. 30–35.
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systems may cause difficulties for the patent applicant in demonstrating that 
the patentability requirements have in fact been met. Firstly, differing from 
so-called classic inventions for instance in the field of mechanics, presenting a 
biotechnological invention only by means of a written description of its component 
parts is challenging. In some situations, a deposit of biotechnological material 
would be significantly more informative, but patent legislation requires a written 
description of the invention. 
Secondly, drawing a line between a mere discovery and a patentable invention 
may be difficult. Many biotechnological inventions have existed in nature for 
a long time, but they have not been isolated and specified until recently, and 
therefore they may not be unambiguously distinguished as mere discoveries or 
as inventions within the meaning of patent legislation. As stated above, a mere 
discovery of a substance in nature cannot be an invention, however, the process 
for obtaining a substance to be isolated from its surroundings may be a patentable 
invention. The substance itself may also be patentable if it can be characterized 
by its structure and its existence has not been recognized before.9
Thirdly, complex ethical questions are often addressed as regards 
biotechnological patents.10 These ethical considerations have also been raised 
in the context of the use of the CRISPR/Cas9 system, but such aspects are left 
outside the scope of this chapter. Yet, it should be mentioned that especially the 
question regarding inheritable editing of human genome has been subject to 
vivid ethical debate ever since the inception of the CRISPR/Cas9 system. The 
system could be used to avoid harmful mutations in future generations’ genome 
in order to prevent serious illnesses. Yet, some concerns have been voiced that this 
technology is still not safe to be applied in humans and it could be conducive to 
increased social inequality in our society. The Convention of Human Rights and 
Biomedicine of the Council of Europe (1997) allows genetic engineering only for 
preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic reasons and only where it does not aim to 
change the genetic make-up of a person’s descendants. However, an alternative 
approach has been recently proposed. In fact, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
has argued that heritable genome editing is not morally unacceptable per se. In its 
new report, the Council approves the use of genome editing to engineer the traits 
9 See Sasa Bavec – Peter Raspov, Patenting Biotechnological Inventions in Europe, Food 
Technology and Biotechnology 40(4) 2002, pp. 353–359.
10 See Mosby 2018.
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of future progeny under certain specific circumstances.11 It finds that changing the 
DNA of a human embryo could be morally permissible if it is in the child’s best 
interests and if it does not add to the kinds of inequalities that already divide our 
society. This approach has already triggered some significant criticism in the public 
sphere. Among other things, concerns have been voiced that heritable editing 
of human genome would lead to social inequality. As discussed above, beyond 
moral considerations, the procedure of modifying genes in human embryos has 
not been proven safe as of yet. Among other things, it should examined what kind 
of undesired alterations the CRISPR-Cas9 system may cause to human DNA.12 In 
any case, although the wider ethical considerations are outside the primary scope 
of this chapter, heritable editing of human DNA is a matter of highly ethically 
sensitive nature, and thus there is clearly a need to ensure that a great variety of 
voices is heard in public discussions at a global scale as to what should and should 
not be allowed if we are to allow any heritable modification of human genome in 
the foreseeable future.13
Despite the wide array of challenges in patent application proceedings, 
biotechnological patents constitute an increasingly large proportion of patented 
inventions, some of which are also high-profile and attractive patents, such as 
the CRISPR/Cas9 patents. Biotechnologies such as the CRISPR-Cas9 system can 
be highly lucrative because of their immense potential for public health, which 
raises the stakes of the patent bargain.14
11 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing and Human Reproduction: Social and Ethical 
Issues. 2018. Available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/genome-editing-human-
reproduction, accessed 9 September 2020. For further details, see Blick, in chapter 6 of this 
anthology.
12 See Kosicki et al. 2018.
13 Juli Mansnérus – Céline Dujardin – Raimo Lahti, Forms and Levels of Legal Protection of the 
Human Embryo in Biomedical Research in Finland and France, pp. 199–224 in Ewa M Guzik-
Makaruk – Emil W Plywaczewski (eds.), Current Problems of the Penal Law and Criminology: 
Aktuelle Probleme des Strafrechts und der Kriminologie. Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck 2019.
14 See Mosby 2018.
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9.4 CRISPR/Cas9 Patent Dispute in Europe and the 
United States
9.4.1 The Emergence of CRISPR/Cas9 Technology
The CRISPR/Cas9 system has been perceived as one of the most significant 
innovations influencing the dynamics of the field of biotechnology.15 This great 
scientific potential has been accompanied by some significant endeavours to 
capitalize the invention. Therefore, the patentability of CRISPR/Cas9 technology 
has been in the limelight ever since its potential to engineer genetic material 
was disclosed for the first time. In 2012, Jennifer Doudna from the University of 
California and Emmanuelle Charpentier from Umeå University (‘Team California’) 
were heading the first group to report that they had been able to reprogram 
CRISPR/Cas9 to target specific DNA.16 Their experiment was conducted in vitro. 
The publication of Team California’s research report fuelled the emergence of 
further research regarding CRISPR/Cas9 technology. Shortly, another team 
of researchers headed by Feng Zhang from the Broad Institute (‘Team Broad 
Institute’) published another significant research article, in which successful use of 
CRISPR/Cas9-assisted gene targeting was reported in eukaryotic cells, including 
human cells.17 After the publication of these articles, both teams established spin-
off companies to administer licensing rights to their CRISPR/Cas9-related patents.
9.4.2 The United States: Team Broad Institute Prevails over Team 
California 
In May 2012, Team California filed the very first provisional patent application (No. 
61/652,086) regarding the use of the CRISPR/Cas9 technology with the USPTO. 
The application asserted patent rights covering the use of CRISPR/Cas9 technology 
without any specific indication on cell types, however, disclosing data obtained 
from prokaryotic cell types and in vitro. Nearly seven months later, in December 
2012, Team Broad Institute submitted their provisional patent application (No. 
15 Ledford 2016a, p. 460.
16 Martin Jinek – Krzysztof Chylinski – Ines Fonfara – Michael Hauer – Jennifer Doudna – 
Emmanuelle Charpentier, A Programmable Dual-RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive 
Bacterial Immunity. Science 337(6096) 2012, pp. 816–821.
17 See Le Cong – Fei Ann Ran – David Daniel Cox – Shuailiang Lin – Robert Barretto – Naomi 
Habi – Patrick D Hsu – Xuebing Wu – Wenyan Jiang – Luciano A Marrafini – Feng Zhang 
– Multiplex Genome Engineering Using CRISPR/Cas Systems, Science 339(6121) 2013, pp. 
819–823.
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61/736,527) to the USPTO, covering the use of a similar technology in eukaryotic 
cell types. Due to an expedited review by the USPTO, Team Broad Institute was 
granted the US patent no. 8,697,359 on the CRISPR/Cas9 technology already in 
April 2014, prior to Team California. 
Some authors18 have suggested that Team Broad Institute’s receipt of the 
patent ‘359 prompted Team California to amend the claims of its patent application 
(No. 13/842,859), removing any reference suggesting that they are limited to 
a particular cell type. Allegedly, such amendments enabled Team California’s 
grounds for a suggestion for an interference proceeding before the US Patent 
and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the ‘PTAB’) against 
Team Broad Institute, which it requested in April 2015.19 In the proceedings, 
Team California demanded a nullification of Team Broad Institute’s CRISPR/
Cas9 patents, claiming that the patents overlapped with Team California’s patent 
application.
The USPTO announced the interference proceedings in January 2016.20 In 
Team California’s view, the scope of their first patent application - which only 
clearly explained the use of CRISPR/Cas9 on prokaryotic cells – also encompassed 
the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in eukaryotic cells. Team California claimed that a person 
having ordinary skill in the art – a post-doctoral researcher with relevant skills – 
could have understood that CRISPR/Cas9 applied on prokaryotic cells could be 
applied on eukaryotic ones as well, which should render Team Broad Institute’s 
invention ‘obvious’ for a person skilled in the art and, hence, unpatentable due to 
obviousness.21 The Broad Institute presented a counterargument that they had 
to tweak and modify the system to be able to use CRIPSR/Cas9 on eukaryotic 
cells. In their view, the modifications were so significant and non-obvious that 
the invention did not interfere with Team California’s invention and a separate 
patent on the use of CRISPR/Cas9 on eukaryotic cells should thus be granted.
In February 2017, the PTAB decided the interference proceedings in Team 
Broad Institute’s favor. The decision focused mainly on whether there would 
have been a reasonable likelihood to success for Team California’s CRISPR/Cas9 
18 See for example James W Sanner, The Struggle for CRISPR: A Billion Dollar Question in 
Intellectual Property. Journal of Law, Technology and Policy 431 2016, pp. 431–453.
19 Under 37 C.F.R § 41.202, any patent applicant who believes that another application claims the 
same invention may suggest an interference. If the inventions are identical, the PTAB determines 
the priority of the inventions and only the preceding invention will be patentable. However, if 
the inventions are distinct, e.g. due to a non-obvious improvement compared to the preceding 
technology, there is no interference. Jacob S Sherkow, Inventive Steps: The CRISPR Patent 
Dispute and Scientific Progress. EMBO Reports 18(7) 2017, pp. 1049.
20 Patent Interference No. 106,048.
21 See Ledford 2016a.
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technology in vitro and in prokaryotic cell types in eukaryotic cells as well.22 
Relying on various expert opinions, Team California’s article on the invention23 
and their key inventor Jennifer Doudna’s public statements, where she expressed 
her doubts on getting the technology to work in an eukaryotic cell environment,24 
the PTAB was convinced that Team Broad Institute did accomplish a non-obvious 
and additional inventive step in relation to the state of art by making the technology 
usable in eukaryotes. As a result, the patents of Team Broad Institute were not 
considered to overlap with Team California’s patent application; the inventions 
were considered distinct.25 
Subsequent to the decision of the USPTO, some significant confusion has 
remained as to what is the mutual relationship between the contested patents.26 
Some commentators (including Team California’s own attorneys) were still 
convinced that Team California’s patent should be considered the actual ‘founding 
patent’ of CRISPR/Cas9 genome editing technology, and the Broad Institute’s 
patent should subordinate to this first ‘parent patent’. Team California appealed 
the PTAB’s decision in July 2018, claiming that incorrect standards were applied 
in determining the obviousness. In September 2018, the US Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (‘US Court of Appeals’) rejected Team California’s appeal. 
Team California did not appeal the decision and it seemed that the dispute had 
finally come to an end.
It was, however, already in 2019, when the dispute came to light again. By this 
time, the initial patent application filings had been followed by many more and 
both parties had obtained several patents for various CRISPR/Cas9 applications. 
Team California had also filed for several patent applications claiming CRISPR/
Cas9 based methods specifically in eukaryotic cell types, which made the USPTO’s 
PTAB declare a second interference proceeding between Team California and 
Team Broad Institute.27 Subject to the proceedings is 10 patent applications filed 
by Team California including claims relating to the use of CRISPR/Cas9 based 
methods in eukaryotic cell types, and 13 CRISPR/Cas9 patents and one patent 
22 Sherkow, 2017 p. 1049.
23 Martin Jinek – Alexandra East – Aaron Cheng – Steven Li –Enbo Ma – Jennifer Doudna, 
RNA-Programmed Genome Editing in Human Cells. eLife 2 2013.
24 Melissa Pandika – Jennifer Doudna, CRISPR Code Killer. Ozy 2014, available at: https://
www.ozy.com/rising-stars/jennifer-doudna-crispr-code-killer/4690, accessed 9 August 2020. 
Michael Barnes. The CRISPR Revolution. Catalyst Magazine 9.1 2014, pp. 18–20.
25 Patent Interference No. 106,048.
26 See Arti K Rai – Robert Cook-Deegan, Racing for Academic Glory and Patents: Lessons from 
CRISPR. Science 358(6365) 2017, pp. 874–876.
27 Patent Interference No. 106,115.
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application of Team Broad Institute. In these second proceedings, the parties 
expect to receive a final decision on which party was the first to invent the use of 
the CRISPR/Cas9 in eukaryotic cell types.28 On 18 May 2020, the oral argument 
on motions in the interference was heard by the USPTO’s PTAB. 
As for the very latest developments in the US, it appears that the latest round 
in battle has an apparent winner, but the fight goes on.29 The PTAB ruled on 10 
September 2020 that a group led by the Team Broad Institute has ‘priority’ in 
its already granted patents for uses of the original CRISPR system in eukaryotic 
cells covering potentially lucrative applications in lab-cultured human cells or 
in humans directly. Yet, the ruling can be also seen to give Team California an 
advantage on the invention of one critical component of the CRISPR tool kit.30 
Interestingly, the Team Broad Institute issued a statement that seems to call 
for a ‘peace treaty’ According to the statement: 
‘Although we are prepared to engage in the process before the PTAB and are 
confident these patents have been properly issued to Broad, we continue to 
believe it is time for all institutions to move beyond litigation and instead 
work together to ensure wide, open access to this transformative technology. 
The best thing, for the entire field, is for the parties to reach a resolution 
and for the field to focus on using CRISPR technology to solve today’s 
real-world problems.’31
The timeline of the US proceedings is presented in the Appendix 1 of this chapter. 
To date, the proceedings have not been decided. 
28 Julian Cockbain – Sigrid Sterckx, Patenting Foundational Technologies: Recent Developments 
in the CRISPR Patent Struggle. The American Journal of Bioethics 20(4) 2020, pp. 11–12, 11.
29 Jon Cohen, The latest round in the CRISPR patent battle has an apparent victor, but the 
fight continues. Scientific Community Technology. Available at: https://www.sciencemag.
org/news/2020/09/latest-round-crispr-patent-battle-has-apparent-victor-fight-continues. 
doi:10.1126/science.abe7573. Accessed 27 November 2020.
30 Ibid. The court refers to as CVC because it includes the University of Vienna and scientist 
Emmanuelle Charpentier.
31 Broad Institute, For Journalists: Statements and Background on the : CRISPRpatent process. 
September 27, 2020. Available at: https://www.broadinstitute.org/crispr/journalists-statement-
and-background-crispr-patent-process. Accessed 27 November 2020.
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9.4.3 Europe: Team California Prevails over Team Broad Institute 
It appears that the status of the European CRISPR/Cas9 patents is even more 
complicated than of those in the United States. The same parties, i.e. the UC and 
the Broad Institute, have been involved in a legal race for a patent in Europe as 
well. Similarly as in the United States, Team California was the first to file its 
European patent application in March 2013, claiming priority of their earlier 
United States patent application of May 2012. Team Broad Institute filed their 
European patent application eight months later, in December 2013, similarly 
claiming priority of their United States patent application of December 2012.
Both Team Broad Institute and Team California succeeded in their applications 
and obtained respective European patents covering an extensive and fundamental 
range of uses of the CRISPR/Cas9 technology. Interestingly, however, the EPO 
arrived at an opposite approach than the USPTO with regard to the patent 
application filed by Team California and, in April 2017, it granted Team California 
a broad patent (No. EP2800811) on the CRISPR/Cas9 system in all cell types 
including eukaryotic cells.32 The awarding of the patent constituted a significant 
victory for Team California in the ongoing patent dispute.
Simultaneously, Team Broad Institute was facing difficulties with regard to their 
patent applications. Similarly as in the United States, the team was granted their 
first European CRISPR/Cas9 patent (No. EP2771468) prior to Team California, 
already in February 2015, but the patent was soon subject to an opposition 
proceeding. During the nine-month opposition phase, nine notices of opposition 
were submitted against the patent. It was brought to the attention of the EPO 
that Team Broad Institute could not claim priority stemming from their United 
States patent application, as the inventors had been named differently on the 
respective applications. Under European patent law, a priority claim can only be 
made by the same applicants who have been assigned in the earlier application 
or by applicants to whom the right to claim priority has been transferred before 
the application is filed.33
The EPO agreed with the opposition notices, finding that one of the inventors 
named in the Broad Institute’s United States patent application was indeed omitted 
from the European application: inventor and co-applicant Luciano Marraffini, 
a researcher at Rockefeller University. Neither had Marraffini transferred his 
32 Rai et al. 2017.
33 Ulrich Stroz, CRISPR Cas9 – Licensing What Can’t Be Licensed. Les Nouvelles - Journal of the 
Licensing Executives Society LIII(2) 2018, pp. 123–131, 91.
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priority rights to the Broad Institute.34 Consequently, priority could not be claimed, 
which resulted in a calculation of the patent’s priority date from the date when 
the EPO had received the patent application in December 2013. Crucially with 
regard to Team Broad Institute’s patent application, many research articles about 
eukaryotic genome editing with CRISPR/Cas9 were published during the period 
between December 2012 and December 2013.35 These publications caused a lack 
of novelty of the invention, as by December 2013, the CRISPR/Cas9 system’s use 
in editing eukaryotic genome could no longer be perceived as novel in relation 
to the prior art. Thus, Team Broad Institute’s invention was not patentable in 
Europe. The EPO revoked Team Broad Institute’s CRISPR patent (No. EP2771468) 
in March 2018, denying its reliance on its United States priority and citing a lack 
of novelty over prior art. Team Broad Institute immediately appealed the decision 
of the opposition division, but the appeal was dismissed in January 2020. The 
revocation of the patent was confirmed.36 In November 2020 the EPO finally 
published its reasoning for its Decision confirming that it did have right to decide 
on priority entitlement. It was found that EPO case law on the issue of priority 
was well established and that there is no reason to deviate from it. It also stated 
that all applicants must be listed on both an initial application and subsequent 
application to be entitled to priority.37
Something that seems to have been a mere technical formality turned into a 
crucial failure in Team Broad Institute’s patent case, potentially resulting in the 
revocation of not only the CRISPR patent (No. EP2771468), but also of Team 
Broad Institute’s any related patents and patent applications with similar listings 
of inventors. Not all patents and patent applications of Team Broad Institute suffer 
from the same problem, however, even if Team Broad Institute would obtain 
protection for a narrower application of the CRISPR/Cas9 technology, Team 
34 Storz 2018, p. 91, see also Catherine Coombes, Opinion: How to Avoid Legal Problems in 
Collaborative Research’, The Scientist 2016. Available at: https://www.the-scientist.com/online-
first/opinion-how-to-avoid-legal-problems-in-collaborative-research-32953, accessed 9 August 
2020.
35 Prashant Mali – Luhan Yang – Kevin M Esvelt – John Aach – Marc Guell – James E DiCarlo 
– Julie E Norville – George M Church, RNA-Guided Human Genome Engineering via Cas9. 
Science 339(6121) 2013, pp. 823–826. Woong Y Hwang – Yanfang Fu – Deepak Reyon – Morgan 
L Maeder – Tsai Shengdar – Jeffry D. Sander – Randall T Peterson – Jing-Ruey Joanna Yeh 
– Keith Joung, J, Efficient Genome Editing in Zebrafish Using a CRISPR-Cas System. Nature 
Biotechnology 31(3) 2013, pp. 227–229.
36 Case T 844/18.
37 EPO, Datasheet for the decision, of 16 January 2020, case number T 0844/18 - 3.3.08. Available 
at: http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/22848DBA6784C883C12586170
04D48BB/$File/0844.18.3308(decision).pdf. Accessed 17 December 2020.
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California appears to have a substantially stronger patent position in Europe.38 
The timeline of the European proceedings is presented in the Appendix 2 of this 
chapter.
9.5 Comparative Perspectives on the Approaches of 
the USPTO and the EPO to the Assessment of the 
Patentability Criteria of the CRISPR/Cas9 System
Table 1. The Inventiveness Analysis
Europe The United States
European Patent Convention Article 52
An invention must be new and involve an 
inventive step
35 US Code Sections 102 and 103
An invention must be novel and it must not be 
obvious
Problem-solution approach 
1. What is the closest prior art?
2. What is the objective technical problem that 
the invented solution solves?
2. Would the invented solution, considering 
the closest prior art and the objective 
technical problem, have been obvious to the 
skilled person? 
Non-obviousness approach
1. What is the scope and content of prior art?
2. What are the differences between the prior 
art and the claimed innovation?
3. What is the ordinary skill level in the field? 
4. Would the prior art have suggested to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art that this 
process should be carried out and would have 
a reasonable likelihood of success?
Would the solution by which Team Broad 
Institute transferred the CRISPR/Cas9 system 
to eukaryotic cells have been perceived 
obvious by a bioscientist?
Would the step from bacterial cells to 
eukaryotic cells have been obvious to Team 
California with a reasonable likelihood of 
success?
As discussed above, in addition to the requirement of usefulness of an invention in 
the United States and the European equivalent of industrial application, novelty 
and non-obviousness, and the corresponding novelty and inventive step, are two 
additional patentability requirements applied by the USPTO and the EPO. In 
order for an invention to be novel, it must not have been known to the public 
prior to the filing of the patent application. The novelty of an invention is assessed 
by comparing the invention to applicable prior art in the field. In order for an 
invention to be non-obvious, it shall not be obvious for a person having ordinary 
skill in the art. Respectively, the perspective of a person who is skilled in the art 
is applied in the assessment of inventive step in Europe.
38 Cockbain – Sterckx 2020.
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Although the requirements of non-obviousness in the United States and 
inventive step in Europe are very similar, different outcomes may arise from the 
application of different approaches to these criteria. The USPTO approaches non-
obviousness typically by first determining the state of art, thereafter the difference 
between the prior art and the claimed innovation and finally the ordinary skill 
level in the field. In contrast in Europe, the EPO applies a so-called ‘problem-
solution’ approach to the inventive step assessment, in which it first identifies 
‘an objective technical problem’ and thereafter it assesses whether the invention 
would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the field.39 See Table 
1 above for further details.
After analysing the merits of the CRISPR/Cas9 patents in relation to their prior 
art, the patent offices have ultimately reached opposite outcomes. In its analysis, 
the USPTO assumed that the CRISPR/Cas9 system in a generic environment 
constituted the ‘prior art’. This claim was compared with the claim concerning the 
technology in a eukaryotic cell environment. The USPTO confirmed that the step 
from using the technology in a generic cell environment to using it in the eukaryotic 
cell environment constitutes a non-obvious innovative step that qualifies for patent 
protection. In contrast, the EPO found the same step to be obvious.40
The US Patent Board of Appeals further analyzed whether it was possible 
and how likely it would have been for Team California to get the CRISPR/Cas9 
system to function in eukaryotic cells.41 This resulted in investigations on the 
differences between cell types and how differences in cellular environments could 
affect the function of the CRISPR/Cas9 system. The Board of Appeals of the USPTO 
concluded that all of these environmental conditions create uncertainty as to how 
Team California’s CRISPR/Cas9 system works within eukaryotic cells. The Board 
of Appeals referred to one of Team California’s key researchers who had expressed 
difficulties in getting CRISPR/Cas9 to function in other types of cells. All in all, the 
impact of the differences in the cellular environments, together with the scientist’s 
comments, resulted in the Board of Appeals concluding that an ordinary researcher 
in biosciences could not have a reasonable expectation of getting Team California’s 
CRISPR/Cas9 system to function in eukaryotic cells. Hence, the Broad Institute’s 
patent was not found to be in breach of Team California’s patent.
It could possibly be argued that the decision seems justified given that the 
opposite result could have led to the patent holder being able to prevent anyone else 
39 Zachary Quinlan, Hindsight Bias in Patent Law: Comparing the USPTO and the EPO. Fordham 
International Law Journal 37(6) 2014, pp. 1797–1804.




from developing an improvement that they might never accomplish themselves. 
In the decision on the interference proceeding, the USPTO stated that if they were 
to accept that success is reasonably expected for every experiment, the subject 
matter would always be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 12 when there is a design 
need or market pressure to solve a problem, a finite number of solutions, and those 
of ordinary skill have the technical capability. Instead of creating a presumption 
of obviousness when researchers attempt experiments to advance a field, the 
US Court of Appeals has recognized that the methodology of science and the 
advance of technology are founded on the investigator’s educated application of 
what is known, to intelligent exploration of what is not known. Each case must 
be decided in its particular context, including the characteristics of the science 
or technology, its state of advance, the nature of the known choices, and the 
specificity or generality of the prior.
The decision by the US Patent Office’s Board of Appeals has, however, been 
subject to criticism. Some commentators have argued that it fails to take into 
consideration the actual realities of biological research that relies on experimenting 
and testing out different hypotheses by trial and error. It has been argued that the 
notion of a ‘reasonable expectation of success’ could possibly be challenged in the 
context of biological systems.42 It could be argued that there are some techniques 
to get the bacterial system to work in eukaryotic cells that are well known to 
anyone with a basic knowledge of molecular biology. Despite the fact that Team 
California did not have a specific plan that included a ‘reasonable expectation of 
success’, they possibly still had some kinds of plans on how to get the CRISPR/
Cas9 system to function in eukaryotic cells. In favor of Team California, it could 
be argued that molecular biology as a field has a rather high level of ‘ordinary’ 
skills and the techniques used by Team Broad Institute to adapt the CRISPR/
Cas9 to function in eukaryotic cells are generally well known to all bio-scientists 
operating in laboratories. 
Hence, some significant differences can be seen in the approaches of the 
USPTO and the EPO in their assessment of innovativeness. The USPTO poses a 
question as to whether the innovation would be an obvious step to a person with 
an ordinary skill level in the art with reasonable expectations of success. In the 
case of CRISPR/Cas9, this approach boiled down to a question of whether the step 
from bacterial cells to eukaryotic cells would have been obvious to Team California 
with a reasonable expectation of success. In contrast, the EPO analyzes whether 
a person with an ordinary level of skills in the field would find this solution to be 
an obvious answer to an objective question – in this case, whether a bio-scientist 
42 See Sherkow 2017.
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would have perceived the way the Broad Institute transferred the CRISPR/Cas9 
system as an obvious solution or not. The differences in the approaches applied 
by the patent offices have resulted in the situation at hand, where the step from 
bacterial to eukaryotic cells is perceived as innovative in the USA, but not in 
Europe. 
On a more general note, patenting biological inventions is particularly 
challenging due to a number of reasons. One of them is unpredictability. Biological 
systems are often complex and may result in unpredictable outcomes even in the 
case of routine research. Results can also be quite difficult to reproduce. All this 
significantly complicates the innovativeness assessment of a ‘person with ordinary 
skills in the art’ in the context of biology. Furthermore, the non-obviousness 
assessment applied in the United States has been subject to criticism. It has been 
found to be quite problematic and ill-suited for rapidly evolving fields such as 
biotechnology, as it does not always properly address the above-mentioned lower 
possibility of success in the field of biotechnology due to the unpredictability and 
the rather high skill level of a person with ‘ordinary skills in the art’.43 
9.6 Some Practical Implications of the Case 
In light of the current developments in the patent proceedings, the state of the 
contested CRISPR/Cas9 patents appears somewhat unclear. Team California 
seems to hold a stronger position in Europe, while the situation appears quite 
opposite in the United States. However, the situation may also change as the 
next moves of the parties and possible further decisions of any instances remain 
to be seen. Therefore, on a transatlantic scale, this pending dispute on CRISPR/
Cas9 patents creates some difficulties for commercialization of the technology 
and uncertainties affecting potential licensing of this technology.44
These challenges notwithstanding, both parties are licensing their patents. 
Licenses granted by the parties relate to 1) basic research 2) the development 
and sale of tools for CRISPR/Cas9 use, and 3) the developing and selling of 
CRISPR/Cas9-aided technology.45 Within the first category of CRISPR/Cas9 
licenses, i.e. licenses for basic research, tools for non-profit research are granted 
43 See for example Timo Minssen, Meanwhile on the Other Side of the Pond: Why Biopharmaceutical 
Innovations that Were ‘Obvious to Try’ Still Might Be Non-Obvious. Chigaco-Kent Journal of 
Intellectual Property 9(1) 2010, pp. 60–131.
44 Ledford 2016a, p. 460. 
45 Jorge L Contreras – Jacob S Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific Discovery. 
Science 355(6326) 2017a, p. 699.
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free of charge for researchers and academic institutions. However, for the other 
categories of commercial licenses, the situation appears more complicated. Both 
patent holders have granted exclusive licenses to commercial uses of CRISPR/Cas9 
through their spin-off companies.46 Subsequent to the decision of the US Court 
of Appeals stating that Team Broad Institute’s patent did not breach the patent 
of Team California, patent licensees and possible licensees are now wondering 
to whom they should be paying the license fees, as it is still under dispute which 
party will obtain the CRISPR/Cas9 patent on the eukaryotic cells. This situation 
appears rather confusing for potential licensees.47 Until the dispute is resolved, 
anything developed under the wrong license could later be jeopardized, contested, 
or in need of an additional license, if the final victor were to decide to enforce 
its patents against the inventor.48 Which one of the parties should be entitled to 
collect license fees? Which party will have the patent rights in the future? What 
kind of licenses are needed for transatlantic research co-operations or if a product 
crosses from Europe to the USA or vice versa?
This situation becomes even more complicated when considering Team 
California’s position in accordance with which their patent should be perceived 
as the ‘founding patent’ and the Broad Institute’s patent as its sub-type. As the 
PTAB found that Team Broad Institute’s invention did not overlap with Team 
California’s invention and was separately patentable, room was left for such 
interpretation.49 In practical terms, this would mean that Team California would 
be able to block any subsequent inventions building on their founding invention 
and, on the other hand, that Team Broad Institute would be able to block any 
use of their improvement.50 In this setting, a party willing to use CRISPR/Cas9 
for commercial applications would possibly have to enter into license agreements 
with both patent holders.51
As far as academic researchers do not attempt to commercialize their research, 
they are given a CRISPR/Cas9 license free of charge for non-profit purposes 
by both parties. Yet, the current licensing model is unclear with respect to any 
46 Knut J Egelie – Gregory D Graff – Sabina P Strand – Berit Johansen, The Emerging Patent 
Landscape of CRISPR–Cas Gene Editing Technology. Nature Biotechnology 34 2016, p. 1030.
47 Jon Cohen. CRISPR Patent Ruling Leaves License Holders Scrambling. Science 355(6327) 2017, 
p. 786.
48 Nicola Dagg – Marc Döring – Joachim Feldges – Derek Lim, Editing the Future: A Brief 
Introduction to CRISPR. The Licensing Journal 37(4) 2017, pp. 1–4. Jacob S Sherkow, Patents 
in the Time of CRISPR. Biochemist 38 2016, pp. 26–29.
49 Dagg et al. 2017.
50 Stroz 2018 p. 124.
51 Rai et al. 2017, p. 875. 
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innovations arising in the context of basic non-profit research using CRISPR/Cas9 
or, furthermore, in the event that an innovation using CRISPR/Cas9 is made.52 It 
is not fully clear whether a researcher that makes this kind of an invention needs 
to get a commercial license for such use from either one or both of the patentees. 
In this context, it has been seen as problematic that both license holders are only 
granting exclusive commercial licenses, which complicates the commercialization 
of innovations.53 From the perspective of academic researchers who are willing 
to commercialize their innovations, the situation is very far from an optimal one. 
Licenses on CRISPR/Cas9 are hard to get for commercial use and, even then, 
there is a high risk of uncertainty, as it might still be unclear from which one of 
the patent holders a license is needed.
Given the actual circumstances, criticism regarding the exclusivity of 
the licensing may appear quite understandable from the potential licensees’ 
perspective, as exclusivity will block out some start-up companies from the market 
and prevent them from commercializing their CRISPR/Cas9-based inventions. 
As a classical argument against exclusivity, this may in turn result in the slowing 
down of the technical innovation relating to this technology and the hampering 
of the competition in the field. There is also a risk that some uses of CRISPR/
Cas9, such as therapies meant for rare diseases or for less privileged groups of 
patients, which have not appeared commercially attractive enough, risk becoming 
neglected.54
Furthermore, the uncertainty regarding the scope and the actual holder of 
the patent rights for the use of the original CRISPR/Cas9 patent(s) in eukaryotic 
cells has created a situation where third parties have pursued to circumvent the 
patent(s) by trying to create new versions of the CRISPR-system that do not 
fall within the scope of protection of the existing patents.55 It appears that new 
applications of the CRISPR system are constantly emerging and experimented 
with – some of them seem to be even more prominent gene-editing tools than 
the original ones(s) and some patents are pending for such new applications.56 
Beyond these considerations, the scope of the CRISPR/Cas9 patent(s) still remains 
uncertain. It should be noted that the contested CRISPR/Cas9 patents represent 
just one subcategory found in one bacterial species out of numerous other CRISPR 
52 Egelie et al. 2016, p. 1030.
53 Op. cit., p. 1031.
54 Contreras and Sherkow 2017a, p. 700.
55 Rai et al. 2017.
56 Jacob S Sherkow, The CRISPR Patent Landscape: Past, Present, and Future. The CRIPSR 
Journal 1(1) 2018, p. 6.
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and Cas-enzymes or Cas-like enzymes present in nature. It appears that new 
versions, some of which are potentially even more prominent than the original 
CRISPR/Cas9 system, are continuously discovered in nature and being tested for 
use as genome editing tools. It is not sure whether these types of CRISPR editing 
tools fall within the scope of protection of the contested patents.57
Some American patent experts have speculated that the legal battle between 
the Broad Institute and the UC could finally end in a cross-licensing agreement 
where they share the licensing revenue from the patents.58 Others have suggested 
that the establishment of a patent pool would provide the necessary efficient, 
non-exclusive, and non-discriminatory solution, which would increase compe-
tition and accelerate the commercialization of CRISPR/Cas9 products and the-
rapies.59 While this view has also been subject to criticism, as patent pools are 
rarely seen within the biopharmaceutical sector where development processes are 
usually exceptionally costly and lengthy,60 the creation of a patent pool has been 
announced by a Californian company named MPEG LA, LLC. By far, only Team 
Broad Institute has publicly expressed interest in taking part in the pool,61 and 
as the patent litigations continue, both parties’ participation remains uncertain.
Thinking beyond the discussion on the commercial aspects of the case at hand 
- or perhaps going to the very heart of it – there are some curious public policy 
issues present in the case as well. The institutions racing for the patent protection, 
which by now have spent millions of dollars on litigation, are universities, i.e. non-
profit, public-funded research institutions, aimed at developing science for public 
good.62 The CRISPR/Cas9 technology unquestionably has great potential for the 
benefit of the public, but the idea of university research institutions as promoters 
of the public on the one hand and as parties in a protracted legal dispute aimed 
at profit maximization on the other hand seems somewhat contradictory.
University researchers are no exception from inventors who are allowed to 
seek patent protection for their inventions. As with the possibility for patent 
57 Rai et al. 2017, p. 878.
58 Cohen 2017, p. 786.
59 Lawrence Horn, Patent Pools for CRISPR Technology. Science 355(6331) 2017, p. 1274.
60 Jorge L Contreras – Jacob S Sherkow, Patent Pools for CRISPR Technology – Response. Science 
355(6331) 2017b, pp. 1274–1275.
61 Amy Dockser Marcus – Joe Palazzolo – Jonathan D Rockoff, Crispr Patent-Holders Move 
Toward Easing Access to Gene-Editing Technology. Wall Street Journal 2017. Available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/crispr-patent-holders-move-toward-easing-access-to-gene-
editing-technology-1499527983, accessed 9 August 2020.
62 John Conley, Clash of Titans: The Fight Over the CRIPR Gene-Editing Patent Rights. The 
Privacy Report 2018. Available at: https://theprivacyreport.com/2018/10/08/clash-of-titans-
the-fight-over-the-crispr-gene-editing-patent-rights/, accessed 9 August 2020.
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protection in general, this opportunity serves the purpose of providing an incentive 
to innovate for these institutions. Profits are often further ensured through the 
establishment of spin-off companies, to which exclusive rights to commercial uses 
of the innovation are given.63 The present case is no exception is this perspective. 
Yet, in big financial interests may also lie challenges and risks, where these interests 
have the potential to steer the focus away from public interests towards private 
ones. Innovators involved in extensive and intensive patent litigations may halt 
the progress of scientific research while focusing on the infringement proceedings 
rather than on sharing knowledge and improving technology. Patent litigations 
may also create significant legal uncertainty for those wishing to exploit and further 
develop an invention.64 Broad patents on a technology in a very early phase 
and fierce and protracted patent litigations can therefore not be considered very 
beneficial for the scientific community. At the end of the day, such may have 
quite the opposite effect than patent protection is intended to have, leading to 
a situation where the patented invention is more likely to impede research and 
development than promote it. 
This all brings us down to the question of what the role of universities as 
research institutions should be. At the end of the day, is their purpose to develop 
science for own profit or for public good? 
9.7 Conclusions 
CRISPR/Cas9 is a pivotal technology with a high commercialization potential. 
Now, regrettably this potentially profitable technology is risking to lose its financial 
edge and competitive advantage in the absence of clarity as to who has the right 
and title to the ‘founding’ patents. Some potential third party licensees wishing for 
a license to the technology are facing uncertainty and/or being rejected due to the 
exclusivity of the license. The parties to the dispute are not only losing money in 
the litigation, but also potential license holders because of this uncertainty. While 
both teams are spending substantial amounts of time and financial resources on the 
patent litigation, some others in the scientific community are moving ahead and 
striving to improve said technology. Some researchers are already investigating 
new innovative applications that could potentially circumvent or even replace 
the CRISPR/Cas9 system. 
63 See e.g. Conley, 2018.
64 Franc Mali, Is the Patent System the Way Forward with the CRISPR-Cas 9 Technology? Science 
& Technology Studies 2020, pp. 2–3, 15.
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The CRISPR/Cas9 litigation appears exceptional in many senses. It seems that 
the underlying motives behind the dispute are not only about the patent, but also, 
and perhaps more, about academic pride and prestige.65 In fact, it is common 
for two academic institutions to end up in massive and prolonged litigations on 
both sides of the Atlantic. It is even more common that academic parties try to 
reach a satisfactory solution, such as a cross-licensing agreement, that would 
be mutually beneficial for both parties. In this very exceptional situation where 
the rights to CRISPR/Cas9 are divided between the parties, settling the case by 
entering into a cross-license agreement would possibly benefit both parties and 
also create certainty for those third parties who wish to get a license to use the 
CRISPR/Cas9 system on eukaryotic cells. Both parties have entered into cross-
licensing agreements on CRISPR/Cas9 technology with third parties, but not with 
each other.66 Given the exceptionally fierce litigation strategies of the parties, the 
current likelihood of reaching a settlement seems unlikely. Both parties have an 
immense interest in not only getting the legal rights, but also for being recognised 
as the innovators of the ground-breaking CRISPR/Cas9 technology. 
Generally speaking, this exceptional case also illustrates the major differences 
between the patent granting approaches in Europe and the United States, 
especially in the case of patents on biotechnological innovations. The EPO assesses 
innovativeness as a matter of whether a person with ordinary skill in the art would, 
in light of the scientific understanding of the moment, reach the technological 
step as a solution to an objective question or problem. In contrast, in its non-
obviousness assessment, the USPTO seeks to evaluate whether a person with 
ordinary skills in the art has a reasonable chance of success in reaching the same 
outcome as the potential inventor. This approach has been criticized because in 
the field of biotechnology, there are multiple factors that affect the chances of 
success in a scientific experiment. Some of the variables in an experiment can also 
be interdependent and/or otherwise very hard to control. In addition, it is very 
hard to define the concept of a ‘reasonable chance of success’, as in some cases 
reaching a desired outcome can be very hard for even the most skillful and senior 
researchers. It should be noted that, in practice, in the field of biotechnology, 
a doctoral degree seems to appear as a minimum educational standard for ‘a 
person with ordinary skills in the art’. Yet, this standard is not applied equally 
in other fields of technology, so the USPTO should perhaps somehow clarify its 
standards concerning qualification as ‘a person with ordinary skills in the art’ for 
each field of science. 
65 Rai et al. 2017, p. 877.
66 Sherkow 2018, p. 6.
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In conclusion, the battle on the ‘founding’ patent rights to CRISPR/Cas9 
technology on eukaryotic cells does not seem to benefit either one of the parties. 
It also creates some significant uncertainties over the commercial use of the 
technology for existing third-party licensees or potential licensees. A cross-
licensing agreement between the parties to the dispute could be a viable solution. 
However, as of today, reaching such an agreement to settle the case seems quite 
unlikely. The unclear patent situation creates some significant uncertainties that 
risk hampering the commercialization prospects of the CRISPR/Cas9 technology 
on eukaryotic cells and slowing down the development and market access of any 
future applications of said technology.
What can we then learn from this exceptional dispute? Some of the lessons 
learned could be summarized as follows:
(1) This present case constitutes an excellent example of what can be 
accomplished through collaboration between researchers from 
different institutions. Simultaneously however, it should be considered 
as a warning on the disastrous that can follow where explicit ownership 
of intellectual property rights is not assigned in advance.67 It was 
not until the first patent applications were filed in the United States 
that an inventorship analysis was conducted, which resulted in the 
exclusion of Marraffini from the list of inventors. The consequences 
of Marraffini disputing this decision were decisive in the patent 
dispute in Europe. Accordingly, it is important always to draw up 
collaboration agreements. Questions on intellectual property rights 
should be addressed and agreed upon as early as possible, and in any 
case before filing any patent applications.68 The patenting failure of the 
Broad Institute in Europe has also shown the importance of having in 
place appropriate university invention policies and robust processes 
regarding administration of patents to ensure that the know-how and 
patentable inventions are adequately protected and patent filings are 
complete (i.e. all inventors are duly mentioned in order to meet the 
requirement of novelty).
67 Catherine Coombes, Opinion: How to Avoid Legal Problems in Collaborative Research’, The 
Scientist 2016. Available at: https://www.the-scientist.com/online-first/opinion-how-to-avoid-




(2) In the United States, on the other hand, the public statements by the key 
inventor Jennifer Doudna with respect to Team California’s CRISPR/
Cas9 technology, together with an article on the same matter, turned 
into one of the decisive factors for the outcome of the patent dispute. 
In addition to presenting the invention, the article69 also explained 
some unresolved challenges of the technology, which were repeatedly 
confirmed by Doudna in interviews given in 2014. While this is typical 
in research and academia, it is good to keep in mind that these kinds 
of statements are exactly what the counterpart in a patent dispute will 
look for, and hence, they might later be crucial for a patent dispute.70
(3) The intention of both Team California and Team Broad Institute 
in their respective patent applications appear to have been to cover 
possible CRISPR/Cas9 applications as broadly and comprehensively 
as possible in various cell environments, including prokaryotic cell 
types and eukaryotic cell types. However, at the time of filing the first 
patent applications, it was only Team Broad Institute that succeeded 
in making this technology work in eukaryotes. The consequences of 
this can be witnessed in the United States, and these remind every 
inventor to carefully consider and evaluate their early patent filing 
strategies.71
(4) Further, it is likely that the present case complicates the manner in 
which obviousness for CRISPR technologies will be assessed in the 
future. As explained above, Cas9 is not the only possible nucleus to be 
used in relation to CRISPR, and there may potentially be even more 
efficient and useful nucleases.72 The decision in the CRISPR dispute 
has raised discussion as it fails to address the question of how future 
applications of CRISPR will be evaluated. Will the common knowledge 
on the CRISPR/Cas9 mechanism render all future applications of 
the technology obvious?73 Furthermore, considering the differing 
approaches in the obviousness assessment in the United States and 
69 See Jinek et al. 2013.
70 Stroz 2018, p. 131.
71 Dagg et al. 2017.
72 Deborah Ku, The Patentability of the CRISPR-Cas9 Genome Editing Tool. Chicago-Kent Journal 
of Intellectual Property 16(2) 2017, pp. 408–439, 15.
73 See Jacob S Sherkow. Law, History and Lessons in the CRISPR Patent Conflict. Nature 
Biotechnology 33(3) 2015, pp. 256–257.
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Europe, will these prospective future CRISPR applications be subject 
to contradictory decisions on different sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
The Broad Institute is one of many actors with patents and pending 
patent applications in this particular field of technology. Furthermore, 
there are also patents, and patent applications covering later, more 
specific inventions and platforms. This means that disputes on patents 
relying on this technology are likely to continue in the foreseeable 
future. Most recently, when it comes to the mere battle for academic 
glory, the Nobel Prize 2020 in Chemistry was awarded to Emmanuelle 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interpretation of the Patient’s  
Need for Help Can Be Supported  
with Machine Learning
by Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Lauri Lahti1
Abstract
Machine learning is a methodology that aims at learning to recognize statistical patterns 
in data. Developing machine learning methods enables identifying dependencies in the 
knowledge processes of healthcare and thus to support providing personalized care that 
addresses the patient’s needs. However, the computations and results of machine learning 
are often difficult to interpret in an intuitive human-understandable way. Furthermore, 
besides modelling the patterns of biomedical data, it has remained challenging to develop 
machine learning methods on a linguistic and semantic level that can support the patient’s 
appropriate involvement in all the phases of decision making to support his/her best care. 
To address this, based on online questionnaire answers (n=673) our current research 
analyzes how different people rate the ‘need for help’ for a set of health-related expression 
statements and how this rating depends on the background information about the person 
(such as his/her evaluation of the health and wellbeing). The respondents were recruited 
from various Finnish patient and disabled people’s organizations, other health and 
wellness organizations, and educational institutions as well as organizations of healthcare 
professionals, and they represented a great diversity of current personal health conditions, 
abilities, and attitudes. We have carried out machine learning experiments to find out what 
kind of results can be gained when training a convolutional neural network model based 
on the ‘need for help’ ratings to classify persons into groups relying on the background 
information. We report our preliminary results showing that it is possible to categorize 
and distinguish respondent groups based on the patterns of their answer distributions.
1 Department of Computer Science, Aalto University, Finland.
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10.1 Introduction
Due to rapid technological advances, personal health-related information can be 
gathered and analyzed with an increased detail and efficiency. At the same time, 
it is evident that handling the sensitive personal data requires addressing ethical 
principles and privacy measures that are enforced with legislation and global-level 
regulation2. To enable active deployment of health analytics that protects data 
privacy and ensures transparency of methods3, there is a need for research that 
develops methods that specifically support the patient’s appropriate and sufficient 
involvement in decision making concerning his/her care and also evaluates how 
much and what kind of information is sufficient to identify certain characteristics 
of a person and to make reliable reasoning and predictions based on them.
In this current research article, we report some preliminary results gained 
in DIHEML research project at Aalto University (‘Development of method for 
interpretation of health expressions based on machine learning to support various 
care events and persons, DIHEML’, 2018-2021) that is actively developed and 
initiated by its main researcher Lauri Lahti4 5. DIHEML research project aims 
at finding new innovative solutions to the traditional challenge that machine 
learning can generate impressive results but still it is often hard to interpret 
them with human reasoning and to illustrate and explain in an intuitive human-
understandable way the steps leading to the results6. DIHEML research project 
develops measuring of the health condition and quality of life to assist in developing 
machine learning methods to support public sector healthcare and wellbeing by 
addressing the personalized needs of the patient. This new research approach 
gets motivation from the previous research7 8 9. With machine learning, we aim 
to contribute to the broader developmental context of artificial intelligence 
supporting personalized care.
DIHEML research project relies on conducting broad interactive adaptive 
questionnaire surveys with various population groups to gather large sets of human 
answers that can depict how different persons conceptualize and interpret diverse 




6 Gehrmann et al., 2018.
7 Bradley & Lang, 1999.
8 Warriner et al., 2013.
9 Mauss & Robinson, 2009.
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imagined health conditions and care situations, and what kind of impressions 
and reactions these situations induce in the minds of these persons. The health 
conditions and care situations are shown to the person as textual expressions, 
images, and videos. DIHEML research project aims at identifying from human 
thinking and communication such patterns that are important to be carefully 
addressed in respect to 1) evaluating the person’s need for getting care, 2) the 
person’s learning about health-related information, and 3) supporting the person’s 
advantageous health behavior.
DIHEML research project has already established a broad collaboration 
network with a large set of Finnish patient and disabled people’s organizations 
and has so far gathered a large collection of answers that represent persons having 
different backgrounds. These gathered answers reflect a great diversity of current 
personal health conditions, abilities and attitudes towards health problems and 
ways to deal with them, besides information about the gained care, satisfaction 
about the gained care and wishes for developing the care. DIHEML research 
project collects answers about various imagined scenarios concerning symptoms, 
health conditions, getting care from health-care professionals, implementing self-
care and various alternative forms of interaction between the patient and the 
doctor concerning decision making about the patient’s care, as well as activities 
of everyday life surrounding health-related themes and managing with health 
problems. Besides patient and disabled people’s organizations, human answers 
are currently collected also from various other health and wellness organizations 
and educational institutions as well as organizations of healthcare professionals. 
Also all the readers of this research article who are at least 16 years old are freely 
welcome to participate voluntarily in the data acquisition of DIHEML research 
project by answering the online questionnaire at the following web address: 
https://ilmaisu.cs.aalto.fi/tutkimus/osallistu/avain-XE4WKP-67RW3PEMHX
DIHEML research project develops new methods to support healthcare with 
machine learning. Machine learning is a methodology that aims at learning to 
recognize statistical patterns in data with tailored algorithms that usually benefit 
from large samples of input data to increase accuracy. Machine learning can 
be considered to have two major types of approaches: supervised learning and 
unsupervised learning.
Supervised learning is carried out often with an aim to predict an outcome, 
and this may consist of classification tasks in which a trained human can succeed 
well and thus the algorithms typically aim at approximating an appropriate human 
performance10. Supervised learning usually tries to perform classification by 
10 Deo, 2015.
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choosing among subgroups such a subgroup that can best describe a new instance 
of data and also to produce a prediction that consists of estimating an unknown 
parameter11. Supervised learning is also actively used to estimate risk and this can 
be considered to extend further than just approximating human performance and 
to aim at identifying hidden characteristics of data12.
In contrast with supervised learning, unsupervised learning is typically carried 
out without an exact aim of predicting a direct outcome and instead unsupervised 
learning aims at identifying naturally occurring patterns or groupings that are 
present in the input data13. With this more relaxed initial learning goal, it is 
often challenging for humans to directly judge the actual appropriateness and 
meaningfulness of the generated groupings and thus usually they are evaluated 
based on the performance they achieve in a subsequent supervised learning task14.
In our current research, we aim to develop both supervised and unsupervised 
machine learning methodologies to support the patient’s appropriate involvement 
in decision making concerning his/her care. This machine learning relies on 
measurements that we gather from patients concerning their care. We aim 
at gathering the patient’s interpretations about expressions and experiences 
increasingly also in acute real-life care situations but since that kind of data 
acquisition is ethically challenging and laborious to be performed we thus currently 
emphasize measuring the patient’s interpretations with imagined situations.
10.2 Previous Research
Mental imagery has been considered to offer a measurable phenomenon that 
opens important possibilities to increase understanding about the human cognitive 
processes, and mental imagery has been linked to functional properties of the 
maintenance and treatment of clinical disorders15 16, and kinaesthetic and somatic 





15 Hackmann et al., 2011.
16 Holmes & Mathews, 2010.
17 Braun et al., 2006.
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It has been shown that the patterns of neural activation during imagery and 
actual perception have a strong overlap18 19. Neuroimaging experiments have given 
preliminary indication that self-reported ratings of the vividness of mental imagery 
can correlate with activation of the same sensory-specific cortices as activated in 
perception20 21 22.
Comparative experiments have verified that the spontaneous use of mental 
imagery in daily life varies between different persons23. Clark et al.24 showed 
experimentally that introducing a positive mood change increased the probability 
of experiencing a positive involuntary autobiographical memory about it during 
the following week.
It has been shown that imagining a future event increases the person’s 
perception concerning the probability that the imagined event will occur25 26. 
Furthermore, people perceived the likelihood of contracting a disease higher when 
the description of the disease is easier to imagine rather than harder to imagine27, 
and people prioritized selecting a simpler separate cause for imagined symptoms 
rather than a more complex combination of causes even if the likelihood value 
for the combination of all the causes was displayed to be higher than for simple 
separate causes28.
Think-aloud studies have identified that the background of people, such as sex 
and age, affects how the person describes and perceives health-related knowledge 
and its meaning to them29 30. Age-induced changes in cognitive and communicative 
functioning are also reflected in self-reported health questionnaire answers31.
It has been suggested that the human experiences and biological response 
systems are fundamentally rooted in certain affective dimensions, such as 
18 Ganis et al., 2004.
19 McNorgan, 2012.
20 Cui et al., 2007.
21 Herholz et al., 2012.
22 Belardinelli et al., 2009.
23 Davies et al., 2012.
24 Clark et al., 2013.
25 Carroll, 1978.
26 Sherman et al., 1985.
27 Sherman et al., 1985.
28 Lombrozo, 2007.
29 Joffer et al., 2016.
30 Borraccino et al., 2019.
31 Knäuper et al., 2016.
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pleasure, arousal, dominance, and approach-avoidance32 33. Already gathered 
affective dimensional measurements about a broad set of health-related semantic 
expressions have identified variations and dependencies based on the person’s 
background34. Berna et al.35 experimentally gathered a list of self-identified most 
significant mental imagery describing the patient’s pain combined with associated 
triggers, affects, meanings, and avoidance patterns. 
In the supervised form of machine learning, to enable predicting an outcome 
from a classification task typically requires first identifying some possible 
predictors, i.e. features, and this forms the feature selection phase. After that, there 
is a need to identify a function that relates values of the features to a prediction 
outcome and this phase can be referred to as the class assignment phase36. 
Various alternative types of functions can now be chosen to address different 
requirements and offering more flexible modeling than offered by for example 
logistic regression models of traditional statistics. Possible function classes include 
for example decision trees, artificial neural networks, support vector machines, 
and prototype methods, such as k-nearest neighbors.
The choice of a function class is associated with the challenge of fitting free 
parameters that are weights applied to individual features, somewhat resembling 
the regression coefficients used in logistic regression. Corresponding to the selected 
models and functions, dedicated algorithms are then used to test different value 
combinations to find optimal values for free parameters to achieve a good model37. 
This is typically carried out with a training data set of examples and involves also 
estimating the training error, i.e. assessing how similar the predicted outputs 
are to the known outputs, with an aim to minimize this error according to a loss 
function (illustrated by the training loss). After that the algorithm is applied with 
a validation data set, containing examples not present in the training data set, to 
evaluate the model’s performance by measuring the validation loss.
Using informative features and expressive functions can help to achieve a 
low training error but it has been found out that highly complex models (also 
involving a large number of features) have a tendency to generalize poorly due to 
overfitting data, although this can be counteracted by increasing the number of 
32 Bradley & Lang, 1999.
33 Mauss & Robinson, 2009.
34 Warriner et al., 2013.





training samples38. On the other hand, using fewer features and a less expressive 
model can unnecessarily lower the quality of models and thus a common practice 
is to apply flexible models but penalize excessive complexity, for example too 
many free parameters or a too broad range of parameter values, with a process 
of regularization39. 
In our current research, we have conducted our initial machine learning 
experiments especially with a convolutional neural network model since it has 
been shown to succeed well in the classification of medical literature, patient 
records, clinical narratives, and patient phenotypes40 41 42 43 44 45 46.
10.3 Experiment
We have developed an online questionnaire system enabling to gather from varied 
persons the personal interpretation ratings about the ‘need for help’ concerning 
health-related expression statements. To enable this, we have first gathered a large 
collection of health-related texts covering among others authorized healthcare 
guidelines (such as Terveyskirjasto47, International Classification of Diseases48 
and International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health49), support 
materials of the organizations of patients and impaired, and other health and 
wellness organizations, and texts of online discussion forums. From that large 
text collection, we have identified and extracted some essential health-related 
expression statements with a method we developed and reported in our previous 
research50.
In this research article, we report some preliminary results gained in DIHEML 
research project concerning a current data subset ‘Need for help related to 
38 Deo, 2015.
39 Deo, 2015.
40 Hughes et al., 2017.
41 Zhao et al., 2017.
42 Gehrmann et al., 2018.
43 Rojas-Barahona et al., 2018.
44 Yao et al., 2019.
45 Qing et al., 2019.
46 Shickel et al., 2019.
47 Terveyskirjasto,2020.
48 International Classification of Diseases, 2011.
49 International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, 2013.
50 Lahti et al., 2018.
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coping independently’ that is a part of a broader data acquisition entity that 
we have gathered in respect to interpretations about health-related expression 
statements (ES) about the coronavirus COVID-19 epidemic and everyday life. For 
that purpose, we have first extracted a set of expression statements from official 
national guidelines of National Institute for Health and Welfare in Finland51 
and international guidelines of World Health Organization52 concerning the 
coronavirus epidemic. These expression statements included among others 
descriptions of possible symptoms of the coronavirus, how to deal with mild 
cases of the coronavirus with just self-care, when one should seek admission for 
professional care, and what kind of practicalities are suggested as prevention. A 
broader description and motivation about the data acquisition and analysis will 
be reported by us in more detail in another future publication. 
We now report preliminary results concerning specifically six expression 
statements ES12-ES15 and ES19-20 belonging to the data subset ‘Need for help 
related to coping independently’. Between 30 May and 3 August 2020 with an 
online questionnaire we have gathered from 673 voluntary human evaluators the 
‘need for help’ ratings for these six health-related expression statements (ES12-
ES15 and ES19-20) on an 11-point Likert scale. The respondents were recruited 
from various Finnish patient and disabled people’s organizations, other health 
and wellness organizations, and educational institutions as well as organizations 
of healthcare professionals.
Besides the ‘need for help’ ratings, we have gathered answers to seven 
background questions (BQ). The person was asked to give answers concerning 
his/her evaluation about own health (BQ1) and quality of life (BQ5) on a 9-point 
Likert scale as well as answers about the sex (BQ8, answer alternatives ‘man’ or 
‘woman’ to maintain comparability with the previous Finnish health surveys), and 
age (BQ9), adapted from de Bruin et al.53, Koskinen et al.54, Nosikov & Gudex55 
and Aalto et al.56. Furthermore, we have gathered binary no/yes answers to two 
health-related questions, adapted from Koskinen et al.57: ‘Do you have a permanent 
or long-lasting disease or such a deficit, ailment or disability that reduces your 
ability to work or to perform your daily living activities?’ (BQ2, Onko sinulla jokin 
51 National Institute for Health and Welfare in Finland, 2020.
52 World Health Organization, 2020.
53 de Bruin et al., 1996.
54 Koskinen et al., 2012.
55 Nosikov & Gudex, 2003.
56 Aalto et al., 2013.
57 Koskinen et al., 2012.
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pysyvä tai pitkäaikainen sairaus tai jokin sellainen vika, vaiva tai vamma, joka 
vähentää työ- tai toimintakykyäsi?) and ‘Do you need continuously or repeatedly 
care given by a doctor for a long-lasting disease, deficit or disability that you 
have just mentioned?’ (BQ4, Tarvitsetko jatkuvasti tai toistuvasti lääkärinhoitoa 
jonkin äsken mainitsemasi pitkäaikaisen sairauden, vian tai vamman takia?). In 
addition, with a question (BQ3) the respondent was asked to indicate if a doctor 
had identified one or more diseases in him/her and to describe them (in a form 
adapted from Koskinen et al.58).
The expression statements ES12-ES15 and ES19-20 are shown in Table 1 and 
the details of background questions BQ1 and BQ5 in Table 2. We have gathered 
questionnaire answers in Finnish language but we now report our results in 
English. Since the semantic meanings in the translated English texts typically 
cannot fully match with the original Finnish meanings due to linguistic and cultural 
differences we provide in this article text also the original Finnish texts used in 
the questionnaire. 
Table 1. Expression statements ES12–ES15 and ES19–20 that were rated by the person in 
respect to the impression about the ‘need for help’.
Compact 
notation
Expression statement Range of values for 
the person’s answer 
(indicating the  
‘need for help’ rating)
ES12 ‘I must be inside a house without getting out.’ 
(Joudun olemaan talon sisällä ilman ulospääsyä.)
0–10
ES13 ‘I must be without a human companion.’  
(Joudun olemaan ilman ihmisseuraa.)
0–10
ES14 ‘I do not cope in everyday life independently without 
getting help from other persons.’  
(En pärjää arkielämässä itsenäisesti ilman avun 
saamista muilta henkilöiltä.)
0–10
ES15 ‘I do not cope at home independently without getting 
help from persons who originate outside of my home.’ 
(En pärjää kotona itsenäisesti ilman avun saamista 
kotini ulkopuolisilta henkilöiltä.)
0–10
ES19 ‘I have a bad health condition.’ (Minulla on huono olo.) 0–10
ES20 ‘I have an ordinary health condition.’  
(Minulla on tavallinen olo.)
0–10
58 Koskinen et al., 2012.
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Table 2. Details about background questions BQ1 and BQ5.
Compact 
notation
Question about the person’s 
background information






‘What kind of health condition you 
have currently according to your 
opinion?’ (de Bruin et al., 1996; 
Koskinen et al., 2012)  
(Minkälainen terveydentilasi on 
mielestäsi nykyisin?)
A 9-point Likert scale supplied with the 
following partial labeling: ‘9 Good’,  
‘8 –’, ‘7 Rather good’, ‘6 –’, ‘5 Medium’, 
‘4 –’, ‘3 Rather bad’, ‘2 –’, ‘1 Bad’. 
(9 Hyvä, 8 –, 7 Melko hyvä, 6 –, 5 




‘How would you rate your quality of 
life? Give your estimate based on the 
latest two weeks.’ (Nosikov & Gudex, 
2003; Aalto et al., 2013)  
(Minkälaiseksi arvioit elämänlaatusi? 
Anna arviosi viimeisimpien kahden 
viikon ajalta.)
A 9-point Likert scale supplied with the 
following partial labeling: ‘9 Very good’, 
‘8 –’, ‘7 Good’, ‘6 –’, ‘5 Neither good nor 
bad’, ‘4 –’, ‘3 Bad’, ‘2 –’, ‘1 Very bad’.  
(9 Erittäin hyväksi, 8 –, 7 Hyväksi, 6 
–, 5 Ei hyväksi eikä huonoksi, 4 –, 3 
Huonoksi, 2 –, 1 Erittäin huonoksi.)
When accessing the online questionnaire, the person was informed that only 
persons who are at least 16 years old are allowed to participate. Furthermore, to 
address the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union a privacy 
notice about the research was shown to the person and he/she was asked to give 
approval for handling his/her data.
Before our online questionnaire started to gather actual interpretations from 
the human evaluator a guidance and training section was provided to him/her. In 
brief, the person was advised to interpret how much each expression tells about 
the need for help, and to give his/her interpretation about the expression on a 
numeric scale 0-10 so that 0 indicates the smallest possible need for help and 10 
indicates the greatest possible need for help. 
Then a small training phase allowed the person to get accustomed to giving 
the ‘need for help’ ratings by rating three expression statements: ‘I have a good 
health condition.’ (Minulla on hyvä olo.), ‘I have a bad health condition.’ (Minulla 
on huono olo.), and ‘I have an ordinary health condition.’ (Minulla on tavallinen 
olo.). The answers of this training phase were excluded from the following analysis. 
After that, as a clarification, the person was asked to not interpret how much 
the expression tells about just his/her own situation but instead to interpret 
what kind of impression this expression induces in him/her, thus giving his/
her interpretation about the expression’s meaning in respect to the mentioned 
property. 
Then the actual interpretation tasks finally began and the expression statements 
ES12-ES15 and ES19-20 (see Table 1) were shown, one at a time, in a speech bubble 
above a simple briefly animating face figure that remained the same for all the 
expression statements (see Figure 1). The person gave his/her rating about the 
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‘need for help’ for each shown expression statement by pressing one of the eleven 
alternative number buttons depicted by the values 0-10. After the interpretation 
tasks, the person was asked to answer to the background questions BQ1-BQ5 
and BQ8-BQ9.
In the analysis, we use traditional statistical tests. First, we compute Kendall 
rank-correlation measures and cosine similarity measures for each comparable 
pair of parameter values of the ‘need for help’ ratings of expression statements 
and the answers to the background questions. Then we compute Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (i.e., Mann–Whitney U test) and tests of one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) between two groups to identify statistically significant rating differences 
for each expression statement in respect to groupings based on the answer values 
of each background question.
After that, we carry out machine learning experiments with a basic 
implementation of a convolutional neural network algorithm that we run in 
a TensorFlow programming environment (adapted from TensorFlow image 
classification tutorial59). By contrasting the overall findings, we make conclusions 
about the applicability of the machine learning approach in this knowledge context.
Figure 1. In the online questionnaire, the person is asked to interpret the shown expression 
statement in respect to the impression about the ‘need for help’. The original Finnish 
texts were: Ohje: Anna tulkintasi painamalla jotakin numeropainikkeista 0–10. / Minulla 
on tavallinen olo. / avun tarve / pienin / suurin.
59 TensorFlow image classification tutorial, 2020.
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10.4 Results
We received questionnaire responses from 673 persons of which 123 (18%) were 
men and 550 women (BQ8). They represented ages from 16 to 89 years (BQ9; 
M=46,93, Mdn=51, SD=19,57). There were 454 (67%) persons who answered 
having a permanent or long-lasting health problem that reduces ability (BQ2) and 
219 persons who did not. There were 309 (46%) persons who answered having 
a continuous or repeated need for a doctor’s care due to a long-lasting health 
problem (BQ4) and 364 persons who did not.
The respondents (n=673) reported in the following way to represent seven 
disease categories (BQ3, the number of unique persons who selected a category): 
lung diseases: 126; heart and circulatory diseases: 177; joint and back diseases: 
301; injuries:103; mental health problems: 188; vision and hearing deficits: 191; 
other diseases: 345. When considering all the respondents, the mean value was 
approximately the same for the answers about the estimated health condition 
(BQ1; M=6,53, Mdn=7, SD=1,97) and the quality of life (BQ5; M=6,53, Mdn=7, 
SD=1,77).
Table 3 shows Kendall rank-correlation measures and cosine similarity 
measures for each comparable pair of parameter values of the ‘need for help’ 
ratings of expression statements ES12-ES15 and ES19-ES20 and the answers of the 
background questions BQ1 and BQ5 (n=673). Motivated by a recommendation of 
Akoglu60 we considered a Kendall rank-correlation measure greater than or equal 
to 0,70 to indicate a significant correlation and the statistical significance levels 
were defined as p<0,05, p<0,01 and p<0,001. Thus it appears that a significant 
correlation was found between only the expression statements ES14 and ES15 





Table 3. Kendall rank-correlation measures (on the upper-right region of the table) and 
cosine similarity measures (on the lower-left region of the table) for each comparable 
pair of parameter values of the ‘need for help’ ratings of expression statements ES12-
ES15 and ES19-ES20 and the answers of the background questions BQ1 and BQ5 (n=673). 
Before computing cosine similarity measures the answer values of each parameter were 
normalized by the formula (x - min(x))/(max(x)-min(x)) and then these new values were 
shifted so that the mean value was positioned to the zero by the formula (x - mean(x)). 
The statistical significance levels were defined as p<0,05, p<0,01 and p<0,001, denoted 
by symbols *, ** and ***, respectively.
ES12 ES13 ES14 ES15 ES19 ES20 BQ1 BQ5
ES12 0,65*** 0,57*** 0,54*** 0,43*** −0,09** 0,01 0,01
ES13 0,77 0,51*** 0,49*** 0,47*** −0,02 0,00 0,01
ES14 0,69 0,62 0,86*** 0,42*** −0,16*** 0,02 0,04
ES15 0,67 0,60 0,95 0,40*** −0,18*** 0,04 0,05
ES19 0,55 0,58 0,55 0,52 0,03 −0,06 −0,05
ES20 −0,24 −0,17 −0,36 −0,37 −0,15 −0,01 −0,05
BQ1 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,04 −0,08 0,03 0,63***
BQ5 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,05 −0,05 −0,01 0,75
Table 4 shows the ‘need for help’ ratings of each expression statement ES12-ES15 
and ES19-ES20 that are evaluated in respect to groupings based on the answer 
values of the background questions BQ1 and BQ5, for two groups, the number 
of persons denoted by n1 and n2 (n=673). We created groupings of two groups so 
that ‘group 1’ contained those respondents who gave an answer value that was 
lower than the mean value of all the answers to the background question, and 
‘group 2’ contained all the other respondents.
We computed for each group the mean of the ratings given by the respondents 
belonging to this group (denoted by M1 and M2). We computed Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (i.e., Mann–Whitney U test) between two groups to identify statistically 
significant rating differences but in this observation we did not find any statistically 
significant differences at significance levels p<0,05, p<0,01, and p<0,001. 
Supplementing tests of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) supported these 
findings.
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Table 4. The ‘need for help’ ratings of each expression statement ES12–ES15 and ES19–
ES20 are evaluated in respect to groupings based on the answer values of the background 
questions BQ1 and BQ5, for two groups, the number of persons denoted by n₁ and n₂ 
(n=673). We computed for each group the mean of the ratings given by the respondents 
belonging to this group (denoted by M₁ and M₂). We computed Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
(i.e., Mann–Whitney U test) between two groups to identify statistically significant rating 
differences but in this observation we did not find any statistically significant differences 
at significance levels p<0,05, p<0,01 and p<0,001. M=mean, Mdn=median, SD=standard 
deviation. 
Grouping based 
on the answer 
value (x) of the 
background 
question (BQ)
ES12 ES13 ES14 ES15 ES19 ES20














































































We carried out machine learning experiments with a basic implementation of a 
convolutional neural network algorithm that we run in a TensorFlow programming 
environment (adapted from TensorFlow image classification tutorial61).
Our approach consisted of creating an image classifier using a keras.Sequential 
model with layers.Conv2D layers and then providing input data to the model in 
the form of images. We used a model consisting of three convolution blocks with 
a max pool layer in each of them and having on the top a fully connected layer 
that is activated by a relu activation function. We compiled our model with the 
optimizers.Adam optimizer and the losses.SparseCategoricalCrossentropy loss 
function. Table 5 describes layers of the convolutional neural network model used 
in the machine learning experiments.
Since the convolutional neural network model required labeled input data 
in the form of images, we transformed with an R language script our originally 
character-encoded questionnaire data into a set of grayscale raster images before 
feeding it to the model.
61 TensorFlow image classification tutorial, 2020.
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First, the original rating answer values in the range 0-10 were transformed 
linearly into the range 0,0-1,0. Each entity of six transformed rating answers (in 
the range 0,0-1,0) of expression statements ES12-ES15 and ES19-ES20 given by 
a certain person were transformed into an individual raster image so that each 
single rating answer value was represented by a region of 25 pixels (width 5 
pixels and height 5 pixels) having a brightness value in the range 0-255 directly 
proportional to the greatness of the transformed answer value in the range 0,0-
1,0. All the six separate 25-pixel-sized regions were then joined as a 3×2 matrix 
to form a combined grayscale raster image (width 15 pixels and height 10 pixels).
Table 5. Layers of the convolutional neural network model used in the machine learning 
experiments.
Model: ‘sequential’
Parameters: total 32162; trainable: 32162; non-trainable: 0
Layer (type) Output shape Number of parameters
rescaling_1 (Rescaling) (None, 10, 15, 3) 0
conv2d (Conv2D) (None, 10, 15, 16) 448
max_pooling2d (MaxPooling2D) (None, 5, 7, 16) 0
conv2d_1 (Conv2D) (None, 5, 7, 32) 4640
max_pooling2d_1 (MaxPooling2D) (None, 2, 3, 32) 0
conv2d_2 (Conv2D) (None, 2, 3, 64) 18496
max_pooling2d_2 (MaxPooling2D) (None, 1, 1, 64) 0
flatten (Flatten) (None, 64) 0
dense (Dense) (None, 128) 8320
dense_1 (Dense) (None, 2) 258
We performed machine learning experiments with labeled images so that their 
labeling matched the groupings that we have just previously analyzed with 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (i.e., Mann–Whitney U test) and tests of one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) between two groups to identify statistically significant rating 
differences (see Table 4). We allocated for the training and validation 80 percent 
and 20 percent of the data, respectively. 
Table 6 shows our results about training and validation of the convolutional 
neural network model based on the labeling in respect to groupings based on 
the answer values of the background questions BQ1 and BQ5, for two groups 
(n=673). For each grouping we report training and validation metrics gained 
when reaching the lowest value for the validation loss (ensured by further 50 
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evaluation steps with a patience procedure), averaged from 100 separate training 
and validation sequences.
Table 6. Results about training and validation of the convolutional neural network model 
based on the labeling in respect to groupings based on the answer values of the background 
questions BQ1 and BQ5, for two groups (n=673). M=mean, Mdn=median, SD=standard 
deviation.
Training and validation metrics gained when reaching the 
lowest value for the validation loss
Grouping based on the answer 
















































Figure 2 illustrates the loss and accuracy for training and validation of the 
convolutional neural network model for one sequence based on the labeling in 
respect to the grouping of two groups based on the answer values of the background 
question BQ1 (n=673), as indicated in Table 6. In this illustrated single sequence 
the lowest value for the validation loss was reached at the epoch step 14 and at 
that step the following metrics were gained: training loss 0,63, training accuracy 
0,67, validation loss 0,66 and validation accuracy 0,65.
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Figure 2. Loss and accuracy for training and validation of the convolutional neural network 
model for one sequence based on the labeling in respect to the grouping of two groups 
based on the answer values of the background question BQ1 (n=673).
10.5 Discussion and Future Work
Our current research has aimed to explore and analyze how different people rate 
the ‘need for help’ for a set of health-related expression statements and how this 
rating depends on the background information about the person (such as his/
her evaluation of the health and wellbeing). Furthermore, we have carried out 
machine learning experiments to find out what kind of results can be gained 
when training a convolutional neural network model based on the ‘need for help’ 
ratings to classify persons into groups relying on the background information.
With Kendall rank-correlation measures we found a significant correlation 
between only the expression statements ES14 and ES15 (0,86) which gained also 
the highest cosine similarity value (0,95). With Wilcoxon rank-sum test (i.e., 
Mann–Whitney U test) and tests of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) we did 
not find statistically significant rating differences between two groups in respect 
to the answer values of the background questions BQ1 and BQ5, for two groups. 
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Anyway, we still noted an emerging polarization of the ratings. Among the six 
expression statements only ES19 gained higher mean ratings from the respondents 
who indicated a lower estimated health condition (BQ1) or a lower quality of 
life (BQ5) than from the respondents who indicated a higher estimated health 
condition or a higher quality of life, respectively. The other expression statements 
ES12-ES15 and ES20 gained lower mean ratings from the respondents who 
indicated a lower estimated health condition (BQ1) or a lower quality of life (BQ5) 
than from the respondents who indicated a higher estimated health condition or 
a higher quality of life, respectively.
Based on our gathered rating values we can conclude that in accordance with 
the previous research62 63 64 65 66 we have identified complex variations in personal 
interpretations about health-related expression statements depending on the 
background information about the person. However, this complex variation is 
not random but instead with suitable statistical and machine learning methods 
we show that it is possible to categorize and distinguish respondent groups based 
on the patterns of their answer distributions. Although the values of validation 
accuracy remain relatively low in our initial machine learning experiments they 
are still above the values of pure chance and offer a way to complement other 
analysis methods concerning the modeling of knowledge processes of healthcare. 
Anyway, creating highly accurate machine learning models and results requires 
typically having large data sets for the training and validation of the models. 
Since our current data set contains a relatively moderate number of questionnaire 
answers (n=673), our current experiments focus on evaluating the general 
applicability of machine learning approach in this knowledge context. When our 
data set progressively grows, we expect to shift emphasis more to developing 
fine-tuned machine learning models with an increased validation accuracy. In 
our current observation, a relatively narrow distribution of answer values caused 
groupings of unequal size that can introduce a bias to training and validation 
results. In any case, at the same time the current data set enabled to identify some 
computational borderlines for the applicability of machine learning in this context. 
It is worth noting that although Kendall rank-correlation measures and cosine 
similarity measures were relatively low and the groupings based on the answer 
values of the background questions BQ1 and BQ5 did not show statistically 
62 Bradley & Lang, 1999.
63 Mauss & Robinson, 2009.
64 Joffer et al., 2016.
65 Borraccino et al., 2019.
66 Knäuper et al., 2016.
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significant rating differences with Wilcoxon rank-sum test (i.e., Mann–Whitney 
U test) and tests of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), the machine learning 
experiments still managed to categorize and distinguish respondent groups based 
on the patterns of their answer distributions. Relying on the interpretation 
measurement data gathered in our DIHEML research project we aim to cover 
a broader set of expression statements, answers to background questions, 
and extended analysis results in future publications. In addition, while taking 
appropriate and sufficient anonymization actions in respect to addressing the 
General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union in handling the 
research data, DIHEML research project also aims to produce and publish results, 
models, algorithms, and data openly as much as possible to be used by anyone 
for non-commercial purposes.
There remains a lot of alternative approaches to be explored in future research 
concerning the structure and details of affective dimensions concerning health-
related knowledge and their relationship to decision making. We decided to 
gather now ratings in respect to the ‘need for help’ since this semantic dimension 
emerged strongly in the context of health-related online discussions in our previous 
analysis67. However, the selection of the ‘need for help’ dimension can be motivated 
also by its intuitive relatedness to the dominance dimension68 that reflects the 
degree of ability to cope and to be in control of one’s own life situations, and also to 
the approach-avoidance dimension69 that reflects the desire to reach some relieving 
assistance or to be reached by this assistance. In addition, Berna et al.70 have 
found links between self-identified most significant mental imagery describing the 
patient’s pain and associated triggers, affects, meanings, and avoidance patterns.
When developing methods to support care based on the person’s interpretations 
about expressions and their relationship to experiences in various situations it is 
also important to address and counteract various sources of measurement biases. 
For example, the findings of the previous research71 72 73 indicate that interpretations 
and explanations gained about more complex health-related expressions concerning 
causes and likelihoods of diseases can have inherently different distributional 
properties, reliability, and validity than those gained about less complex health-
67 Lahti et al., 2018.
68 Bradley & Lang, 1999.
69 Mauss & Robinson, 2009.
70 Berna et al., 2011.
71 Carroll, 1978.
72 Sherman et al., 1985.
73 Lombrozo, 2007.
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related expressions. Furthermore, the comparability of interpretations gathered 
from persons representing different ages can be influenced by various age-induced 
changes in cognitive and communicative functioning74, possibly related to the 
challenges of understanding and remembering correctly. On the other hand, 
to realistically capture dependencies between interpretations and background 
information about the person, it is important to explore and analyze interpretations 
gained from multiple sufficiently diverse populations and life conditions. Our 
current research has addressed this by gathering answers from respondents 
representing a great diversity of current personal health conditions, abilities, and 
attitudes, belonging to various Finnish patient and disabled people’s organizations, 
other health and wellness organizations, and educational institutions as well as 
organizations of healthcare professionals.
Our results can be used for developing adaptive computational methods that 
can identify the patient’s needs from any kind of free text passages, such as from 
healthcare chatbots, patient diaries, online guidance and screening for care, or their 
derivatives, for example, emergency phone calls that are immediately annotated 
with a speech recognition (resembling the proposals of Zhao et al.75, Gehrmann 
et al.76, Rojas-Barahona et al.77, and Shickel et al.78). Our current methodology 
relying on interpretations of imagined situations can be extended to be applied 
also in real-life situations thus enabling for example to automatically screen and 
monitor the person’s ordinary knowledge processes (such as speech and writing) 
so that assistance can be alerted to him/her in the case that certain risk-related 
patterns are detected. 
According to two reviews, there is still a lack of systematic development 
for reliable evaluation metrics for healthcare chatbots79 and their algorithms 
have challenges in semantic understanding80. Therefore future work should 
emphasize the creation of comprehensive open-access resources of data, models, 
and algorithms about knowledge processes of healthcare that can be used in 
standardized ways and are well-understandable for everyone. Our current research 
aims to advance the development of human-understandable machine learning 
methodologies by a scalable modular approach that relies on identifying and 
74 Knäuper et al., 2016.
75 Zhao et al., 2017.
76 Gehrmann et al., 2018.
77 Rojas-Barahona et al., 2018.
78 Shickel et al., 2019.
79 Abd-Alrazaq et al., 2020.
80 Laranjo et al., 2018.
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addressing the personal needs of the patient and highlights the importance to 
ensure his/her appropriate involvement in all the phases of decision making to 
support his/her best care.
Besides contributing to the development of the methods that support the 
patient’s care, our research approach and results offer insight that can be used 
also to enhance understanding of how to ensure the protection of data privacy, in 
accordance with the previous research81 82. Our results show that with relatively 
basic statistical and machine learning methods it is possible to identify sensitive 
characteristics of a person indirectly from even a relatively small data set and 
a low number of personal answers that may initially seem to be non-sensitive. 
Furthermore, it is possible to make reasoning and predictions based on these 
identified characteristics thus making a person’s privacy even more vulnerable. 
Therefore in the development of health analytics, it is important to address such 
technical solutions that can keep the person appropriately informed about the 
amount and depth of details that the available analysis can possibly directly or 
indirectly identify, reason, and predict about him/her. The person should be 
provided with the possibility to make a well-informed decision about the amount 
and depth of the analysis that he/she is participating in. While quickly evolving 
methodologies of machine learning can offer desired and valuable enhancement 
for health analytics, it is important to implement them so that the person and 
his/her needs and rights become appropriately and ethically respected.
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